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ABSTRACT
In essence, the transparency and data protection regimes draw from different 
grounds. The aim of the research was to first identify and analyze the different 
requirements of the transparency and data protection regimes and thereafter seek 
the solution for balancing the said requirements. The rules examined in this research 
regulate the disclosure of information and processing of personal data by the EU 
institutions. However, the solution for the tension is sought from the European 
law in a wider perspective.
The analysis of the colliding rules draws from normative legal analysis. Critical 
legal positivism considers the rules only examples of issues pertaining to the surface 
level of law and this research draws essentially from the separation of rules and 
principles based on the doctrines elaborated by such scholars as Ronald Dworkin 
and Robert Alexy.
The requirements drawing from the data protection legislation and the 
transparency legislation are contradictory to a certain extent and the tension on 
the level of rules is apparent. The most apparent contradiction relates to the purpose 
limitation principle which closely relates to the further processing of personal data 
and the requirements to reason the disclosure of personal data. Simultaneously, 
the public access regime builds on a basis where applications for the requests of 
information do not need to be reasoned.
However, the collision of rules does not necessarily reflect a collision of the 
underlying principles and the research will seek the balance between the examined 
rules by reconciling the underlying principles of the data protection and public 
access to documents regimes.
After the essence of the examined rights has been identified, it will become 
clear that the collision does not exist on the level of principles. Besides privacy 
and self-determination, the requirement to have legal basis is considered to form 
the hard core of protection of personal data. This element also separates it from 
privacy. It follows that the right to protection of personal data can be reconciled 
with the right to public access to documents while the essence of both rights are 
preserved. A suggestion how to reconcile the examined rights will be given and 
the concluding analysis will also provide tools for balancing the said rights in the 
current legal framework by interpretation.
There has been earlier study in this field of law. However, this study dates from 
2007 and significant changes have taken place after that. A recast process on the 
Regulation 1049/2001 on public access to documents has been launched and a 
vast EU data protection reform was finished in the spring 2016. Also, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union has delivered significant decisions concerning 
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the relationship between protection of personal data and transparency after 2007. 
Besides providing a new angle for seeking the solution by balancing the underlying 
principles, this research also provides first analysis of the relationship between 
protection of personal data and transparency in the current legal framework.
Keywords
data protection, privacy, personal data, transparency, purpose limitation, further 
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I believe that by May 2018 there were not too many who could claim they had never 
heard the letter combination GDPR – the General Data Protection Regulation. When 
I started with this project several years ago, I was told that data protection was not 
a good topic for a PhD, because it is such a niche sector of law. I did not agree. It 
was clear even back then that not too many fields of law cover as comprehensively 
nearly every sector of life and society. I also had a very strong personal interest in 
the topic and felt quite privileged when I later entered into the GDPR negotiations. 
Data protection has become a very hot topic with the vast reform process that 
has taken place in the EU. This development was bolstered by a series of data 
protection scandals including Uber, Cambridge Analytica, Snowden, the Schrems 
case, and Wikileaks’ leaks to name just a few. When triggered by individual persons, 
like Snowden, Assange or Schrems, certain individual data protection rights have 
been at the core of the discussion. In the case of Snowden and Assange, the issues 
addressed equally included freedom of information, or more precisely disclosure 
of information; information, which also contained personal data.1
This thesis will take a specific interest in the relationship between the protection of 
personal data and a transparent society, with a particular emphasis on the democratic 
decision-making process. Despite the current data protection reforms, the tension 
between data protection and public access to documents has not entirely vanished 
from the European legal scene. The General Data Protection Regulation clearly 
leaves the space for the Member States to reconcile public access to documents 
with the protection of personal data, but the General Data Protection Regulation 
itself does not – nor should it – provide a direct answer to the question of how to 
reconcile these fundamental rights. At the same time, the reform process for the 
Data Protection Regulation for the EU institutions themselves, now referred to as 
the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation2, provided an excellent opportunity 
to seek a balance between the said fundamental rights at the Union level. Quite 
delightfully, this opportunity was not wasted.
The amendments adopted in the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation 
were needed. Statistics on public access to EU institutions’ documents dating from 
1 Some of these breaking news events had a strong influence on European Data Protection Reform. See for 
example Press release, Vivane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission, EU Commissioner for 
Justice, Today’s Justice Council – A council of Progress, Luxembourg, 6 June 2014.
2 The Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and 
Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39–98).
2  
the time before the adoption of the said Regulation reveal a concerning tendency. 
While the general trend shows that public access to documents has steadily increased, 
the offline trend of the protection of personal data becoming the most applied 
exception is concerning. The reports of the Commission and the Council on public 
access to documents reveal clearly this development.3 This was also the very reason 
for the decrease in the percentage of the documents released by the Commission in 
the year 2015.4 While in 2011 only 8,9% of the refusals were based on a personal 
data exemption, in 2015 the corresponding figure was 29%.5 The Council’s report 
on access to documents reveals a similar trend. According to Council statistics, in 
2015 the refusal to give full access to documents was justified with the protection of 
personal data in 29% of cases.6 This was the most widely applied single exemption 
for denial of disclosure.
These figures capture in a clear and simple manner why it is essential to work 
further to find a stable balance between the two fundamental rights. 
3 Unfortunately, the European Parliament does not provide clear figures on the exemptions which have been 
applied in its report. For the report of the European Parliament, see Report on public access to documents (Rule 
116(7)) for the years 2014–2015 (2015/2287(INI)), available on the internet <http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2016-0141+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> T. 
Ojanen, “Privacy Is More Than Just a Seven-Letter Word: The Court of Justice of the European Union Sets 
Constitutional Limits on Mass Surveillance: Court of Justice of the European Union, Decision of 8 April 2014 
in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, Participation and 
Democracy” in European Law and Polity 3 (2014), 528–541, For an analysis, see M.-P.Granger & K.Irion, 
“The Court of Justice and the Data Retention Directive in Digital Rights Ireland: Telling Off the EU Legislator 
and Teaching a Lesson in Privacy an Data Protection” in European Law Review 39 (2014), 835–850. See 
also the Report from the Commission on the application in 2015 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2991 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents COM/2016/0533 final, available 
on the internet < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:533:FIN> [last visited 
23.10.2016]. 
4 See the Report from the Commission on the application in 2015 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents COM/2016/0533 
final, available on the internet < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:533:FIN> 
[last visited 23.10.2016]. Similarly, Report from the Commission on the application in 2016 of Regulation 
(EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 
COM/2017/738 final, available on the internet < 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:05a0236b-dbf9-11e7-a506-01a> [last visited 29.12.2018] 
and Report from the Commission on the application in 2017 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents COM/2018/663 final, available 
on the internet < 
 http://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com_2018_663_f1_report_from_commission_en_v3_
p1_988979.pdf > [last visited 29.12.2018]. By 2018 the percentage had increased to 31,3%.
5 Ibid.
6 Public Access to Council documents: 2015 report, available on the internet  < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2016/06/24-council-access-documents/> [last visited 23.10.2016]. See also Fifteenth 
annual report of the Council on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents, 7903/17, Brussels 12 May 2017. In 2016 there was a decrease in the percentage, 
21,2% of the partial refusals were reasoned with the said exemption at the initial stage, however, on the 
confirmatory stage the refusal was increased to 45,5%. In 2017 the corresponding figures were 16,8% and 
3,9% and the most widely applied exception was the protection of institution’s decision-making process, 
see Sixteenth annual report of the Council on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May regarding public access to European Parliament, Council 
and Commission documents, 8689/18, Brussels 14 May 2018.    
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1. SUBJECT MATTER AND AIM 
This research will examine the interplay between two fundamental rights in the 
European legal framework and the aim is to reconcile the protection of personal 
data with the right of public access to documents.
In essence, there is a tension between the requirements arising from the 
transparency and data protection regimes. The precise legal nature of these two 
rules, rights or principles is also unclear. Protection of personal data has only very 
recently been recognized as an independent fundamental right, instead of a sub-
element of another fundamental right; namely, the right to privacy and integrity. 
Similarly, transparency – and more precisely public access to documents – is a 
newcomer in the field of fundamental rights. The extent to which these two rights 
should be pursued is also controversial.
The tension between these rights takes place in the form of colliding rules. The 
problem would be resolved if one of these principles could be seen as superior 
to the other one. Thus, it is necessary first address the question of whether data 
protection or transparency can be considered superior to the other or whether they 
both are considered fundamental rights in the sense of EU law. Only after this initial 
question is addressed can some more detailed and practical situations where the 
tension between the two rights is apparent be examined.
When the reconciliation exercise is carried out, it is essential to identify the hard 
core of the examined rights.7 Reconciliation is possible only when the essence, or 
hard core, of the rights remains untouched. When the inviolable core of these rights 
has been identified, an attempt will be made to balance the underlying principles 
in order to reconcile the requirements of data protection legislation with the rights 
provided by the transparency legislation.
1.1 LEGAL AND SOCIETAL CONTEXT OF THE EXAMINED RIGHTS
To understand the significance of the tension between these two rights, they must 
first and foremost be placed in their legal and societal context.8 Transparency and 
the right to public access to documents must be considered in a wider perspective 
7 See for example T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European 
Union clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 
2 (2016); G. Van Der Schyff, Cutting to the Core of the Conflicting Rights: The question of inalienable Cores 
in Comparative Perspective, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 
131–147.
8 On contextual interpretation of the essence of the fundamental rights, see for example T. Ojanen, “Making 
the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union clarifies the structure of 
fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2016), 326.
4  
as a part of democratic society and, in particular, the democratic decision-making 
process.9 As the core of the democracy is the idea of a nation as the sovereign 
of political power, it is easy to draw the connection between transparency and 
democracy. How could a nation form a position on anything if its people are not 
provided with the necessary information?10 The connection between transparency 
and democracy is also clearly underlined in the second recital of the Transparency 
Regulation11 which underlines that openness enables citizens to participate more 
closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys 
greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizens in 
a democratic system. It goes even further, stating that openness contributes to 
strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights as laid 
down in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.
Furthermore, an individual’s right to privacy and to the protection of personal 
data must be examined as a part of democratic society and the democratic decision-
making process.12 Data protection will also be assessed in the wider context and in 
relation to the protection of privacy and integrity. For a long time, the core aim of 
the protection of personal data was seen as identical to the protection of privacy and 
integrity. This was clearly illustrated in, for instance, Article 1 of the Data Protection 
Regulation13 according to which “Community institutions or bodies shall protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right 
to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data […]”. In this context, data 
protection could have been seen as a part of protection of privacy and integrity. It 
has also been suggested that privacy actually forms a part of data protection. It is 
therefore essential to examine the areas where these two rights overlap. Yet, there 
9 The alliance between transparency and democracy has been recognized already in the early case-law. For 
example, in the case Council of the European Union v Hautala (353/99P), the Advocate General concluded 
that access to documents is a fundamental right. The ECJ did not confirm this approach, instead it underlined 
the importance of the public’s right of access to documents held by public authorities and its connection with 
the democratic nature of the institutions. Similarly, in the so called Turco case (Case C-39/05 P and C-52/05 
P, Kingdom of Sweden and Maurizio Turco v Council), Advocate General Maduro stated that Regulation 
1049/2001 seeks to govern the exercise of a right which has acquired the status of fundamental right. ECJ 
maintained its neutral approach recalling the connection between public access to institutions’ documents 
and the democratic nature of those institutions.
10 T. Pöysti, Tehokkuus, informaatio ja eurooppalainen oikeusalue, (Helsinki, 1999) 481.
11 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48).
12 Case T-121/05, Borax Europe v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:64; Case T-115/13, Dennekamp v Parliament, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:497.
13 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1–22). The Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the 
free movement of such data, repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 
295, 21.11.2018, p. 39–98) does not contain similar wording.
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is still room for the argument that protection of privacy includes the protection of 
personal data where it follows that the latter should be considered a sub-element 
to the protection of privacy. Therefore this aspect must be thoroughly examined.
1.2 COLLIDING RULES
Besides the theoretical and contextual setting introduced earlier, the tension between 
transparency and data protection culminates in a more detailed and concrete 
manner on the level of colliding rules, which are examples of issues pertaining to 
the surface level of law.14 Next, some examples will be introduced where the tension 
is apparent and will be studied further in this thesis.
The first example is a situation where a person is requesting access to a document 
containing the applicant’s own personal data. The Transparency Regulation does 
not address this situation any differently from other situations where the requested 
document contains personal data. However, based on the Data Protection Regulation, 
one has privileged access to his or her own personal data. Even if the applicant 
would not be entitled to have access to the document based on the Transparency 
Regulation, (s)he might have that right under the Data Protection Regulation. 
Applying the Data Protection Regulation instead of Transparency Regulation would 
lead to a more transparent approach in this case. The questions of how to deal with 
these situations, and what role the principle of good administration should have, 
arise in this context. 
The second practical example relates to the applicant’s onus to state reasons for 
the application. The Transparency Regulation aims to provide the widest possible 
access to the documents and as such, the applicant is not required to justify his or 
her application. Therefore, from the outset, the reasons for the request cannot have 
any relevance as such. Contrary to this approach, if the request for the information 
is based on the Data Protection Regulation, the applicant has to provide reasons 
for the request. The Court of Justice has taken a stand on this very precise question 
by stating that full application of both the Transparency Regulation and the Data 
Protection Regulation should be ensured, and the requirements set by the Data 
Protection Regulation cannot be set aside.15 It follows that the applicant must provide 
some level of reasoning for the application when access to personal data is requested. 
14 For levels of law, see Kaarlo Tuori, for example K.Tuori, “Law, Power and Critique”, in Tuori et al. (ed.), Law 
and Power, Critical and Socio-Legal Essays, (Deborah Charles Publications, 1997) and K. Tuori, Critical Legal 
Positivism, (Hants, 2002).
15 See Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 56; Case T-115/13, Dennekamp v Parliament, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:497. For a case comment, see for example O. Lynskey, “Data protection and freedom of 
information; reconciling the irreconcilable?”, in Cambridge Law Journal 70 (2011), 37–39.  
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The entry into force of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation clarifies this 
situation to a certain extent.
The third example is a recurring situation which relates to further transmission 
of personal data and the purpose limitation principle. An often repeated argument is 
that the access to a document cannot be granted as the document contains personal 
data and releasing it would violate those provisions of the Data Protection Regulation 
concerning the further transmission of personal data and the purpose limitation 
principle.16 If this argument was accepted as such, it would lead to a situation where 
all requests for access to documents containing personal data could be refused based 
on this argument alone. Regardless of the nature of the personal data, it would 
never be released based on the Transparency Regulation and only partial access 
could be granted to the documents containing personal data.
A fourth example concerns the data subject’s right to object the processing of 
data relating to him or her.17 At the outset, the data subject’s right to object the data 
processing reflects the value of self-determination and is justified in the data subject’s 
relationship with the controller. In this thesis, however, it must be examined in 
relation to someone’s right to information and as an element that restricts the said 
right. The scope of the right to object needs to be defined precisely and thereafter 
be placed in the context of the democratic decision-making process and the public’s 
right to information.
1.3 CONTRIBUTION TO THE CURRENT DISCUSSION
The subject matter of this thesis has not been thoroughly examined previously, 
even if there are some early studies in this field, such as the dissertation of Herke 
Kranenborg at the University of Leiden on the relationship between data protection 
and access to documents. Unfortunately, this study was published in Dutch and, as 
such, is not accessible to a wider European audience.18 Also, this dissertation was 
published in 2007, more than a decade ago. This was before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union delivered its landmark judgments, and before European 
data protection reform. That is to say some significant changes have taken place 
since its publication.
16 See for example Case T-529/09, In ‘t Veld v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2012:215, para 20; Case T36/04, API v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:258, paras 54, 94.
17 See for example Case T-412/05, M. v European Ombudsman, ECLI:EU:T:2008:397; Case C-553/07, College 
van burgemeester en vethounders van Rotterdam v E.E: Rijekeboer; ECLI:EU:C:2009:293, paras 4, 16, 48, 
52, 65.   
18 H. Kranenborg, Toegang tot documenten en bescherming van persoonsgegevens in de Europese Unie – 
Over de openbaarheid van persoonsgegevens (Kluwer, 2007).
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In Finland, the existing studies have primarily focused on the relationship 
between the rights of expression and privacy, or alternatively the focus has been 
in the national context.19 The questions posed by this thesis have not been addressed 
by the previous studies. Considering that Finland as an actor in the European Union 
sets much weight on transparency and actively attempts to guide the EU as a whole 
towards a more transparent society, this lacuna in the research is regrettable.
Two topical developments emphasize the significance of this research. First, 
the European Union is currently in a transitional period. Extensive reform of the 
European data protection regime has just been concluded at the Union level. The 
Member States very recently finalized the adoption of the necessary measures to 
meet the requirements set by the General Data Protection Regulation and so-called 
Law Enforcement Directive.20 And even more importantly, the interpretation of the 
new data protection instruments has not yet been settled. Furthermore, Convention 
108 has been renegotiated and as an aftermath to the GDPR negotiations, the 
European Commission published its proposal for the Regulation concerning the 
processing of personal data in the Union institutions.21 These negotiations were 
concluded on 23 May 2018.22 The negotiations on the Transparency Regulation in 
turn have not been closed. This is, however, a status quo.
Also, the recent events that have taken place in the UK relating to Brexit seem 
to set heavy demands for the EU to strengthen the transparency in its decision-
making structures, as lack of information turns easily into distrust. It is very tempting 
to draw the parallels between Brexit and the Danish rejection of the Maastricht 
19 For example, Päivi Korpisaari (ex. Tiilikka) has a vast list of publications focusing on this question. Korpisaari 
has also contributed to the discussion related to access to information in the European legal framework; for 
that, see P. Tiilikka, “Access to Information as a Human Right in the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights” in The Journal of Media Law 5(1) (2013). For Korpisaari see also Henkilötiedot ja paikkatiedot: Miten 
tietosuojalainsäädäntö vaikuttaa paikkatietojen julkaisemiseen ja luovuttamiseen, Ympäristöministeriö, 
21.2.2018. See also R. Neuvonen, Yksityisyyden suoja Suomessa, (Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 2014) 161–184; 
H.Kulla & M.Koillinen, Julkisuus ja henkilötietojen suoja viranomaistoiminnassa (Turun yliopisto, 2014) 
and T.Voutilainen, Oikeus tietoon – Informaatio-oikeuden perusteet (Edita, 2012). For Nordic approach, 
see also J.Reichel, “The Swedish right to freedom of speech, EU data protection law and the question of 
territoriality”, in A-S.Lind; J.Reichel & I.Österdahl (eds.), Transparency in the Future – Swedish Openness 
250 years (Visby, 2017), 201–224. For the relationship between freedom of expression and protection of 
personal data in the cloud environment, see MCEL Working Paper series, Freedom of expression and Artificial 
Intelligence: on personalisation, disinformation and (lack of) horizontal effect of the Charter by Maja Brkan 
(March 17, 2019). Available on the internet < https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354180 > [last visited 1.5.2019].
20 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 
119, 4.5.2016, p. 89–131).
21 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision 
No 1247/2002/EC, COM(2017) 8 final (10.1.2017).
22 See for example Press release (23.5.2018) by Council of the European Union New rules on data protection for 
EU institutions agreed available <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/05/23/
new-rules-on-data-protection-for-eu-institutions-agreed/> [last visited 21.7.2018]. The EU Institutions’ Data 
Protection Regulation has now entered into force.
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Treaty in 1992. The latter was followed by a flourishing discussion on public access 
to documents in the European Union.23 This discussion drew from the discourse 
relating to the democratic decision-making process in the European Union.24
2. LIMITATIONS
The tension between transparency and data protection will be examined in the 
European legal framework. These rights are examined as fundamental rights 
and the essence of the said rights is at the core of this study. This limitation 
is significant in particular regarding the protection of personal data. This 
limitation excludes the commercial dimension of data protection from the scope 
of this study. The European Commission has stated that some evaluation has 
assessed that “the value of European citizens’ personal data has the potential 
to grow to nearly € 1 trillion annually by 2020”.25 Thus the economic value 
of personal data is apparent.
Deriving partly from its economic value, the protection of personal data has 
several dimensions in the European legal framework. Data protection can be 
examined as one of the key elements of IT law, or consumer law26 or contractual 
law27 etc. The Data Protection Directive28 was the first instrument regulating data 
protection in the European Union. It is of particular importance to note that 
the legal base for this Directive was Article 95 EC, which lays down the grounds 
for measures which have as their object the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market.29 This aim was also clearly expressed in the Commission’s 
23 I. Harden, “The Revision of Regulation 1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents”, in European Public Law 
2 (2009), 239–256.
24 Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, June 2006.
25 Commission factsheet on The EU Data Protection Reform and Big Data, March 2016, available on the internet 
< http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/data-protection-big-data_factsheet_web_en.pdf> [last 
visited 9.10.2016].
26 The role of data subject as consumer is of particular interest in this respect. For an analysis of the emergence 
of consumer law and data protection law, see N.Helberger, F.Zuiderveen Borgesius and A. Reyna, “The Perfect 
Match? A closer look at the relationship between EU consumer law and data protection law” in Common 
Market Law Review 54 (2017), 1427–1466.
27 For example, the contracts between controller and processor have a high significance in cloud environment. 
See also for example M. Brkan, “Data protection and European private international law: observing a bull 
in a China shop” in International Data Privacy Law, 5 (2015).
28 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31–50).  
29 The first paragraph of Article 95 states that “by way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise 
provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out 
in article 14. The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 251 and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market. [… ]”
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explanatory memorandum on the Data Protection Directive, which underlined 
that the objective of the Directive is to allow personal data to flow freely from 
one Member State to another.30 To achieve this aim, a high level of protection of 
personal data had to be ensured as well as security of data protection. In other 
words, the protection of one’s privacy or personal data was not initially the goal 
itself. The actual aim was the free flow31 of personal data and the high level of 
protection of one’s personal data could be described rather as means to attain 
this goal. A similar approach can be identified when examining the OECD’s 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. 
Even if the need to protect privacy has been recognized in these guidelines, the 
actual interest seems to lie in the need to avoid the development of “unnecessary” 
hinderances to the free flow of data.32
An individual legal base for the protection of personal data was established 
only in the Treaty of Lisbon.33 Together with the Charter of Fundamental Rights34 
these evolutions in the European legal framework have created solid bases for data 
protection to be acknowledged as fundamental right and this is where the focus 
of this thesis is laid.
Another significant limitation is the exclusion of access to personal data for 
the purposes of national security. This issue is clearly related to data protection’s 
character as a fundamental right, not its economic value. However, this thesis does 
not seek the solution on how to balance one’s right to protection of personal data 
with the need to ensure national security. When assessing the requirements drawn 
from ensuring national security vis-à-vis data subject’s rights, the core question is 
how much a data subject’s rights may be restricted for reasons of national security 
and the balance must be found in a relationship between the state and data subject. 
30 Commission of the European Communities, Explanatory Memorandum com(92) 422 final.
31 See also for the case-law joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and 
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:294, paras 39–42; case C-101, Lindqvist, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, paras 79–81; Case 
C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, paras 51–53.
32 See the OECD original guidelines, OECD Council Recommendation concerning Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (23 September 1980), available on the internet 
< http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelines ontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofperson
aldata.htm> [last visited 23.10.2016], see also the revised Recommendation adopted by the OECD Council 
on 11 June 2013, “Privacy Guidelines”, available on the internet < ttp://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_
privacy_framework.pdf> [last visited 23.10.2016].
33 Article 16 TFEU stipulates that “1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
them. 2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying 
out activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free movement of such 
data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.” 
34 Article 8 for Charter of Fundamental Rights states that “1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal 
data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis 
of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the 
right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”
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The focus of this thesis is, however, balancing two fundamental rights. Finding a 
balanced approach to restrict one’s right to protection of personal data is only one 
side of the coin. The other side of the coin is to find a balanced approach to restrict 
one’s right of access to documents. While there are certainly still many relevant 
questions in the field of data protection and national security to be examined more 
profoundly, these highly relevant issues have already inspired quite a wide range 
of academic literature.35
The focus of the thesis is public access to documents containing personal data. 
Thereby the thesis does elaborate on how to disclose documents by anonymizing 
personal data. As anonymized personal data is no longer personal data, data 
protection legislation does not apply to such situations and information could be 
disclosed solely based on the Transparency Regulation.  
Regarding transparency, the focus of this thesis will be on the European access 
to documents legislation. This excludes some transparency initiatives launched by 
the European Commission from the scope of this study. For example, the “lobbying 
register”, or transparency register, if you wish.36 The same applies also to some 
other developments, such as broadcasting Council meetings. The significance of 
these steps in paving the way towards a more transparent European Union must 
however be acknowledged.
The wider European legal framework sets the environment for the assessment 
of the founding principles for the fundamental rights examined in this thesis. 
When moving from the more general level into a more detailed assessment of the 
tension between the rules, the focus will be on the provisions of the EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation and the Transparency Regulation; in other words, on 
the instruments applied by the EU institutions. Even if the rules of only these 
instruments will be examined, the assessment cannot be fully separated from the 
General Data Protection Regulation and the relevant national legislation regarding 
data protection and public access to documents. The examined rules reflect the 
more profound principles of the said rights. These principles are derived from the 
wider European legal framework, thus the ground from which these principles stem 
must be thoroughly covered.
35 See for example M.Tzanou, The Added Value of Data Protection as a Fundamental Right in the EU Legal Order 
in the Context of Law Enforcement, (EUI, 2012); A.Dimitrova and M.Brkan, “Balancing National Security and 
Data Protection: The role of EU and US Policy-Makers and Courts before after the NSA Affair”, in Journal 
of Common Market Studies (2017) DOI.10.1111/jcms.12634. For more recent examples, see A.Vedaschi, 
“Privacy and data protection versus national security in transnational flights: the EU-Canada PNR agreement” 
in International Data Privacy Law 8 (2018) and O. Tambou, “Opinion 1/15 on the EU-Canada Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) Agreement: PNR Agreement Need to Be Compatible with EU Fundamental Rights”, in 
European Foreign Affairs Review 23 (2018). See also O. Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection 
Law, (Oxford, 2015) 161–173.
36 For the Transparency Register, see Transparency and EU, available on the internet < http://ec.europa.eu/
transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?locale=en#en> [last visited 23.10.2016].
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3. JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK
The research will be conducted in the framework of Constitutional EU and also 
wider European law. The third field of law framing this research is Information Law, 
which has slowly become an area of law in its own right.37 While the collision of the 
examined rules exists in EU law – and more precisely in the legislation concerning 
the EU institutions – the solution for the tension is sought from European law in a 
wider sense. In addition to EU law, wider European law consists of the practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights and also national law and practice of the European states.
Thus, the study can be placed in the framework of legal positivism when it comes 
to the analysis of the colliding legal rules. This part of the thesis is a formation of 
normative legal analysis. However, critical legal positivism considers the examined 
rules only examples of issues pertaining to the surface level of law.38 Separation of 
rules and principles in the line with the legal doctrines developed by gentlemen like 
Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy provides a method for deducting the solution 
for the collision from Tuori’s deeper levels of law.39 The deeper levels of law must 
be sought from the wider European regime and this part of the thesis is not limited 
to legal positivist analysis, but reaches the elements of something more enduring 
and universal, and therefore provides a twist of natural law as well.40
4. METHODOLOGY
The underlying theoretical foundation for this research is in the analysis of the 
nature of the transparency and data protection as rules, principles or policies.41 This 
analysis will be carried out based on doctrines elaborated by such scholars as Ronald 
Dworkin, Robert Alexy, Konrad Hesse and Kaarlo Tuori. The characteristic elements 
of these doctrines are, for example, differentiating the rules and principles based on 
their nature, and rules being applied in an either-or manner, while principles carry 
37 For Information Law as an independent area of law, see A.Saarenpää, “Legal Infomatics Today – The View 
from the University of Lapland”, in A. Saarenpää & K. Sztobryn (eds.) Lawyers in the Media Society, The 
Leal Challenges of the Media Society, (Lapin yliopisto, 2016), 13.
38 For Tuori, see for example K.Tuori, “Law, Power and Critique”, in Tuori et al. (ed.), Law and Power, Critical 
and Socio-Legal Essays, (Deborah Charles Publications, 1997) and K. Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism, (Hants, 
2002).  
39 For the three level of legal order, see K. Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism, (Hants, 2002). 
40 For providing the means to diminish the unclarity between legal positivism and natural law, see J. Bengoetxea, 
The legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, (Oxford, 1993) 21.
41 See for example R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London, 2009); R. Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in 
Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights, (Oxford, 1984); R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford, 2010).
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dimension and allow balancing. Furthermore, the inviolable core of the rights, which 
in turn approaches the “rule-like” effect, will be assessed in order to gather the scope 
of the principles, which allows for balancing.42 More profound assessment of the 
methodology applied in this research together with the setting of the jurisprudential 
framework will be provided in Chapter I.  
The chosen methodology provided an excellent tool for assessing the core 
question of this thesis. Identifying the hard core, or the essence, of the right43 did 
demonstrate that the inter-rights conflict was not total in Zucca’s terms44, but left 
room for balancing the principles in a manner which allowed the essence of the 
rights to be preserved.
5. TERMINOLOGY AND KEY DEFINITIONS 
The most central concepts of this thesis will be elaborated in more detail in their 
respective chapters. Such concepts are for example personal data, the processing of 
personal data, document etc. The terms referring to these concepts are applied as 
they are established in European law. However, the exact content of these concepts 
still causes uncertainty and therefore they must be elaborated in detail with the 
appropriate references to relevant case-law. Furthermore, the content of these key 
concepts has a central role when balancing the protection of one’s personal data with 
public access to documents. Thus, instead of repeating the definitions of respective 
laws, it suffices at this stage to note that definition of the terms corresponds to the 
definitions as they are adopted in the relevant legislation.
Nevertheless, some initial remarks of the applied terminology ought to be made. 
First, the Regulation 1049/2001 will be referred to in this thesis as the “Transparency 
Regulation”. This might not be the most commonly applied name for the said 
Regulation; most often it is referred to as “Regulation 1049”. While Regulation 
1049/2001 covers public access to documents, transparency as a concept covers more 
widely other areas and instruments strengthening society’s openness. Furthermore, 
it ought to be noted that when entering into the discussion of fundamental rights, it 
is precisely public access to documents, which has this status, not transparency in 
42 See T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 
(2016), 321–323; G. Van Der Schyff, Cutting to the Core of the Conflicting Rights: The question of inalienable 
Cores in Comparative Perspective, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 
131–147.
43 See T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 
(2016), 321–323.
44 L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 26–28.   
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broader terms. However, for the purposes of making the text more reader-friendly, 
the vocabulary used in this thesis adopts “Transparency Regulation”.
Furthermore, to separate Data Protection Regulation 45/2001 from the General 
Data Protection Regulation, it is referred to as the Data Protection Regulation. For 
the General Data Protection Regulation, the abbreviation GDPR will be applied. 
The Data Protection Regulation is applied by the EU institutions where the GDPR 
is applied by private sector actors and Members States’ public sectors.45 The GDPR 
sets an obligation for the European Commission to submit legislative proposals 
when this is needed in order to ensure that the processing of personal data will 
be uniform and consistent. The obligation to put forward a legislative proposal 
regarding the processing of personal data by the Union institutions was underlined 
and the Commission gave its proposal accordingly.46 The new Data Protection 
Regulation for the EU institutions will be called the “EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation”.47 This thesis was initially drafted based on the former Data Protection 
Regulation, but the text has been aligned with the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation. Where there is a difference in the former Data Protection Regulation 
and the renewed EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, this is specifically 
mentioned. The most significant amendment relates to the provisions on justifying 
the application. The analysis of the case-law is based on the former data protection 
regime, as there is no case-law on the interpretation of the EU Institutions’ Data 
Protection Regulation yet. The EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation does 
not have an influence on this analysis, but it might confirm certain conclusions 
drawn in the analysis. 
The Data Protection Directive refers to the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/
EC.48 The GDPR has now replaced the Data Protection Directive. Even though the 
GDPR entered into force in May 2016, it became applicable only in May 2018. Thus, 
the Member State legislation which is based on the Data Protection Directive was 
still in force in May 2018. At the same time as the GDPR, a Directive regarding the 
processing of personal data in the context of police and judicial cooperation was 
adopted.49 The “Law Enforcement Directive” (LED) will not be examined in this 
45 The national flexibility provided in the GDPR leaves a wide margin for the member states to adopt more 
specific data protection legislation in the public sector. See for example Article 6(3) and 23 of GDPR.
46 See Article 98 of GDPR.
47 The Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and 
Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39–98).
48 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31–50).  
49 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 
119, 4.5.2016, p. 89–131).
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thesis. The Data Protection Directive should also be separated from the so-called 
ePrivacy Directive.50 Following the adoption of the GDPR, the European Commission 
did launch a consultation on the ePrivacy Directive with a view to reviewing it as a 
part of the Digital Single Market Strategy.51 The consultation led to Commission’s 
proposal for Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications.52
The Court of Justice of the European Union will be referred as the CJEU. 
This abbreviation will be applied also in such cases where the Court delivered its 
judgment in an era before the structural changes concerning the Court, instead of 
using the abbreviation commonly applied before these changes (ECJ). Similarly, 
the established abbreviations for European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), The 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU),, Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) and European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) will be applied 
in this thesis. 
6. SOURCES
The research is mainly based on the legal documents of the European Union 
and the Council of Europe. The focus will be on the EU’s primary legislation and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. Secondary EU legislation will also be applied as a source. Thus 
Directives, Regulations, Council Decisions etc. will be applied as sources. Where 
publicly available, the preparatory work of secondary legislation has also provided 
a significant source for the thesis. Furthermore, the case-law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights will provide 
significant source for the research. National legislation and national decisions 
by different bodies will provide further support in relation to certain questions 
examined in this research. In addition, opinions and statements by such institutions 
as the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the Article 29 Working Party 
(WP29) and its current formation, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and 
European Ombudsman will provide important input to the sources of the thesis. 
Furthermore, the Council’s replies to confirmatory applications will also provide 
50 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy 
and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47).
51 The Digital Single Market Strategy is one of the European Commission’s priorities. For more, see “Digital 
Single Market, Bringing down barriers to unlock online opportunities”, available on the internet < http://
ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/> [last visited 16.10.2016].
52 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect 
for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM(2017) 10 final (10.1.2017).
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an additional source for the thesis. Case-law, academic literature and legislative 
processes have been followed up to August 2019.  
The emphasis on the sources will be on the legal and official documents. As 
the European data protection regime has recently gone through a vast reform, the 
academic literature can at this stage provide well-reasoned opinions. No settled 
case-law or practice by the data protection authorities exist just yet. However, the 
academic literature provides significant support when individual issues are studied. 
This is in particular the case with data protection, which itself has stimulated various 
studies from several different angles. The academic literature on transparency and 
in particular public access to documents is more scarce, but it does exist. Academic 
literature applied in this research will contain scientific articles, commentaries, 
studies, case notes etc.
In the interests of transparency, the author’s official post in the Finnish 
administration should be acknowledged. The author represented the Finnish 
government in the GDPR negotiations in the DAPIX working party in the Council, 
participating in the GDPR drafting process. The author has also participated or 
had the responsibility of numerous other data protection files, including the EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. The author was also part of the Finnish 
delegation in the reform negotiations for the Transparency Regulation. Currently 
the author holds a post as Deputy Data Protection Ombudsman in Finland.
7. STRUCTURE
This thesis consists of two parts; the General Part and the Case studies. These two 
parts will be followed by the concluding remarks. The first chapter of the General 
Part will introduce the theoretical foundations for the research. This will be followed 
by chapters which will discuss transparency legislation and more precisely the public 
access to documents regime in the European legal framework, followed by similar 
analysis of European data protection legislation. These chapters will concentrate on 
concepts which are relevant when examining the relationship between transparency 
and the protection of personal data. Once the necessary elements for understanding 
the background and the context where the examined tension occurs have been 
clarified, some more concrete situations of tension will be tackled in the fifth and 
sixth chapters. These situations are not only theoretical, but have also materialized 
in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union or taken place in 
the European institutions’ practice when assessing whether access to document 
should be granted. The last section will draw together all of the earlier sections and 
provide a solution on how to balance transparency together with data protection 
requirements. Next the content of different chapters of the thesis will be elaborated 
in more detail.
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PART 1, GENERAL PART
Chapter I provides the theoretical foundations for the research. This chapter draws 
on the writings of Dworkin and Alexy in particular, but also on more recent scholars 
such as Zucca. The chapter builds also on Kaarlo Tuori (Finland), Konrad Hesse etc.
Chapter II provides a short overview of the developments and “history” of data 
protection and transparency legislation, and draws together the developments of 
these rights. As both data protection and access to documents are relatively new 
concepts, particularly in the field of fundamental rights, this chapter provides 
useful background information on the context and societal environment where 
the development of these concepts took place.
Chapter III examines some of the core concepts of European transparency 
legislation. While these concepts are presented in the general framework of European 
transparency regulation, the purpose of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive 
picture of the said legislative framework. Instead the focus will be on selected key 
concepts, which are essential to first identify and then elaborate, as these concepts 
will play a significant role later in this thesis, when the tension between transparency 
and data protection will be tackled. When the tension between transparency and 
data protection is elaborated, it is fundamental to understand the dimensions of 
these concepts as well as how they function.
First, a general overview of transparency regulation in Europe will be provided. 
The relationship between democracy and transparency together with transparency’s 
nature as a fundamental right is discussed first. This is followed by discussion of 
some of the most relevant concepts related to this legislation and how they are 
to be understood in the European legal framework. This will be followed by the 
identification and elaboration of the core principles of transparency regulation. 
Without a thorough understanding of these principles, one cannot fully comprehend 
European transparency regulation.
Chapter IV will provide a similar overview of the data protection concepts to the 
one provided in Chapter III for transparency. It will first elaborate on data protection 
as a fundamental right. The data subject’s right to self-determination is of particular 
interest in this section. After data protection as fundamental right and its relation to 
democracy has been addressed, central data protection concepts and data protection 
principles, which should be separated from Dworkin’s and Alexy’s principles, are 
elaborated. This section covers, for example, the concept of personal data and the 
purpose limitation principle. Also, some other data protection elements, which are 
particularly important in relation to transparency, will be elaborated. These are, for 
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example, consent and the right of access to personal data. Lastly, some new data 
protection elements will be assessed, and a short overview of Europe’s new data 
protection regime will be provided.
PART 2, CASE STUDIES
Once the central concepts and principles of transparency and data protection 
legislation have been established in the previous chapters, Chapter V focuses on 
the dilemmas caused by competing rules and principles in the given framework. 
This chapter elaborates on the tension between data protection and transparency 
in light of the recent case-law of European Courts. It will identify the dilemmas and 
give indications on possible solutions raised by the case-law. The chapter has three 
main sections and a conclusion. The first section focuses on the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. It examines four significant judgments of 
Luxembourg courts, Bavarian Lager, Satakunnan Markkinpörssi, Volker un Markus 
Schecke GbR and Dennekamp. The second section of this chapter will focus on the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. While this section gives a broader 
European perspective on the issues discussed in this thesis, it will also provide some 
indications on how to solve the dilemmas arising from the simultaneous application 
of the two Regulations. The third section of this chapter will draw together the 
different elements of the central issues discussed in the chapter, such as consent 
of the data subject, stating reasons for the application and professional activities.
Chapter VI will elaborate further on the tension discussed in the previous chapter. 
While Chapter V focused on the dilemmas that have arisen in the aftermath of 
recent case-law, this chapter will focus on dilemmas not yet addressed by the courts. 
Besides completing the previous chapter on the elements causing tension between 
transparency and data protection, it will also elaborate further on some of the 
questions covered in Chapter V. 
The issues discussed in this chapter include access to one’s own personal data, 
further transmission of personal data, the purpose limitation principle, and the 
data subject’s right to object and stating reasons for the application.   
The Concludind Chapter – From simply sharing the cage to living 
together – will draw together the discussion from the previous chapters. The 
core dilemmas causing the tension on the surface level of law together with some 
indications of how to solve these dilemmas and how to deduct the solution by 
identifying the underlying principles and the essence, or hard core, of the rights 
were elaborated in the previous chapters. Thus, at this stage, the reader should 
have the relevant information on the transparency and data protection regimes for 
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the final discussion. The concluding chapter will focus on resolving the dilemma 
of competing rules and principles. While the theoretical framework provides the 
means to deduct an answer for the dilemmas examined in this thesis, an attempt 
at a more concrete solution will be provided.
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS;  
CLASHING PRINCIPLES
This chapter will provide an overview of the theoretical foundations of this thesis. The 
objective of this thesis is to provide a structuralized approach to the simultaneous 
application of the Transparency and the Data Protection Regulations where the 
essence of both rights is appropriately acknowledged. Instead of addressing this 
aim by examining solely the underlying objectives of the Regulations, the theoretical 
framework will provide the means for deeper understanding of the research question 
by identifying the underlying principles and the essence of the said rights. Even 
more importantly, it frames and provides the structure for the research and for 
the sought solution.
When seeking a fair balance between two rights, the theories of clashing principles 
and rules become interesting. This question has been thoroughly discussed in the 
legal field, yet it seems like it has not been entirely exhausted.53 There are numerous 
participants in this discussion, but the contributions of two scholars are of particular 
interest in this thesis: Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. While Ronald Dworkin 
initiated the intense debate over the theory of clashing principles, Robert Alexy is 
of equal importance, providing the necessary angle for examining these issues from 
the civil law perspective.54 These gentlemen share many of the founding ideas of the 
theories of clashing principles, which will serve as a basis for the discussion in this 
thesis. It must also be acknowledged that some of the participants in the discussion 
of clashing principles do not agree, at least not entirely, with all the components of 
the doctrines developed by the two gentlemen.55
As established earlier, this thesis can be placed within the fields of European and 
Constitutional law. As such, the purpose of the theory of the colliding legal principles 
and rights is to serve as a tool in this research, not as the purpose itself. However, 
53 See for instance J. Raz “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” in The Yale Law Journal 81 (1972), 823–854 
and J. Raz, the Authority of Law, Essays on Law and Morality, (Oxford, 1979), 53–77; M.Rosenfeld, Law, 
Justice, Democracy, and the Clash of Cultures (Cambridge, 2011) 182–207. In Finland, see also for example 
A. Aarnio, On Rules and Principle, A Critical Point of View, in Aerschot (ed.) Juhlakirja, Kaarlo Tuori, 50 
vuotta, (Helsinki, 1998), 83–96.
54 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009); R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 
2010). 
55 See for example H.L. Hart.
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the importance of this tool is evident. Just consider the statement of Alexy: “without 
[the distinction of rules and principles] there can be neither an adequate theory 
of the limitation of rights, nor an acceptable doctrine of the conflict of rights, nor 
a sufficient theory of the role of constitutional rights in the legal system”.56 While 
acknowledging the significance of the theoretical foundations of clashing principles 
and rights, this thesis will not elaborate on this aspect in great detail as the theoretical 
foundations will first and foremost provide an angle and an approach to examine 
the core question of the thesis. A short overview of the theoretical foundations 
together with the core concepts of the theories will be provided next. Before entering 
into the said discussion, the basic elements of limiting fundamental rights in the 
European legal framework will be covered. This is followed by the discussion of the 
concepts of principles and rights. Thereafter, the dilemma of clashing principles will 
be tackled. As a last element of this chapter, democracy will be briefly discussed. 
The last element of this chapter is necessary in order to give an exhaustive picture 
of the framework in which the research question is examined. The entire research 
question must be examined in the context of democratic legitimacy and therefore 
the different doctrines of democracy contribute to the theoretical framework of 
the thesis.
1. LIMITING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
When seeking a balanced approach for the simultaneous application of two rights, 
the question of restricting rights becomes relevant. First, it must be noted that the 
sole fact of limiting a fundamental right to realize another fundamental right does 
not necessarily lead to the collision of rights. Fundamental rights can be limited, 
but restrictions to fundamental rights cannot be arbitrary or disproportionate. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights sets clear parameters for limiting the rights 
recognized by the Charter. The tension examined in this thesis exists in the European 
Union legal framework. Therefore, the Charter provides the primary frames for 
assessing how the said rights may be restricted. The practice of the European Court 
of Human Rights is also relevant in this assessment. Article 52(1) of the Charter 
states that
“Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised 
by this Charter must be provided for by law and essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations 
56 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 44.
22  PART 1 – GENERAL PART 
may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives 
of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others.”57
At least four elements which need to be met when fundamental rights are limited 
can be distinguished. First, limitations must be provided for by law. Second, the 
essence of the rights at stake must be preserved. The third and fourth elements 
emerge in the requirement of proportionality; limitations must be necessary and 
meet the objectives recognized by the European Union or be required to protect 
other rights.58
1.1 PROVIDED FOR BY LAW
The limitations on fundamental rights must be provided for by law.59 At the outset, 
the criteria seem quite clear, however, the question of what law is might arise in some 
hard cases. The first time the CJEU addressed this question was in the context of the 
WebMindLicenses case. While referring to the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, the CJEU set a particular weight in its assessment on the question 
of whether the legal basis for the measures in the said case was sufficiently clear and 
precise. In other words, clearness and preciseness were essential criteria in defining 
what is law in the sense of Article 52(1). Furthermore, the CJEU emphasized the need 
to define the scope of the limitation. It underlined that this provides a protection 
against arbitrary interference by the authorities.60 Thus the CJEU’s interpretation 
was not based on formal requirements, but rather on substantive ones, when defining 
the criteria to be met when assessing what law is in the meaning of Article 52(1).
The interpretation of the CJEU follows the settled practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights.61 In its assessment, the ECtHR first establishes whether 
57 Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union. Furthermore, paragraph 3 of the same 
article clarifies that “in so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent 
Union law providing more extensive protection.”
58 Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union.
59 See for example case C-73/16, Puskar v Financne riaditel’stvo Slovenskej republiky etc, EU:ECLI:C:2017:725, 
paras 62–63; Joined cases C-439/14 and C-448/14, SC Star Storage SA etc, ECLI:EU:C:2016:688, para 49–
50; case C-650/13, Delvige, ECLI:EU:C:2015:648, para 46–47.
60 For case-law on the content of the concept of law, see case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses, ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, 
para 81; ECtHR 2 August 1984, Malone v the United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1984:0802JUD000869179, 
para 67; ECtHR 12 January 2010, Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR: 
2010:0112JUD000415805, para 77.
61 See for example ECtHR 14 September 2010, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v the Netherlands, ECLI:CE:ECHR:20
10:0914JUD003822403, paras 83 and ECtHR 10 November 2005, Leyla Sahin v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:
2005:1110JUD004477498, paras 88.
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there is an interference of a right provided by the Convention on Human Rights. 
As a second step, it examines if this interference is prescribed by law. The basis 
for the interference might be laid down in a legislative act, an act of the executive 
or administrative authorities, a systematic practice or momentary act, etc.62 In its 
assessment the ECtHR has set a particular emphasis on the clearness and preciseness 
of the legal basis. This allows those concerned to act accordingly and seek expert 
advice when needed. Furthermore, this is also closely linked with the requirement 
for predictability.63 Similarly, the CJEU has emphasized that “the principle of legal 
certainty requires that Community rules enable those concerned to know precisely 
the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals must be able 
to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are…”.64 Furthermore, 
the ECtHR has emphasized in its case-law that the legal basis setting the limitations 
for the rights must also provide sufficient protection against arbitrary measures. It 
follows that the powers of the competent authorities must have been clearly defined.65
To conclude, the case-law of the European courts do not set formal but rather 
substantive requirements for the law or legal basis when fundamental rights are 
restricted. This does not, however, prevent the national legislator from setting more 
formal requirements when it comes to national law.66
1.2 THE ESSENCE OF THE RIGHT
The limitations to fundamental rights provided by the Charter may not be limited 
in a manner which would infringe the essence of the right. The essence might also 
be referred to as the hard core of the right. The proportionality doctrine has been 
elaborated in a reasonable amount of detail by the European courts, however, the 
62 L. Cariolou, “The search for an equilibrium by the European Court of Human Rights”, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts 
between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 249–251.
63 ECtHR 14 September 2010, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v the Netherlands, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:0914J
UD003822403, paras 81–82; ECtHR 31 March 2016, Stoyanov etc. v Bulgaria, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:033
1JUD005538810, paras 124–126.
64 See case C-345/06, Heinrich, ECLI:EU:C:2009:140, para 44 and case C-158/06, ROM-projecten, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:370, para 25.
65 ECtHR 14 September 2010, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v the Netherlands, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:0914J
UD003822403, paras 81–82; ECtHR 31 March 2016, Stoyanov etc. v Bulgaria, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0331
JUD005538810, paras 124–126. See also see case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses, ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, paras 
81, 84.
66 See also for example recital 41 of the GDPR. Recital 41 states that “where this Regulation refers to a legal 
basis or a legislative measure, this does not necessarily require a legislative act adopted by a parliament, 
without prejudice to requirements pursuant to the constitutional order of the Member State concerned. 
However, such a legal basis or legislative measure should be clear and precise and its application should be 
foreseeable to persons subject to it, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union and the European Court of Human Rights”.
24  PART 1 – GENERAL PART 
identification of the essence of the right has not yet provided a similar contribution 
to legal doctrines.67
The CJEU has applied Article 52(1) several times, which includes the requirement 
of non-violation of the essence of the fundamental right. Yet, it appears that the court 
is often satisfied by merely noting that the essence of the right has not been violated 
and rather grounds its argumentation on the proportionality test. For example, 
the question of the essence of the protection of personal data was touched upon in 
such cases as Tele2 Sverige, Digital Rights Ireland and Schecke. In its Tele2 Sverige 
decision the CJEU did state that the data retention in question did not affect the 
essence of the rights as the content of the communication was not in the scope 
of the said retention.68 In its earlier judgment in the Digital Rights Ireland case, 
the CJEU came to a similar conclusion; the essence of the right was not violated. 
The CJEU did hold the examined Directive void based on the proportionality test 
instead.69 The Court’s approach seems very reasonable and also pragmatic. The 
proportionality test does leave margin for reassessment of the chosen measures in 
order to, for example, adjust the Union legislation with the requirements set by the 
Court. To pronounce a violation of the essence would instead lead to a situation 
wherein there is no future measure available to rectify the situation.
Another question is how clearly the essence of the right can be separated from 
the proportionality test. The inviolable core and how it is to be identified will be 
further examined as a part of the balancing test in section 3.2.2.1.
1.3 PROPORTIONALITY
The Charter states that the limitation must be carried out in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality; limitations may be made only if they are necessary. 
In other words, Article 52 sets a requirement for the proportionality test when 
fundamental rights are limited. The third and fourth elements which were established 
earlier are both present in the said requirement. In other words, limitations must 
be necessary and meet the objectives recognized by the European Union or needed 
to protect other rights.
The CJEU has a long lineage when it comes to applying the proportionality 
test.70 Even if the proportionality test was initially applied when assessing whether 
67 For the essence of the right, see also M. Brkan, ”The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU 
Legal Order: Peeling the Onion to its Core”, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2(2018), 332–368.
68 Case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, paras 100–101.
69 See case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, para 101; Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 
Digital Rights Ireland and Kärtner Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, paras 26–30, 65.
70 See for example case C-331/88, R v Minister Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa etc., 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:391. For the CJEU’s case-law on proportionality and the appropriate measures to achieve 
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the Union measures had exceeded what is necessary to achieve the aims set by 
the Treaties, the basic elements of the test as formulated in the Fedesa case, are 
very similar to those applied when the limitations of fundamental rights are stake. 
These are: 1) The measure must be suitable to achieve a legitimate aim, 2) The 
measure must be necessary to achieve the said aim, 3) The measure must not have 
an excessive effect on the applicant’s interest.71
In the context of fundamental rights, the proportionality test is more recent 
in the EU’s legal framework. Until quite recently, fundamental rights have been 
established, developed and protected only through the case-law of the CJEU. 
This changed with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. The Charter is now endowed with the same weight and 
importance as founding treaties.
When fundamental rights emerged on the scene of the EU regime, they were at 
first balanced with the economic freedoms.72 Then the core question was whether a 
fundamental right could constitute a rightful reason to deviate from the freedoms 
provided by the founding treaties.73 Only later was the proportionality test applied 
in the context of limiting fundamental rights.
When it comes to the European Court of Human Rights, the proportionality 
test has formed an essential element in the assessment of limitations to rights for 
longer. The proportionality assessment by the ECtHR culminates in the evaluation 
of whether an interference is necessary in a democratic society. When assessing 
whether such a pressing social need exists, which justifies the interference, the 
ECtHR has paid attention to the relevance of the measures and also sufficient 
reasoning of the contracting parties.74 
The first time the CJEU confirmed the Charter’s binding nature was when it 
applied the proportionality test provided by Article 52 while assessing the rightful 
interference of one’s right to protection of personal data and privacy in the Schecke 
case.75
the legitimate objectives and on the question of not exceeding what is appropriate and necessary, see case 
C343/09, Afton Chemical, ECLI:EU:C:2010:419, para 45; joined cases C581/10 and C629/10, Nelson and 
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:657, para 71; case C283/11, Sky Österreich, ECLI:EU:C:2013:28, para 50 and case 
C101/12, Schaible, ECLI:EU:C:2013:661, para 29. For assessing the aims pursued by certain restrictions, see 
case C-398/15, Manni, ECLI:EU:C:2017:197, paras 48–61.
71 Case C-331/88, R v Minister Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa etc., ECLI:EU:C:1990:391.
72 See for example J.H. Jans, ”Proportionality Revisited” in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 27(2000).
73 See for example case C-112/00, Schmidtberger, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333; case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:809; case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation ja The Finnish 
Seamen’s Union, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772 and case C-36/02, Omega, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614. For balancing 
fundamental rights with the freedoms provided by the Treaties, see also S.A de Vries, “Balancing Fundamental 
Rights with Economic Freedoms According to the European Court of Justice”, in Utrecht Law Review 9(1) 
(2013), 169–192.
74 See for example ECtHR 25 November 1999, Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway (1999–VIII), para 43.
75 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662.
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When the proportionality test is applied, Alexy’s law of balancing and Hesse’s 
doctrine of practical concordance become of particular interest. These doctrines will 
be soon studied in more detail together with the thesis developed by Dworkin. At this 
stage it suffices to note that the doctrine elaborated by Konrad Hesse is considered 
a limitation tool, but also a tool for interpretation. When practical concordance is 
applied, all constitutional rights and values are considered of equal rank. When a 
tension between two competing rights exist, both rights are considered variable. 
This enables a context-based assessment and a balanced solution can be sought 
based on the specific circumstances of the case.76
Quite interestingly, practical concordance sets lot of weight on the object and 
purpose when the proportionality test is carried out.77 This leads to the following 
question: how would this relate to Dworkin’s separation of principles and policies 
where policies, which are drawn from the objectives and aims, are always superseded 
by principles in a case of collision.78 I see that practical concordance gives a tool to 
assess how policies are to be taken into consideration in balancing. While Dworkin 
never denies the role of policies in the balancing79, Hesse’s practical concordance 
structures how to take them into consideration when balancing two rights; as a part 
of proportionality test. Thus, these two doctrines seem to complete one another.
Finally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights stresses that limitations must meet 
the objectives recognized by the Union.80 In the case-law of the ECtHR, it has been 
similarly underlined that the limitations to human rights must be necessary in a 
democratic society.81 These requirements can be rendered to Hesse’s context-based 
approach. It must be noted that when assessing the objectives of the Union and 
what is necessary in democratic society, the following remarks can be made. On 
the one hand, the requirement to meet the objectives recognized by the Union can 
be considered wider in a sense that it implies that the core freedoms on which the 
76 K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfaussungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Heidelberg, 1990) 142; 
T. Marauhn and N.Puppel, Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: Konrad Hesse’s notion of “Praktische 
Kokordanz” and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 279–281, 296.
77 K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfaussungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Heidelberg, 1990) 142; 
T. Marauhn and N.Puppel, Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: Konrad Hesse’s notion of “Praktische 
Kokordanz” and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 281.
78 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 1977) 90–122.
79 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 116–117.
80 For example the fight against international terrorism and serious crime have been considered as an objective 
of general interest in the CJEU’s case-law. See for example joined cases C402/05 P and C415/05 P, Kadi 
and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para 363 and 
joined cases C539/10 P and C550/10 P, Al-Aqsa v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2012:711, para 130.
81 See Article 52(1) in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union or Articles 8(2) and 10(2) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights; see also for example R.Gisbert, The Right to Freedom of expression 
in a democratic Society (Art. 20 ECHR), in Garcia Roca & Santolaya (eds.) Europe of Rights: A Compendium 
of the European Convention of Human Rights, (Leiden, 2012), 371–401.
27CHAPTER I
Union is established must be taken appropriately into account when limiting rights. 
These are the freedoms creating a basis for the internal market and having therefore 
strong economic influence. On the other hand, the notion of a democratic society 
is wider in the sense that it is not limited to the European Union, but contains 
elements of democracy more widely.
2. PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS
The short discussion of the basic elements of limiting rights in the European 
legal framework paved the way for what will follow now; a study of the concepts 
of principles and rights and, in particular, the discussion of clashing rights and 
principles which will follow thereafter.
To start with, it should be noted that the number of rights, which are considered 
fundamental rights, has increased over the past years. Besides classic negative rights, 
a whole new generation of positive fundamental rights has appeared.82 The rights 
examined in this thesis, the right to protection of personal data and the right of access 
to documents, are relatively new in the field of fundamental rights. These rights 
have previously been protected through other rights, but they are now considered 
independent, individual rights.
The proliferation of fundamental rights has also led to questioning whether 
fundamental rights should be treated differently from other interests and rights.83 
While this question is acknowledged in this thesis, the baseline assumption is that 
fundamental rights are considered to trump others. Policies, aims and objectives 
provide significant elements to be taken into consideration when balancing is carried 
out, but these elements cannot outweigh rights. While these elements are considered 
relevant in balancing, it must be underlined that democracy is more than just a 
significant element in balancing. As was established in chapter 1, when the limitation 
of a fundamental right is necessary in a democratic society, it is justified. In other 
words, democracy forms an essential element in the balancing test.
2.1 PRINCIPLES
Principles form the basis for the rights and are therefore an important element in 
legal reasoning. As Dworkin notes in one of his writings, “legal practice, unlike many 
82 J.H. Gerards, Fundamental rights and other interests: Should it really make a difference, in Brems (ed.) 
Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 655–659.
83 Ibid.; R. Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights, (Oxford, 1984), 153–167.
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other social phenomena, is argumentative. Every actor in the practice understands 
that what it permits or requires depends on the truth of certain propositions that 
are given sense only by and within the practice; the practice consists in large 
part in deploying and arguing about the propositions”.84 Therefore, those with 
the best information on the propositions describing rights would seem to have an 
advantage in legal discourse.85
Dimension is a characteristic and distinctive element of principle; principles are 
said to carry a dimension. In other words, principles are not applied in an either-
or manner. This is a matter where Dworkin and Alexy seem to very much agree, 
even if there are some other noteworthy differences in their doctrines.86 Despite the 
differences, simultaneous application of their doctrines is indeed feasible. Firstly, 
Dworkin’s interpretation of principles is narrower than Alexy’s. Dworkin’s more 
narrow interpretation of principles draws from the difference between individual 
and collective good. Dworkin links principles with individual good and sees that 
they create the backbone for the arguments of individual rights; collective rights 
Dworkin relates with policies.87 This is a difference, which Alexy does not make. 
His interpretation of principles is broader and includes collective good as well.88 
Secondly, Alexy sees principles as optimization requirements.89 As he puts it, 
“principles require that something be realized to the greatest extent legally and 
factually possible”.90 These differences are not necessarily contradictory, and, as 
underlined earlier, do not hinder the assessment of principles based on Dworkin and 
Alexy simultaneously. Furthermore, both of these scholars agree on the distinction 
between principles and rules.91 Even if this difference is not the focal point of this 
study, and the focus of the research is rather on the underlying principles as such, 
this distinction is significant in order to provide a better understanding and a more 
comprehensive picture of the functioning of the principles.
84 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Oxford, 1998) 13.
85 See for example K. Tuori, Law, Power and Critique, in Tuori et al. (ed.) Law and Power, Critical and Socio-
Legal Essays, (Deborah Charles Publications, 1997), 7. Tuori notes that the only power in discourses is that 
of better argument.
86 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 48–54; R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
(Duckworth, 1977) 22.
87 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 90–100.
88 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 62.
89 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010), 48; for more, see also K. Möller, “Balancing 
and the structure of constitutional rights” in Constitutional Law 5 (2007), 453–468.
90 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 57;  K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfaussungsrechts 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Heidelberg, 1990) 142. For optimization requirement see also Konrad 
Hesse’s practical concordance in T. Marauhn and N. Puppel, Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: Konrad 
Hesse’s notion of “Praktische Kokordanz” and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in Brems (ed.) 
Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 279–281.
91 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 50–54; R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
(Duckworth, 1977) 27.
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The above-mentioned distinction is quite well established in the general 
framework of legal theory.92 Both Dworkin and Alexy seem to have a similar basis 
for their distinction, even if Alexy’s approach appears to be more formalistic. Rules 
are seen as clear statements of law, which must be applied as such, while principles 
allow more balancing and are more flexible.93
Principles differentiate from rules firstly in the manner in which officials take 
them into consideration.94 Principle can be considered as legal principle, when 
officials like judges have to take it into account when relevant for the case. Although 
an official might be obliged to take a legal principle into a consideration, this does 
not necessarily mean that the principle will be applied in the case, or if applied, it 
can be overruled by other principle. Yet, if not applied, this cannot be considered 
as rendering the principle void and it might well be applied in the next case. This 
differs from the manner in which rules function, an all-or-nothing-fashion. The 
second distinctive feature follows from the first one; unlike rules, the principles 
have dimension. In this context, the dimension reflects the importance and the 
weight of the principle.95
Even if the different nature of rules and principles appears relatively easy to 
comprehend, it is not always obvious how to distinguish principles from rules. 
Principles cannot be identified, for example, solely based on the formulation.96 
There might even be similarities in the formulation of rules and principles and 
some scholars have specifically noted that such texts as fundamental rights in the 
Constitution or international human rights conventions contain both rule-like and 
principle-like norms.97 Nevertheless, Dworkin argues that if one is familiar with the 
law and legal system, one should recognize principles and be able to separate them 
from rules.98 It appears that if a rule is drawn very generally, it is more likely to act 
as a principle. Principles are typically quite general in their nature99. However, for 
the purposes of this thesis it is not necessary to draw clear guidelines on how to 
separate rules from principles. It is essential, however, to comprehend how these 
different elements of legal system serve their purposes. An interesting doctrine in 
92 See for instance R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 44–48; R. Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, (Duckworth, 1977), 14–31; See also Zucca’s approach, L. Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas, 
(Oxford, 2007) 11.
93 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 14–31.
94 For more criteria for how to examine the difference between rules and principles, see H. Tolonen, “Rules, 
Principles and Goals: the interplay between law, morals and politics”, in Scandinavian studies in law 35(1991), 
269–293.
95 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 14–31.
96 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 24–28.
97 See for example M. Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa, (Jyväskylä, 1991) 32–34. For the particular 
relationship between Constitutional rights and principles, see also See K. Tuori, Critical Legal Postivism, 
(Hants, 2002) 171–172.
98 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 22–31.
99 M. Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa, (Jyväskylä, 1991) 34.
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this respect is the thesis of rule fragments and so-called rule influence and principle 
influence which follows from rule fragments. This doctrine underlines that a rule is 
not necessarily a singular provision but might be formed from different fragments. 
It follows that certain provisions in an international human rights Convention, 
for example, are not necessarily direct rules, but these provisions might have rule 
influence in certain circumstances. This signifies that these provisions are applied 
as rules together with other elements of the legal order.100 Principle influence on 
the other hand would lead to a balancing of different elements.101 It was established 
that rules can be composed of different fragments, but in the case of principles this 
is even more clear. Dworkin attacked positivists’ theories precisely by arguing that 
unwritten elements of law, such as principles, do exist.102 In Tuori’s theory of the 
deep structure of law, principles103 are drawn from the underlying layers of law. 
Tuori sees that legal order is formed from several layers of law. On the surface 
level, there is, for example, current legislation and norms. The deeper levels of law 
consist of tacit knowledge of the lawyers. The deeper levels are the most stable 
levels of law.104 As principles are not necessarily concretely formulated, they must 
be sought from the deep structure of the jurisprudence.
It was established that the formulation, as such, does not reveal principles, nor 
distinguish them from rules. Instead the capability to identify principles draws on 
expert knowledge of the legal system. Here Dworkin offers institutional support as 
a tool for perceiving principles.105 Although this gives us some guidance on how to 
recognize a principle, it does not give a precise formula for reaching the right answer. 
Such examples of institutional support as travaux préparatoires or established social 
practice are given in the legal literature.106 However, there is no unequivocal answer 
to, for example, which institutional acts should have references to the principle. 
Furthermore, there is no simple or clearly direct relation between the institutional 
acts and the principles they support. This is also the reason why institutional support 
cannot be considered as the rule of recognition107 for principles, argues Dworkin.108 
100 For rule-like effect of the hard core see T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court 
of Justice of the European Union clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European 
Constitutional Law Review 2 (2016).
101 See M. Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa, (Jyväskylä, 1991) 31–38.
102 For common grounds of law, R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Oxford, 1998) 44.
103 Tuori distinguishes two types of principles. First, principles as legal norms, which exist on the surface level 
of law. Second, principles as sources of law, these principles must be derived from the deeper level of law. 
See K. Tuori, Critical Legal Postivism, (Hants, 2002) 179. The focus in this study is in the latter.
104 K. Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism, (Hants, 2002) 147–196.
105 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 39–45, 64–68.
106 H. Tolonen, “Rules, Principles and Goals: the interplay between law, morals and politics”, in Scandinavian 
studies in law 35(1991), 276.
107 For rule of recognition see H.L.A Hart, Concept of Law, (Oxford, 1961) 72–107.
108 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 39–45.
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Before examining the existence of institutional support, substantive significance 
reveals whether the legal instrument at stake is actually a principle.109
As a concluding remark, it could be noted that even if the different nature of 
rules and principles seems quite clear, it is far from clear how to draw clear lines 
between them. In the end, the core question seems to culminate in the validity of 
the weaker element of law. Furthermore, even if the concepts of rule influence and 
principle influence will not be adopted in this thesis, this is mostly for the sake 
of clarity of the text, and the underlying idea of these concepts is accepted. This 
doctrine specifies the difference at stake and it would indeed be more accurate to 
talk about principle influence instead of simply principles in this thesis as well.
2.2 RIGHTS
When Dworkin’s or Alexy’s principles collide, the actual collision takes place on 
the surface level of law in the form of colliding rights. Principles can be seen 
as propositions which describe rights; “arguments of principle are arguments 
intended to establish an individual right”110. Principles are balanced on the basis 
of their dimension and courts often seek the balance between different rights 
through doctrines of proportionality.111 When the relationship between principles 
and rights is seen in the Dworkinian way, it appears that the correct proportionality 
considerations are drawn from the dimensions of different principles.
Dworkin separates abstract rights from concrete rights and argues that this 
difference is crucial for all adequate theories of rights. Following from the difference 
between abstract and concrete rights, the principles establishing these rights can 
also be characterized either abstract or concrete. Abstract rights are general political 
aims, aiming at collective good. While generality can be considered characteristic 
for abstract rights, concrete rights are instead more definite and more precise. 
Furthermore, contrary to an abstract right, a concrete right is aimed at individual 
good. Abstract rights do not collide or carry different dimension of weight like 
concrete rights do. However, abstract rights are an important element of concrete 
rights as they support them, and, even more importantly, concrete rights are derived 
from abstract rights.112 Because abstract rights never collide in the Dworkinian world, 
109 H. Tolonen, “Rules, Principles and Goals: the interplay between law, morals and politics”, in Scandinavian 
studies in law 35(1991), 275–277.
110 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 90–91.
111 P. Ducoulombier, Conflicts between Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights: An 
Overview, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 234.
112 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 1977) 90–122.
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it is the concrete rights which are either confirmed or denied in the so-called hard 
cases.113
The focus of this thesis is on colliding rights and as such, concrete rights are 
of primary interest here. However, when seeking the fair balance between two 
rights, it might require assessment of abstract rights to form a more comprehensive 
picture of the context. The final outcome of balancing might take place on the level 
of concrete rights, but it is essential even for Dworkin’s Hercules114 judge to take 
abstract rights duly into consideration.115
Thus, the objectives and aims of the legislation forming the basis for the rights 
examined in this thesis will be analyzed in the concluding chapter when the balance 
between the colliding principles will be sought.
Fundamental rights are often considered trumps. It follows that the trump would 
surmount other rights in a situation of conflict.116 In Dworkinian theory, rights based 
on policies could never create a basis for trumps. This could be done only by rights 
based on principles and, as such, for individual rights.117 When rights are considered 
trumps and prevail over other rights, the question of two fundamental rights colliding 
and how to solve such a collision arises. Thus, to identify a collision of rights, the 
colliding rights must be fundamental. It is of interest to note though, that in the recent 
literature, it has been proposed that fundamental rights should not automatically be 
considered superior to other interests and rights. This would be in particular the case 
when peripheral interests are at stake.118 As earlier established, fundamental rights 
are often formulated in a very general manner. This leaves relatively wide discretion 
for judges to evaluate how wide the scope of each fundamental right actually is.119 
3. CLASHING RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES
The clash of rights might take several forms, but the collision is of most interest when 
two constitutional rights are clashing. This is for several reasons. Firstly, constitutions 
113 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 1977) 100–101.
114 Hercules is a superhuman lawyer, a judge who is able to solve all conflicts as they should be solved with his 
superhuman skills, see for example R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 1977) 105–106.
115 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 116–117.
116 R. Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights, (Oxford, 1984), 153–167.
117 See for example L. Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas, conflicts of fundamental legal rights in Europe and the 
USA, (Oxford, 2007) 50–51.
118 J.H. Gerards, Fundamental rights and other interests: Should it really make a difference, in Brems (ed.) 
Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 686–690.
119 This has also caused some criticism that because judges are not chosen democratically, i.e. by vote, they 
should not create law. See E. Maes, Constitutional Democracy, Constitutional Interpretation and Conflicting 
Rights, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 70.
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hardly ever set one fundamental right above other fundamental rights.120 Even if 
fundamental rights can be considered absolute or qualified based on their nature, 
this distinction does not necessarily dictate the outcome of the conflict between such 
rights.121 Like Ojanen underlines, the inviolable core of the right does exist despite 
of the nature of the fundamental right.122 Secondly, fundamental rights are often 
defined in a very general manner. When a legislator regulates fundamental issues, 
the result is likely to be a set of very general propositions. These propositions should 
maintain their effect and weight even when circumstances change.123 This leaves a 
wide scope for collision, which might take place on a level of rules.
For a comprehensive picture of clashing rights and underlying principles, they 
should be mirrored against clashing rules. As Zucca notes, both Alexy and Dworkin 
see the conflict of rules very much alike. When rules are conflicting, only one of them 
becomes applicable rendering the other one void.124 These conflicts could be solved 
for instance based on principles like lex specialis or lex posterior i.e. constructions 
of jurisprudence familiar to most lawyers. So, Dworkin and Alexy have a similar 
approach regarding clashing rules that the collision can be solved in a very clear-
cut manner; the rule is either applicable or it is not. It also appears that once the 
clash of rules has been solved, the same pattern would apply in subsequent cases.125 
Thus, when assessing the conflict between rules, consistency and foreseeability play 
an important role.
Besides some relatively easily applied principles like lex specialis which give 
guidance on how to solve the situations of colliding rules, Dworkin draws the answer 
for solving the case of clashing rules from the underlying principles supporting the 
rules.126 Similarly Alexy sets weight on balancing principles.127 Alexy has adopted 
a very structural approach for balancing and underlines that “the key question 
is […] under what conditions does which principle take precedence over the 
other”.128 Although this might seem to blur the lines between rules and principles, 
120 E. Maes, Constitutional Democracy, Constitutional Interpretation and Conflicting Rights, in Brems (ed.) 
Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 69–71.
121 ECtHR Grand Chamber, 8 July 1999, Sürek and Ödzemir v Turkey. See also P. Ducoulombier, Conflicts 
between Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights: An Overview, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts 
between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 238.
122 T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 
(2016), 326.
123 E. Maes, Constitutional Democracy, Constitutional Interpretation and Conflicting Rights, in Brems (ed.) 
Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 69–71.
124 L. Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas, (Oxford, 2007) 11; R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 
2010) 50–54; R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth, 1977) 27.
125 Ibid.
126 R.Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 14–31
127 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 50–54.
128 Ibid.
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the distinctive feature still remains; the non-applicable rule becomes void while the 
weaker principle does not vanish.
The core difference between clashing principles and clashing rules draws from 
the weight or dimension that the principles carry. As previously noted, dimension 
is a characteristic feature of principles and the disjunctive factor vis-à-vis rules. 
The dimension of principle is weighted in a situation where principles clash. 
Consequently, unlike a rule, a principle does not become void when colliding with 
another principle. Weighting the dimension of the principle might seem to lead 
to case-by-case evaluation when solving hard cases by drawing an answer from 
the deeper level of law, however, both Alexy and Dworkin deny that the outcome 
would be somehow arbitrary or irrational. Dworkin relies on the “one-right-answer” 
thesis while Alexy’s approach is more structured and underlines the circumstances 
of the case.129
Even if Dworkin sees principles leaving a margin for finding the correct answer 
in their application, he still presumes that the correct answer exists. Once the judge 
has found the right answer, he or she is bound by it. Sometimes, it might happen, 
however, that a single judge makes a mistake and comes up with wrong solution.130 
Dworkin underlines that judges are not arbitrarily coming up with answers to what 
law is in the absence of law, but once they have formulated what the law actually 
is, they follow the law in their decision. Therefore, it is not a question for political 
discretion.131
Alexy sees that balancing might lead to different outcomes on a case-by-case 
basis, but underlines that, regardless, balancing is a rational process.132 For balancing 
to be rational, it is essential, however, that the statements leading to a preferential 
statement are rationally defined.133 Alexy argues that “the circumstances under 
which one principle takes precedence over another constitute the conditions of a 
rule which has the same legal consequences as the principle taking precedence”.134 
According to Alexy, these statements leading to a preferential statement include “the 
intention of the constitution makers, the negative consequences of an alternative 
statement of preference, doctrinal consensus and earlier decisions”.135 It can be 
129 See for example R. Dworkin, Matter of Principle, (London, 1985) 119–145; R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional 
Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 54, 100–107.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 100–101.
133 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 101.
134 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 54.
135 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 100–101; K. Hesse, Grundzüge des 
Verfaussungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Heidelberg, 1990) 142. For the contextual-based 
assessment and circumstances, see also Konrad Hesse’s practical concordance in T. Marauhn and N.Puppel, 
Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: Konrad Hesse’s notion of “Praktische Kokordanz” and the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 
280.
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argued that Alexy’s circumstances are approaching Dworkin’s institutional support 
to certain extent.136 Thus the assessment of the dimension of principles can be drawn 
from a very similar basis on Alexy’s and Dworkin’s terms.
Alexy has formulated a “Law of Balancing”, which he sees as an answer to a 
question of what should be rationally justified. According to the Law of Balancing 
“the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the 
greater must be the importance of satisfying the other”.137 Some authors have 
criticized courts’ wide margin of appreciation and balancing and suggested that 
the use of this margin should be minimalized and based on strict criteria. The 
criteria suggested were based on questions of what, who, how and why, and it was 
suggested that applying these criteria could lead to a hierarchical order between 
different rights.138 However, it seems like these criteria could be rendered back to 
Alexy’s circumstances, which dictate the conditions for balancing. To suggest that 
this would lead to a hierarchical order between rights would seem rather bold, 
and the underlying dilemma would mostly seem to relate to the definition of the 
hierarchy itself.
Hesse’s “practical concordance” is also of particular interest when it comes 
to balancing. First, and very much in line with Alexy, Hesse sees that deriving 
from the constitution’s consistency, optimization must be applied.139 Secondly, and 
still in line with Alexy, Hesse sees that optimization must take place in specific 
circumstances. Hesse also underlines that limitations may not exceed what is 
necessary to attain the aim of the limitation. According to Hesse “conflicting rights 
and interest must be subject to limitations, so that each one attains its optimal 
effect. Consequently, limitations have to be proportionate in the light of specific 
circumstances. They must not be broader than required to establish concordance 
of conflicting constitutional values”.140 This very much concretizes the content of 
the necessity element established by Article 52 of the Charter.
Some scholars have opposed the idea of rules being either applicable or void. 
It has been suggested that “it is clearly not the case that every time rules conflict, 
one is valid and other invalid. Sometimes one rule will be considered an exception 
to the other”.141 This argument doesn’t seem to hold. When applying a rule which 
136 For institutional support, see for example Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 39–45.
137 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 102–107.
138 P. Ducoulombier, Conflicts between Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights: An 
Overview, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 238–247.
139 K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfaussungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Heidelberg, 1990) 142; 
T.Marauhn and N.Puppel, Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: Konrad Hesse’s notion of “Praktische 
Kokordanz” and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 279–281.
140 Ibid.
141 L.Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas, conflicts of fundamental legal rights in Europe and the USA, (Oxford, 
2007) 11–12.
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contains an exception, the judge is still applying a certain rule and bound by it. 
He or she has some margin of discretion when deciding whether the exception is 
applicable in the said case. Regardless of the outcome of his or her decision, the 
said rule would not become void, because the exception is part of the rule. The 
exception would simply be either applicable or not in the said case.142 However, 
when a margin of discretion has been used in order to decide whether an exception 
becomes applicable, the underlying principles of the different rights might need to 
be balanced.
Furthermore, Zucca counters strongly Dworkin’s presumption of the existence of 
one right answer in balancing principles. He argues that if this was accepted, there 
would not be any genuine conflicts of fundamental rights.143 The “one right answer” 
thesis does seem to imply the existence of a harmonious universe of rights. However, 
conflicts between rights do exist when two equally important fundamental rights 
are at stake and the case cannot be solved without one interfering with the essence 
of the other. Before coming to this conclusion, a serious attempt to reconcile the 
rights should be made. The conclusion that a real conflict of rights exists should not 
be drawn too hastily. As Zucca underlines, it is important to distinguish genuine 
conflicts from the spurious ones and this narrows down the scope of genuine 
constitutional conflicts. Once the spurious conflicts have been separated from the 
genuine ones, the conflicts solved by rational arguments must also be distinguished 
from the genuine conflicts.144
3.1 TOTAL AND PARTIAL CONFLICTS
When narrowing down the scope of genuine constitutional conflicts, total conflicts 
can be distinguished from partial ones.145 Based on this fundamental distinction, 
Zucca divides conflicts into four different lots. Firstly, conflicts can be total and 
arise in so-called intra-relations situations. When this is the case, there is the same 
right at stake, but two different right-holders. Realizing the right of one holder 
will inevitably render the right of the other holder void. Zucca uses the separation 
of conjoined twins as an example. There are also intra-rights conflicts that are 
partial. As in the previous case, there are two right-holders and they are sharing an 
interest in the same right. However, in this case, the problem can be solved without 
142 Both Alexy and Dworkin do recognize the existence of exceptions. For Dworkin, see for example Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977), 24–27.
143 L.Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas, conflicts of fundamental legal rights in Europe and the USA, (Oxford, 
2007) 11–12.
144 L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 3–126.
145 H.Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, (Oxford, 1991) 123–127.
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interfering with the core of that right. Here the given example is two different 
groups wanting to demonstrate at the same time in the same place of the city and 
reconciling this dilemma requires some logistics, but the core of the right would 
still remain untouchable.146
Secondly, total and partial conflicts can arise in inter-rights relations according 
to Zucca. In these cases, two different rights are colliding, both having the equal 
status of fundamental right. As an example of total conflict in inter-rights relations, 
Zucca looks at assisted suicide. It can be argued that decisional privacy and right 
to life cannot be realized simultaneously. Regarding partial inter-rights conflicts, 
the conflict between the right to free speech and informational privacy is given 
as an example. When this type of conflict occurs, it can be solved by case-by-case 
regulation.147 The focus in this thesis is on inter-rights relations. The aim is to 
find a solution for how to execute one’s right to the protection of personal data 
simultaneously with another person’s right of access to documents without violating 
the essence of the said rights.
While partial conflicts can be solved by balancing, Zucca sees that total conflicts 
cannot be solved at all; or more correctly, cannot be solved without setting one 
right aside. There are two main manners of balancing conflicting rights: structured 
balancing and loose balancing. For the purpose of this research, the former is of 
more interest. The characteristic features for structured balancing are the assessment 
of the scope of the rights and rights’ strengths.148 The assessment of the scope of 
the right requires formulation of the hard core of the said right. Ojanen notes the 
hard core of a fundamental right can generate a rule and as a consequence require 
an either-or application.149
Furthermore, Zucca argues that balancing is often used to explain the conflicts 
away. He sees that, instead, the genuine conflicts should be recognized and dealt 
with.150 I agree to some extent. For example, defining the scope of the right very 
narrowly can create an illusion of harmonious coexistence of different rights; the core 
of each right remains untouchable. However, this might not solve the conflicts on a 
practical level, only on a theoretical one. Regardless, the harmonious coexistence of 
146 L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 26–28.
147 L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 26–28.
148 L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 28–37.
149 See T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 
(2016), 321–323.
150 L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 28–37.
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fundamental rights should be taken as premise151 while at the same time recognizing 
the possibility of genuine conflicts of rights.
3.2 THE ESSENCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
To distinguish genuine conflicts of principles from the partial ones, the essence or 
the hard core of the related rights must be identified. When a collision occurs in 
inter-rights relations, the conflict is genuine only when the hard core of the said 
rights cannot be put into effect simultaneously. The question of what constitutes the 
hard core of the rights which are in focus in this research, i.e. the right to protection 
of personal data and the right to public access to documents will be examined in 
the concluding chapter.
3.2.1 RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE APPROACH
Alexy distinguishes the absolute and relative approach when defining the inalienable 
core.152 The relative approach leaves more margin for discretion. With the relative 
approach, the hard core, the essence of the right, can be identified after it is clear 
what is left of the said principle when balanced with other principle. The hard core 
must remain inviolable, but this approach allows broad margin for balancing as 
far as the proportionality principle is taken appropriately into account.153 It seems 
that a genuine collision of rights could never occur when this doctrine is applied.
When the absolute approach is adopted, the founding idea is that certain 
conditions create an essence of the right, which cannot be violated. Thus, certain 
conditions would set the circumstances where the essence of the right would be 
preserved.154 Alexy sees that “the absolute theory goes too far in saying that there 
are legal positions such that no possible legal reason can restrict them”.155 This 
observation seems to underline the need to take the circumstances of the case duly 
into account. Alexy also notes that “the extent of ‘absolute’ protection depends 
151 Also Zucca underlines that the existence of genuine conflicts of rights is rare, see for example Conflicts of 
Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, 
(Intersentia, 2008), 19–37.
152 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 192–196; For absolute and relative approaches, 
see also G. Van Der Schyff, Cutting to the Core of Confidential Rights: The Question of inalienable Cores in 




155 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 195.
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on the balance of principles”.156 This leads to a context-based assessment, where 
the rights, which are balanced, might lead to a different definition of the essence 
depending on the balanced principles.157
Thus, both the relative and absolute approach allow taking into consideration 
the circumstances of the case, but the relative approach would define the essence 
of the right based on what is left after the balancing of the principles, while the 
absolute approach sets the conditions under which the essence of the right cannot 
be breached. This research examines the relationship between data protection and 
public access to documents and therefore the circumstances of the examined case 
are settled to certain extent. Thus, the differentiating circumstances will be examined 
in the concluding chapter only to provide an exhaustive picture of the context in 
which these rights are interacting.
3.2.2 IDENTIFYING THE INVIOLABLE CORE
In line with Alexy’s doctrine, Ojanen stresses that when identifying the hard core of 
the fundamental right, the normative elements of the right together with particular 
characteristics of each case must be recognized appropriately. Ojanen distinguishes 
three more general elements for the assessment of the essence of the right. These 
elements relate to textual formulation, the amount of the elements forming the 
hard core and the nature of rights.158
The first element of the essence of the right is ultimately based on the more 
general remark of the normative elements of the fundamental right and specific 
characteristics of the case. Being faithful to Alexy, Ojanen namely stresses that the 
essence of the fundamental right cannot be identified solely based on the textual 
formulation of the right. Instead the assessment requires appropriate evaluation 
of the context.159 This approach reflects Alexy’s doctrine, which underlines the 
circumstances of the case.160 Thus the essence of the right cannot be identified in a 
vacuum. Instead, it requires balancing of the underlying principles.
Ojanen’s second general remark relates to the hard core itself. The hard core 
does not necessarily constitute of only one element but may contain several different 
156 Ibid.
157 See also T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European 
Union clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law 
Review 2 (2016), 321–323.
158 See T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 
(2016), 321–323.
159 Ibid.
160 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 54, 100–107.
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elements. In other words, several elements might form the hard core of a right. 
These elements would then generate the rule-like effect.161 As a third element, Ojanen 
brings up that rights other than absolute rights have a hard core. This doctrine 
separates the inviolable core of the right from the other elements of the right. It 
could be said that even non-absolute rights contain the non-violable hard core, 
which is absolute.162
The “one-right-answer” thesis by Dworkin breaches the elements of natural law.163 
Alexy and Ojanen in turn underline the circumstances of the case and contextual, 
case-to-case interpretation. These scholars, however, seek the answer from the 
deeper levels of law. While the contextual-based interpretation might approximate 
Hart’s positivist approach which underlines discretion, it does not exclude the 
Dworkinian “one-right-answer”thesis.164 The doctrine of similar circumstances 
leading to similar outcomes allows the essence of the right to remain the same. 
Despite the intriguing dimensions of this question, it will not be further elaborated on 
in this thesis. For the purposes of this research it suffices to note that the hard cores 
of rights are seen as absolute and, as such, having the rule-like effect. Furthermore, 
in identifying the hard core of the right, the answer must be sought from the deeper 
levels of law and this calls for the balancing of principles in Alexy’s sense.
3.3 SOME CRITICS OF BALANCING OF RIGHTS
It is quite common understanding that when two fundamental rights must be applied 
simultaneously, it often requires balancing. Some scholars have, however, criticized 
balancing and considered it an incomplete method. Reasons for such criticism 
vary. Some have claimed that balancing, which the court’s decisions are based on, 
is quite opaque. Furthermore, it has been claimed that balancing is irrational and 
arbitrary. Also, balancing has been claimed too narrow when excluding collective 
goals and policies from the considerations.165
161 See T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 
(2016), 321–323; see also for example M. Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa, (Jyväskylä, 1991) 32.
162 See T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 
(2016), 321–323.
163 See for example R. Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz (ed.) Law, Morality, and Society: 
Essays in Honor of HLA Hart, (Oxford 1977), 58–84; R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 
1977) 14–31, 44, 159–60, 340–42, 334, 360; R. Dworkin, Matter of Principle, (London, 1985) 119–145.  
164 For Hart’s positivist approach, see H.L.A Hart, Concept of Law, (Oxford, 1961). For “one-right-answer” thesis, 
see R. Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz (ed.) Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in 
Honor of HLA Hart, (Oxford 1977), 58–84; R.Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 14–31, 
44, 159–60, 340–42, 334, 360; R. Dworkin, Matter of Principle, (London, 1985) 119–145.  
165 See for example S. Greer, “‘Balancing’ and the European Court of Human Rights: a Contribution to the 
Habermas-Alexy debate” in The Cambridge Law Journal 63 (2004) 412–413.
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These concerns are justified to a certain extent. However, Alexy’s doctrine does 
seem to provide an answer to these concerns. Firstly, Alexy does not separate rights 
based on the differing aims. Therefore, both individual rights and collective rights 
are considered equal. Secondly, Alexy’s balancing process is rational and logical. The 
circumstances of the case are the elements for measuring the dimensions of different 
principles. Similar circumstances would lead to similar outcomes.166 Identifying 
Alexy’s circumstances and formulating them in precise conditions leading to a 
certain outcome in similar cases would create a rational formulation for balancing 
in each case. For the third point of criticism, namely the lack of transparency in 
the decision-making process, identifying Alexy’s circumstances would provide a 
tool for the court to formulate their reasoning in a more precise and, as such, also 
more transparent way.
4. DEMOCRACY
This section will briefly introduce the core components of democracy and also some 
of the key concepts related to democracy. While acknowledging how fascinating and 
multilayered the concept of democracy is, it is beyond the scope of this research to 
explore this concept thoroughly. However, a brief overview is provided to facilitate 
the further examination of the relationship between transparency, privacy and 
democracy at a later stage. As it will be argued later in this thesis, if transparency is not 
to be considered a fundamental right, it ought to be considered a right with equivalent 
importance. This argument draws from the relationship between public access to 
documents and democracy. In Nordic countries, public access to documents is seen 
as an essential component of democratic society, as the current Chancellor of Justice 
in Finland, Tuomas Pöysti, puts it, “Rational political, ethical and legal debate 
requires reliable and publicly available information. Thereby access to information 
and participation in public discourse are essential democratic values”.167
Some scholars consider that democracy itself is a right and that there is a general 
right to democracy.168 This right would belong to people169 and in line with Dworkin’s 
thesis would therefore be based on policies. As such, it would always be overrun 
by principles, which are aimed at individual good.170 However, without getting 
166 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 54, 100–107.
167 T. Pöysti, Scandinavian Idea of Informational Fairness in Law – Encounters of Scandinavian and European 
Freedom of Information and Copyright Law, in Scandinavian Studies in Law 65(2007), 225.
168 E. Maes, Constitutional Democracy, Constitutional Interpretation and Conflicting Rights, in Brems (ed.) 
Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 70.
169 Ibid.
170 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 90–100.
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deeper in the rights discussion at this point and while setting Alexy’s differing 
approach of collective and individual rights aside, democracy is not considered a 
right in the sense that rights are defined in this thesis.171 However, democracy is 
an essential building block when balancing fundamental rights. This is because 
limiting fundamental rights is acceptable to a certain extent, when this is necessary 
in a democratic society.172
The roots of democracy are deep in Western society. The origins of democracy 
are often associated with Ancient Greece, but according to some, the first versions 
of democracy can actually be traced all the way to the Mycenaeans.173 Democracy is 
said to be the first form of governance by the people. In other words, people were 
not governed by nature or by one sole authority, such as a king. Even if the existence 
of deities was apparent in the democracy of Ancient Greece, the core idea was that 
humans could actually rule and govern themselves. And when doing this, they were 
equals. Equality in this context meant that the ancient Greeks had equal rights before 
the law and they had equal rights to speak.174 The democracy in Ancient Greece 
was a very pure form of direct democracy and the idea of representative democracy 
has its roots in a much later era, in the 16th to 18th centuries.175 Here, attention 
should be drawn to the core element of democracy. That is equality between people 
when governing themselves. For this to happen, it is naturally essential that those 
participating in governing are provided with equal information. Quite interestingly, it 
appears that public record-keeping existed already in Athens and, even if there was 
no single constitution, the laws were displayed publicly176. Thus, it could be argued 
that access to information already played a role in the first forms of democracy.
4.1 KEY ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRACY
The concept of democracy can be approached from different angles. One way to 
address democracy is to examine the conditions which a sovereign state should 
meet to be considered a democracy. Three elements defined by the late professor 
Thomas Franck can be used as a starting point in this assessment. Franck argues 
that essential elements for democracy are self-determination, freedom of expression 
171 Democracy is not defined as a right for example in the European Convention on Human Rights or in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union.
172 See for example Article 52(1) in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union or Articles 8(2) and 
10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
173 For more, see J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy, (London, 2009) xi.
174 Naturally, this did not apply to slaves or women at the time.
175 J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy, (London, 2009) xiv, xviii, 38.
176 J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy, (London, 2009) 37.
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and electoral rights.177 While the three aspects of democracy defined by Franck can 
without a doubt be considered main elements of democracy, they alone might not 
be enough to build a well-functioning democracy.
Sabino Cassese178 has elaborated Franck’s three elements into more detailed 
requirements. Cassese first underlines the importance of free elections and in this 
context he also stresses the significance of a multi-party system. Besides these two 
points, he also underlines the importance of separation of powers. As a second 
element, he brings up freedom of information and public access to official documents. 
Lastly, he returns to the core values of democracy in Ancient Greece and lists equality 
as one of the components on which democracy is built. These two sets of criteria are 
rather compact and partly overlapping. They seem to complete each other nicely. It 
is also possible to define the core elements of democracy in a much wider way. For 
example, the United Nations Security Council has taken a rather wide approach to 
democracy. This approach has taken place in the context of United States’ invasion 
of Iraq. In several resolutions, the Security Council concluded that the following 
elements are part of democracy: right to determine own political future and control 
own natural resources, right to independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial 
integrity; the rule of law, and democracy, including free and fair elections and an 
internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq.179 As can be seen, 
these elements defining democracy are quite comprehensive.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to draw conclusions about the precise 
elements on which democracy is built. While all of the aforementioned criteria can 
be distinguished, Dworkin draws the punch line of effective democracy quite nicely, 
when elaborating the core requirements for achieving a democratic society. As he 
puts it, “people do not govern themselves if they are deprived of the information 
they need to make an intelligent decision or cheated of the criticism they need in 
order effectively to judge the record of their officials”.180 While recognizing the 
people as sovereign regardless of the actual form the democracy, Dworkin places 
heavy emphasis on gaining access to information in order to govern oneself.181 
Putting this in the context of Franck’s and Cassese’s criteria, it can be concluded that 
free elections and other political institutions related to them, are unquestionably 
the core elements of democracy. However, they would have little value if people 
177 Franck T.M., “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, in The American Journal of International 
Law 86 (1992), 52.
178 Seminar lecture by Sabino Cassese, May 2011, London. Sabino Cassese is a former judge in a constitutional 
court in Italy and professor of Public Law at the University of Rome.
179 Security Council Resolutions 1511(2003), p.1 (no 2), 1546(2004), para 3 and 1637(2005), p. 1 (no 4); Security 
Council Resolution 1546(2004), p. 1 (no 3) and Resolution 1619 and 1637(2005); Security Council Resolution 
1546(2004), p. 1 (no 10); Security Council Resolution 1483(2003), para 22.
180 For the particular relationship between Constitutional rights and principles, see also See K. Tuori, Critical 
Legal Postivism, (Hants, 2002) 171–172.
181 R. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible here?, (Princeton, 2006) 154.
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were deprived of accurate information. Furthermore, people could not be equal if 
not provided with equal information. Even if Dworkin draws his conclusion when 
elaborating on the importance of freedom of speech in a democratic society, this 
doctrine can be extended to the freedom of information and access to documents. 
Freedom of speech would have little use without accurate information.
4.2 DIFFERENT FORMS OF DEMOCRACY
Even if several different types of democracy can be distinguished, they all share 
the core idea of the people as sovereign and citizens’ equal rights to participate 
in the decision-making process.182 The difference in different types of democracy 
comes mainly from the extent to which, and manner in which, the people are able 
materialize their rights.
The purest form of direct democracy183 probably existed in Ancient Greece.184 
While in Greece all citizens participated in the decision-making, direct democracy 
exists today mainly as a component in society, which is mainly based on representative 
democracy. For example, in Switzerland citizens are able to vote when the proposals 
concern constitutional amendments and the outcome of the referendum binds the 
government.185 Also in many of the EU Member States referendums took place before 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.186 In a representative democracy, the members 
of the parliament get the justification for decision-making from the sovereign, i.e. the 
people, which has authorized parliament through free elections.187 Another form of 
democracy is participatory democracy, in which citizens are able participate in the 
decision-making process in one form or another.188 Examples of such participation 
182 G. Smith, Democratic Innovations, (Cambridge, 2009) 22.
183 In some contexts direct democracy is used as a partner to indirect democracy in the sense that in direct 
democracy refers to institutions where the representatives have been elected with direct vote and indirect 
democracy refers to the institutions where the representatives have been chosen from a lot, which has been 
elected with a direct vote in the original country. For that, see A. Rosas & L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law, 
(Oxford, 2010) 112–115.
184 See for example E. Maes, Constitutional Democracy, Constitutional Interpretation and Conflicting Rights, 
in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 71–72.
185 G. Smith, Democratic Innovations, (Cambridge, 2009) 111–113.
186 For more about direct democracy and the relevance of access to correct information in the direct democracy, 
see for example A.Lupia and J.G.Matsusaka, “Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions” in The 
Annual Review of the Political Science 7 (2004), 463–482.
187 See for example P. Avril, “The democratic institutions of the European countries”, in Rieu & Duprat (ed.) 
European democratic culture, (London, 1995), 215–216.
188 For participatory governance, see also E. Korkea-aho & P. Leino, “Who owns the information held by EU 
agencies? Weed killers, commercially sensitive information and transparent and participatory governance” 
in Common Market Law Review 4 (2017), 1059–1092.
45CHAPTER I
are the right to complain to the European Ombudsman and open initiatives to the 
European Commission.189
Features of both above-mentioned types of democracy are combined in the 
concept of deliberative democracy. While representative democracy gets its 
authorization from free elections and voting, deliberative democracy draws it from 
citizens’ participation in the process of drafting the law through free, public debate.190 
It has been noted that possibility to participate in public debate does not yet imply 
that the views expressed would dictate the outcome of the law drafting process.191 192 
Although this is naturally correct, the benefits of public debate are still obvious. Even 
if the outcome might differ from some of the views expressed during the process, 
these views cannot simply be disregarded. To justify the final outcome, dissenting 
opinions should be taken into consideration and “reasoned away”. Even if it might 
be too much to ask to provide reasoning that would convince the opposite side, 
they should at least convince a “reasonable man”. This obviously contributes to 
the final outcome of law drafting processes and should lead to better law-making.
Graham Smith points to the deficit of citizens’ control over the decision-making 
process as a common problem for all of the variations of democracy.193 He suggests 
that transparency could be part of the solution. He separates transparency in relation 
to participants and transparency in relation to wider public.194 For the purposes of 
this research, the latter is of more interest. The sovereign – the people in this case 
– should have the right to know, regardless of the adopted form of democracy.195 
189 A. Rosas & L.Armati, EU Constitutional Law, (Oxford, 2010) 124: Article 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.
190 A. Ieven, Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of 
Human Rights’ balancing of private life against other rights, in E. Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 61–63; see also See E. Maes, Constitutional Democracy, Constitutional 
Interpretation and Conflicting Rights, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 
2008), 74–79. 
191 A. Ieven, Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of 
Human Rights’ balancing of private life against other rights, in E. Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 64.
192 For an analysis of current topical issues in light of deliberative democracy see S. Ecran, “Democratizing 
Identity Politics: a Deliberative approach to the Politics of Recognition”, in D. Gozdecka and M.Kmak (ed.) 
Europe at the Edge of Pluralism, (Intersentia, 2015), 13–26.
193 G. Smith, Democratic Innovations, (Cambridge, 2009) 22.
194 G. Smith, Democratic Innovations, (Cambridge, 2009) 25–26.
195 For the use of term right to know, see for example A.Saarenpää, “Legal Infomatics Today – The View from 
the University of Lapland”, in A. Saarenpää & K. Sztobryn (eds.) Lawyers in the Media Society, The Leal 
Challenges of the Media Society, (Lapin yliopisto, 2016), 11.
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4.3 THE DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE PRACTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Court of Human Rights has referred to democratic society in several 
cases relating to the right to freedom of speech.196 Nevertheless, the Court of Human 
Rights has been criticized for not having given a clear and unambiguous definition of 
democracy.197 It has been claimed that the Court of Human Rights has concentrated 
on the functioning of democratic institutions and the processes related to them 
rather than giving guidelines on how to interpret the concept of democracy itself. 
Moreover, it has been considered problematic that when the Court of Human Rights 
refers to the characteristic values198 of democracy in its case-law, these values have 
not been elaborated further.199
Besides the above-mentioned criticism, the Court of Human Rights has been 
urged to take a clearer position regarding the relationship between democracy and 
human rights. It has been noted that democracy and human rights do not always 
go hand in hand. It often appears that democratic decisions are majority decisions 
and therefore could also discriminate against minorities.200 However they also share 
the underlying value of human autonomy.201
Democracy might not be clearly defined by the ECtHR and there might be some 
deficits in the formulation of the relationship between human rights and democracy, 
however, in the big picture it does seem that human rights are protected by the 
Convention in the context of democratic society rather than the other way around.202
196 See for example ECtHR 24 June 2004, Von Hannover v Germany (2004–VI) and ECtHR 77 June 2017, 
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0627JUD000093113). 
For an analysis, see for example R. Gisbert, The Right to Freedom of expression in a democratic Society (Art. 
20 ECHR), in Garcia Roca & Santolaya (ed.) Europe of Rights: A Compendium of the European Convention 
of Human Rights, (Leiden, 2012), 371–401.
197 A. Ieven, Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of 
Human Rights’ balancing of private life against other rights, in E. Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 57.
198 Pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness.
199 R. O’Connell, “Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in 
a democracy”, in Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 3 (2010), 263–79. 
200 For an analysis of hate speech and democracy in light of the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, see J. Cernic, “Democracy as a Trump Card? Combating Hate Speech in Pluralistic Societies”, in D. 
Gozdecka and M. Kmak (ed.) Europe at the Edge of Pluralism, (Intersentia, 2015), 163–175.
201 A. Ieven, Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of 
Human Rights’ balancing of private life against other rights, in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights (Intersentia, 2008), 61.
202 S. Greer, “‘Balancing’ and the European Court of Human Rights: a Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy 
debate” in The Cambridge Law Journal 63 (2004) 416–417.
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4.4 DEMOCRACY IN THE EU
Democracy is one of the founding values of the European Union and this is also clearly 
expressed in Article 2 of the TEU.203 Despite this, the European Union has long been 
blamed for the deficit of democracy. These claims and the reasons provoking them 
have been vastly explored by various scholars and other stakeholders. For example, 
Rosas and Armati identify three different reasons causing these allegations. First, 
the EU as a whole is seen undemocratic, because it is run by non-elected officials.204 
Second, the European Parliament has been accused of having an undemocratic 
foundation. Third, the lack of transparency in Union decision-making is commonly 
raised as the main problem causing the accusations of the undemocratic Union. 
Both legislative and executive processes are seen opaque. As a more fundamental 
problem, Rosas and Armati identify the lack of a sense of community.205 It is quite 
easy to concur with this; the lack of unity among the nations was quite apparent 
for example during the eurozone crisis.
The European Union has worked to respond to these allegations. The democratic 
foundations of the European Parliament have constantly been increased and the 
Parliament’s role in the legislative process has been strengthened.206 Also, starting 
from the Treaty of Maastricht, the role of transparency has gained more weight in 
the EU institutions decision-making.207 At any rate, as Rosas and Armati note, the 
democratic nature of the Union must be placed in right context. The European 
Union is not a federal state and even less a national state. The discussion on the 
lack of democracy should therefore be put in this context.208
Thus, the settled theories and opinions on how democracy should work might 
not be directly applicable in the European Union. The unique nature of the Union 
might require new solutions. As an example, equality between the Union members 
might not be best achieved in a one-man-one-vote manner but might require some 
more sophisticated practices in order to accomplish the most democratic mode in 
which to function.
203 The Treaty on the European Union (OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 13–45).
204 A. Rosas & L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law, (Oxford, 2010) 111–112.
205 A. Rosas & L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law, (Oxford, 2010) 111–112.
206 A. Rosas & L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law, (Oxford, 2010) 111–123.
207 See for example I. Harden, “The Revision of Regulation 1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents” in 
European Public Law 2 (2009), 239–240.
208 A. Rosas & L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law, (Oxford, 2010) 112. 
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CHAPTER II 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TRANSPARENCY AND DATA PROTECTION  
REGIMES IN EUROPE
This chapter will focus on the development of the transparency and data protection 
regimes in Europe, starting with an overview from the very early stages of 
development. This overview should provide grounds for understanding how the 
Nordic approach on transparency has developed, and how different the development 
process of the two examined rights has been on the European scene. Yet, the progress 
of these concepts has led to the same culmination point in the recent breakthrough, 
giving recognition as a fundamental right to protection of personal data and the right 
of access to documents. This culmination point will be assessed in more detail later 
in the context of the said rights. This section will provide a more general picture 
of the developments.
In chronological order, this chapter will first focus on the development of the 
transparency regime and, more precisely, the right of access to documents. First, 
the background and the context in which the principle of public access was grown 
is examined. This is followed by an overview of the development of the legislative 
framework on access to documents in the European Union. Thereafter, its character 
as a fundamental right will be briefly covered. The second part of this section 
concentrates on developments regarding data protection. For a long time, it has 
been seen essentially as an element of privacy and it will be approached from this 
angle. Thus, the discussion will touch upon the developments of the protection of 
privacy, as such, but the emphasis will be on the evolution of the protection of one’s 
personal data itself. Data protection rights are a more recent phenomenon than 
transparency. The need to protect personal data draws strongly from the progress 
which has taken place in automatic data processing. Its roots are approximately 
60 years long.
The concluding part will focus on the most significant differences and similarities 
between the development of the two fundamental rights under examination; data 
protection and access to documents.
49CHAPTER II 
1. THE GENESIS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO 
DOCUMENTS AND ITS EMERGENCE IN THE 
EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 FIRST DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TOWARDS A RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS
The history of the European transparency regime can be tracked down all the way 
to 18th century. In 1766, the first freedom of press law was adopted in Sweden. 
This law contained the fundamental principle of access to official documents.209 
It is considered the first law, which contained the general principle of access to 
documents in Europe and also more generally in the world.210 The law was enacted 
as a constitutional law whereupon nearly all official documents became public. This 
made critical discussion of the legislation and policies adopted by the government 
possible. This was not the case with religion, which still remained under censorship.211 
The law contained, for example, provisions on access to documents relating to court 
proceedings. Furthermore, the law covered both documents received by the public 
authorities and documents processed by them. The documents covered by this law 
were accessible to the public and freely publishable, however, some exceptions to 
the general principle did exist already at this very early stage. Access to official 
documents was attained either by viewing and copying the document at the public 
authorities’ premises orby receiving a duplicate of the document.212
The father of Swedish freedom of information law was Anders Chydenius, who 
is considered the father of the right of access to documents also in more general 
terms.213 Anders Chydenius was a Swedo-Finn, liberal priest and politician. 
Chydenius saw that societal changes required the awareness of the wider public and 
freedom of press would provide the answer for this. Chydenius was a member of the 
Freedom of Press committee in the Swedish Parliament and even if the majority of 
the members of this committee were rather conservative, members treasuring the 
idea of freedom of press were able to prepare the proposal for the above-mentioned 
209 P. Hyttinen, Anders Chydenius, Defender of Freedom and Democracy, (Kokkola, 1994) 34–35. See also J. 
Hirschfeldt, “Free access to public documents – a heritage from 1766”, in A-S.Lind; J.Reichel & I.Österdahl 
(eds.), Transparency in the Future – Swedish Openness 250 years (Visby, 2017), 21–28.
210 A.Bohlin, Offentlighets principen, (Stockholm, 2001) 18–21; C. Malmström, “Sveriges agerande i Öppenhetsmål 
inför EG-domstolen – politik och juridik hand in hand” in Europarättslig tidskrift, 10 (2008), 11–20.
211 P. Hyttinen, Anders Chydenius, Defender of Freedom and Democracy, (Kokkola, 1994) 34–35.
212 A.Bohlin, Offentlighets principen, (Stockholm, 2001) 18–21.
213 C. Malmström, ”Sveriges agerande i Öppenhetsmål inför EG-domstolen – politik och juridik hand in hand” 
in Europarättslig tidskrift, 10 (2008), 11–20.
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law without heavy constraints. This was mainly due to the inactive participation 
of the more conservative members in committee meetings. The Freedom of Press 
committee submitted their final proposal to the Estates in the spring of 1766. The 
proposal included abolition of censorship with the exception of writings related to 
religion. Access to all official documents, as well as memorandums drafted in the 
parliamentary sessions and protocols from the session, was incorporated in the 
proposal.214 Chydenius worked hard to push the law through the Parliament. In his 
autobiography Chydenius notes that he did not work for any other cause as hard 
as he did for the freedom of the press.215 Chydenius also believes that the absence 
of certain members during the decision-making process were crucial for his law to 
pass in the Parliament. These members were rather conservative and would most 
likely have voted against the Freedom of Press Act.216 Even though freedom of 
press law has been one of Chydenius’ great achievements – and Chydenius himself 
considered it his most important achievement –, quite interestingly, he might be 
even better known as a defender of freedom of trade and industry.217
Chydenius treasured democracy, human rights and equality. Already, back in 
1766, Chydenius stated that 
“No proof should be necessary that a modicum of freedom for 
writing and printing is one of the strongest Pillars of support for 
free Government, for in the absence of such, the Estates would not 
dispose of sufficient knowledge to make good Laws, nor Practitioners 
of Law have control in their vocation, nor Subjects knowledge of the 
requirements laid down in Law, the limits of Authority and their own 
duties. Learning and good manners would be suppressed, coarseness 
214 P. Virrankoski, Anders Chydenius, Demokratisk politiker I upplysningens tid, (Jyväskylä, 1995) 86–93, 
174–196.
215 E.G.Palmen, Anders Chydenius, (Helsingfors, 1903) 109–150; A.Chydenius, Antti Chydeniuksen omatekoinen 
elämänkerta, in Kare (ed.) Anders Chydenius, Suuri Suomalainen valituskirjailija, (Alea-Kirja, 1986), 
434–438. To quote Chydenius,“Ingenting arbetade jag vid denna riksdag så tränget uti som skrif- och 
tryckerifriheten. Nordencrantz’ skrifter hade redan så öppnat mig ögonen, att jag ansåg den för ögonstenen i 
ett fritt rike.” Furthermore, Chydenius noted that “om skrif- och tryckfriheten blifver en frihetens grundpelare 
i alla regeringar, där den skyddas; on de flesta Sveriges olyckor i de nästförflutna tider leda sin upprinnelse 
ifrån mörker och villfarelse, så är det värdt för eftervärlden att känna de som tillfälligheter, hvarigenom 
den hos oss liksom genom ett lyckskott af försynenblifvit skänkt åt Svea innebyggare, - anekdoter, som 
annars aldrig kunde hinna i våra häfdatecknares händer”, E.G.Palmen, Anders Chydenius, (Helsingfors, 
1903) 109–110.
216 Ibid.
217 P-L. Kastari, Antti Chydenius ja painovapauden aate, (Tampereen yliopisto, 1981) 1; L. Harmaja, Antti Chydenius 
kansantaloudellisena kirjailijana, (Helsinki, 1929); see also The National Gain” by Anders Chydenius, translated 
from the Swedish original published in 1765 with an introduction by Georg Schauman (London, 1931); C.Uhr, 
Antti Chydenius 1729–1803, Adam Smithin Suomalainen edelläkävijä, (Helsinki, 1965).
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in thought, speech and customs would flourish, and a sinister gloom 
would within a few years darken our entire Sky of Freedom.”
Memorandum on the Freedom of the Press, 1765.218
These words, expressed more than 250 years ago, show the triangle between freedom 
of press and transparency, good administration and democracy. Only freedom of 
press is directly mentioned in the text, but the idea of good administration together 
with democracy, are clearly visible in these lines. Regarding the explicitly-mentioned 
freedom of writing, the requirement of access to official documents is tacit, as access 
is a prerequisite for distribution of information.
The principle of access to documents has long traditions in Northern Europe. 
However, its emergence in other European countries has taken place only very 
recently. It seems that the real breakthrough took place only in the 1990s when 
transparency legislation was passed in the recently-born democracies in Eastern 
and Central European countries. The older and more mature democracies in Europe 
also adopted new legislation on transparency during this period.219 This was more 
than 200 years after Chydenius had expressed the above ideas on the need for 
greater transparency.
1.2 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU
The first step towards transparency regulation in the European Union was the 
adoption of the Declaration of the Treaty of Maastricht on the right of access to 
information. As it was still just a Declaration, it did indicate political willingness to 
move in that direction, but it was not legally binding. The legal basis for regulation 
regarding public access to documents was introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1997. The new Article 255 EC220 provided the right of access to documents to any 
citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered 
office in a Member State. This was, however, subject to secondary legislation, which 
was to be adopted within two years after the Treaty entered into force.221
218 P. Hyttinen, Anders Chydenius, Defender of Freedom and Democracy, (Kokkola, 1994) 34–35. See also 
Anders Chydenius Foundation, What did Chydenius say about freedom of the press, available on the internet 
< www.chydenius.net/historia/mita_sanoi/e_ilmaisunvapaudesta.asp > [last visited 14.8.2017].
219 Explanatory report of the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, Explanatory Report 
– CETS 205 – Access to Official Documents; See also for example P.Birkinshaw, Freedom of information 
The Law, the Practice and the Ideal, (Cambridge, 2010) 29; P. Birkinshaw, “Review of V. Deckmyn and I. 
Thompson (eds.), Openness and Transparency in the European Union” in European Public Law 4 (1998), 
614–615..
220 Currently article 15 of TFEU.
221 See also A. Alamanno, “Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law: Transparency, Participation and 
Democracy” in European Law Review 39 (2014), 72–90; P.Birkinshaw, “Review of V. Deckmyn and I. 
Thompson (eds.), Openness and Transparency in the European Union” in European Public Law 4 (1998), 
613–622; H. Ragnemalm, “The Community Courts and Openness Within the European Union” in Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2 (1999), 19–30.
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According to Cecilia Malmström, who later became the European Commissioner 
responsible for home affairs, the negotiations that eventually led to the adoption 
of Article 255 EC were quite complicated. Resistance towards greater transparency 
came not only from some Member States, which lacked long traditions in access to 
official documents, but also from some parts of the EU institutions. These institutions 
were unaccustomed to the idea of public access to their documents.222
After the initial struggle of creating a functional legal basis for secondary 
legislation, it became possible to set the parameters for more detailed regulation 
of public access to documents in the EU context. It was during the Swedish 
Presidency in the spring of 2001 when this process culminated in the adoption of 
the Transparency Regulation.223
The Transparency Regulation governs the disclosure of the EU institutions’ 
documents to the public. Its predecessor was the Code of Conduct224 adopted by 
the Commission and the Council. The Commission and Council had both also 
adopted the decisions225 specifying the rules on the access to these institutions’ 
documents.226 This adoption of these instruments took place in the beginning of 
1990s. In comparison with the Transparency Regulation, one of the most significant 
differences is that the before-mentioned rules governed only the documents 
drawn up by these institutions. The current Transparency Regulation applies to 
all documents held by the institutions regardless of the original source. This can 
be considered one of the core principles of the Transparency Regulation.
The Transparency Regulation was adopted on the 30 May 2001 and this was 
considered as a triumph for transparency. Some authors have noted that the 
Regulation was the result of a long negotiation process and that its adoption was 
possibly due to the transparency-friendly political climate at the time.227 Besides 
the appropriate climate facilitating this change, it did also require the efforts of the 
transparency-oriented Member States.228
222 C. Malmström, “Sveriges agerande i Öppenhetsmål inför EG-domstolen – politik och juridik hand in hand” 
in Europarättslig tidskrift, 10 (2008), 11–20.
223 I. Harden, “The Revision of Regulation 1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents” in European Public Law 
2 (2009), 239–256.
224 Code of Conduct Concerning Public Access to Documents to Council and Commission Documents (OJ L 340, 
31.12.1993, p. 41–42).
225 Council Decision of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council documents (OJ L 340, 31.12.1993, p.43–
44); Commission Decision of February 1994 on public access to Commission documents (OJ L 46, 18.2.1994, 
p. 58–59).
226 See also for example S. Kadelbach, “Case Law A. Court of Justice”, in Common Market Law Review 38 
(2001), 179–180.  
227 I. Harden, “The Revision of Regulation 1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents” in European Public Law 
2 (2009), 239–256.
228 See for instance C. Malmström, “Sveriges agerande i Öppenhetsmål inför EG-domstolen – politik och juridik 
hand in hand” in Europarättslig tidskrift, 10 (2008), 11–20.
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The right of public access to documents reached its culmination point in the 
European Union legal framework when the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (“the Charter”) was adopted and later given the same status as the 
founding treaties. The Charter clearly recognizes public access to documents as a 
fundamental right. Article 42 of the Charter stipulates that any citizen of the Union 
has a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.229 
This approach reflects the Nordic thinking of public access principle; the right of 
public access is a fundamental right – or constitutional right – in Nordic countries.230
Setting this development in an international context and looking at the 
international instruments in this area, the United Nations Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters231 ought to be mentioned. The European Union has also 
ratified this so-called Aarhus Convention. However, this Convention covers only 
issues relating to environmental matters. The Aarhus Convention has now celebrated 
its 20th birthday, having been adopted in 1998.
Besides the before-mentioned legislation, the first binding international 
instrument regarding access to official documents was negotiated approximately 
15 years ago. The Convention of the Council of Europe on Access to Official 
Documents (Convention 205) was opened for signatures in June 2008. As was 
the case regarding the protection of personal data, there were some pre-existing 
instruments guiding the contracting parties of the Council of Europe towards a 
more transparent society. The Committee of Ministers had adopted earlier both 
a Recommendation and Declaration regarding public access to documents. The 
Recommendation 2002(2) adopted in 2002 created basis for the Convention 205. At 
the moment, 14 contracting parties have signed the Convention and nine out these 
14 have also ratified it, Norway being the first, followed by Hungary. Besides the 
Northern European countries, many new members of the Council of Europe, such 
as Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia and Slovenia have signed the Convention. 
The Convention will enter into force after ten parties have ratified it.
229 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 1–16).
230 See for example for Finland Perustuslaki 12 §.
231 13. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, Aarhus, Denmark, 25 June 1998.
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2. THE EMERGENCE OF DATA PROTECTION IN  
THE EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TOWARDS DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION
The evolution of data protection legislation closely follows technological 
developments. In essence, the driving force behind the development of data 
protection regulation was the fear of the potential effects of uncontrolled use of new 
information technologies. The new technologies enabled gathering vast amounts 
of information in extensive data banks. Not only did it become possible to process 
large amounts of data, but the possibilities to interlink personal data also reached 
a new level. Information from two different data banks became easily connectable 
based on as little as one common element.232 On the one hand, the new technologies 
were seen as a threat to privacy and on the other hand the new possibilities they 
offered for controlling and supervising people were considered dubious.233 This 
progress can be placed in the 1960s.234
Initially, automatic data processing was only used for different functions of 
calculation. Only at a later stage did the new technologies become suitable for 
other types of usage on a larger scale, such as information saving, processing 
and combining. The technical development in this area can be considered very 
significant. The first computers were physically very large; their actual size was easily 
tens of metres.235 Today, an effective computer fits in our purse and even pockets. 
Not only has it become easier to carry and place the computers and information 
technologies, but they have also become affordable for the wider public. Against 
this background, it is quite obvious why the fear of Orwell’s “Big Brother” reached 
new proportions in the 1960s.
When looking at the progress taking place in the 1960s, it can be argued that 
a similar transition period is taking place today. Quite often the significance of 
contemporary developments is overestimated. However, the consequences of the 
current progress can hardly be overestimated: the rapid growth in the number 
of street cameras, drones, mobile phones with cameras, efficient means for data 
232 A-R. Wallin & P. Nurmi, Tietosuojalainsäädäntö, (Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1990) 1–7.
233 Ibid.
234 See for example Privacy International, What is Data Protection, available on the internet < https://
privacyinternational.org/node/44 > [last visited 14.8.2017]. For the developments in Europe, see also De 
Hert, P. & V. Papakonstantinou, “The rich UK contribution to the field of EU data protection: Let’s not go 
for “third country” status after Brexit” in Computer Law & Security Review 33 (2017), 355–356.
235 A-R. Wallin & P. Nurmi, Tietosuojalainsäädäntö, (Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1990) 3–5.
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transfers and expanded use of social networks etc. New technologies are providing 
possibilities to record everyday life, combined with the ability to transfer and 
distribute this data rapidly and very efficiently. This progress has culminated into 
a present state where it is said that we live in a network society.236
When the main development in the 1960s was the extent and ease of data 
collection and the possibility to combine data from different sources, while the 
key issue today seems to relate to the nature of the data, which new technologies 
enable us to collect, save and distribute. Recording your schoolteacher lecturing 
the class differs significantly from information about, for example, the books she 
has borrowed or bought on any particular day. Furthermore, new technologies not 
only allow you to monitor what books you have bought, but even more precisely to 
have information on which articles caught your attention in today’s online paper, 
etc. The data subject themselves might not even know the conclusion drawn from 
the personal information his or her online behaviour reveals to a data controller.237
2.2 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU
As was mentioned, the protection of personal data and data files is a rather new 
phenomenon.238 The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108) was the first 
European legal framework for the protection of personal data.239 This Convention 
was also the first international legally binding instrument in the field of data 
protection and some non-European countries have also accessed Convention 108. 
When contextualising this progress, it should not be forgotten that Convention 108 
was opened for signatures only in January 1981.240 Achieving this goal took four 
years of negotiating.
At this stage, 51 contracting parties have ratified the Convention, with the latest 
ratifying party being Tunisia, which ratified the Convention in July 2017.241 Even 
though the first international instrument regulating data protection is 37 years old, 
236 A. Saarenpää, “Legal Infomatics Today – The View from the University of Lapland”, in A. Saarenpää & K. 
Sztobryn (eds.) Lawyers in the Media Society, The Leal Challenges of the Media Society, (Lapin yliopisto, 
2016), 10–16.
237 For profiling, see M. Hildebrandt, “Who is profiling who? Invisible Visibility”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. 
De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009).
238 L.A.Bygrave, Data Protection Law, Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer Law International, 
2002) 2.
239 Convention 108 and Protocol, available on the internet < www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/convention108-
and-protocol > [last visited 15.8.2018].
240 Convention 108 and Protocol, available on the internet < www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/convention108-
and-protocol > [last visited 15.8.2018].
241 Convention 108 and Protocol, available on the internet < www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/
conventions/treaty/108/signatures?p_auth=Xn1qwlWa > [last visited 15.8.2018].
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the first national laws protecting personal data were drafted in Europe in the 1970s; 
that is ten years earlier. For example in Germany, a first data protection law was 
passed in the region of Hesse in 1970.242 In Sweden, a national law on the protection 
of personal data was passed in 1973, with Sweden being the first country to enact a 
national data protection law.243 In other Nordic countries, data protection laws were 
adopted at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.244 In France, the Loi 
relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés entered into force in 1978.245
Already before the conclusion of Convention 108, there had been some attempts 
in Europe to find common ground on data protection principles, both in the private 
and public sectors. For example, the Council of Europe adopted two Resolutions 
relating to this topic at the beginning of the 1970s.246
The European data protection regime is under an extensive transition period 
at the moment. The first instrument regulating data protection in the European 
Union was Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.247 Many of the 
solutions adopted earlier in the French legislation (Loi relative à l’informatique, 
aux fichiers et aux libertés) formed guidelines for the Data Protection Directive.248 
The Data Protection Directive has not been applicable from 25 May 2018 when the 
application of the General Data Protection Regulation began.249
The Data Protection Directive provided a general legal framework up until May 
2018 for the processing of personal data in the European Union.250 An interesting 
detail in the process towards said Data Protection Directive is the fact that the 
Commission amended its proposal as regards the formal distinction between the 
242 See for example Privacy International, What is Data Protection, available on the internet < https://
privacyinternational.org/node/44 > [last visited 14.8.2017].
243 P. Seipel, “Sweden”, in Blume (ed.) Nordic Data Protection, (Kauppakaari, 2001), 116.
244 P. Blume, “Denmark”, in Blume (ed.) Nordic Data Protection, (Kauppakaari, 2001), 11; A .Saarenpää, 
“Finland”, in Blume (ed.) Nordic Data Protection, (Kauppakaari, 2001), 42; D.W. Schartum, “Norway”, in 
Blume (ed.) Nordic Data Protection, (Kauppakaari, 2001), 78.
245 See for example L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law, Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer 
Law International, 2002); For the recent developments in the EU, see B. Custers, F. Dechesne, A.M. Sears, T. 
Tani & S. van der Hof, “A comparison of data protection legislation and policies across the EU” in Computer 
Law & Security Review 34 (2018), 234–243.
246 CoE, Committee of Ministers (1973), Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of individuals vis-
à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector, 26 September 1973;  CoE, Committee of Ministers (1974), 
Resolution (74) 29 on the protection of the privacy of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the public 
sector, 20 September 1974.
247 The ongoing reform process regarding data protection legislation in the European Union will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapters IV and VII.
248 Bygrave, Data Protection Law, Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer Law International. 
The Hague, 2002) 5.
249 For an academic analysis of the GDPR negotiations, see A. Rossi, “How the Snowden Revelations Saved the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation” in The International Spectator Italian Journal of International 
Affairs 53(2018), 95–111.
250 From May 2018 onwards the processing of personal must be carried out in accordance with the General Data 
Protection Regulation.
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rules applying to the public and private sectors. This was done at the Parliament’s 
request.251
Besides the general legal framework there are several specific regimes for data 
protection and also sectoral legislation. An example of the sectoral legislation is 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation (and its predecessor, Data Protection 
Regulation), which regulates the processing of personal data by the Union 
institutions. The former Data Protection Regulation followed the solutions adopted 
in the Data Protection Directive. This Regulation was also renewed in the course 
of the recent data protection reform.
The European legal framework, which is briefly covered in this section, illustrates 
that EU-level regulation of data protection is comprehensive. It follows that data 
protection legislation has, or at least should have, similar features in all Member 
States. Based on Convention 108, the similarities should be detectable in the 
legislation of other European states.
As was the case with the right of access to documents, the culmination point 
for the development of data protection has been its recognition as a fundamental 
right. At the latest, this took place when the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union entered into force. The Charter clearly stipulates that everyone has 
the right to protection of personal data. Before this culmination point, the protection 
of personal data was seen as an element of privacy. Privacy, in turn, has enjoyed a 
rather unchallenged position as a fundamental right for a long time. For example, 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides everyone with the 
right to respect for their private and family life, home and correspondence. Privacy 
has long been recognised as one of the corner-stones of modern Western society.252 
Quite interestingly, the right to privacy can also be linked with developments leading 
society towards a more individualistic culture.253 The scope and the limits of privacy 
are under constant debate and the further we are from the hard core of privacy, 
the more complex the questions become. The first attempts to define privacy can 
be placed in the United States, where this happened in close connection with the 
growing power of the press and the increasing influence of journalists.254
251 Commission of the European Communities, Explanatory Memorandum com(92) 422 final, p. 2.
252 A-R. Wallin & P. Nurmi, Tietosuojalainsäädäntö, (Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1990) 1–7. For the global 
dimension of the development, see Benediek, A and M. Römer, “Externalizing Europe: the global effects of 
European data protection” in Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance 21 (2019), 32–43.
253 C. Bennet & C. Raab, The Governance of Privacy - Policy instruments in global perspective, (Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2003) 14–15.
254 A-R. Wallin & P. Nurmi, Tietosuojalainsäädäntö, (Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1990) 4.
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3. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE RIGHTS EXAMINED IN THIS THESIS
This chapter has examined and explained some of the developments and different 
phases in the evolution of the transparency and data protection regimes in the 
European context. Next, the concluding section will examine some of the most 
significant similarities and differences in the evolution of these two rights.
Looking at the right of access to documents, it is easy to identify certain phases 
in its evolution, with the first phase covering the time from its emergence to the 
1990s. This rather long period is characterised by relative silence of this right, 
despite the birth and existence of it, still lacking a more general breakthrough in 
the wider European context. While quietly and firmly strengthening its place in the 
Nordic countries, it did not have wider recognition in Europe. The second phase 
is characterised by the relatively rapid breakthrough in European countries and 
in the European Union institutions. It can be argued that at the moment we are 
living the third phase of the evolution; access to documents has not only become 
recognized as a right more extensively in Europe, but it is also firmly approaching 
its status as a fundamental right on more general level.
The evolutionary process of the right to protection of personal data is slightly 
different. It is not characterized by clearly separable phases. Its development has 
a close and logical connection with the progress of related technologies. Therefore, 
it also seems quite natural that its emergence throughout Europe has taken place 
approximately at the same time, starting from the 1970s.
From a legal point of view, it is possible to distinguish the periods when data 
protection was considered a part of privacy from the current situation marked by 
the acceptance of protection of personal data as an individual fundamental right. 
Despite the differences in the development processes, the culmination point of both 
access to documents and data protection is the same; fundamental right status. 
However, it seems like the concept of data protection will keep evolving further 
while the public access principle seems more stable. This is due to the constantly 
evolving technological environment. As an example of the further fragmentation 
of the concept of the protection of personal data, the “right to be forgotten” can be 
mentioned. Without elaborating this further, it suffices to note that certain elements 
of the protection of personal data are gradually gaining increasingly attention as 
independent elements.255
255 As a recent example of this fragmentation, see for example W. Li, “A tale of two rights: exploring the potential 
conflict between two rights to data portability and right to be forgotten under the General Data Protection 
Regulation” in International Data Privacy Law 8 (2018) and J.C. Buitelaar, “Child’s best interest and 
informational self-determination: what the GDPR can learn from children’s rights” in International Data 
Privacy Law 8 (2018).
59CHAPTER II 
Besides the differences in the evolutionary process itself, another clear difference 
between these two rights is that the protection of personal data has a longer common 
European history, while access to documents is actually an older concept, but was 
originally recognized only in a very limited number of European countries. When 
comparing the development of data protection and transparency, one of the most 
significant and apparent differences derives from the way they have been rooted in 
the European ground. While data protection has a relatively long history in European 
countries, access to documents is a newcomer. Naturally, both data protection and 
access to documents are rather “new kids on the block” when examining fundamental 
rights from a more general and wider perspective.
This chapter has differentiated the developments of these two rights and provided 
some explanations for it. However, it does seem that, in essence, the emergence of 
both of these rights has been launched by technological changes. While this is quite 
clear regarding data protection, we can also find a technological innovation behind 
the genesis of transparency legislation; namely printing. This observation sets an 
excellent ground to question why data protection development took place relatively 
simultaneously in different European countries when this was not the case regarding 
the right of access to documents.256 The answer can be sought from a number of 
factors. One of the most apparent explanations relates to globalization. In a sense, 
Europe has become “smaller” when compared with the situation in 1776. One of 
the main questions in the early phases of protection of personal data was precisely 
the free flow of data between different European states as transborder data flows 
had become quite ordinary. Access to documents did not face similar issues in its 
early stages and, due to the different nature of this right, corresponding questions 
have not arisen in its later developments either.
However, we can seek another and even more interesting explanation from 
cultural and societal reasons. Developing technologies created pressure to protect 
one’s privacy including personal data, as explained earlier in section 2.1. When this 
happened, privacy was already considered as a right requiring protection and it also 
needed to be protected in the changing environment. However, the technological 
inventions behind the laws regulating the freedom of press did not create pressure to 
open official files to the public. Printing did, however, enable the birth of mass media. 
Freedom of press can of course be realized without access to official documents, even 
if it can be argued that some of the core functions of this right are left incomplete 
without access to relevant public sector information. However, the urge to have 
access to official documents did not follow from the existing societal setting, but it 
had to arise from society. Thus, it can be argued that the pressure leading towards 
256 See for example C.Uhr, Antti Chydenius 1729–1803, Adam Smithin Suomalainen edelläkävijä, (Helsinki, 
1965). Uhr argues that Chydenius and his thoughts would have become better recognized and received if 
the scene had been Paris or London instead Sweden.
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regulation regarding access to documents is rather based on cultural and societal 
changes, and the relatively slow expansion of this right can be explained by cultural 




This chapter will examine some of the core concepts of European transparency 
legislation. While these concepts are presented in the general framework of the 
European transparency regime, the purpose of this chapter is not to give an 
exhaustive picture of the regulatory framework. Instead the focus will be on selected 
concepts. These concepts will play a significant role later in this thesis, when the 
tension between transparency and data protection will be tackled. At that stage, it 
will be fundamental to understand the dimensions of these concepts as well as how 
they function in the European legal framework. Therefore these concepts must first 
be identified and thereafter elaborated.
First, a general overview of the foundations of European transparency regulation 
will be provided. The basis to consider the right of access to documents as a 
fundamental right will be examined. Also, the relationship between transparency 
and democracy will be touched upon. More detailed analysis of this relationship 
will be provided in the concluding chapter. The latter part of this chapter will cover 
some of the most significant concepts of transparency legislation and examine how 
they are to be understood in the European legal framework. First, the definition 
of a document will be studied and this will be followed by the identification and 
elaboration of the core principles of transparency regulation. These principles are 
the soul of the legislation; not always apparent, but always present. Without a 
thorough understanding of these principles, one cannot fully comprehend European 
transparency regulation. A significant part of the content of these concepts is drawn 
from the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the preparatory 
work of the transparency legislation. The structure of this chapter and the manner 
which the key concepts are presented in this thesis serve mainly for the purposes 
of this thesis.257
Before engaging to this discussion further, it must be underlined that the 
European Union does not have the competence to harmonize legislation on access to 
documents in Member States.258 European Union transparency legislation therefore 
257 For comprehensive presentation of the Transparency Regulation, see B. Driessen, Transparency in EU 
Institutional Law: A Practitioner’s Handbook, (Kluwer 2012). This presentation reflects, however, the 
personal views of the writer and approaches transparency in a rather restrictive manner.
258 See Article 5 TEU; Article 15 TFEU. See also for example Article 29 Data Protection working party, “Opinion 
2/2016 on the publication of Personal Data for Transparency purposes in the Public Sector”, 1806/16/EN WP 
239, p. 2. WP29 clearly takes the approach that the said opinion on transparency in the public sector does 
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applies only to the Union institutions. It follows that Union should not regulate how 
personal data is disclosed based on public access to documents legislation in Member 
States either.259 Transparent administration is a relatively new phenomenon in the 
EU context. Transparency and open governance do not have a long tradition in 
the European Union institutions and for a long time the presumption was rather 
secrecy and non-disclosure of information. Some relics of this thinking still exist.260
1. TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK – A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR  
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DEMOCRACY
This thesis examines the right of public access to documents as a fundamental 
right. Its status as a fundamental right in the European Union was controversial 
still some years ago and its final emergence in the field of fundamental rights has 
taken place only very recently. While the angle of this thesis builds on the tension 
between the two fundamental rights, an alternative approach would have been to 
examine the right of public access documents as an essential element of democratic 
society. This section will first elaborate the right of public access to documents 
as a fundamental right. Thereafter a brief overview of the relationship between 
transparency and democracy will be given. More detailed analysis of democracy as 
one the Transparency Regulation’s aims will be conducted in the concluding chapter.
1.1 TRANSPARENCY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The nature of the right of access to documents was widely debated before the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights entered into force. There was not a solid understanding that 
the right of access to documents was fundamental right. Even though many of the 
Member States recognized it in their constitutions as a right, it was not unanimously 
accepted as fundamental right in the European Union.261 Some dissenting opinions 
not address the question of which information should be available based on national legislation in Member 
States. For the scope of Union law, see also case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2018:788.
259 For a different approach, see M. Koillinen, “Oikeudesta anonyymiin julkisen vallan käyttöön”, in Lakimies 
1 (2016), 26–53.
260 See for instance A. Bicarregui “Rights of Access under European Union Law” in Coppel (ed.) Information 
Rights, Law and Practice, (Oxford, 2010), 93; see also B. Driessen, “The Council of the European Union 
and access to documents” in European Law Review 30 (2005), 679–696.
261 In a survey conducted in 2005, it was discovered that 10 out of 24 Member States’ constitutions acknowledged 
access to documents as a right. In four other Member States’ constitutions, it was formulated as a duty for 
authorities to release information.
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might still exist. However, with the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, there is no longer room for a real dispute over the nature of the right of 
public access. It is a fundamental right. However, the Charter recognizes public 
access to documents as fundamental right only in relation to the EU institutions. 
Hence, those Member States which do not recognize public access to documents 
as a fundamental right may preserve their approach. In other words, public access 
to documents might still not be recognized as a fundamental right in the European 
Union on the level of all Members States, but the angle of the variance has twisted; 
its’ nature cannot be denied when the focus is on the EU institutions.
Even if public access to documents is not recognized as a fundamental right 
in all European legal systems, this does not imply that it would be unknown in 
such cases. The right of access to public documents indeed has institutionalized 
status in most of the Member States. It is considered a legal principle in many 
of the European Union Member States. Sometimes it might be formulated as a 
responsibility on authorities to actively disclose information or it might be explicitly 
formulated as one’s right of access to documents. In both cases, it establishes the 
right to know for the public.262
1.1.1 LEGAL BASIS
Before the Charter of Fundamental Rights entered into force, the right of access 
was explained as a fundamental right partly based on its legal basis, which was set 
in EU primary legislation. The legal basis for public access to documents is briefly 
examined next.
The legal basis for public access to the EU institutions’ documents was laid 
down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, the 
current Transparency Regulation was drafted while the Treaty of Amsterdam was 
still in force and its legal basis is therefore drawn from the Amsterdam Treaty. An 
attempt to reform the Transparency Regulation has taken place and the negotiations 
for the recast process of the Transparency Regulation was launched in 2008.263 
Unfortunately, the negotiations have not advanced for years and it seems unlikely 
that this would change in the near future. Even the so-called “lisbonisation” of the 
Transparency Regulation has not been carried through, and therefore the legal 
basis for the Transparency Regulation is still drawn from the Treaty of Amsterdam.
262 H. Kranenborg and W. Woermans Access to Information in the European Union – a Comparative Analysis 
of EC and Member State Legislation (Europa Law Publishing, 2005), 10. See also for example T. De Freitas, 
“Administrative Transparency in Portugal”, in European Public Law 2(2016), 667–688. 
263 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access 
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents COM(2008) 229 final (30.4.2008).   
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The legal basis for public access to documents has stimulated some commentaries 
on the nature of said right. It has been suggested that the right to information is not a 
universal right. The precise meaning of this statement is unclear, but this argument 
has been justified with the formulation of Article 255 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.264 
According to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the right of access to documents can be 
limited on the grounds of private and public interests. However, these limits have 
to be defined in law.265 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
contains a similar provision.266
In other words, the legal basis clearly entitles the Council, together with the 
European Parliament, determine the limits for the right of access. This must be 
done in a legislative procedure. This might seem to limit the right of access to 
documents, but actually, it underlines the nature of the said right as a fundamental 
right. Stemming from the common European heritage, and even more importantly, 
from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the restrictions to fundamental rights 
must be laid down by law.267 It is acknowledged that sometimes there might be a 
need to balance two fundamental rights and restrict the scope of one or the other 
– or maybe even both – in order to apply them simultaneously, while the essence 
of both rights should be preserved.268
It therefore seems that the requirement to define the limitations in law legislated 
in ordinary legislative procedure actually emphasizes the fundamental nature of 
the right of public access. It implies that the institution cannot diverge from the 
Transparency Regulation by enlarging, for example, the scope of the exceptions in 
their internal rules of procedure. This seems even more clear after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, which specifically articulates that the institutions’ internal 
rules of procedure are to be in accordance with access to document regulation.269 
Thus the sole fact that there can be limitations to the right of access to documents 
cannot be considered to decrease the status of the said right.
264 See for instance V. Deckmyn, Guide to European Union Information, (European Institute of Public 
Administration, 2003), 5.
265 According to Article 255(2) “General principles and limits on the grounds of public or private interest 
governing this right of access to documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 251 within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam”.
266 According to Article 15(3) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union “[…] General principles 
and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of access to documents shall be 
determined by the European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure. Each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings 
are transparent and shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to 
its documents, in accordance with the regulations referred to in the second subparagraph”.
267 Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
268 See Chapter I.
269 Art. 15 of the TFEU stipulates that “each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings 
are transparent and shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to 
its documents, in accordance with the regulations referred to in the second subparagraph”.
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And lastly, if the intention with the universal right was to indicate that there is 
no such thing as unlimited access to all documents, this is true. And it is equally true 
that such a right would not be feasible. The advantages of transparent administration 
are recognized in the legislation, and good administration derives partly from the 
transparency. But this does not equal an all-encompassing transparency. It is equally 
important to protect certain interests and protecting these interests might in some 
cases require non-disclosure of some parts of the document. Such interests could 
relate, for example, to international relations or military matters. In some cases, 
the protection of personal data could be such an interest. When the exceptions 
to public access to documents are based on such interests and are first clearly 
defined and thereafter narrowly applied, the exceptions rather serve the core idea 
of transparency than diminish its purpose.
1.1.2 CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
If the right of access to documents was earlier explained as a fundamental right 
based on its legal basis, the necessary institutional support for the full recognition 
was gained at the highest possible level when the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
entered into force.270 After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon271, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights became equally binding and valued with the founding treaties.
Article 42 of the Charter guarantees that “any citizen of the Union, and any 
natural or legal person residing or having registered office in a Member State, has 
a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents”. 
The right of access covers the documents held by institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union despite their medium. Thus, public access to documents is 
to be considered a fundamental right in the administrative context of the European 
Union. However, this approach cannot necessarily be extended to the Member States 
of European Union, which all have different administrative traditions.
To conclude, in the wider European context, the status of the right to information 
is still somewhat of a blur.272 Not all of the Member States recognize the right to 
information as a fundamental right. This is the case for example in Germany and 
in Slovenia. However, this does not necessarily imply that the weight placed on 
270 For institutional support, see Chapter I section 1.1 and in particular Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
(Duckworth 1977) 39–45, 64–68.
271 The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force 1 December 2010.
272 For wider European approach, see also ECtHR 14 April 2009, Tárásag a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary, 
Application No 3734/05 and ECtHR 26 May, Kenedi v Hungary, Application no31475/05. The case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights suggests that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
contains an element of right of access to documents held by authorities or public institutions.
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transparency in a democratic society is overlooked in such cases. In Slovenia, for 
example, transparency is highly valued in the national legislation.273
1.2 TRANSPARENCY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR A WELL-
FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY
While data protection legislation has emerged simultaneously in European states, 
regulation relating to public access to documents has developed with very different 
paces in different parts of Europe. The first pan-European instrument (Convention 
205) was opened for signatures only in June 2009 and it will enter into force once 
ten signatory parties ratify the Convention. This has not yet happened.274
It is not therefore surprising that the nature of public access to documents as 
a fundamental right might still raise some question marks in the wider European 
context. However, the connection between well-functioning democracy and 
transparency is explicitly acknowledged.275 Besides the clear references in legislative 
acts on how transparency strengthens democracy, and surveys carried out in this 
topic, the Court of Justice of the European Union has emphasized how transparency 
contributes to the democratic structures of society. Furthermore, the CJEU has so 
far solved some hard cases by elaborating the relationship between transparency 
and democracy rather than the nature of public access as a fundamental right.276 
It must be noted though, that the core question in these benchmark cases has not 
been the collision of two fundamental rights. Instead the focus has been on the 
application of some of the exceptions laid down in the Transparency Regulation. 
These exceptions do not necessarily protect interests related to other fundamental 
rights. The interest protected by the exception might relate, for example, to legal 
advice277 or the institutions’ decision-making -process, or so-called “space to think”278.
273 See for example Slovenian Access to Public Information Act, published on 22 March 2003 (Official Gazette 
of RS. No 24/2003), available on internet < www.ip-rs.si> [last visited 6.8.2017].
274 See Details of Treaty No.205, Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, available on 
the internet  <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/205> [last visited 
21.2.2017].
275 H. Kranenborg and W. Woermans Access to Information in the European Union – a Comparative Analysis 
of EC and Member State Legislation (Europa Law Publishing, 2005) 10.
276 See for example an Opinion of AG Maduro in joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ 
Council, ECLI:EU:C:2007:721, delivered 29 November 2007, para 32 and Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 
P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374. See also for example D. Ritleng, “Does the European 
Court of Justice take democracy seriously? Some thoughts about the Macro-Financial Assistance case” in 
Common Market Law Review 53 (2016), 11–34.
277 See for example, Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374; 
See also Opinion of AG Bobek in case C-213/15 P Commission v Breyer, ECLI:EU:C:2016:994.
278 See for example, Case C-280/11 P Council v Access Info Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2013.
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At this stage, it is enough to note that transparency is an essential element of 
democratic society. The relationship between transparency and democracy will be 
elaborated in more detail when the aims and objectives of Transparency Regulation 
are examined in the concluding chapter.
2. THE CONCEPT OF DOCUMENT (VS INFORMATION)
When colliding rules of data protection and public access to documents legislation 
are assessed, one of the central issues to consider is how the material scope of the 
data protection legislation and public access to documents legislation overlaps. 
The Transparency Regulation applies to all documents held by an institution.279 
It is therefore essential to elaborate the concept of document in detail. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is of a particular interest to assess how document differs 
from information, and how it relates to data banks. This will be assessed later in the 
concluding chapter together with the material scope of data protection legislation 
and, in particular, with the concept of personal data.
European public access to documents legislation provides the public with access to 
documents, not to information as in some Member States.280 The difference between 
document and information might seem significant. Information is considered a 
wider concept and it can be argued that it covers more different types of data 
than a simple document does. However, the wide definition of document together 
with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union has rendered the 
difference a minor one.281
The Transparency Regulation defines document as “any content whatever 
its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form a sound, visual or 
audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and 
decisions falling within the institution’s sphere of responsibility”.282 Roughly, three 
279 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48), article 
2(3).
280 H. Kranenborg and W. Woermans, Access to Information in the European Union – a Comparative Analysis 
of EC and Member State Legislation (Europa Law Publishing, 2005); See also for example P.Birkinshaw, 
Freedom of information The Law, the Practice and the Ideal, (Cambridge, 2010) 29, 118–120.
281 For case-law, see for example Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634 
and Case C-353/99 P Council of the European Union v Heidi Hautala, ECLI:EU:C:2001:661. Also, it should 
be noted that according to Aarhus Regulation (1367/2006), the objective of the Regulation is to guarantee the 
right of public access to environmental information received or produced […] Thus the vocabulary adopted 
in the Aarhus Regulation differs from the Transparency Regulation.
282 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48), Article 
3(1).
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elements can be identified; first, the content, second, the medium and third, the 
matter. While the content and the matter are quite multilateral elements and they 
need to be examined in more detail, the third element, namely medium, seems 
more clear. Therefore, this section will first elaborate the notion of medium and 
thereafter the two other elements of document; concept and matter.
2.1 MEDIUM
It is quite clearly spelled out in Article 3 of the Transparency Regulation that the 
medium is not be considered when assessing whether some data forms a document. 
Regardless of this rather clear provision, the question has also been tried before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. And the Court has confirmed that medium 
is insignificant when assessing whether data can be a document.283
However, this question is twofold. On the one hand, the medium can be 
considered the data itself and on the other hand, it can be seen as the base that 
the information is saved on. These elements might share some features, but they 
should be considered separately to draw the line between the information and the 
base it is attached to. As for the first point, the Court of Justice has clarified that for 
example audiotapes are documents.284 Furthermore, the General Court has specified 
that the definition covers also CDs, videotapes etc.285 Besides moving pictures and 
voice, the General Court has confirmed that information in a database is also a 
document. However, the General Court did not reflect on the question whether 
the database as such could be considered a document.286
2.2 CONTENT
Once it has been established that the right of access covers the information in 
the documents regardless of the medium, the next step is to assess whether all 
information should be considered a document. While it is relatively easy to state 
that medium is indifferent when assessing whether the requested data forms a 
document, the question of content is more challenging.
How to define what constitutes the content of a document is a fundamental 
question from many perspectives. If all information were to be considered a 
283 See for example Case T-121/05, Borax Europe v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:64; Case T-166/05, Borax 
Europe Ltd. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:65.
284 Case T-121/05, Borax Europe v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:64; Case T-166/05, Borax Europe Ltd. v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:65.
285 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, para 90.
286 Ibid., paras 125, 164.
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document, the applicant could request, for example, some information from a 
databank, like a series of numbers or personal data based on his or her right of 
access to documents. This is a highly relevant question, in particular regarding the 
relation of personal data and access to documents. So far, the tension between access 
to document and data protection legislation has concretized in situations where the 
applicant has requested a document containing personal data, or certain personal 
data which has been a part of a document, not purely personal data which could, 
for example, be retrieved from databanks.
The right of partial access to documents which stems from the Hautala287 
case, and was later incorporated into the Union legislation, renders the difference 
between the concepts of information and document nearly insignificant.288 It has 
been argued, however, that information should form a understandable entity, or be 
understandable to be considered a document.289 The interpretation of the highest 
authority, the Court of Justice of the European Union, is still missing. However, 
the General Court did assess and elaborate this question in the Dufour case. The 
General Court elaborated the elements for defining document in a context where 
access had been requested to European Central Bank documents.290
The General Court adopted a very broad approach regarding the definition of 
a document. It first concluded “that a document […] may be a book of several 
hundred pages or a ‘piece of paper’ (to borrow the term used by the ECB in an 
argument summarised in paragraph 70 above) containing a single word or figure, 
such as a name or telephone number. Similarly, a document may consist not only 
of text, as in the case of a letter or memorandum, but also a picture, catalogue or 
list, such as a telephone directory, a price list or a list of spare parts”. The General 
Court went further by stating that “as has already been noted […], the terms used 
in that definition necessarily imply that even content of minuscule proportions, 
such as a single word or figure, is, if it is stored (for example, if it is written on a 
piece of paper), sufficient to constitute a document”. And even more importantly, 
it stated “it is clear […] that a literal interpretation of the definition of the term 
287 Case C-353/99 P Council of the European Union v Heidi Hautala, ECLI:EU:C:2001:661.
288 The case T-264/04 World Wildlife Fund EEP v EU Council has been interpreted by some as General Court 
taking a stand of the definition of document [A. Bicarregui “Rights of Access under European Union Law” 
in Coppel (ed.) Information Rights, Law and Practice, (Oxford, 2010), 102]. However, it seems like this 
reference to the General Court holding that the Regulation “applies to information generally and not only 
simply to documents” is incorrectly interpreted as the Court’s statement when it actually was the conclusion 
of parties’ arguments. Also, the case relates the relationship of Aarhus Regulation and Regulation 1049/2001 
and as earlier noted, the Aarhus Regulation governs access to information when Regulation 1049/2001 covers 
access to documents.
289 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, paras 112, 114, 115–117.
290 Decision of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2004 on public access to European Central Bank documents 
(ECB 2004/3)(2004/258/EC) (OJ 2004 L 80, p. 42). The definition of a document is similar with the 
Transparency Regulation and the recitals of the said decision refer to the Transparency Regulation. See in 
particular case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, paras 54–55, 66, 
68, 80, 106, 119, 121, 123, 157–159, 162, 164, 166.
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‘document’ […] leads to the conclusion that the entirety of the data contained in a 
database constitutes a document within the meaning of that provision and that 
no considerations of a practical nature, and none of the various documents to 
which the parties refer, can call that conclusion into question”.291 In other words, 
all information in the databanks is to be considered a document. The General 
Court did not take the view that, for example, the entity which the information 
forms could be of relevance when assessing what constitutes a document.292 The 
approach adopted by the General Court follows the direction established by earlier 
case-law and Union legislation, drawing strong parallels between information and 
document. The General Court concluded that separate words, lists, catalogues or 
for example figures can be considered a document. The General Court underlined 
that, for example, length cannot be considered relevant when assessing whether the 
information at hand is to be considered a document.293 Consequently one name or a 
set of names could be considered a document in the meaning of the Transparency 
Regulation.
Another interesting and relevant point, which the General Court considered in 
its judgment was how to assess whether the applicant had requested information 
where its disclosure would require the institution to create a new document. This 
is an interesting point, particularly because it has often been argued – and also 
confirmed by the General Court – that an institution does not have an obligation 
to create a new document for the applicant.294 The General Court first clarified that 
such information, which is not saved on any base, does not constitute a document. 
An example of such information would be discussions in a meeting, which all the 
participants would indeed remember but which has not been recorded. In other 
words, the civil servants would not be obliged to present this information as a 
document.295 Secondly, the General Court set out the rather evident point that a 
document which is removed or deleted from the database is not to be considered a 
document in the meaning of the Transparency Regulation.296 This is the case even 
when those documents could somehow be retrieved from the database.297
291 Ibid., paras 94, 108, 125, 164.
292 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, paras 94, 108, 164. For the 
coherence of the information see for example Government bill for the Public Access to Document Law HE 
30/1998 vp, p. 19,53,73 and 82 (Finland, laki viranomaisen toiminnan julkisuudesta 21.5.1999/621).
293 Ibid., paras 91, 93, 94.
294 See for example Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, paras 73, 
149. See also case C-491/15 P, Typke v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2017:5, para 37.
295 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, paras 88–89, 126–127.
296 The reference was to the Decision of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2004 on public access to European 
Central Bank documents (ECB 2004/3)(2004/258/EC) (OJ 2004 L 80, p. 42). See what has been said earlier 
of the similar interpretation of this decision and Transparency Regulation.
297 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, paras 128–130.
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In other words, the applicant cannot expect that an institution takes up the 
aforesaid measures. Thus, an institution cannot be expected to create a new 
document which corresponds to the needs of an applicant. However, the institution 
has certain level of responsibility to assist the applicant.298 As the Republic of Finland 
submitted in the Dufour case, the term document “also includes any combination 
of data in a database that can be produced using the tools for that database. The 
fact that such a search, although possible, is not carried out by the institution in 
question as part of its day-to-day activities is, in that regard, irrelevant”.299 The 
Kingdom of Denmark took a similar approach and the General Court confirmed 
this view in its decision.300
The aforementioned measures could be described as gathering information. 
Thus, the institution is not required to create a new document, but simply put 
together the information it already has. This would be the case, for example, when 
an institution has the information an applicant is requesting, but it was dispersed 
in different registers and data banks. If the information could be retrieved from 
the data banks by using normal search functions, the current “non-existence” of a 
document should not be accepted as grounds for non-disclosure of the information.
Another interesting element, which the General Court clarified in its judgment 
was that the permanent nature of the information is insignificant. Thus, the 
constantly changing content of a database would not be an obstacle to consider the 
information a document. The content of the database should be assessed according 
to the date of the request.301
The General Court’s approach is justified. First, even if it might at first seem quite 
far-reaching to consider all information a document regardless of size or coherence, 
the institution that examines the application cannot know what might be relevant 
information for the applicant. Thus, if none of the exceptions would be applicable in 
the said case, access should not be refused based on irrelevance of the information.302 
Second, the requirement set for the institution to gather information which already 
exists seems more than reasonable. Data filing systems are constantly developing. 
If fragmented information was to be excluded from the scope of the Transparency 
Regulation, it could lead to a situation where a vast amount of information was 
dispersed in different databanks and therefore unreachable in the meaning of the 
Transparency Regulation. The General Court found a fair balance between the 
applicant’s right to receive information and the institution’s administrative burden.
298 See for example Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, 
p. 43–48), Article 6(2)–(3).
299 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, para 63.
300 Ibid., paras 59 and 153.
301 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, para 130.
302 See also Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, paras 111, 112, 115.
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2.3 MATTER
The two first components of the document were medium and content. The third 
element is closely related to content, but instead of the form of the content, the 
third element draws from the substance of the content.
The third element in Article 3 limits the scope of a document to those matters 
which concern the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution’s 
sphere of responsibility.303 This would basically exclude the personal communication 
of civil servants from the scope. However, it would not automatically exclude, for 
example, all e-mails exchanged between civil servants. Provided that these e-mails 
relate to policies etc. falling within the institution’s sphere of responsibility, they 
would indeed be documents in the meaning of Article 3 of the Transparency 
Regulation.
3. REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS
This section will address two main elements of requests for public access to 
documents. The first element relates to the notion of an applicant, in other words 
the question of who can file an application for public access to documents. The 
elaboration of this notion will be followed by the question of whether an applicant 
should state reasons for the request. The latter topic is particularly important in 
the context of data protection.
3.1 APPLICANT
Any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing in a Member 
State is entitled to access to documents of the institutions. This follows from the 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights and is also clearly stipulated in the Transparency 
Regulation.304 Even if the Charter limits the access right to Union citizen and to those 
who are permanently staying in the Union, the institutions have adopted a wider 
approach.305 The wider approach derives at least partly from the possibility to make 
303 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48), article 
3.
304 Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; Article 2(1) of Regulation 1049/2001.
305 See for example Report from the Commission on the application in 2015 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, ANNEX 1, Brussels, 
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an application for access to documents anonymously.306 When access to documents 
is applied for anonymously, the identity of the applicant cannot be verified. Hence, 
it has been a very practical approach to waive the narrow interpretation of Article 
2(1) of the Regulation and broaden the scope of applicants. Also, this seems to be 
entirely in line with the underlying principle of the Transparency Regulation aiming 
to guarantee the widest possible access to documents.
The Commission has proposed enlarging the scope of beneficiaries to any natural 
or legal person in its proposal for the Regulation on access to documents.307 This 
proposal broadening transparency vis-à-vis current legislation might be prejudiced 
by the inadequate legal basis.308 Even if the current practice allows wider access 
to documents than required by the secondary legislation, the primary legislation 
limits the beneficiaries to the citizen of the Union, and to any natural or legal person 
residing, or having its registered office in, a Member State.309
If the strict interpretation is adopted, the applicant should have some connection 
to the European Union, be it either citizenship or permanent residence in the 
European Union. Thus, non-citizens residing outside of the European Union would 
not have the right of access to documents. For example, an Australian living in the 
United States would not be entitled to information held by the EU institutions.
3.2 STATING REASONS FOR THE APPLICATION
One of the core elements of public access to documents legislation in the European 
Union legal framework has been the equal treatment of applications regardless of 
the origin of the application. This feature follows from the idea of public access to 
documents. The situation is slightly different in the other main European institution, 
namely in the Council of Europe. The case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights indicates that access is granted to official documents and for individual 
24.8.2016, COM(2016) 533 final, p. 7, available on the internet < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.
html?uri=cellar:3a0be84b-69fd-11e6-9b08-01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/DOC_2&format=PDF > [last visited 
5.3.2017].
306 See article 6(1) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 
May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 
31.5.2001, p. 43–48).
307 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access 
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents COM(2008) 229 final (30.4.2008).
308 The settled case-law of the Court of Justice does allow though that secondary measures are adopted 
based on the primary legal basis of an act, or when necessary, see Case C-211/01, Commission v 
Council, ECLI:EU:C:2003:452, paras 38–40 and case C-178/03, Commission v Parliament and Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, para 43.
309 During the past years, the EU body has asked the requester’s postal address in some cases. See for example 
AsktheEU.org, available on the internet <https://www.asktheeu.org/en/help/privacy> [last visited 19.8.2018].
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applicants rather than public access to documents.310 The Convention negotiated 
in the framework of the Council of Europe sets as a principle access to public 
documents.311
At first sight, this difference might seem minor. However, it leads to significant 
differences in the application of the rules. When access is granted to the public, the 
information of the applicant becomes irrelevant. As previously noted, the documents 
can be requested anonymously. That is, the identity of the applicant does not play 
a role when assessing whether the document should be disclosed. Also, the settled 
practice of the Council is indeed to disclose all documents on the internet, if access 
has been granted to one applicant.312
Quite interestingly, when placing this feature of European access to document 
legislation into the Dworkinian theory of rights and principles, the separation of 
individual aims and collective aims seems to play a role.313 When application can 
be filed anonymously and even more importantly, the identity of an applicant is 
insignificant, the right of an individual seems to approach the features of collective 
right. Furthermore, the right of access to documents is precisely defined as the 
public’s right.314 Now, if the right was considered collective instead of individual, it 
would be based on policies instead of principles and in a Dworkinian world could 
not collide with rights based on principles.315 Policies always weigh less and as such, 
principles trump policies regardless of the circumstances of the case.316 Regardless 
of the rather abstract features of the right of access, it does take the form of an 
individual right, in other words as concrete right. The one exercising the right of 
access to documents is always a natural person, or legal person. It follows that the 
right of access to documents is concretized in the form of an individual right in each 
case. It differs in this respect from democracy, for example. The difference between 
aims and objectives and principles will be further developed and examined in the 
concluding chapter. At this stage it suffices to say that regardless of the described 
characteristics, the right of access to documents is considered a right based on 
principles in this thesis.
310 See for example ECtHR 2 November 2010, Gillberg v Sweden; ECtHR 7 July 1989, Gaskin v the United 
Kingdom;
ECtHR 14 February 2006, Turek v Slovakia, (2006–II); ECtHR 19 February 1998, Guerra and Others v Italy.
311 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, (ETS No 205).
312 For Council’s erga omnes practice, see B. Driessen, Transparency in EU Institutional Law: A Practitioner’s 
Handbook, (Kluwer 2012) 44.
313 For individual and collective rights, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 90–100.
314 On freedom to receive information, see for example R. Gisbert, The Right to Freedom of expression in a 
democratic Society, in Roca & Santolaya (ed.) Europe of Rights: A Compendium of the European Convention 
of Human Rights, (Leiden, 2012) 386.
315 See Chapter I section1.2. See in particular R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 1977) 90–122; R. 
Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights, (Oxford, 1984), 153–167.
316 Ibid.
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The question of the applicant’s identity becomes interesting when it is assessed 
in the context of stating reasons for an application – or to be more precise, in the 
context of not being obliged to state reasons for an application. Article 6 of the 
Transparency Regulation stipulates that the applicant is not obliged to state reasons 
for the application.317
The Council legal service’s interpretation of the said provision together with the 
element of public access to documents has been that the Council must abstain from 
taking into consideration individual reasons presented by the applicant. This is the 
case when, for example, an academic has filed a request for documents. The personal 
interests of the applicant have not been considered.318 Still in 2009, this approach 
seemed justified based on the case-law together with the existing legislation. At that 
stage there did not seem to be reasons to adopt a different approach.
At this stage it is important to note that the specific interest of the applicant does 
not necessarily equal the reasoning of an application. Application can, of course, 
also be justified in more general terms. This would be the case if the information 
was necessary for example for the protection of the environment. This question is 
also linked with the question of the existence of an overriding public interest, which 
will be examined later in this chapter.319
While the right to file a request for a document anonymously is an important 
element of the Transparency Regulation, it does not necessarily belong at the hard 
core of the said right. While the legal framework created in the Council of Europe 
also sets weight on the right not to state reasons, the European Court of Human 
Rights has often assessed the right of access to documents precisely through some 
specific interest the applicant has in the case.320
Public access to documents in the European Union should rather be understood 
as wide access to official documents instead of party access to these documents. Party 
access would always relate to a certain situation and circumstances while simple 
317 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48).
318 Case C-266/05 P, Sison v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2007:75, para 43; B. Driessen, Transparency in EU Institutional 
Law: A Practitioner’s Handbook, (Kluwer 2012) 45,70; B. Driessen, “The Council of the European Union 
and access to documents” in European Law Review 30 (2005), 690.
319 For reasoning on general terms, see Case T-115/13, Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:497, para 
68.
320 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents lays down following conditions for requesting 
the access in its Article 4:
1. An applicant for an official document shall not be obliged to give reasons for having access to the official document.
2. Parties may give applicants the right to remain anonymous except when disclosure of identity is essential in 
order to process the request.
3. Formalities for requests shall not exceed what is essential in order to process the request.
For the case-law, see ECtHR 2 November 2010, Gillberg v Sweden; ECtHR 7 July 1989, Gaskin v the United 
Kingdom;
ECtHR 14 February 2006, Turek v Slovakia, (2006–II); ECtHR 19 February 1998, Guerra and Others v Italy.
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access to documents could relate to a wider range of situations, even if the specific 
interests of the applicant are taken into account. Thus, when assessing whether to 
disclose documents, the weight should rather be in granting the widest possible 
access to information, not in disclosing the documents to the public as a whole. 
This should be the approach in particular in such cases, where the interpretation 
of public access to documents would actually limit access to documents.
4. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
At the outset, the administration should be transparent. As it will be argued later 
in this thesis, transparent administration leads to less corruption and more open 
decision-making strengthens the democratic framework of society. It follows that 
disclosure of documents and information should rather be the presumption than an 
exception.321 This seems obvious when formulated like this. However, when taking 
this approach to a more practical level, it suddenly turns into a more challenging 
question. Instead of asking why a piece of information cannot be disclosed, the 
commonly rising question seems to be whether it could be disclosed.322 At first sight 
the difference might seem insignificant, and naturally both questions might lead to a 
similar outcome, i.e. disclosure of the same amount of information. However, it does 
reveal how the one posing the question addresses transparency; the presumption of 
disclosure is stressed differently. The first questioner presumes that the information 
will be disclosed unless there are particular reasons not to. The second questioner’s 
starting point is not to release the information unless there are particular reasons 
speaking in favour of the disclosure. The underlying principles in the European 
transparency framework strengthen the approach of the first questioner.
This section will examine the founding principles and some of the rules stemming 
from these principles in the public access regime in the European legal framework. 
In some cases, the principles are fairly easy to identify. But in some cases, they 
are more implicit and need to be recognized or found.323 However, in both cases 
they illustrate the spirit of the European transparency regime. And even more 
importantly, they form the basis for the interpretation of law in situations where a 
potential tension between rules arises.
Many of the principles have been developed in the practice of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and, in some cases, later incorporated into Union 
321 See for instance Bailey S.H., Administrative Law, (London, 2005) 42–44; see also Case T-395/13, Samuli 
Miettinen, ECLI:EU:T:2015:648, para 21.
322 For example in National Information Law Conference, Canberra, 23–25 March 2011.
323 For more see Chapter I.
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legislation. Often the examined principles and rules share the same fundamental 
object of granting the widest possible access to information and therefore might 
be partly overlapping.
4.1 WIDEST POSSIBLE ACCESS
The principle of widest possible access had already existed and was apparent in 
the European Union legal framework when it was finally clearly formulated in the 
recitals of the Transparency Regulation in 2001. The fourth recital of the Regulation 
states that “the purpose of this Regulation is to give the fullest possible effect to 
the right of public access to documents”. The actual impetus to this principle was 
given earlier in the Hautala case.324 The Hautala case can certainly be considered 
one of the breakthrough cases in European access to documents case-law. The 
principle of partial access was formulated in this case, but even more importantly, 
the Court based the partial access rule on the principle of widest possible access. 
The principle was sought from Declaration No. 17 of the Maastricht Treaty and Code 
of Conduct.325 Thus the Court held that the possibility of disclosing the document 
partially had to be examined even if such a rule did not exist in the Council Decision 
on public access to documents.326 The Court’s ruling was based on the principle of 
the widest possible access, which was sought from the regulatory framework. The 
formulation of the widest possible access principle seems to be a classical example 
of how principles are recognized in Dworkin’s and Alexy’s terms, with the principle 
of widest possible access also gaining the necessary institutional support.327 First, 
it was recognized by the Court of Justice and later incorporated into the legislative 
act itself.
After its initial appearance, the principle of the widest possible access has been 
confirmed repeatedly in the Union’s case-law.328 Withholding information has 
been argued on several different grounds, however, it seems that this fundamental 
principle has not yet been challenged. Thus, it can be argued that widest possible 
324 Case C-353/99 P, Council of the European Union v Heidi Hautala, ECLI:EU:C:2001:661, paras 80–83. See 
also D. Curtin, “Citizens’ fundamental right of access to EU information: an evolving digital passepartout?” 
in Common Market Law Review 37 (2000), 16–18.
325 Ibid.
326 Council decision on public access to Council documents, 20 December 1993.
327 For institutional support, see for example R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 39–45.
328 See for example C-135/11P, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds v Commission, 21 June 2012 (not yet 
published), para 49; Case C-506/08 P, Sweden v MyTravel and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:496, para 
75; Case C-266/05 P, Sison v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2007:75, para 63; Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 
P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, para 36; Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and 
C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:541, para 73; Case T-395/13, 
Samuli Miettinen, ECLI:EU:T:2015:648, para 17.
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access has obtained a status as one of the core principles of public access to 
documents legislation.
The principle of widest possible access lays underneath most of the other 
core concepts and rules of the Transparency Regulation. For example, the wide 
definition of a document can be seen as an expression of this principle, and the 
narrow interpretation of the exceptions stems partly from the principle of the widest 
possible access. The overlapping characteristics of the elements introduced in this 
section are partially explained by this.
4.2 PARTIAL ACCESS
The principle of widest possible access emerges for example in the form of partial 
access to documents. This rule was first established in the case-law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. A Member of the European Parliament, Heidi 
Hautala, had requested a document containing information on arms export rules. 
Even if the applicable rules did not contain provisions setting requirements for 
partial access, the said rules did not disallow such interpretation either. Thus, the 
Court of Justice concluded that it was not in line with the principle of proportionality 
to refuse partial disclosure of the document.329 This case-law was later incorporated 
into the legislation in Article 4(6) of the Transparency Regulation.330
The partial access rule was first developed or found in the early 2000s in the 
regulatory framework of the European Union. Also, most of the European Union 
Member States have provisions in their transparency legislation, which secure partial 
access to a document in cases where the document cannot be released entirely.331 
As previously explained, this approach has rendered the difference between access 
to documents and access to information a minor one.332
In more practical terms, this rule sets the duty for the institutions to assess 
whether the document can be released partially when it is not entirely covered by 
the exception applied. It follows that those parts of the document which could be 
released without undermining the interests protected by the exceptions have to be 
disclosed. Quite rarely the requested documents would be entirely covered by one 
or more exceptions. In most cases some parts of the document can be released. An 
example of this is In ’t Veld case, where a Dutch Member of the European Parliament 
329 Case C-353/99 P, Council of the European Union v Heidi Hautala, ECLI:EU:C:2001:661, paras 27–31; 
Council decision on public access to Council documents, 20 December 1993.
330 According to Article 4(6) of the Regulation 1049/2001 if only parts of the requested document are covered 
by any of the exceptions, the remaining parts shall be released. 
331 H. Kranenborg and W. Woermans Access to Information in the European Union – a Comparative Analysis 
of EC and Member State Legislation (Europa Law Publishing, 2005), 18–19.
332 See Chapter IV section 2. 
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had requested access to legal advice given by the Council’s legal service. The General 
Court itself examined the content of the said document and concluded that while it 
did include parts covered by some of the exceptions, there were indeed some parts 
which could have been disclosed.333
The partial access rule is also very closely linked to the institutions’ duty to 
examine the documents individually and to make decisions about disclosure 
based on the content. Only individual examination enables partial disclosure of 
the documents.
4.3 NARROW INTERPRETATION OF EXCEPTIONS
The exceptions to the right of access to documents must be interpreted narrowly. 
This is another well-established element in the CJEU’s case-law.334 It is an element 
which clearly reflects the more general principle of the widest possible access to 
documents.335 This also reflects a more general approach in EU law; that the 
exceptions from the main rule should be interpreted restrictively. Hence this 
approach does not differ from general EU law.
The Court has given more concrete content for the principle of narrow 
interpretation by underlining the following elements. Firstly, the Court has been 
very precise that the institutions have the duty to ensure that the requested 
document actually contains the type of information which is protected by the 
exception applied.336 It follows that it does not suffice that the document is for 
example named “legal advice”, if it does not in reality contain any legal advice. 
Consequently, withholding certain information requires that the institution verifies 
that the information is actually the type of information that is protected by the 
applied exception.
A second element of the narrow interpretation is the necessity to evaluate 
whether the interest protected by the exception would actually be endangered if 
the information was disclosed. Thus it does not suffice to ensure that the document 
actually contains information protected by the exception, but also that the actual 
disclosure of the information should somehow undermine the protection of that 
333 Case T-529/09, In ’t Veld v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2012:215, paras 106, 112. See also case T-350/12P, In ’t Veld, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039. 
334 See for example Case T-395/13, Samuli Miettinen, ECLI:EU:T:2015:648, paras 58, 67; Case C-266/05 P, 
Sison v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2007:75, para 63; Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ 
Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, para 36; Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden 
and Others v API and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:541, para 73; Case C-506/08 P, Sweden v MyTravel 
and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:496, para 75.
335 See for example Case T-529/09, In ‘t Veld v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2012:215, paras 17–18.
336 Case T-395/13, Samuli Miettinen, ECLI:EU:T:2015:648, para 25.
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interest.337 It follows that an assessment of the consequences of the disclosure is 
required when the exceptions are applied.338
Furthermore, the CJEU has on several occasions underlined on a more general 
level that all exceptions to the right of access must be interpreted narrowly.339 Hence 
it can be argued that the well-established principle of narrow interpretation requires 
that the scope of the exception cannot be extended by the interpretation. Thus, the 
scope of the said exception is strictly limited to the wording of the Transparency 
Regulation.
4.4 NO BLOCK EXEMPTIONS
One of the founding elements of European access to document regulation is that it 
covers all documents held by the EU institutions. In other words, no information is 
excluded from the scope of the Transparency Regulation solely based on the nature 
of the information or based on the origin of the document. This follows directly from 
the Transparency Regulation.340 Furthermore, based on well-established case-law, 
the assessment of the disclosure of the document must be based on the content of 
the document.341 These are the elements which form the basis for the underlying 
idea of “no block exemptions”.
The principle of no block exemptions is not explicitly formulated in the regulatory 
framework of transparency legislation and is therefore controversial to some degree. 
Also, the recent case-law has tried heavily the limits of this principle.342 Nevertheless, 
its weight cannot be overlooked. Firstly, it has long roots in European thinking. The 
first indications of such thinking in the European Union can be traced all the way to 
pre-Amsterdam era and the regulatory framework of that time. In some early access 
to documents cases, the General Court refused to confirm the arguments which 
337 See for example joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, 
para 49; joined cases T-424/14 and T-435/15, ClientEarth v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:848, para 59.
338 See for example, Case C-280/11 P, Council v Access Info Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2013:671, para 31.
339 See for example joined cases T-424/14 and T-435/15, ClientEarth v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:848, para 
58; Case C-266/05 P, Sison v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2007:75, para 63; example joined cases C-39/05 P and 
C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, para 36; Case C-280/11 P Council v Access 
Info Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2013:671, para 30.
340 Regulation 1049/2001, article 1(4).
341 See for example joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, 
paras 38–40. See also P. Birkinshaw, “Review of V. Deckmyn and I. Thompson (eds.), Openness and 
Transparency in the European Union” in European Public Law 4 (1998), 614.
342 See for example joined cases T-424/14 and T-435/15, ClientEarth v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:848, paras 
64–65; case C-562/14 P, Sweden and Spirlea v European Commission, ECLI:EU:2017:356 and case C-271/15 P, 
Sea Handling SpA, in liquidation, formerly Sea Handling SpA v commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:557. However, 
see also case C-331/15 P, French Republic v Carl Schlyter, ECLI:EU:C:2017:639. For the presumption of 
non-disclosure, see D. Curtin & P. Leino, “In search of transparency for EU law-making: Trilogues on the 
cusp of dawn” in Common Market Law Review 6 (2017), 1078–1079.
81CHAPTER III
suggested that in certain cases whole policy areas were to be excluded from the scope 
of the access rules.343 Further, when no common legal ground can be found in the 
wider European context, the profound elements of transparency legislation should 
be sought from Member States where it has stabilized position in the general legal 
framework. In such settings, the non-existence of block exemptions is considered 
one of the core principles of the said legislation.344 Finally, the underlying principle 
of no block exemptions is apparent in the rules laid down in the Transparency 
Regulation. The rules reflecting this principle relate to the origin of the document, 
exceptions and classified documents.
Adopting other types of approach could narrow down public access to documents. 
As a civil servant, I do understand the beauty of the idea of block exemptions in terms 
of minimizing administrative work. However, this could easily lead to situation where 
certain information is not disclosed even when there is no reasonably foreseeable 
danger of harming interests protected by the exemptions. Taking particularly into 
account how the case-law and the CJEU’s approach has enhanced public access to 
the EU institutions’ documents in comparison to general practice applied by the 
institutions, this risk is not purely hypothetical.345    
5. OTHER CHARACTERISTIC ELEMENTS OF THE 
TRANSPARENCY REGULATION
The previous section discussed the underlying principles of European transparency 
legislation. This section will examine some of the most essential rules of European 
transparency legislation. The rules examined in this section are of particular 
importance when tackling the relationship between transparency and data 
protection. This section will first address the overriding public interest and this 
will be followed by Member State and third party documents.
343 See for example Case T-194/94, Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v Council, ECLI:EU:T:1996:156; Case 
T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council, ECLI:EU:T:1998:127; D. Curtin, “Citizens’ fundamental 
right of access to EU information: an evolving digital passepartout?” in Common Market Law Review 37 
(2000), 35–36.
344 See for example A. Bohlin, Offentlighets principen, (Stockholm, 2001) 160. Secrecy exemptions can be applied 
only after harm test has been carried out, i.e. not solely based on the nature of the information.
345 See for example joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, 
paras 38–40, case T-233/09, Access Info Europe / Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2011:105, Case 
C-280/11 P Council v Access Info Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2013:671, Case T-540/15 De Capitani v Parliament, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:167.
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5.1 OVERRIDING PUBLIC INTEREST
“Public interest” is a challenging concept, yet it appears in various different 
contexts.346 As there is not a lucid definition for public interest347, it leaves a wide 
margin for appreciation. In the context of European transparency legislation, the 
legislator has added an extra layer to it; the public interest has to be overriding.348 An 
explanation can be sought from the role given to the public interest in this context. 
When an overriding public interest appears, access to information should be given 
even if such access would undermine the interests protected by the exceptions laid 
down in the Transparency Regulation.349
The exceptions laid down in the Transparency Regulation can be divided into 
two categories based on the overriding public interest test. The exceptions laid down 
in Article 4(1) do not contain the overriding public interest test when exceptions 
laid down in Articles 4(2) and 4(3) necessitate assessing whether an overriding 
public interest exists. The exceptions subject to the overriding public interest test 
relate to protection of commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including 
intellectual property, court proceedings and legal advice, the purpose of inspections, 
investigations and audits and also matters where the internal decision-making 
-process is still ongoing. In some exceptional cases, it also covers the time post 
decision-making. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, when an interest 
protected by an exception is subject to the overriding public interest test, the 
document has to be disclosed when such an interest exists even if the disclosure 
undermines the interests protected by the said exceptions.350
The legislator has not given a clear indication as to how to assess the existence 
of an overriding public interest and the Court has also been quite prudent not to 
open the Pandora’s box in relation to the overriding public interest. Despite the 
scarce guidance, two different conditions for assessing whether there is an overriding 
public interest can be drawn from the legal framework. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union has also provided procedural guidance for assessing the existence 
of the overriding public interest.351
346 See for example Regulation (EC) No 679/2016 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88).
347 See for example Case T36/04, API v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:258, para 94.
348 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48), Article 
4.
349 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, para 44.
350 Ibid.; see also for instance Birkinshaw P. Government & Information – the Law Relating to Access, Disclosure 
& their Regulation, (Tottel Publishing, 2005), 196–202.
351 See joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, paras 28, 
40, 44.
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The first indication in the Union case-law for assessing when the criteria of 
the overriding public interest test are met was delivered in the Turco case.352 The 
CJEU held that legal advice given by the Council’s legal service in the course of 
legislative procedure should, in principle, be disclosed to the public. In its reasoning, 
the Court quite firmly stated that it is in the public interest to know what the 
legislation is based on, and as such also have access to legal advice given during 
such a process. Furthermore, when setting the three steps for assessing whether 
the legislative documents should be disclosed, the CJEU stated that even if the 
interests protected by the said exception would be undermined by the disclosure, 
the disclosure is justified when the public interest to know relates to the legislative 
process.353 Support for the adopted approach can be drawn from Recital 6 of the 
Transparency Regulation. It states that wider access to documents should be granted 
when the institution is acting in its legislative capacity.354
The second indication for assessing whether the circumstances of the case 
form an overriding public interest can be drawn from the Aarhus Regulation.355 
The Aarhus Regulation governs access to environmental information received or 
produced by the Union institutions. Some presumptions regarding the overriding 
public interest are laid down in Article 6 of the Aarhus Regulation. With certain 
restrictions, the overriding public interest is deemed to exist when the information 
requested relates to emissions into the environment. The Article also stipulates more 
generally that it should be taken into consideration if the information requested 
relates to emissions into the environment.356
Thus, two different occasions where an overriding public interest is presumed can 
be identified. First, the legal advice given in the course of the legislative process and 
secondly, information relating to emissions into the environment. The overriding 
public interest is a rather powerful provision as it contains the idea of allowing some 
degree of harm for the protected interests when disclosing the document and the 
consequences of stating something as an overriding public interest are quite far 
reaching. It is therefore understandable that the Court of Justice refers to it sparingly.
In the context of the Turco case, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
also provided guidelines for assessing whether the circumstances of the case create 
352 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374.
353 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, paras 38, 40, 
44, 45–50, 59–60, 67–68. For disclosing information in the course of legislative procedure, see also case 
T-540/15, De Capitani v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2018:167.
354 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48), recital 
6.
355 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p. 13–19).
356 Ibid.
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an overriding public interest.357 Furthermore, it has given a clear indication of 
who should conduct the overriding public interest test. The Court has seen that 
the institution has the best opportunity to assess whether an overriding public 
interest exists.358 Hence, the duty to examine whether the qualifications for an 
overriding public interest are met is for the institution. Naturally, it might advance 
the applicant’s cause to draw the institution’s attention to such circumstances as 
might form the basis for an overriding public interest. However, even when such 
remarks have not expressly been put forward, the institution should assess on its 
own initiative whether the qualifications for the overriding public interest are met. 
This is a logical approach; the applicant is not in a position to know the detailed 
content of the requested document and it would therefore be disproportionate to 
set an onus on the applicant. As the institution is in a better position to conduct the 
overriding public interest test, having a clear picture of the content of the document, 
it is logical to set the obligation on the institution. However, it appears that so far, 
the institutions have not released documents based on the overriding public interest 
test. In the aftermath of the Turco decision, the General Secretariat of the Council 
has disclosed an increasing number of documents containing legal advice, but it 
is not apparent that those documents have been released based on the overriding 
public interest test. Apparently, the institutions are simply considering the public 
interest when balancing the interests in the first phase.359
5.2 MEMBER STATE AND THIRD PARTY DOCUMENTS
Before the current Transparency Regulation, the Member States had the right to 
veto when access to documents originating from them was requested. This right 
of veto was abolished when the Transparency Regulation entered into force.360 The 
abolishment of the veto was considered one of the improvements strengthening 
transparency.361 Thus, regardless of the original source or author of the document, 
it is for the institution to decide whether to disclose the document.362 
357 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, paras 38, 40, 
44, 45–50, 59–60, 67–68.
358 See for example Case T-529/09, In  ’t Veld v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2012:215, para 20; Case T36/04, API v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:258, paras 54, 94.
359 See for example also B. Driessen, Transparency in EU Institutional Law: A Practitioner’s Handbook, (Kluwer 
2012) 70. 
360 C. Malmström, “Sveriges agerande i Öppenhetsmål inför EG-domstolen – politik och juridik hand in hand” 
in Europarättslig tidskrift, 10 (2008), 11–20; Council decision on public access to Council documents, 
20.12.1993.
361 Ibid.
362 See, to that effect, for example Case C-135/11 P, IFAW International Tierschutz-Fonds gGmbH /European 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2012:376, paras 57, 61.
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Even if the institution has to make the final decision on whether to disclose the 
document and it is responsible for the lawfulness of the said decision, it is bound 
to a certain procedural basis laid down in the Transparency Regulation, and finally 
also to the opinion of the Member State. The Transparency Regulation provides 
some safeguards, which guarantee that the interests of the Member States and third 
parties shall be taken into account when assessing the disclosure of the document.363
Article 4 of the Transparency Regulation contains clear exceptions in paras 1–3 
when the provisions in paragraphs 4–7 are rather procedural. These provisions set 
the guidelines on how to apply exceptions in some particular cases. According to 
Article 4(5) of the Transparency Regulation, a Member State may request that the 
institution not disclose a document originating from that Member State without its 
prior agreement. Article 4(4) in turn stipulates how to release documents originating 
from a third party.
The institutions should consult the Member States when releasing documents 
originating from them. However, it is of utmost importance to note that sole 
procedural actions cannot be regarded as sufficient on the institutions’ part. Firstly, 
following from the abolishment of the veto, there has been an onus on the Member 
State to provide reasons when it denies the further disclosure of the said document. 
It cannot simply ban the disclosure of the document.364 Secondly, the Member 
State is bound to exceptions laid down in the Transparency Regulation.365 Thus 
the Member State cannot base its denial, for example, on national legislation. The 
approach adopted by the Court is quite reasonable, as the institution would hardly 
be in a position to assess whether such refusal is reasonably motivated.
Once the Member State has stated reasons for the refusal, it is for the institution 
to assess whether the given reasoning finally complies with the Transparency 
Regulation.366 The institution cannot satisfactorily fulfil its obligation to give a 
reasoned answer to the applicant by simply referring to the negative answer from 
the Member State.367 This seems quite natural; after all, it is the institution who has 
to defend the possible complaint later, for example in court. The Court of Justice has 
recently specified how the institution can fulfil this obligation. First, the institution 
must ensure that the reasons given by the Member State actually exist. Second, the 
363 According to Article 4(5) of the Regulation 1049/2001 a Member State may request the institution not to 
disclose a document originating that Member State without its prior agreement.
364 Formerly Member States had the right to veto the disclosure of a document originating from them. However, 
this was changed when the current Regulation 1049/2001 on public access to documents was adopted in 2001. 
See also for instance E. Nieto-Garrido and I.M. Delagado, European Administration Law in the Constitutional 
Treaty, (Oxford, 2007) 93–97.
365 See, to that effect, for example case C-135/11 P, IFAW International Tierschutz-Fonds gGmbH /European 
Commission, EU:C:2012:376, para 34.
366 Case C-135/11 P, IFAW International Tierschutz-Fonds gGmbH /European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2012:376, 
para 62.
367 Ibid.
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institution must refer to these reasons in its decision. However, the institution is not 
obliged to conduct an exhaustive examination to decide whether the reasons given 
by the Member State are applicable. The further reasoning of the Court of Justice 
seems to explain this. The duty to finally assess whether the reasons provided by the 
Member State are actually applicable is on the Court itself. It is therefore necessary 
for the Court also to request the withheld documents.368 Thus the Member State’s 
right to be heard before releasing a document originating from them can be placed 
somewhere between a procedural right and substantive exception. It is certainly 
a procedural right, but based on the Court’s second round of IFAW judgments it 
appears to have some relics from the earlier right to veto as well. Even if the Member 
State is not entitled to simply deny the disclosure, the institution’s duty is satisfied 
with a rather prima facie type of examination.
Compared with Member States’ right to deny the further disclosure of the 
document as long as the denial is reasoned, the procedural rights of other third 
parties are not as strong. When assessing the disclosure of the information, the 
institution has an obligation to consult the third party from which the document 
originates. However, Article 4(4) of the Transparency Regulation does also contain 
the possibility not to consult the third party. When it is clear that the document shall 
or shall not be disclosed, the institution is not obliged to consult the third party. 
Thus, when deciding on the disclosure, the institution is not obliged to consult the 
third party when it is evident that the consultation is not necessary. 
6. EXCEPTIONS AND CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
This section will examine the exceptions to the right of access of documents on a 
general level.369 Each of these exceptions has created a vast amount of case-law 
and could be examined from several different angles. However many interesting 
issues might arise in this context, for the core question of this thesis it suffices to 
have a clear picture of the logic and overall structure of the exceptions and how 
the exception relating to one’s privacy and data protection is placed in this entity.
All exceptions to access to documents are laid down in Article 4 of the 
Transparency Regulation and more precisely in paragraphs 1–3 of the said Article. 
The list of exceptions is rather short compared to list of exceptions in some national 
laws.370 However, the scope of the interests protected by the said exceptions cannot 
368 Ibid, paras 62–63, 70–77.
369 Exceptions do not lead to collision of rules. See Chapter I, section 2.
370 Depending on how the exceptions are numerated, at least ten exceptions are laid down in Regulation 1049/2001 
while, for example, the Finnish public access to documents legislation (Laki viranomaisten toiminnan 
julkisuudesta 621/1999) contains 32 exceptions.
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be deemed smaller solely based on the length of the list. The exceptions laid down 
in the Transparency Regulation are quite general in their nature and therefore they 
cover quite a wide range of different interests.
As mentioned earlier, the Transparency Regulation contains two types of 
exceptions. The distinction is based on the necessity to evaluate whether an 
overriding public interest exists. Exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) are not subject 
to the overriding public interest test. However, exceptions laid down in Articles 4(2) 
and 4(3) do include the provisions establishing the necessity to evaluate whether 
there is an overriding public interest.
6.1 SO-CALLED ABSOLUTE EXCEPTIONS
The exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) are sometimes described as absolute 
exceptions.371 It has also been argued, that “an institution must refuse access if 
a document falls within the terms of exception”.372 Without further elaboration, 
describing these exceptions as absolute might be slightly misleading. If the 
exceptions are to be considered mandatory in a sense that they do not leave any 
margin of discretion for the institution, this would actually put certain types of 
documents entirely outside of the scope of the Transparency Regulation. Yet, the 
scope clearly covers all documents held by the institutions.373 It is therefore not 
enough for the institution to merely establish that a certain document contains 
information described in one of the exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) of the 
Transparency Regulation. This is only the first step to be satisfied when assessing 
the disclosure of the document or information in the document. Thereafter, the 
institution has to evaluate whether the disclosure of the document would actually 
undermine the interests protected by the exceptions. This has also been clearly 
stated in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.374 Once the 
institution has concluded that the document or part of the document contains 
information that cannot be released without undermining the interests protected 
by Article 4(1) of the Regulation, the institution has no margin to decide on the 
371 See for instance A. Sharland, “Information rights under European Union law”, in Coppel (ed.) Information 
Rights, (London, 2007), 114–115; See also B. Driessen, Transparency in EU Institutional Law: A Practitioner’s 
Handbook, (Kluwer 2012) 65.
372 A. Sharland, “Information rights under European Union law”, in Coppel (ed.) Information Rights, (London, 
2007), 114.
373 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48), article 
2(3).
374 For example, Case T36/04, API v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:258, paras 54–57, 94; see also joined cases 
C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:541, 
para 72; joined cases T-391/03 and T-70/04 Franchet and Byk, ECLI:EU:T:190, para 116.
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disclosure of the information. It follows that when disclosure of the information 
would harm the protected interests, it cannot be released for instance based on the 
existing public interest.
The institution has to examine the documents individually375, which is another 
indication of the principle of no block exemptions. If there was no obligation to 
assess each document individually, the decision would be based on the nature of 
the document rather than its content. The refusal would then not require a harm 
test and this would lead to a block exemption, or at least the examination would be 
conducted as if there was a block exemption. However, in some exceptional cases, 
the duty of individual examination can be set aside. The General Court has stated 
that in cases where the individual examination of the documents would lead to an 
overwhelming administrative burden, the need for individual examination can be 
overlooked. However, the case-law following this decision has set the threshold for 
this doctrine quite high.376 Also, the institution is obliged to reason the overwhelming 
burden and substantiate its existence.377
Thus, the exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) cannot be considered absolute 
in any other way but releasing the institution from the overriding public interest 
test. The interests considered so important that they do not leave the room for the 
overriding public interest test are public security, defence and military matters, 
international relations and the financial, monetary or economic policy of the 
Community or a Member State. These interests are listed alongside privacy and 
protection of personal data in Article 4(1).378
6.2 OTHER EXCEPTIONS
While so-called absolute exceptions require the interest balance test when deciding 
whether those exceptions are applicable at all, the exceptions laid down in Article 
4(2) and 4(3) contain an overriding public interest test.379 Thus, it has been seen 
375 See for example joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:541, para 72; Case T36/04, API v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:258, paras 
55–56.
376 See for example case T-2/03, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:125; 
Joined cases T-424/14 and T-435/15 ClientEarth v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:848; Case C-139/07 P, 
Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, ECLI:EU:C:2010:376; Case T-42/05, Williams v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:325.
377 Case T-42/05, Williams v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2008:325, paras 86, 89; case T-2/03, Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:125, para 113.
378 Regulation 1049/2001.
379 According to Article 4(2) and 4(3) of the Transparency Regulation:
 “2. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of: 
— commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property, 
— court proceedings and legal advice, 
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that the interests protected by these articles could suffer a little harm in cases where 
there is an overriding public interest which would justify the disclosure. While this 
has been articulated quite clearly, the institutions rarely disclose documents based 
on the overriding public interest test. The institutions have rather simply noted that 
an overriding public interest does not exist.380 Consequently, it seems that it has 
been left entirely for the Court to decide whether the said circumstances meet the 
conditions set for an overriding public interest.381
The interests protected in Article 2 can be divided into three categories. The first 
indent covers different commercial interests which need to be protected, the second 
indent covers legal advice and the third indent inspections and investigations. The 
exception formulated in Article 3 in turn protects the institution’s decision-making 
process. These exceptions are examined next.
The commercial interests of both natural and legal persons are protected by the 
first indent of the Article 2. It has also been specifically mentioned that this exception 
includes intellectual property. The formulation of the exception is not limiting, and 
therefore other types of commercial interest are also protected by the said exception. 
However, the normal narrow interpretation of exceptions naturally applies.
The Court of Justice of the European Union has given a couple of landmark 
judgments on how to interpret the exception relating to the protection of court 
proceedings and legal advice. As earlier explained, the Court of Justice did set wide 
access to legal advice given in a course of the legislative process as a presumption 
in the Turco case.382 While wide access to legal advice is a presumption if delivered 
in the course of the legislative process, this presumption does not apply to all legal 
advice and even less so when it has been given in the course of court proceedings. 
The Court took a rather restrictive approach for the disclosure of documents which 
relate to court proceedings, in particular when the said process is still ongoing.383 
These decisions have underlined the liaison between transparency and democracy; 
— the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in 
disclosure.
 3. Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which 
relates to a
 matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document 
would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public 
interest in disclosure.
 Access to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary 
consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if 
disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless 
there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.”
380 See for example documents 6224/17, Brussels, 15 February 2017 and 5961/17, Brussels, 14 February 2017. 
381 For circumstances of the case, see Chapter I section 2.
382 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374.
383 Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:541.
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transparency is one of the founding principles of the democratic structures of society 
and, as such, an important element in the legislative process. The disclosure of 
similar content was assessed differently in the latter case, where the legal advice 
related to a court proceeding where the institution was a participant. Thus, the 
interests protected in the second indent of Article 4 deserve a different protection 
depending on the circumstances of the case and therefore the disclosure of the 
document is not examined solely based on the content of the said documents. The 
content is placed in a wider context, and this was done through the overriding 
public interest test.384
The exception formulated in the third indent has been tried several times 
before the Court. This is an exception which becomes relevant when infringement 
proceedings are taking place. In these cases, it is often the parties themselves or 
third parties with a specific interest in the case, who are seeking the information. The 
party access rules would often provide more limited access to documents than the 
Transparency Regulation. Another reason burdening the Transparency Regulation 
is “unnecessary” requests filed mostly in order to delay the inspection procedure. 
These requests might cover thousands of pages and when the examination must 
be carried out individually and based on content, going through such a vast file 
is naturally time consuming. In some cases, this might well serve the applicant’s 
interest.
The second set of exceptions including the overriding public interest test relate 
to decision-making processes. The exception covers both the ongoing decision-
making process and also situations where the process is not in an active phase 
anymore. It has also been seen as important to enable the institutions to protect 
their decision-making process in cases where a certain process has been finalized.
6.3 EXCEPTION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 4(1)(B) – PROTECTION 
OF PERSONAL DATA
The exception relating to the protection of personal data is at the very core of this 
research. This section will shortly introduce the said exception. More profound 
and detailed analysis will follow when the tension between transparency and the 
protection of personal data will be assessed in Chapter VI and Chapter VII.
The exception relating to protecting personal data and privacy is laid down in 
the second part of Article 4(1). According to Article 4(1)(b) of the Transparency 
Regulation, “The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure 
would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in 
384 For contextual-based approach and circumstances of the case, see Chapter I, subsection 2.2.1.
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particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding the protection 
of personal data”. At least three different elements can be distinguished in this 
provision. First, the privacy or integrity of the data subject must be endangered. 
Second, the disclosure needs to be examined based on the Data Protection 
Regulation. And third, there is no overriding public interest test.
Access to the document, or parts of the document, may be refused thereby, 
if it contains personal data, provided that the disclosure would undermine the 
protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual. While the wording of the 
said exception refers to privacy and integrity of a person, the Court of Justice has 
adopted an approach, which sets the weight on the nature of the information.385 
In other words, rather than examining whether the disclosure of certain personal 
data would undermine the privacy and integrity of a person, the Court of Justice 
sees that disclosure of all personal data has to be examined in light of the Data 
Protection Regulation. The CJEU’s reading of the said exception seems to imply 
that it does not see the protection of privacy and integrity as separate elements of 
the protection of personal data. This issue will be discussed in more detail later.
As noted, the exception relating to personal data does not contain the overriding 
public interest clause, and therefore the parts of the document containing personal 
data cannot be disclosed, once it is established that the disclosure would undermine 
the protected interests. As the exception also refers to Community legislation, the 
Union data protection legislation must be taken into account when the said exception 
is applied.
6.4 CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
As previously underlined, the Transparency Regulation covers all documents 
held by an institution and classified documents are not an exception to this.386 
Therefore, even sensitive documents can be requested, and also disclosed, based 
on the Transparency Regulation. In these cases, the possible refusal must be based 
on individual examination of the documents, i.e. the classified marking cannot 
serve as the sole reason to withhold the information. Naturally, the classification 
provides a strong indication of the content, but still, this does not exempt the 
institution from the actual and individual examination of the content. It is not 
unusual that documents marked as “RESTREINT UE”, for example, are disclosed 
at least partially.387
385 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378.
386 See also D. Curtin, “Citizens’ fundamental right of access to EU information: an evolving digital passepartout?” 
in Common Market Law Review 37 (2000), 23–26.
387 See for example disclosure of a document 10949/05, Brussels, 23 May 2016, available on the internet 
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However, the special nature of sensitive documents is recognized in the 
Transparency Regulation. To safeguard the special interests relating to sensitive 
documents, Article 9 stipulates how to handle the applications relating to these 
documents and who is entitled to do so. These documents also form an exception 
from the originator rule; the sensitive documents can be disclosed only with the 
permission of the originator.388 Hence, the special nature of these documents has 
been recognized and interests protected by the classification safeguarded by the 
procedural rule.
It is quite important to note though, that Article 9 does not constitute another 
exception, but simply lays down the process for how classified documents are to be 
examined. Withholding a sensitive document has to be reasoned with the exceptions 
of the Transparency Regulation. And the sensitive nature of the document does 
not suffice alone to explain the application of certain exceptions. The Luxembourg 
courts have been quite consistent with this approach.389
Another interesting point is that only documents relating to matters defined 
in Article 4(1)(a) can be considered sensitive in the meaning of the Transparency 
Regulation. It follows that only matters relating to international relations, public 
security, defence and military matters and monetary policy can be regarded as 
sensitive and receive special treatment as such. However, it seems that this should 
not be interpreted as meaning that only these exceptions could be applied when 
examining whether a sensitive document could be disclosed. This should only be 
taken as a first step in the process of deciding whether to disclose information and 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10949-2005-DCL-1/en/pdf>[last visited 20.2.2017] 
and document 8807/16, Brussels, 19 May 2016, available on the internet <http://data.consilium.europa.
eu/doc/document/ST-8807-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf> [last visited 20.2.2017].
388 Article 9, Treatment of Sensitive documents:
 “1. Sensitive documents are documents originating from the institutions or the agencies established by 
them, from Member States, third countries or International Organisations, classified as ‘TRÈS SECRET/
TOP SECRET’, ‘SECRET’ or ‘CONFIDENTIEL’ in accordance with the rules of the institution concerned, 
which protect essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States in the areas 
covered by Article 4(1)(a), notably public security, defence and military matters.
 2. Applications for access to sensitive documents under the procedures laid down in Articles 7 and 8 shall 
be handled only by those persons who have a right to acquaint themselves with those documents. These 
persons shall also, without prejudice to Article 11(2), assess which references to sensitive documents could 
be made in the public register.
 3. Sensitive documents shall be recorded in the register or released only with the consent of the originator.
 4. An institution which decides to refuse access to a sensitive document shall give the reasons for its decision 
in a manner which does not harm the interests protected in article 4.
 5. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that when handling applications for sensitive 
documents the principles in this article and article 4 are respected.
 6. The rules of the institutions concerning sensitive documents shall be made public.
 7. The Commission and the Council shall inform the European Parliament regarding sensitive documents 
in accordance with arrangements agreed between the institutions.”
389 See for example Case C-350/12 P Council v Sophie In ’t Veld, ECLI:EU:2014:2039, in particular paras 97–
99; see also joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03 Sison v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2005:143, para 73.
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it only indicates that the document has to be assessed in the line with Article 9 
of the Transparency Regulation. Once this has been established, the civil servant 
assessing the disclosure of the document should have the normal palette of the 
exceptions to apply if necessary.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA PROTECTION
The right to the protection of personal data was earlier considered only as an element 
of privacy. This has naturally set the weight on different elements of privacy when 
data protection has been balanced with other rights, and when it has been assessed 
whether the core elements of data protection have been taken properly into account 
in the reconciliation. Only very recent developments have led to the current situation 
where data protection is considered as an independent fundamental right.
This chapter will first examine the relationship between privacy and data 
protection and then focus on data protection as an independent fundamental 
right. The right to self-determination is an essential element in this discussion. It 
will be argued that self-determination is gaining an increasing importance in the 
European data protection framework. This development is not only significant in 
the relationship privacy – data protection – self-determination. It is even more 
intriguing in the challenging relationship between transparency and protection of 
personal data.
Once the general setting for the data protection framework has been examined, 
this chapter will focus on those elements of the data protection legislation, which 
will become relevant when the existing tension between the different solutions of 
European transparency legislation and data protection legislation will be tackled. 
The discussion will take properly into account the ongoing legislative reform process 
and even set weight on the forthcoming data protection legislation and its provisions. 
Even though the data protection reform has been extensive, it does not necessarily 
provide answers to all of the challenges caused by fast-developing technology. These 
developments might become significant also in relation to transparency and access 
to documents legislation. An example of this is how personal data is being stored 
and processed. Instead of traditional data files and registers, personal data exists 
increasingly in data flows. This, in turn has relevance when the right of access is 
given to documents, not to information in more general terms. As the European 
data protection regime is in a transitional phase, it is necessary to examine the core 
concepts together with some of the new data protection elements explaining the 
transition in detail. This is essential for providing a coherent picture of the setting 
in which the tension examined in this research takes place.
95CHAPTER IV
1. DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
This section will first concentrate on the concept of privacy in the European legal 
framework and then move on to discuss the relationship between data protection 
and privacy. Finally, the concept of self-determination will be discussed. These 
three concepts interact in several different ways. Lastly, privacy’s relationship with 
democracy will be briefly covered.
1.1 PRIVACY
Privacy is a concept with multiple dimensions and therefore rather challenging 
to define. It has stimulated a vast amount of literature, yet the multidimensional 
character of this concept seems to be the only aspect on which most authors are 
willing and even eager to agree.390 In this chapter, some of privacy’s characteristic 
features will be examined. However, this chapter does not attempt to give a thorough 
picture nor definition for privacy, but rather give some guidance on how privacy 
is understood in this thesis.
Rights relating to informational privacy can be tracked down all the way to 
the 18th century and to the United States of America. In Europe, similar progress 
took place slightly later.391 The first pan-European acknowledgement of the right to 
privacy took place in the European Convention on Human Rights. In other words, the 
beginning of common European standards on privacy can be placed in the 1950s.392 
In Europe, privacy rights were considered first and foremost in the relationship 
between individuals and the state. The approach differed from the United States, 
where it was rather a question relating to inter-individual relations.393 However, the 
approach has later become broader in Europe and, for instance, the Parliamentary 
Assembly explicitly underlined in its Resolution 1165 (1998) that the protection of 
one’s privacy should also cover interference by private actors, such as mass media.394 
Consequently, it can be argued that inter-individual relations are part of European 
privacy rights today.
390 H. Delany & E. Carolan, The Right to Privacy, (Thomson Round Hall, 2008) 4; J.Q. Whitman “The Two 
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty” in Yale Law Journal 113(2004), 1153. See also K. Hughes, 
“A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law” in The Modern Law Review 
75(5) (2012), 806–808.
391 A-R. Wallin & P. Nurmi, Tietosuojalainsäädäntö, (Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1990) 1–7.
392 European Convention on Human Rights was concluded on 4th of November 1950.
393 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 62–76.
394 Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolution 1165 (1998), point 12.
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When trying capture how the concept of privacy is constructed, there are 
several different angles to choose from. Quite commonly privacy is explained by 
distinguishing the four elements it consists of. These four elements are the rights 
to a private life, family life, home and correspondence.395 When taking a closer look 
at these four elements, it is easy to note that they have strong similarities with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
For a long time, the right to privacy was closely connected to the protection of 
family life and all four previously-mentioned elements seem to have quite clear 
relations to family life. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
goes as follows:
“Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
When the European Convention on Human Rights was negotiated, the protection 
of privacy was still quite clearly connected to a certain sphere, namely the home. 
Even today, individuals’ right to privacy is not considered indispensable when in 
public places. An example of this is provided by the practice developed in the United 
States, where reasonable expectations have been used as a measurement when 
assessing whether there is an infringement of one’s privacy.396 Clearly, individuals’ 
expectations cannot be the same in public places as in their private gardens. 
However, this doctrine allows the scope of reasonable expectations to be narrowed 
from public places to relatively private areas as well, such as changing rooms etc., 
by a simple notification of the surveillance. Also, due to the technical developments, 
even one’s own garden does not seem to be as in the private sphere as it used to 
be; videotaping streetview cars might pass by any time.397 Not to mention the most 
395 H. Snijders, “Privacy of Contract”, in Ziegler Human Rights and Private Law (Hart, 2007), 105– 116.
396 J.Q. Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty” in Yale Law Journal 113(2004), 
1162.
397 See also H. Nissenbaum, Privacy in context – Technology, Policy, and Integrity of Social Life, (Stanford 
University Press, 2010) 22–25, 51–53.
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current cause of privacy dilemmas, drones. It has been rightly noted, that the non-
normative approach of the reasonable expectation doctrine does not necessarily 
guarantee sufficient protection for individuals as the reasonable expectations might 
vary significantly depending on the place. For instance, the notification of video 
surveillance would lower the degree of the reasonable expectation, yet the right to 
privacy should not be deprived of individuals solely based on such notice.398 Even 
if the doctrine of reasonable expectations alone might not provide an answer to 
the question of whether there is a breach of privacy, this doctrine provides an 
additional tool when assessing whether one’s personal data can be disclosed. This 
will be elaborated in more detail in the concluding chapter.
When trying to gain a deeper understanding of the privacy rights in the ECHR 
context, one should take note of the case-law and also some of the Council of 
Europe’s instruments. Unfortunately, the European Court of Human Rights has not 
given a universal definition of privacy. In its case-law, the right to privacy has been 
examined from many different angles, but one, clear and unambiguous definition 
is still missing.399 Instead, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
have defined privacy in one of its resolutions. Later, the Parliamentary Assembly 
confirmed its earlier definition by repeating it in its Resolution 1165 (1998). The 
Parliamentary Assembly stated that privacy is the right to live one’s own life with 
a minimum of interference. Quite interestingly, the Parliamentary Assembly also 
noted that the right to control the use of one’s own personal data should be included 
in this definition. Besides giving obvious recognition to the protection of personal 
data, the Parliamentary Assembly’s resolution quite interestingly sets weight on 
self-determination. This is particularly interesting as the theory of informational 
self-determination was not generally accepted in most of the Council of Europe’s 
member states at that time, according to Van Hocke & Dhont.400 While this resolution 
might offer valuable guidance when framing privacy, due to its unbinding nature, 
that is all it can offer.
When trying to capture privacy rights in European terms, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights must also be taken into consideration. The Charter states that 
“everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications”. The wording of Article 7 of the Charter is almost identical to the 
first indent of the European Convention on Human Rights.401 The similarities are 
398 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76.
399 H. Snijders, “Privacy of Contract”, in Ziegler Human Rights and Private Law (Hart, 2007), 105–116.
400 M. Van Hoecke & J.Dhont, Obstacles and Opportunities for the Harmonisation of Law in Europe: Case of 
Privacy, in V. Heiskainen & K.Kulovesi (ed.) Function and Future of European Law, (Helsinki, 1999), 128.
401 Article 7 Respect for Private and Family Life; Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and 
family life, home and communications.
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not coincidental. When the Charter of Fundamental Rights was negotiated, the aim 
was to align the formulation of the provisions of the Charter with the Convention. 
This was to avoid the danger of contradictory interpretation of the fundamental 
rights by the two European courts.402
An attempt to define privacy has also been made in academic literature. For 
example, Trudel formulates privacy as follows “Logically, not everything about 
an individual belongs to his or her private life. The right to privacy concerns 
information that affects an individual’s independence and ability to exercise control 
over information concerning intimate relationship and life choices. However, as 
soon as an individual does things that concern others, his or her private life is 
necessarily constrained by their legitimate interests”.403 This is quite a clever way 
to put it. First the information which should fall under the scope of privacy is 
described; the information which affects an individual’s independence. Second, an 
indication of how the right to privacy can be exercised on a practical level is given. 
This is by exercising control over the information. Trudel’s description of privacy 
reveals an element mentioned earlier when discussing the Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Resolution, namely self-determination. Whitman, Professor of Comparative and 
Foreign Law at Yale, sees this feature as being very characteristic of European privacy 
thinking, and also an aspect differentiating it from American privacy thinking.404 This 
is also a point of great interest when taking a look at the protection of personal data, 
which is a very European fundamental right, and which sets an increasing weight 
on the aspect of self-determination as I will argue later.405 Finally, returning to the 
third element of Trudel’s definition of privacy, this could be considered even the 
most significant aspect of the formulation. It frames the logical barriers of privacy; 
things that concern others. 
Besides numerous definitions of privacy, it has also been identified through its 
scope. For example, the following elements have been described as forming a part of 
the concept of privacy. The first element is “control over the gathering, storage, use 
and dissemination by the state or others of one’s identifying features or personal 
information”.406 All the activities mentioned in this formulation also fall quite clearly 
402 See for example EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Why the Charter of Fundamental Rights exists, available 
on the internet  < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm>  [last visited 
20.3.2017].
403 P. Trudel, “Privacy Protection on the Internet: Risk Management and Networked Normativity”, in S. Gutwith; 
Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 317–
334.
404 J.Q. Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty” in Yale Law Journal 113(2004), 
1161,1196–1202.
405 For informational self-determination in European privacy thinking, see also M. Van Hoecke & J. Dhont, 
Obstacles and Opportunities for the Harmonisation of Law in Europe: Case of Privacy, in V. Heiskainen & 
K. Kulovesi (ed.) Function and Future of European Law, (Helsinki, 1999), 128–129.
406 A. Ieven, “Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of 
Human Rights’ balancing of private life against other rights”, in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts between Fundamental 
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under the definition of the processing of personal data. Furthermore, the described 
information falls under the definition of personal data. Therefore, this element seems 
clearly to indicate the processing of one’s personal data. However, this does not mean 
that considering this as a part of privacy would be somehow incorrect. The second 
element is “control over features of one’s identity and self- expression through one’s 
names, titles, physical appearance, life-style, marital status and gender identity”.407 
Apart from lifestyle, these features fall under the definition of personal data. And also, 
depending of the context, lifestyle could be considered personal data as well. The 
third element is “physical, moral, psychological and sexual integrity”.408 The third 
element begins to diverge from the definition of personal data, even if depending on 
the context these elements could also be considered personal data. The fourth and 
fifth elements are more clearly on the solid ground of privacy alone: “well-being in 
the sense of freedom from (environmental) nuisance” and “decisional freedom of 
self-determination regarding questions concerning sexuality, pregnancy and the 
end of life”.409 The aim is not to form an exhaustive and solid picture of the scope 
of privacy through these elements. However, they do illustrate how the protection 
of one’s personal data can be considered a part of privacy. It will later be discussed 
whether privacy can be seen as part of data protection as well, but it seems clear 
that even if the protection of one’s personal data has recently gained an independent 
status as fundamental right, it still cannot be entirely separated from privacy. Gloria 
González Fuster argues correspondingly that even if the CJEU has separated privacy 
and data protection in some of its judgments, the CJEU does not, de facto, make a 
clear difference between the said rights in its reasoning, but rather returns to stress 
the element of privacy when stating reasons for the infringement.410 
The different ways to approach the concept of privacy have now been examined 
and it was noted that there does not seem to be a clear way to define it. How 
the content of privacy should be interpreted in the context of the European data 
protection regime has not been unambiguously defined either. Next, this issue will 
be elaborated further.
Rights (Intersentia, 2008), 40. It ought to be noted that this evaluation has been given in the context of the 
scope of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
407 A. Ieven, “Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of 
Human Rights’ balancing of private life against other rights”, in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights (Intersentia, 2008), 40.
408 Ibid.
409 Ibid; for decisional privacy, see B. van der Sloot, “Decisional privacy 2.0: the procedural requirements implicit 
in article 8 ECHR and its potential impact on profiling” in International Data Privacy Law 7 (2017).
410 G. González Fuster, “Fighting For Your Right to What Exactly? The Convoluted Case Law of the EU Court 
of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data Protection” in Birbeck Law Review, 2(2) (2014), 263–278; G. 
González Fuster & R. Gellert, “The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search 
of an uncharted rights“ in International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 1(2012), 73–81. See also 
O. Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law, (Oxford, 2015) 132–135.
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1.2 DATA PROTECTION AS AN INDEPENDENT FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT
It is clear from the outset that data protection has a very intimate relationship with 
privacy. As previously discussed, it was long considered a part of privacy in the field 
of fundamental rights. Sometimes it is even referred to as data privacy.411 In other 
words, heavy weight on the protection of one’s privacy has been given when data 
protection has been balanced with other fundamental rights.412
Data protection has become an individual fundamental right very recently. 
This transformation stems from the different developments in the EU’s legislative 
framework and also from Court practice. Thereby, it has now gained the necessary 
institutional recognition.413 
In Europe the recognition of data protection as a fundamental right took place at 
the latest when the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union entered 
into force 1 December 2009.414 The Charter clearly distinguishes the protection of 
personal data from the right to privacy. In other words, the right to the protection 
of personal data is now clearly laid down in Article 8 of the Charter and the right 
to privacy in its separate Article 7. This is a significant step forward, as the Charter 
clearly stipulates that personal data has an independent value in the field of 
fundamental rights. Article 8 states that “
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on 
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access 
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the 
right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority.”
411 S.Greenstein, Our Humanity Exposed – Predictive Modelling in a Legal Context, (Stockholm University, 
2017) 258–263.
412 See for example case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378.
413 Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; for institutional support, see Chapter I section 1.1. and in 
particular Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 39–45, 64–68.
414 See for example EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, How the Charter became part of the EU Treaties, 
available on the internet  < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm>  [last 
visited 20.3.2017]. See also comments on the reluctance for using the term privacy in the data protection 
legislation, I.Lloyd, “From ugly duckling to Swan. The rise of data protection and its limits”, in Computer 
Law and Security Review 34 (2018), 780. See also O. Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection 
Law, (Oxford, 2015) 89–129.
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As data protection has grown from the privacy right, it is natural that earlier case-
law and also academic literature has underlined this aspect of data protection and 
often examined data protection from this angle. The umbilical cord is strong in this 
case, and more recent case-law is still very closely attached to this relationship.415 
Although the CJEU treats data protection as an individual fundamental right, it 
has not spelled out the distinctive features of data protection as Gloria González 
Fuster notes.416 The CJEU has left the essence of data protection obscure and has 
often treated it together with the right to privacy. For example, in the so-called 
Data Retention judgment, the court does indeed give an independent status to data 
protection. It specifically states that retention of the said data has to be in line with 
Article 8 of the Charter. However, the Court’s argument throughout the case keeps 
privacy and the protection of personal data very much hand in hand. The Court 
underlines that the content of the communication was not to be retained, but rather 
the information covered by the Data Retention Directive related to, for example, the 
source of the communication. Such data as date, time duration, calling telephone 
number and IP address had to be retained. The Court stressed in its reasoning that 
by combining this information, a very detailed information of a person’s private life 
might be revealed. Thus, in the end, the CJEU’s reasoning sets a heavy weight on 
the interference with one’s privacy.417 Privacy and data protection might have been 
treated together, but the CJEU did give data protection a specific and independent 
recognition. In earlier case-law the CJEU would only underline the right to privacy 
in the context of reconciling fundamental rights, even when the focus of the case 
was on the processing of personal data.418 Finally, the Court concludes that the Data 
Retention Directive is invalid because it “does not lay down clear and precise rules 
415 For an analysis of the CJEU’s case-law on the concepts of privacy and data protection, see also M. Brkan, 
The Court of Justice of the EU, privacy and data protection: Judge-made law as a leitmotif in fundamental 
rights protection, in Brkan, M. & E. Psychogiopoulou (ed.) Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the 
Digital Environment, (Edward Elgar, 2017), 10–31; G. González Fuster, “Fighting For Your Right to What 
Exactly? The Convoluted Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data Protection” 
in Birbeck Law Review, 2(2) (2014), 263–278; G. González Fuster & R. Gellert, “The fundamental right of 
data protection in the European Union: in search of an uncharted rights“ in International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology 1(2012), 73–81. See also O. Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law, 
(Oxford, 2015) 132–135. 
416 G. González Fuster, “Fighting For Your Right to What Exactly? The Convoluted Case Law of the EU Court 
of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data Protection” in Birbeck Law Review, 2(2) (2014), 263–278; G. 
González Fuster & R. Gellert, “The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search 
of an uncharted rights“ in International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 1(2012), 73–81.
417 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Kärtner Landesregierung, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, paras 26–30, 65. See also T. Ojanen, “Privacy Is More Than Just a Seven-Letter 
Word: The Court of Justice of the European Union Sets Constitutional Limits on Mass Surveillance: Court 
of Justice of the European Union, Decision of 8 April 2014 in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital 
Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, Participation and Democracy” in European Law and Polity 3 
(2014), 528–541 and M. Brkan, The Court of Justice of the EU, privacy and data protection: Judge-made 
law as a leitmotif in fundamental rights protection, in Brkan, M. & E. Psychogiopoulou (ed.) Courts, Privacy 
and Data Protection in the Digital Environment, (Edward Elgar, 2017), 14–15.
418 Case C-275/06, Promusicae, ECLI:EU:C:2008:5, para 65.
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governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter”. In other words, the interference should be justified 
from both the data protection and privacy perspective. This judgment pushed many 
national stakeholders to give further interpretation on how this is to be interpreted 
in the national context.419 For example in Finland, the Constitutional Committee 
in the Parliament developed its earlier approach further by stating that the type 
of data which was previously considered to be on the outskirts of the right to data 
protection (location data) was now coming closer to the hard core of the said right.420
Even if privacy is still very apparent when assessing data protection, some authors 
have underlined that data protection is not simply a question of informational 
privacy, but also of informational autonomy.421 This is an issue which will be 
examined in more detail later in this chapter when self-determination is discussed. 
In this context, it suffices to note that I see that informational autonomy cannot be 
lightly separated from privacy rights. Therefore, this thesis does not try to entirely 
separate data protection from privacy. The aim is rather to underline the specific 
features of the protection of personal data and elaborate further the said relationship 
by distinguishing underlying principles, aims and objectives, which are characteristic 
to the protection of personal data.
Besides dissatisfaction with the CJEU’s way of treating the rights together even 
when underlying the status of data protection as fundamental right422, the separation 
of data protection from privacy rights has been considered somewhat unsatisfying 
for other reasons. These concerns are drawn from the fear that once removed from 
the sphere of the privacy, the underlying values of dignity and autonomy might 
fade out with time.423 It might well be that practical lawyers who work with data 
protection issues and solve very technical questions would not speculate on these 
values on a daily basis. For instance, the Data Protection Directive refers to the 
aim of the protection of privacy while values of dignity and autonomy are not 
419 See for example in Denmark 2.6.2014, “Justitsministeren ophæver reglerne om sessionslogning”, available 
on the internet  < http://justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2014/justitsministeren-
oph%C3%A6ver-reglerne-om-sessionslogning> [last visited 3.11.2015]; For legality of the Data Retention 
Directive, see also, L. Feiler, “The Legality of the Data Retention Directive in Light of the fundamental Rights 
to Privacy and Data Protection ” in European Journal of Law and Technology 3 (2010).
420 PeVL18/2014 vp, p. 6.
421 See M. Tzanou, The Added Value of Data Protection as a Fundamental Right in the EU Legal Order in the 
Context of Law Enforcement, (EUI, 2012) 22.
422 G. González Fuster, “Fighting For Your Right to What Exactly? The Convoluted Case Law of the EU Court 
of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data Protection” in Birbeck Law Review, 2(2) (2014), 263–278; G. 
González Fuster & R. Gellert, “The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search 
of an uncharted rights“ in International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 1(2012), 73–81.
423 See for instance A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of 
Self-Development: Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De 
Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76. For an analysis of 
protection of personal data turning into a fundamental right, see also M. Brkan, “The Unstoppable Expansion 
of the EU Fundamental Right to Data Protection: Little Shop of Horrors?” in Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law, 23 (2016).
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mentioned. Furthermore, Rodotà questioned whether this general assumption is 
convincing as there are clearly increasing demands for data disclosure due to several 
different factors. These are, for example, security requirements, market interests 
and reorganization of the public sector424. Nevertheless, Rodotà does conclude, 
that “the strong protection of personal data continues to be a ‘necessary utopia’”.
Regardless, I see that the status as an independent fundamental right is rather 
a victory than a loss for the protection of personal data, and in particular for the 
underlying values of data protection. Clearly, this progress should have an effect 
when balancing data protection with other fundamental rights. Previously, data 
protection has been balanced with other fundamental rights as an element of privacy. 
This has led to situation where the focus in the reconciliation has been on ensuring 
that data subject’s privacy is not infringed. This is still an essential aspect of data 
protection and it cannot be overlooked. However, there are also other aims and 
underlying principles for data protection. These other aims and principles should 
be given more weight and should now become more significant in the balancing 
exercise. An example of such an underlying principle would be good governance. 
To conclude, the balancing should not be based solely on the assessment of whether 
there is an infringement of privacy rights, as it has been previously.
1.2.1 PRIVACY AS A PART OF DATA PROTECTION OR DATA PROTECTION  
AS A PART OF PRIVACY
It has now been established that data protection originated and diverged from 
privacy rights. Yet, the question of whether data protection should be considered 
a part of privacy, or privacy a part data protection, is still stimulating interesting 
discussions.425
The origin of data protection, the aim to protect individual’s privacy, is strongly 
present in the early European data protection instruments. They stress the 
importance of the protection of privacy when processing personal data.426 Even 
424 S. Rodotà, “Data Protection as a Fundamental Right” in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 77–82.
425 See for example P. De Hert & S. Gutwirth, “Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxembourg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing 
Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 6; D. Manolescu, “Data Protection Enforcement: The European Experience 
– Case Law”, in N. Ismail & E.L. Yong Cieh (eds.), Beyond Data Protection (Springer, 2013), 217–220. See 
also G. González Fuster, “Fighting For Your Right to What Exactly? The Convoluted Case Law of the EU 
Court of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data Protection” in Birbeck Law Review, 2(2) (2014), 263–278; 
G. González Fuster & R. Gellert, “The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search 
of an uncharted rights“ in International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 1(2012), 73–81.
426 For instance, according to Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and the free movement of such data, Article 1, Member States shall protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing 
of personal data. Also Regulation 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
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though this is the case, it has been quite correctly noted that data protection is not 
merely an angle of the protection of privacy. The scope of data protection can also 
be seen as wider than the one of privacy, and at the same time more specific. The 
scope can be seen as wider, because data protection also relates to other fundamental 
rights besides privacy. And it can be considered more specific, because it is limited 
to the processing of personal data. While more specific, at the same time, the scope 
is also considered broader as all processing of personal data is under its scope,427 
not only personal data relating to one’s privacy. Next, these statements will be 
examined further.
It is correctly said, that data protection covers all processing of personal data, 
not only processing that is assumed to interfere with one’s privacy. This is strongly 
related with one of the differences between these two concepts, namely the more 
specific nature of data protection. It has been noted428 that data protection is more 
specific as it only relates to processing of personal data. If this argument is taken on 
a more concrete level, it is rather facile to observe that data protection regulation 
is more detailed and therefore more specific. The European data protection 
framework consists of several different sets of rules, such as the GDPR and the 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation while privacy legislation consists of 
some clear statements, which could be considered principles as well. While data 
protection rules have initially been drawn up to safeguard individuals’ privacy when 
processing their personal data, individuals’ privacy is not necessarily in danger in 
all circumstances covered by these rules. While it is fairly safe to conclude that 
European data protection regulation is precisely what Dworkin and Alexy intend 
with rules, this is not as clear in terms of privacy regulation. The statements defining 
the right to privacy could be considered principles as well.
It was previously established that contrary to principles, rules apply in all-or-
nothing manner. Once officials have identified which rules are to be applied in the 
said case, those rules will be applied. The public authority applying these rules is 
not entitled to discretion, unless there is a particular reason for it. Thus, the official 
applying data protection regulation is not supposed to balance the rules and consider 
whether there is actual danger of interference with someone’s privacy, if the rule 
clearly applies and there are no specific reasons to derogate from this. The specific 
reasons could be, for instance, competing rules or an exception to the main rule.
personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data contains 
corresponding article as does the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data.
427 See for instance P. De Hert & S. Gutwirth, “Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxembourg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing 
Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 4,11.
428 P. De Hert & S. Gutwirth, “Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Constitutionalisation 
in Action”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection 
(Springen, 2009), 6.
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However, it should not be assumed that these rules are depart entirely from 
privacy. Instead, privacy should be considered an underlying principle for these 
rules. It follows that as long as these rules are applied, and no contradictions arise, 
the question of the protection of one’s privacy does not seem to have an effect on 
how the rules are applied. However, once hard cases arise and a solution must be 
sought from the underlying levels of law, privacy becomes relevant and it must be 
balanced with other underlying principles. Thereby, it appears that even if data 
protection regulation also seemingly covers such processing of personal data where 
one’s privacy is not directly at stake, the connection to privacy still exists in the 
underlying layers of law.
Furthermore, even if the scope of data protection can be considered wider than 
privacy in a certain respect, the protection of one’s privacy does cover sectors that are 
not covered by data protection. Nevertheless, it is fruitless to continue this discussion 
further. I suggested that privacy is one of the underlying principles of data protection. 
In this context, it is essential to note that as an independent fundamental right, 
data protection might also have other underlying principles or aims and objectives 
which create the circumstances of the case. I argue that these other elements should 
gain increasing importance when balancing the right to protection of personal data 
with other rights, precisely because of data protection’s nature as an independent 
fundamental right. While privacy is still a highly significant element in the data 
protection regime, data protection is slowly and firmly departing from its roots. In 
this context, it should be borne in mind that detailed data protection regulation 
does have aims and objectives. In other words, there would be no reason to make 
detailed data protection legislation just for the sake of it.
1.2.2 PERSONAL DATA AS AN ECONOMIC ASSET
The discussion of privacy, personal data and self-determination, which will be shortly 
analyzed in more detail, would not be complete without some remarks related to 
the economic value of personal data. This is particularly interesting as personal 
data is turning into an extremely valuable asset in economic terms and, in many 
ways, the development of modern society seems to be clearly linked with the ways 
in which personal data can or may be processed.   
It has been suggested that individuals would have the right to their own personal 
information as an economic asset.429 This doctrine seems to draw its justification 
from the data subject’s right to self-determination and autonomy. If this doctrine 
429 See for instance A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of 
Self-Development: Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De 
Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76.
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is set in the context where commercial actors sell massive amounts of personal 
data for numerous different purposes, it would indeed seem quite appropriate to 
argue that personal data is an economic asset of the person to whom it relates.430 Of 
course, in such a scenario the time, effort and other investments that the controller 
might have made in this “product” would be disregarded. 
Furthermore, once it has been established that data protection is an independent 
fundamental right, we are bound by the basic characteristics of human rights. 
The idea of one selling their personal data seems slightly problematic from the 
fundamental right angle.431 This is particularly interesting as this might not be 
perceived similarly in non-European countries. It appears to be a very European 
approach that a certain extent of self-determination would remain on the person 
even when there has been an economic gain for that person.432 Furthermore, data 
subjects do not own their personal data in a sense that they could freely deliberate 
how to use it.433  
1.3 SELF-DETERMINATION AS A PART OF PRIVACY AND  
DATA PROTECTION
This chapter first examined different definitions and characteristics of privacy 
rights. This was followed by an analysis of data protection. Before engaging in a 
more detailed discussion of data protection’s different elements and provisions, 
self-determination is addressed in this section. Self-determination is closely linked 
with both privacy and data protection. It therefore seems rational to discuss all 
three of these concepts simultaneously.
Some authors have argued that the right to privacy, and also to data protection, 
are means to obtain other goals and to realize the underlying values of privacy, rather 
than the goals themselves. This conclusion is drawn from German legal practice.434 
The German Constitutional Court gave a landmark decision in the 1980s in which 
430 See also for instance N. Barber “A Right to Privacy” in Ziegler Human Rights and Private Law (Hart, 2007), 
67 – 77.
431 See also for instance S. Rodotà, “Data Protection as a Fundamental Right” in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De 
Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 77–82. He concludes 
that “the right to data protection has to do with protecting one’s personality, not one’s property”.
432 J.Q. Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty” in Yale Law Journal 113(2004), 
1198.
433 P. De Hert & S. Gutwirth, “Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Constitutionalisation 
in Action”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection 
(Springen, 2009), 3. See also for instance Case C-524/06 Heinz Huber, ECLI:EU:C:2008:724.
434 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwirth; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76.
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it underlined the importance of informational self-determination.435 Hence, the 
underlying aim referred to by some authors is self-determination.
The German Constitutional Court has stressed two elements of self-determination; 
human dignity and self-development. These elements were later elaborated on in 
academic literature.436 While the importance of the said values has been underlined, 
it has simultaneously been acknowledged that the right to self-determination cannot 
be considered absolute.437
As it has come out earlier, privacy has traditionally been considered as the corner-
stone of the data protection legislation. However, I argue that self-determination is 
gaining increasing importance and a more independent role in the data protection 
framework. Many of the new provisions put forward by the European Commission 
in its proposal for the General Data Protection Regulation stemmed precisely from 
self-determination.438 For example, data portability and the right to be forgotten 
reflect this underlying aim or principle of data protection. Besides the new provisions 
introduced by the Commission’s proposal, some of the existing elements reflecting 
self-determination did gain more importance or stronger status in the Commission’s 
proposal and in the GDPR as it was adopted. An example of this would be consent. 
The Commission’s proposal did set quite detailed requirements for the fulfillment 
of consent.
When analyzing this development, an essential element which needs to 
be recognized is the increasing role of social media. The new data protection 
provisions support the argument of the increasing role of self-determination in the 
data protection framework. Furthermore, I see that social media and the internet 
environment offer the explanation for the need to strengthen self-determination in 
the said framework. In this new environment, self-determination has a very different 
role than in a more traditional, register-based data protection framework. When 
the data subject him or herself is the active source of the personal data, and also 
in some cases the controller or processor of the said data, it seems quite rational 
435 Judgment by the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 65, 1 (15 December 1983).
436 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwirth; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76.
437 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76. See also for instance Case C-524/06, 
Heinz Huber, ECLI:EU:C:2008:724.
438 See Articles 7, 17, 20 of the Regulation (EU) No 679/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 
119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88). For similar comments, see also W.Li, “A tale of two rights: exploring the potential 
conflict between two rights to data portability and right to be forgotten under the General Data Protection 
Regulation” in International Data Privacy Law 8 (2018), 316. See also O. Lynskey, The Foundations of EU 
Data Protection Law, (Oxford, 2015) 229–272.
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that an objective such as self-determination is gaining more significance and a 
separate role from privacy.
After establishing that self-determination is gaining increasing importance in the 
European data protection regime, the next step is to define the tentative dimensions 
of self-determination in the data protection context.439
From the outset, the notion of self-determination seems quite self-explanatory, 
but there is more to it. One angle of self-determination to examine is to separate the 
control over producing data from the control over existing personal data. I argue 
that when personal data is produced by the data subject themselves, there is more 
ground to set weight on self-determination. I argue that this is also the element 
from which self-determination’s divergence from privacy stems. When the data 
subject is producing the data and controlling its processing, data subjects’ rights 
are protected as far as the data subject has control over the data.
It has been noted though that the right to self-determination should not be 
perceived as one’s right to somehow control or manipulate the information about 
oneself.440 This is why “self” should be separated from the information. Furthermore, 
it has been argued that self-determination does not imply that data subjects would 
have “ownership” rights over their own personal data.441
Even if self-determination can be seen as part of privacy and it was argued that 
privacy is an underlying principle of data protection, it would be false to claim that 
there is always a data subject’s privacy at stake when self-determination plays a part 
in the data protection field. An example of this would be data portability as proposed 
by the European Commission and later adopted in the General Data Protection 
Regulation.442 The core of data portability is the right to move your own personal 
data from one system to another. This personal data could be, for example, on 
Facebook and the data subject443 might have shared this information with hundreds 
if not thousands of followers on Facebook. In other words, the personal information 
might not be private in its nature at all. The concrete goal in this respect seems to 
be to give the data subject control over his or her own personal data. Therefore, 
439 For autonomy and self-determination in different forms of democracy, see J. Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996), 82–118.
440 This is an argument which might need to be redeveloped in light of the Google v Spain judgment, Case 
C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. Self-determination has also been assessed in 
the context of protection of personal data and public access to documents as a part of right of public access, 
see T. Pöysti, Tehokkuus, informaatio ja eurooppalainen oikeusalue, (Helsinki, 1999) 478.
441 See A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-
Development: Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; 
C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 51.
442 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final, p. 9, 26, 38 and 53.
443 The data subject could be considered a processor in such a situation. For waiving the right to privacy, see 
K. Hughes, “A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law” in The Modern 
Law Review 75(5) (2012), 820.
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privacy and self-determination are considered as separate aims or principles of 
data protection in this thesis.
1.4 DATA PROTECTION IN TERMS OF DEMOCRACY
After having discussed the different viewpoints of data protection as an independent 
fundamental right, it is also essential to view how data protection comes together 
with democracy. In this assessment, privacy as an underlying principle of data 
protection is of particular interest.   
The relationship between transparency and democracy444 was examined earlier 
and it was concluded that transparency is a prerequisite for well-functioning 
democracy. According to some445 privacy can also be considered a prerequisite or 
at least an element of democratic society and, for instance, of the freedom of speech. 
The connection between privacy and democracy is drawn from the assumption 
that in order to be able to form and freely express personal opinions, one should 
have privacy to develop and elaborate these thoughts.446 If access to documents is 
inserted into this equation, we immediately notice, that without first having the 
relevant information, the meaning of privacy becomes void via-à-vis democracy. 
Thus, the opportunity to elaborate one’s thoughts without interference is quite 
quickly rendered fruitless if one is not provided with sufficient information.
Even if there might be some grounds to consider privacy a prerequisite or an 
element of democracy, it still seems quite a far-fetched construction, in particular 
when this connection is assessed together with the right of access to documents. 
Given recent revelations on the big data solutions applied by Cambridge Analytica 
for targeted election campaigns, this discussion could be taken to another level with 
a particular interest in such data protection rules as profiling. However, from the 
outset, the core issue would seem to come back to what was said on the privacy to 
develop and elaborate one’s thoughts. 
In the context of the discussion on democracy and the protection of personal 
data, a closer look at the personal data of public figures must also be taken.
444 See Chapter III, section 1.2. More detailed analysis will follow in Chapter VII, subsection 2.1.1.1.
445 See for instance A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of 
Self-Development: Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De 
Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76.
446 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwirth; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76. See also S. Greenstein, Our Humanity 
Exposed – Predictive Modelling in a Legal Context, (Stockholm University, 2017) 159–161.
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1.4.1 PUBLIC FIGURES
It has now been established that expectations for one’s right to privacy is not as high 
in public places. Also, the right to privacy of public figures is more restricted than 
the common man’s. Public figures are those who are acting in one way or other in 
the public sphere. This might be due to their post, as is a case with representatives 
of the government, or they might be public figures for other reasons, like athletes 
and artists. The Parliamentary Assembly has defined public figures in its Resolution 
1165 (1998) as persons holding public office and/or using public resources and, 
more broadly speaking, all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, 
the economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport or in any other domain. However, 
the ECHR has taken a narrower approach to the definition of public figures in its 
judgment in Hannover v Germany.447 The European Court of Human Rights stated 
that “a fundamental distinction needs to be made between reporting facts – even 
controversial ones – capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society 
relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting 
details of the private life of an individual who, moreover, as in this case, does not 
exercise official functions. While in the former case the press exercises its vital 
role of ‘watchdog’ in a democracy by contributing to impart[ing] information 
and ideas on matters of public interest, it does not do so in the latter case”. Some 
have argued that this distinction between public figures and average people, being 
essential for democracy, should also be recognized when applying data protection 
regulation.448 This argument will be examined further in the concluding chapter.
Quite interestingly, it has also been noted that it seems that on some occasions 
the right to privacy has been extended to a right to “protection of personal life”. The 
underlying idea of this is that not all elements falling in one’s personal life should 
necessarily be considered private.449 As concluded earlier, the right to control the 
use of one’s own personal data is not absolute. Similarly, the right to privacy is 
not absolute.
447 ECtHR 24 June 2004, Von Hannover v Germany (2004–VI).
448 P. Trudel, “Privacy Protection on the Internet: Risk Management and Networked Normativity”, in S. Gutwith; 
Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 317–
334.
449 P. Trudel, “Privacy Protection on the Internet: Risk Management and Networked Normativity”, in S. Gutwith; 




Rightful interference in one’s privacy is sometimes measured with reasonable 
expectations. The reasonable expectations doctrine has evolved in the case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Some authors have taken up the concept 
of “legitimate expectations” in their vocabulary when reasonable expectations are 
assessed. Even if reasonable expectations can serve as a useful tool when assessing 
the hard core of privacy rights, some have quite rightfully noted that such a tool 
might actually set the standards lower in the European legal framework.450 When 
surveillance techniques are becoming available for the public at large and becoming 
more efficient, the standards of reasonable expectations might at the same time 
become lower.
2. CENTRAL DATA PROTECTION CONCEPTS
The previous section discussed the founding values of data protection. The latter 
part of this chapter will take the discussion to a more concrete level and focus on 
the core concepts and provisions of the European data protection framework. First, 
the most central data protection concepts will be elaborated. This will be followed 
by the discussion of some main elements of the data protection legislation.451 After 
this, some sub-elements of data protection will be examined. The discussed concepts 
are the relevant elements vis-à-vis European transparency regulation. Lastly, some 
new data protection concepts developed in the renewed data protection framework 
and in particular in the context of the GDPR will be tackled.
The formulation of the most essential data protection concepts has not gone 
through a significant transformation since the Data Protection Directive entered 
into force more than 20 years ago.452 This is also the case after 25 May 2018. One 
could think that over the past 20 years, the content of the core concepts would have 
stabilized. Yet, this is not the case. Even in the most recent cases tried before the 
Court or at the data protection authorities, the fundamental issue often culminates 
in the question of whether some activity should be considered processing of personal 
data at all. In other words, whether some information is personal data and secondly, 
450 S. Nouwt, B.R. de Vries & R. Loermans, Analysis of the Country Reports, S. Nouwt, B.R. de Vries & C. Prins 
(eds.) Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? Eleven Country Reports on Camera Surveillance and Workplace 
Privacy, (Asser Press, 2005), 351–357.
451 These principles are different from Dworkin’s and Alexy’s principles, even if they might sometimes overlap. 
For Dworkin’s and Alexy’s principles, see Chapter I.
452 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31–50).
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whether the activities carried out with the data is to be considered processing or 
who is the controller.453 
One of the factors causing continuous confusion with the fundamental concepts 
of data protection legislation is ever-developing technology. New innovations and 
evolution are constantly creating situations where a rather old regulatory framework 
should provide answers to new dilemmas. An already outdated example of this would 
be Google Street View and other similar services. One of the questions arising in this 
context was whether collecting and processing Street View pictures is processing 
personal data.454
The European legal framework was drawn in a technologically neutral way and 
has so far been able to answer the demands created by new technology.455 The 
broad definition of personal data has been a central element in this development. 
When data is not to be considered personal data or the activities not considered 
processing personal data, the activity does not fall in the scope of the data protection 
legislation. This is the case even when such values as individuals’ privacy is at stake. 
As the argumentation around data protection legislation often returns to these 
fundamental concepts, it is necessary to examine their content.
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL DATA
The scope of the concept of personal data constantly causes debate due to new 
technological innovations, which place this concept in areas not known to legislators 
when drafting data protection legislation decades before. An example of this is the 
CJEU’s ruling where the Court decided that dynamic IP addresses can be considered 
personal data.456 Clearly, defining the concept of personal data is also at the very core 
of this thesis as data protection legislation covers only the processing of personal 
data, not any other type of data.
453 See for example Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317; case C-210/16, 
Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v. Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2018:388 
and case C-25/17, Tietosuojavaltuutettu, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551; Joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12, YS 
e.a., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081, paras 33–48; Case C-212/13, Ryneš, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428. For allocation of 
responsibility, see also M. Brkan, “Data Protection and Conflict-of-laws: A Challenging Relationship” in 
European Data Protection Law Review, 2 (2016).
454 See for example Decision of Administrative Court of Helsinki 30.12.2011, dnro 01026/11/1204.
455 For technology neutral, see for example B-J. Koops, “Should ICT Regulation be Technology-Neutral?”, in 
Koops, Lips, Prins & Schellekens (eds.), Starting Points for ICT Regulation. Deconstructing Prevalent Policy 
On-Liners (Asser Press, 2006); C. Reed, “Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality”, in SCRIPT-ed 4 3(2007); 
B-J. Koops & JP Sluijs, “Network Neutrality and Privacy According to Art. 8 ECHR” in European Journal 
for Law and Technology 3 2(2012).
456 See C582/14, Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779.
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2.1.1 CONVENTION 108, THE GDPR AND EU INSTITUTIONS’ DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION
The European legal framework provides many sources for capturing the concept of 
personal data. To start with, this concept has been defined in Convention 108457and in 
the former Data Protection Directive458, as well as in the GDPR and EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation.
In chronological order, Convention 108 defines personal data as “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable individual (‘ data subject’)”. The GDPR 
and EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation defines personal data in turn as 
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (data 
subject); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as name, an identification 
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that 
natural person”. The definition of personal data was essentially same as under the 
previous data protection regime. The GDPR does clarify an already existing concept 
of identifier in relation to personal data and provides some further examples of 
identifiers. Besides these specifications, there are further elements in the recitals 
of the GDPR clarifying the scope of the concept. For example, deceased people are 
expressly excluded from the scope.459
All the definitions provide a similar starting point; quite a wide definition of 
the concept of personal data.460 The fact that the data subject does not need to 
be identified as far as he or she is identifiable, broadens the scope the concept 
significantly, as does the possibility to identify the person indirectly. Furthermore, 
it cannot be overlooked that protection of personal data is a fundamental right.461 
This sets certain limits for the restrictive interpretation of the said concept. The 
question of whether data is to be considered personal data, has arisen for instance 
in the following cases: sound records, deceased people, licence plates, the pictures 
captured by different Street View services, like Google, or written answers given in 
a professional examination.462
457 Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.
458 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31–50).
459 See for example Council of European Union, 9565/15, Brussels, 11 June 2015, Recital 23(aa).
460 For the broad interpretation of data protection terminology, see D. Erdos “From the Scylla to the Charybdis 
of License? Exploring the Scope of the ‘Special Purposes’ Freedom of Expression Shield in European Data 
Protection” in Common Market Law Review 52 (2015), 121–123.
461 See for example joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert 
v Land Hessen, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662 and joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and 
Kärtner Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
462 Case T-121/05, Borax Europe v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:64; Decision of the Finnish Data Protection 
Board (tietosuojalautakunta) 4/2010, dnro 1/933/2010 and 4/932/2010; Decision of Administrative Court of 
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To frame the concept of personal data, different elements can be distinguished. 
A quite well-elaborated approach separates four aspects of the said concept.463 The 
first element is “any information”, the second element is “relating to”, the third 
element is “identified or identifiable [natural person]” and the fourth element is 
“natural person”.464 These four elements will be examined next.
2.1.2 ANY INFORMATION
It is apparent that the notion of “any information” is indeed very broad.465 The 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP 29, current EDPB) has provided 
some guidance on the interpretation of the said wording. WP 29 sees that “any 
information” covers both objective and subjective information, it covers opinions 
and statements of the data subject as well as false information. Furthermore, 
WP 29 sees that the position of the data subject does not have significance in 
the interpretation. In other words, information relating to persons acting in their 
professional capacity is personal data.466 Objective information is probably the most 
typical type of personal data. An example of this would be someone’s height or 
weight. This is also the type of information which can relatively easily be proven true 
or false. As WP 29 noted, information does not need to be correct to be considered 
personal data. It is easy to agree with WP 29 on this particular point; data protection 
legislation does contain different provisions providing the data subject with the 
right to rectify incorrect information.
The most intriguing analysis carried out by the WP 29 relates to subjective 
information. Subjective information would cover, for example, opinions and 
statements of the data subject. An analysis of an employee provides an example 
of subjective information. However, WP 29 does not take stand on a question of 
whether subjective information should also cover opinions and statements by the 
data subject. However, WP 29’s quite far-reaching opinion stating that drawing 
can be considered personal data, because it reveals the mood of a child seems to 
indicate that opinions and statements by the data subject could also be considered 
personal data. Subjective information is evidently quite a challenging type of 
Helsinki 30.12.2011, dnro 01026/11/1204; Decision of the Finnish Data Protection Board (tietosuojalautakunta) 
2/2009, dnro 1/933/2008 and Case C-434/16, Nowak, ECLI:EU:C:2017:994.
463 Article 29 Data Protection working party, “Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data”, 01248/07/EN 
WP 136, p. 6–21.
464 Ibid.
465 For terms data and information, see D. Erdos “From the Scylla to the Charybdis of License? Exploring the 
Scope of the ‘Special Purposes’ Freedom of Expression Shield in European Data Protection” in Common 
Market Law Review 52 (2015), 121–123.
466 Article 29 Data Protection working party, “Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data”, 01248/07/EN 
WP 136, p. 6–7.
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personal information. For example, a data subject’s right to rectify information is 
quite demanding to execute when it comes to subjective information.
Besides the type of information, WP 29 has also drawn attention to the format 
of the information. It has clarified that the format does not have significance 
when assessing whether the information is to be considered personal data. The 
information could be alphabetical, numerical, graphical, photographic, acoustic 
etc., to be considered personal data.467 This approach leans firmly on the CJEU’s 
case-law and national practice adopted in the Member States. In the Borax case, 
the CJEU decided that voices on audiotapes are personal data. Also, the nature of 
numerical and photographical information was assessed by national data protection 
authorities in several Member States when Google Street View launched its service 
in Europe. An example of this would be the Fonecta case examined by the Finnish 
Data Protection Board. This service and collection of the data is very much like 
Google Street View. The service provider argued that the collected data was not 
personal data at all.468 Contrary to the service provider’s argument, the Board held 
that pictures of people are personal data and this was also the case regarding licence 
plate numbers. This decision was later held by the Court of Appeal.469
2.1.3 “RELATING TO”
European data protection legislation defines personal data as information relating 
to a natural person. The Charter of Fundamental Rights in turn states that everyone 
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. Different 
wording does not lead to contradiction here. The former defines personal data and 
the latter clarifies that the protection of personal data is the right of the data subject.
It suffices to note that with the reference “relating to”, all information about the 
data subject is covered. WP 29 has specified “that in order to consider that the data 
“relate” to an individual, a “content” element or a “purpose” element or a “result” 
element should be present”.470 Wachter and Mittelstadt provide an intriguing analysis 
of the interpretation of the concept of personal data by the CJEU. A particular focus 
has been on information, which relates to the data subject, such as correction marks 
on an examination taken by the data subject.471 Not entirely satisfied with the CJEU’s 
general line of interpretation, the authors doubt in particular the CJEU’s approach 
467 Ibid.
468 Decision of the Finnish Data Protection Board (tietosuojalautakunta) 4/2010, dnro 1/933/2010 and 
4/932/2010; Decision of Administrative Court of Helsinki 30.12.2011, dnro 01026/11/1204.
469 Ibid.
470 Article 29 Data Protection working party, “Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data”, 01248/07/EN 
WP 136, p. 12–15.
471 See Case C-434/16, Nowak, ECLI:EU:C:2017:994.
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in the YS e.a case472, where the data subject was not given full access to information 
related to him, but only to a summary of it.473 The authors approach can be argued 
by the principle of good governance. However, when the definition of the scope 
of personal data is considered in very broad terms, it simultaneously widens the 
tension between public access to documents and protection of personal data. While 
the broad approach might ensure better data subject’s rights in general, it could 
simultaneously lead to an unnecessary restriction of public access to documents.
2.1.4 IDENTIFIABLE
The third element of the concept of personal data is “identifiable”. Someone is 
identifiable when this person can be distinguished from other persons. To meet 
the requirements laid down in European data protection legislation the person is 
either already recognized or, alternatively, it is possible to identify that person.474
To assess whether the person is identifiable, two elements should be taken into 
account. First, identification might take place in the future. Naturally, identification 
should be reasonably foreseeable. In other words, the endless possibilities of 
technological innovations do not suffice as such to make any information personal 
data. This is in particular the case when the information will not be stored for long 
period of time.
Second, identification does not need to happen directly. Identification might take 
place for instance when a particular piece of information is combined with other 
information. A decision by the Finnish Data Protection Board provides a practical 
example of this. The Board concluded in its decision475 that licence plate numbers are 
personal data. In this particular case, the prospective data controller did not plan to 
have other information related to natural persons in its register.476 However, this did 
not play a central element in the Board’s assessment. The information needed for 
identification would have been easy to fetch from the nationwide register with very 
reasonable costs. Therefore, the Data Protection Board concluded that licence plate 
472 Joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12, YS e.a., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081.
473 S. Wachter & B.Mittelstadt “A Right to reasonable interference: Re-thinking data protection law in the age 
of big data and AI” in Columbia Business Law Review 2 (2019), 29–50.
474 Article 29 Data Protection working party, “Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data”, 01248/07/EN 
WP 136, p. 12.
475 Decision of the Finnish Data Protection Board (tietosuojalautakunta) 1/2010, dnro 2/932/2009. Borax had 
appealed Commission decision. Commission had refused to disclose audio tapes from a meeting held by 
Commission and experts and industry representatives in the chemicals’ field. Commission had refused access 
to audio tapes based on articles 4(1)(b) and 4(3) of the Regulation 1049/2001.
476 For more detailed analysis of the concept of personal data by Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data.
117CHAPTER IV
numbers are personal data. Even if this decision is based on national legislation477, 
several decisions and opinions taken by different data protection authorities in 
other EU Member States in Google Street View cases reflect a similar approach; 
in most cases Google is required to blur the licence plate numbers on its Street 
View service.478
Another example of indirect identification is provided by the General Court’s 
decision in the Borax case.479 In this case, the Commission had refused to grant 
access to audio tapes based on two grounds. Among other things, the Commission 
argued that the individuals on the audio tapes were identifiable even if their 
names were erased. Identification was possible as these particular individuals 
spoke different languages, had different accents and they made references to their 
national context in the course of the discussion. Even though the General Court 
annulled the Commission’s decision, it did not differentiate from the Commission’s 
interpretation of personal data. The General Court simply stated that it does not 
suffice to establish that the exception relating to the protection of personal data is 
applicable in principle, it also has to be satisfied that the disclosure of the document 
would concretely, not only hypothetically, undermine the interests protected by the 
related exception of the Transparency Regulation.
The examples provided in this section illustrate that the concept of personal 
data is very wide indeed; dynamic IP addresses, licence plate numbers and audio 
tapes without name references to the voices played on the tape are all personal data.
2.1.5 NATURAL PERSON
The fourth central element distinguished by WP 29 is “natural person”. In other 
words, only natural persons have the right to the protection of their personal 
data. This excludes legal persons from the scope of the data protection legislation. 
Previously legal persons might have benefitted from data protection legislation 
indirectly in such cases where the data subject can be identified based on the 
information about the legal person. This would be the case for example when a 
company’s name is derived from a natural person.480 This did change when the 
477 According to article 3(1) of the Finnish Personal Data Act, personal data means any information on a private 
individual and any information on his/her personal characteristics or personal circumstances, where these 
are identifiable as concerning him/her or the members of his/her family or household.
478 See for example Privacy & Information Security Law Blog, Authorities in Austria and Switzerland Rule on 
Google Street View, 3 May 2011, available on the internet  < https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2011/05/03/
authorities-in-austria-and-switzerland-rule-on-google-street-view/>  [last visited 8.4.2017].
479 Case T-121/05 Borax Europe v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:64.
480 Article 29 Data Protection working party, “Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data”, 01248/07/EN 
WP 136, p. 12. See also joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut 
Eifert v Land Hessen, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662.
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GDPR become applicable in May 2018. The GDPR clarifies that legal persons are 
not in the scope of the Regulation.481
2.1.6 CONCERNS RAISED BY THE WIDE DEFINITION
The wide definition of personal data has raised some concerns. When among other 
things IP addresses are considered personal data, some have expressed fears that 
the concept is enlarging in a manner that will have serious consequences later.482 
Narrowing the concept of personal data could lead to unintended consequences at 
a later stage when new innovations not known today become part of everyday life, 
but these concerns cannot be overlooked. When nearly anything can be considered 
personal data, there is a risk of the controller’s administrative burden becoming 
disproportionate when fairly insignificant personal data is being processed. As a 
practical example, one could mention drawings. If drawings are considered personal 
data on more general terms, this would mean that, for example, kindergartens 
should not hang children’s drawings on the wall. Of course, parents’ consent could 
be asked for this purpose, but even so, this cannot be in line with the aims and 
objectives of the European data protection legislation.
One could argue that if the incorporation of the so-called risk-based approach in 
the GDPR is later successfully applied, the concept of personal data can be broad. 
Appropriate measures to protect the personal data would then be adopted in line 
with the risks that the processing of personal data involves.483
The brief examination of the concept of personal data has given a clear picture 
of the broadness of the scope of the said concept. Personal data can be a wide 
variety of things: pictures, licence plates, audio tapes, IP addresses, even drawings 
and naturally also names, identification numbers etc. The given examples simply 
illustrate how wide the scope of the personal data is.
481 Regulation (EU) No 679/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 
1–88), recital 14. Recital 14 clears that the GDPR “does not cover the processing of personal data which 
concerns legal persons and in particular undertakings established as legal persons, including the name 
and the form of the legal person and the contact details of the legal person”.
482 See for example European Digital Rights, Key aspects of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation 
explained: What are they? Why are they important? What are common misconceptions? What can be 
improved?, available on the internet  < https://edri.org/files/GDPR-key-issues-explained.pdf>  [last visited 
8.4.2017].
483 For the risk-based approach, see for example The Risk-Based Approach in the GDPR: Interpretation and 
Implications by Gabriel Maldoff, available on the internet <https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/
GDPR_Study_Maldoff.pdfxx> [last visited 4.8.2018].
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2.2 PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA
Similarly to the concept of personal data, processing of personal data has been 
broadly defined in the European legal framework. For the European data protection 
legislation to be applicable, the first requirement is that the data at stake is personal 
data. Thereafter, it must be assessed whether personal data is being processed. The 
personal data needs to be processed before the data protection legislation becomes 
applicable.
The former Data Protection Directive did define processing of personal data 
as follows: “processing of personal data (‘processing’) shall mean any operation 
or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation 
or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination 
or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction”. The approach adopted in the GDPR and in the EU Institutions’ Data 
Protection Regulation follows this definition. The definition does provide some 
additional examples of processing, such as structuring and restriction. This does 
not, however, signify that the definition of processing would have been modified; 
the list is not exhaustive.
The requirements for processing of personal data are easily met. The broad 
definition of processing leads to a situation where nearly any activity carried out 
with personal data is to be considered processing and therefore in the scope of the 
European data protection framework.
2.3 DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND THE PURPOSE 
LIMITATION PRINCIPLE
Data protection principles are often considered the backbone of the data protection 
regime.484 All processing of personal data must be carried out in accordance with the 
data protection principles. The Data Protection Directive did define six principles 
relating to data quality. These principles were derived from the European Data 
Protection Convention.485 The data protection principles have been maintained 
in the GDPR. While the core idea has not changed, some differences in emphasis 
484 See for instance S. K. Karanja, Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System and 
Border Control Co-operation, (Leiden, 2008) 135–136.
485 Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. In 
the English version, principles are called criteria, however, in French, Finnish and Swedish versions they are 
clearly named principles.
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occur. The new principle of accountability stresses the controller’s responsibility, and 
the need to process personal data in a transparent manner has been underlined.486
The concepts of principle and rule were studied in Chapter I of this thesis. It 
was discovered that arguments founding the underlying principles are arguments 
aiming to establish individual rights. Another characteristic feature of principles 
is dimension. It is precisely the dimension of principles which allows balancing, 
instead of applying them in an all-or-nothing manner as rules are to be applied.487
It has been argued, that data processing which does not comply with these 
principles is illegitimate.488 It was earlier established that principles do not function 
in an all-or-nothing manner. This leads to a question whether of these principles 
should actually be considered rules in the sense of Alexy and Dworkin even if named 
principles. This argument is further supported by Article 23 of the GDPR, which 
empowers the national and Union legislator to derogate from the data protection 
principles in certain situations. The need for such empowerment is debatable if data 
protection principles were duly principles as they are understood in this thesis. Thus, 
the precise nature of these concepts remains unclear. They do contain principle-like 
features, but their nature approaches rules to certain extent. However, they will be 
called principles as this is the vocabulary adopted in the European data protection 
legislation. The data protection principles have been further specified in the national 
legislation of some Member States. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the former 
Data Protection Act defined eight data protection principles.489
Next, the most relevant principle for the purposes of this thesis will be studied. 
This is the purpose limitation principle, which supports some specific data protection 
rules. The actual content of the principle must be drawn from the data protection 
rules which it supports. The principle of proportionality is not elaborated in this 
section. The issues related to proportionality are elaborated on more general level 
in this thesis.
The purpose limitation principle is one of the corner-stones of the European data 
protection framework. It sets boundaries for the processing of personal data. The 
core idea of the purpose limitation principle is that personal data may be processed 
only for the purposes for which it was originally collected. This principle is also 
the root of one of the key issues which needs to be solved in the relationship with 
access to documents legislation.
486 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final.
487 See Chapter I.
488 S. K. Karanja, Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System and Border Control 
Co-operation, (Leiden, 2008) 135.
489 The GDPR does not leave similar margin for member states. The nature of the legal instrument does not 
allow national implementation in this regard.
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Before engaging in more detailed discussion of the purpose limitation principle, 
it must be acknowledged that the structures of data processing are changing and 
the consequences of this change have not yet been duly reflected in the European 
data protection regime. While personal data was traditionally collected in specific 
databases, vast data flows are now taking the place of traditional data files. And 
even more importantly, different big data applications are commonly used by certain 
stakeholders. The sustainability of the traditional data protection principles has not 
been properly tested in this changing environment yet. However, this intriguing 
issue will be set aside when assessing the purpose limitation principle.
The purpose limitation principle has been laid down in different European data 
protection instruments. Consequently, it should exist in Member States’ national 
legislations.490 After May 2018, it follows directly from the GDPR. The formulation 
might vary in different instruments, but the core idea remains the same. The EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation sets the purpose limitation principle in 
Article 4(b) which states that “personal data shall be collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible 
with those purposes”. This was very similar to the former Data Protection Regulation 
and former Data Protection Directive, which the GDPR did not change.
The purpose limitation principle can be addressed in several ways. The weight 
can be, for example, on the aim of the said principle. It has been suggested that the 
principle has two aims: firstly, the data subject must be informed of the purpose of 
the processing, and secondly, the personal data cannot be used later on for purposes 
incompatible with the original purpose.491 This is, indeed, one way to perceive this 
principle. However, this section will examine the principle from a different angle. 
The purpose limitation principle contains three elements, which will be analyzed. 
First, the purpose of the data collection must be specified. Second, the purposes for 
the collection must be both explicit and legitimate. And third, further processing 
of the personal data cannot be incompatible with the original purpose of the data 
collection.492 These elements do also cover the two aims mentioned earlier.
2.3.1 SPECIFICITY
The data processing purposes should be defined before the personal data is collected. 
Only personal data which is necessary, adequate and relevant for the processing 
490 For instance, the former Finnish Personal Data Act includes an article concerning the defined purpose of 
processing and another article relating to exclusivity of purpose.
491 C. Kuner, European Data Privacy Law and Online Business, (Oxford, 2003) 59–61.
492 For further processing and compatible processing purposes, see case C-536/15, Tele2 (Netherlands) and 
others, ECLI:EU:C:2017:214, paras 34–40.
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purposes may be collected.493 In other words, first the controller has to know why 
the personal data will be collected and thereafter the controller can only collect 
data that is necessary for the said purpose.
Processing purposes should not be defined in a wide manner, even if this might 
seem tempting when all the possible scenarios for further processing are not evident 
at the time of the data collection. It is possible to have several processing purposes 
for the data collection though. In such cases each processing purpose should be 
separately and specifically defined according to Working Party 29.494
The requirement to process personal data for specific purposes is also apparent 
in the Schrems case, even if the CJEU did not underline this in its reasoning but 
rather argued the case based on proportionality. The personal data transferred to 
the United States was not processed for the specific commercial purposes for which 
it was initially collected when the local authorities had vast rights to access this data 
in order to process it for national security purposes.495 Hence, the data was processed 
for different purposes from the original purpose for which the data was stored.
2.3.2 EXPLICITLY AND LEGITIMACY
It was earlier noted that the purpose limitation principle can also be seen referring 
to the duty to inform the data subject of the purposes of the data collection. It can 
be argued that the requirement for explicit data processing includes this element. 
However, when assessing the meaning of the said requirement, the core element 
is that the processing purposes must be clearly defined by the controller. The 
processing purposes should be unambiguously expressed, in such a manner that 
both data protection authorities and also data subjects would have the same solid 
understanding of the processing purposes.496 
As for the legitimate purposes, it clearly refers to the legal basis for processing 
laid down, for example, in Article 6 of the GDPR.497 However, legitimacy has been 
considered wider than simply the legal processing of personal data. It has been 
suggested that legitimacy also implies such things as cultural values, fair processing 
and necessity.498 Further, it has been suggested that such elements as customs, codes 
493 WP 29 Opinion 3/2015, p. 15–16.
494 WP 29 Opinion 3/2015, p. 15–16.
495 Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, para 90. See for example Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Opinion 3/2013 on purpose limitations, p. 17–18.
496 See for example Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2013 on purpose limitations, p. 17–18.
497 For legal basis, see also Case C-13/16, Rigas satiksme, ECLI:EU:C:2017:336.
498 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law, Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, (Kluwer, 2002), 57–61.  
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of conduct, codes of ethics, contractual arrangements and the general context and 
facts of the case form part of the legitimate purposes.499
2.3.3 FURTHER PROCESSING
The third element of the purpose limitation principle relates to further processing. 
Personal data may not be further processed for purposes which are incompatible 
with the original purpose of the data collection. This requirement also stems from 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which emphasizes that personal data must 
be processed for specified purposes.500 However, data processing for historical, 
statistical and scientific purposes are not considered incompatible with the original 
processing purpose.
It has been suggested that this requirement can be approached from two angles. 
It can be examined either from the data controller’s perspective or from the data 
subject’s perspective. When the question is studied from the data controller’s 
viewpoint, the emphasis would be on the realization of the original processing 
purpose. The further processing should not render the actualization of the original 
purpose void or even difficult. When examined from the data subject’s perspective, 
the emphasis would be on legitimate expectations etc.501 This approach might appear 
alluring when personal data is increasingly processed for further purposes, which are 
unknown at the time of the data collection. An example of such use is the transfer 
of flight passengers’ name records for security purposes.
However, the core of the idea of this principle is that personal data must not be 
further processed for purposes which are incompatible with the original processing 
purpose. The Data Protection Regulation does not give clear guidelines on how 
to interpret the purpose limitation principle nor does the EU Institutions’ Data 
Protection Regulation, former Data Protection Directive or the GDPR. When 
applying this principle, the reasonable and legitimate expectations of the data 
subject should be taken into consideration. In other words, for example, genetic 
data, which was collected in the course of scientific research, cannot be used by 
insurance companies later when assessing the risk a particular client might pose 
for the company. However, this should not be considered as an absolute ban for 
further processing of personal data. When assessing what further processing is 
allowed, the emphasis should be on the reasonable and legitimate expectations of 
the data subject.502 For instance, when a public figure has participated in a public 
499 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2013 on purpose limitations, p. 19–20.
500 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 1–16), article 8.
501 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law, Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, (Kluwer, 2002), 340. 
502 For the extent of consent and further processing, see Case C-536/15, Tele2 (Netherlands) and others, 
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meeting, he or she should reasonably expect that his or her name will be disclosed 
at a later stage.
2.3.4 EXCEPTIONS TO PURPOSE LIMITATION PRINCIPLE
There are some exceptions to the purpose limitation principle laid down in the GDPR 
and also in the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. Despite the purpose 
limitation principle, personal data may be processed for archiving purposes in the 
public interest or for scientific, statistical or historical purposes. In other words, 
processing personal data for scientific research purposes or to draw up statistics 
has been considered privileged in the sense that the purpose limitation principle 
is seen to create unnecessary obstacles for such processing.503
While this might clarify the situation when personal data is processed for the 
said purposes, this might cause some confusion how to interpret “compatible” and 
“incompatible”. It is important to note that this Article only states that processing 
for these purposes is not incompatible. It does not claim that processing for these 
purposes would be compatible with the original purposes. In other words, the core 
idea of this provision is that personal data may be processed for the said purposes 
despite the requirements set by the purpose limitation principle. The importance 
of the difference in what is meant by “not incompatible” and “compatible” becomes 
evident when what can be considered compatible processing is assessed in more 
general terms. If the said processing purposes were considered compatible with 
the original processing purposes, the weight on the assessment would lay on 
the importance of the secondary processing purpose. Not on the assessment of 
whether the secondary processing actually fits in the scope of the original processing 
purposes. However, in such cases, the assessment should rather be carried out 
by assessing whether there exist grounds to consider the aim of the secondary 
processing purposes as a public interest and whether the secondary processing 
meets the requirements of proportionality.504
ECLI:EU:C:2017:214, paras34–40.
503 For the collection of personal data for statistical purposes, see also a judgment by the German Constitutional 
Court, BVerfGE 65, 1 (15 December 1983).
504 For proportionality and the overriding public interest in the context of further processing, see judgment by 
the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 65, 1 (15 December 1983).
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2.3.5 FURTHER PROCESSING BASED ON LEGISLATION
It is often seen that data processing in the public sector requires stronger frames 
than that taking place in the private sector.505 Generally speaking, processing in 
the public sector derives its legitimacy from legislation. While the GDPR leaves a 
rather wide margin for assessing the legitimacy of processing in the private sector 
(processing is based on the legitimate interest of the controller), this is not the case 
when it comes to the public sector.
The CJEU has also given some further guidance on the stipulations of national 
legislation on data processing carried out by public authorities. The CJEU clarified 
that when personal data is transferred from one public authority to another 
public authority, the data subjects should be informed in certain cases. The CJEU 
underlined the fact that national legislation which provided the legal basis for such 
data transfers did not cover all of the information transferred to another public 
authority, nor the manner in which it was transferred. The CJEU saw that data 
subjects had to be informed that their personal data was transferred. 506 One could 
argue that the CJEU’s decision could be read in a way which allows the disclosure of 
personal data to another public authority when it is regulated in a detailed manner 
in national legislation. Another significant point in the said judgment is that it did 
not articulate anything on the right to object, but simply on the data subject’s right 
to be informed.
How further processing based on legislation and the purpose limitation 
principle will be perceived under the new data protection regime remains obscure. 
Nevertheless, it does seem that further processing based on legislation does not 
need to be compatible with the original processing purposes. In such cases, the 
legislator has deemed the secondary processing purposes so important that the 
purpose limitation principle can be derogated. Clearly, the legislator is not free to 
stipulate on the matter however it wishes. The Charter of Fundamental Rights sets 
the parameters for the legislator to reconcile different interests, without interfering 
with the essence of the rights protected by the Charter.
505 See for example the exclusion of public sector in the last sentence in Art. 6(1)(f) of the GDPR.
506 C-201/14, Samaranda Bara and others, ECLI:EU:2015:638, paras 35, 37–43. 
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3. SOME ELEMENTS OF DATA PROTECTION 
LEGISLATION
This section will discuss some of the core elements of data protection legislation. 
These elements play an essential role in relation to European transparency 
regulation. This section will first focus on consent, which is one of the legal bases 
for the processing of personal data. This will be followed by the right of access to 
personal data and the right to rectification. All these elements share a common 
feature – they are recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights – and therefore 
must be considered to form the core of the right to data protection. Thereafter, the 
data subject’s right to object will be briefly examined.
As noted earlier, some consider some of the elements which will be discussed 
in this section as principles. The principle referring to these rights is formulated as 
an individual participation principle.507 However, the definition of principle in the 
context referred to diverges from the principles as they are understood in Dworkin 
and Alexy’s terms; in the context referred to, the non-applicability of the principles 
renders the processing of personal data illegitimate. As these elements are applicable 
in an all-or-nothing manner, I separate these elements from principles as understood 
in this thesis.508 For example, if a data subject is not granted access to his or her 
personal data, there must be an exception applicable to that specific case. The data 
controller is not entitled to freely balance the different interests at stake. Naturally, 
it could be examined whether there are some underlying principles which these 
elements reflect, like the individual participation principle, which would be balanced 
on a case-by-case basis. However, this seems unnecessary from the surface; the 
underlying principles should rather be sought from the more general principles 
beneath the data protection regulation.
3.1 DATA SUBJECT’S CONSENT
Processing of personal data must always have a legal basis. The data subject’s 
consent forms a legal basis for data processing, but there are also other 
alternatives.509 Consent, like the other elements examined in this section, reflects 
507 S. K. Karanja, Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System and Border Control 
Co-operation, (Leiden, 2008) 145.
508 See Chapter I, section 1.1.
509 See for example Article 6 of the GDPR. Besides consent, personal data may be processed if processing is 
necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the 
request of the data subject prior entering into a contract; or processing is necessary for compliance with legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject; or processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests 
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self-determination.510 However, as has been underlined on several occasions, the 
principle of self-determination is not absolute in a sense that data subjects would 
have absolute control over their own personal data.511
First, some basic elements of consent will be discussed and thereafter consent 
will be assessed from two different angles: firstly, can the processing of personal data 
be solely based on the consent of the data subject and secondly, how far-reaching 
is the data subject’s right to disallow the processing of his or her personal data.
Consent has been defined in the European data protection framework. It must 
be a freely-given, specific and informed indication of the data subject’s wishes. The 
GDPR defines consent as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous 
indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by 
a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data 
relating to him or her”. The form of consent was not previously specified in the 
European data protection regime, not in the former Data Protection Directive nor 
in the former Data Protection Regulation.512 The GDPR in turn sets quite detailed 
requirements for consent.513
Even if the form of the consent was not specified in the earlier legislation, such 
terms as “unambiguous” and “express” have appeared in practice. These terms 
suggest that the doctrine of implied consent cannot be applied when personal data 
is processed based on consent.514 Thus, a simple notification by the controller stating 
that he is processing personal data, for example for marketing purposes, could not 
be considered unambiguous or express consent. It has been also suggested that 
simply clicking an icon referring to acceptance on a commercial website would not 
necessarily meet the requirements set for consent when the rules and conditions 
are very long and not easily understandable.515
of the data subject or of another person; processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in 
the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; or processing is necessary 
for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party.
510 See for example S. Holm & S. Madsen, “Informed consent in medical research – a procedure stretched beyond 
breaking point?”, in O. Corrigan; John McMillian; Kathleen Liddell; M.Richards & C.Wijer, the limits of 
consent, A socio-ethical approach to human subject research in medicine (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
12.
511 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76. See also for instance Case C-524/06 
Heinz Huber, ECLI:EU:C:2008:724. See also judgment by the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 65, 1 
(15 December 1983).
512 Similarly, the implementing national legislations often do not contain provisions regarding the form of 
consent, see for instance the former Finnish Personal Data Act or UK’s Data Protection Act.
513 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final, p. 46–47 (Articles 7 and 8).
514 See also for consent as regards cookies; Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural 
advertising, adopted 22 June 2010.
515 C. Kuner, European Data Privacy Law and Online Business, (Oxford, 2003) 68.
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Besides being express, the consent must be freely given. This raises the question 
of whether consent as a prerequisite for some other action – like getting a loan – is 
actually a consent, in particular when exceeding what is considered proportional 
processing of personal data for the specified purposes.516
3.1.1 PROCESSING PERSONAL DATA BASED ON CONSENT
It has been suggested that the data subject’s consent as justification for the processing 
of personal data is threefold. Firstly, it should be considered a procedural justification 
rather than a substantive one. In other words, the justification rests on someone’s 
authorization rather than on the merits of the case, i.e. the right to process the 
personal data would not follow from the nature of the data or the circumstances, but 
from the authorization. This leads to the second point: the consent would be valid 
vis-à-vis the consenting party, not necessarily as a justification for the processing of 
personal data as such. Thirdly, the consent would primarily function as a “negating 
wrong”, and not create the basis for the right to process personal data.517 The second 
point could signify, for instance, that the Data protection authorities would not allow 
some processing of personal data, even if the data subject had given their consent 
for the processing. However, the consent could have an effect, for example, on the 
data subject’s right to claim for compensation for the sole reason of the insufficient 
legal basis for the processing.
Furthermore, it has been noted that the wording of the European legal framework 
does not suggest that consent alone would provide sufficient grounds for the 
processing of personal data. For instance, the requirement of proportionality should 
be respected despite of the potential consent of the data subject.518 And not only 
proportionality, but also other principles governing the processing of personal data 
516 The European Parliament took a stand on this issue during the negotiation process on the General Data 
Protection Regulation suggesting in its text that “the execution of a contract or the provision of a service shall 
not be made conditional on the consent to the processing of data that is not necessary for the execution of 
the contract or the provision of the service pursuant to Article 6(1), point (b) ”. The outcome of the trilogue 
negotiations leaves this issue more open. Article 7(4) of the GDPR stipulates that “when assessing whether 
consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, 
including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not 
necessary for the performance of that contract”. Thus, the final formulation of the GDPR has some relics 
of the approach taken by the European Parliament, but does not take as strict an approach as the European 
Parliament. For the European Parliament’s approach, see European Parliament legislative Resolution of 12 
March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation).
517 R. Bronsword, “Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality” in S. Gutwith; 
Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 88–101.
518 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 62–76.
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should always apply. An example of this would be a decision taken by the Finnish 
Data Protection Board.519 The Board took the view that the data subject’s consent 
does not suffice to form the basis for the processing of personal data. Furthermore, 
the Board saw that consent did not justify derogating from the data protection 
principles; the processing of personal data had to be in line with the data protection 
principles. The Supreme Administrative Court later confirmed this approach by 
holding the decision of the Data Protection Board.
It is quite natural that certain established principles of the regulatory framework 
should apply regardless of the data subject’s consent. In other words, the data 
subject cannot consent to differing from the data protection legislation’s provisions 
or principles, but solely to form a basis for the processing.520 If this was not the case, 
the data subject and data controller could quite freely stipulate how to process the 
personal data, rendering data protection regulation somewhat void.
3.1.2 THE LIMITS OF CONSENT
It has been now established that not all of the requirements of data protection 
legislation are met solely based on the data subject’s consent. In other words, 
processing should always meet the other requirements set out in the regulatory 
framework. It was also established that consent should rather be considered a 
procedural justification than a substantive one. This leads to the following question: 
when the legitimacy for the processing of personal data is not derived from the 
nature of the data or the circumstances in which the data is being processed, what 
significance should be given to the nature of the data and circumstances vis-à-vis 
the data subject’s consent? Two questions are of particular interest in this context. 
Firstly, when processing is based on the data subject’s consent, how far-reaching is 
the data subject’s control over their personal data once the processing of personal 
data has begun? And secondly, could the nature of the data or the circumstances 
in which the data has been processed create boundaries to what the data subject 
can consent to?
It is clear that when processing is based on consent, the legal basis vanishes 
when the data subject withdraws his or her consent. But could the nature of the 
data or circumstances in which it has been processed require processing regardless 
519 See for example Decision of the Finnish Data Protection Board (tietosuojalautakunta) 4/2007, dnro 
6/932/2006.
520 This approach was confirmed by the adoption of the GDPR. According to Article 7(2) of the GDPR “2. If the 
data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the 
request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, 
in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration 
which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding.”
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of the data subjects’ wishes? For example, when personal data is being processed 
for scientific research purposes based on consent and the data subject withdraws 
his or her consent, it seems reasonable to argue that the circumstances where data 
is being processed create justification to continue the processing. Clearly, the data 
should not be processed for new research purposes but withdrawing certain data 
from the research sample could lead to corrupted results.
It was already established that the controller or processor cannot circumvent 
the requirements set out in data protection legislation simply by gaining the data 
subject’s consent. But another question is whether the data subject can agree to 
any type of processing, regardless of the nature of the data or the circumstances. 
I see at least two situations in which there appear to be natural limits to consent. 
First, quite often processing carried out in the public sector derives from legal 
obligations and, as such, it seems quite reasonable to expect that the processing 
is based on legislation. In these cases, consenting should not play a significant 
part. Secondly, there are situations where basing the processing of personal data 
on consent sets too much responsibility on the data subject. An example of this 
would be scientific research and the data banks used in scientific research, which 
are constructed solely based on the consent of the data subject. The core issue is 
not necessarily whether their consent is freely given but whether the data subject 
is in reality in such a position that he or she can assess the actual consequences 
of their consent.521 It seems that the burden set on the data subject is too heavy 
in such a construction, and such processing should rather have its legitimacy and 
safeguards in the legislation.522
3.2 THE DATA SUBJECT’S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DATA
While all elements discussed in this section reflect the right to self-determination, 
there is a difference between consent and the other elements, the right of access and 
the right to rectification and objection. Consent is one of the legal bases provided 
in Article 6 of the GDPR.523 In other words, it creates a basis for data processing. 
The other elements examined in this section create rights for the data subject when 
the processing of personal data takes place. When the relationship between data 
protection and transparency is examined, the data subject’s right of access to his 
521 For an interesting case related to the significance of consenting to processing of personal data in relation to 
online disclosure of data, see case T-343/13, CN v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:926. 
522 For the grounds to use consent as legal basis in the public sector, see also T. Pöysti, Trust on Digital 
Administration and Platforms, in Scandinavian Studies in Law 65(2018), 339.
523 Similarly, in Article 5 of EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation.
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or her personal data in the said context will be studied in more detail. At this stage, 
the data subject’s right of access will be briefly examined on more general level.
The right of access is on solid ground in the European data protection framework. 
After the adoption of the former Data Protection Directive, the right of access was 
reinforced by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that everyone has 
the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her.524
As was the case under the previous data protection regime, both the GDPR and 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation contain provisions, which regulate the 
right of access. The right of access enables individuals to know if their personal data 
has been processed and, if so, what personal data is being processed and for what 
purposes. In other words, controllers in the European Union have to provide data 
subjects with this information. Besides multinational companies like Facebook and 
Google, this also applies to public sector controllers, such as the Union institutions.525
Data subject’s rights inevitably create duties for the controller and might cause 
administrative burden. The obligation to search all electronic and paper files has 
been criticized as a significant administrative and financial burden for the data 
controllers.526 However, if searching the information described above does create 
an immense administrative burden for the controller, it ought to be considered 
whether this burden could be avoided by designing the data processing systems 
from the outset in such a manner that answering data subjects’ requests was feasible. 
After all, one of the reasons for the genesis of the European data protection regime 
derives from the increasing possibilities to easily search and combine personal data 
from different data files.
3.3 RIGHT TO RECTIFICATION AND RIGHT TO OBJECT
Like the right of access, the right to rectification has been reinforced by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. The Charter now says that everyone has the right to have 
personal data concerning him or her rectified.527 Furthermore, like the right of access, 
the right to rectify also reflects the values of self-determination. The right of access 
is a prerequisite for the right to rectification. Without access to his or her personal 
data, the data subject would not be able to ask for it to be rectified.
The Data Protection Directive did set an obligation for the Member States to 
provide data subjects with the right to rectification, in particular when the data was 
524 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 1–16), Article 8.
525 However, the duty to provide data subjects with the said information is based on different legal instruments; 
private entities must comply with the General Data Protection Regulation, and EU institutions the Data 
Protection Regulation.
526 P. Carey, Data Protection, (Oxford 2009) 130, 133.
527 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 1–16), Article 8.
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incomplete or inaccurate.528 The GDPR provides a similar right and so does the EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. According to Article 16 of the GDPR, “the 
data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay 
the rectification of personal data concerning him or her which are inaccurate. 
Having regard to the purposes for which data were processed, the data subject 
shall have the right to obtain completion of incomplete personal data, including 
by means of providing a supplementary statement”.529
Lastly, it ought to be mentioned that the right of access and right to rectification 
are often associated with transparency in the data protection context. It ought to be 
underlined that transparency in this context differs from the transparency rights 
examined in this thesis. When transparency is used in the context of data protection, 
it most often refers to transparent processing of personal data.530 In other words, 
the data subjects’ right to know how and for what purposes their data is being 
processed. In the context of the public access to documents regime, transparency 
is not limited to one’s own personal data, but covers more generally all information 
and the public in general.531
Unlike the right of access and rectification, the right to object does not draw on 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, it did already exist under the previous 
data protection regime. Both the GDPR and the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation provide the said right. This right, which reflects self-determination, 
as do the other elements studied in this section, applies to situations where data 
is processed based on the controller’s legitimate interest or the public interest.532 
In other words, when data processing is carried out for example to fulfil the legal 
obligations of the controller, based on Article 6(1)(c) of the GDPR, the right to 
object does not apply.
The right to object is not absolute. A data subject may object to data processing 
based on grounds relating to his or her particular situation. The wording “particular 
situation” sets the threshold for the application of this right rather high. This is 
the first restriction laid down by the legislator. Further, when controller is able to 
demonstrate that there are compelling legitimate grounds for the processing, the 
processing of the said personal data may continue if such grounds override the 
interests of the data subject. Furthermore, it ought to be noted that Article 23 of 
528 Article 12 of the Data Protection Directive.
529 Article 16 of the GDPR.
530 Article 29 Data Protection working party, “Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679”, 17/EN 
WP 260.
531 For collective public see D. Erdos “From the Scylla to the Charybdis of License? Exploring the Scope of the 
‘Special Purposes’ Freedom of Expression Shield in European Data Protection” in Common Market Law 
Review 52 (2015), 119–154. For collective interests, see M. Van Hoecke & J. Dhont, Obstacles and Opportunities 
for the Harmonisation of Law in Europe: Case of Privacy, in V. Heiskainen & K.Kulovesi (eds.) Function and 
Future of European Law, (Helsinki, 1999), 110–111.
532 Article 21 of the GDPR.
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the GDPR and Article 25 of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation provide 
the possibility to derogate from this right, based on national or Union legislation, 
and also even based on internal rules.
3.4 NEW DATA PROTECTION CONCEPTS
It was earlier argued that ever-developing technology has caused a shift on the 
weight from the privacy to self-determination in the data protection framework. 
This issue is now further elaborated through some new data protection concepts, 
namely the right to be forgotten and data portability. It is necessary to examine these 
concepts to form a solid picture of the shift from privacy to self-determination. These 
concepts illustrate excellently how self-determination is gaining more importance in 
the European legal framework for data protection. They all present new elements in 
the European data protection framework. The new provisions related to profiling, 
for example, also reflect the same tendency. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis, deeper analysis of the two above-mentioned concepts should be enough. 
Furthermore, it will later be argued that self-determination should be perceived 
differently in the social media context vis-à-vis public sector processing. For this 
purpose, it is essential to examine some of the concepts that reflect the said progress 
in detail.
3.4.1 RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Ever-developing technology has created pressure to launch new data protection 
concepts, the right to be forgotten being one of them.533 The right to be forgotten 
was taken into a more formal sphere with the GDPR.534 While it had been previously 
mentioned in seminars and in academic articles535, the Commission took it to a new 
level by first introducing it in its Communication and thereafter naming one of the 
articles accordingly in its proposal for the GDPR.536 The core idea of the right to be 
533 The question of whether right to be forgotten is diverging from the right to protection of personal data and 
turning into its own right with underlying principles is excluded from this discussion.
534 See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final (25.1.2012) and  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88).
535 For example, Jeroen Terstegge, Corporate Privacy Officer/ Senior Counsel, Digital Europe at a Data Protection 
conference in Brussels 19 May 2009.
536 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions, A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the 
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forgotten might not be novel, but the new circumstances, such as social media and 
different online applications, have taken it to a new level.
The right to be forgotten is drawn from existing elements in the European 
data protection framework, such as the data subject’s right to have his or her 
data erased and the data subject’s right to have his or her personal data rectified. 
However, the core idea underneath the right to be forgotten is fresh one, and 
caused by technological developments. The right to be forgotten is closely tied with 
developments in our societal structure following on from technological development. 
This evolution has been described as a move from village culture to the global village, 
and during this journey there has been a short stop at city culture537. In villages, 
people knew each other well; the accomplishments achieved, and the pranks played 
in childhood and youth remained in the collective memory of the village and had 
an impact on the individual’s role and status in the village. Life in city culture was 
more anonymous; someone could easily move from one role to another and even 
have quite radical changes in lifestyle without having the past following him or her. 
Now, we have arrived at the third stage of this progress, the global village. Besides 
the features of the classic village society, the new element in this societal structure 
is the global dimension. This has been created through the online world and the 
internet, where the things one has done and said might take on a life of their own 
and have more or less eternal life cycle.
I see that the new societal structures can be seen as one reason for the intense 
debate that the right to be forgotten frequently causes.538 Another reason for the 
heated debate is unrealistic expectations linked with the right to be forgotten. When 
personal data has been released on the internet, it cannot be entirely erased. The 
possibility of copies circulating around is not purely hypothetical. Even innovations 
targetted at creating short lifespans for messages cannot realize the right to be 
forgotten. An example of this is a relatively new social media forum, Snapchat. 
Ten-year-old children very quickly learned to take screen captures of messages sent 
in snapchat and thus, the lifespan of the data very quickly became eternal again.
European Union, COM 2010 (609) final; Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final (25.1.2012); Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88).
537 For example, Jeroen Terstegge, Corporate Privacy Officer/ Senior Counsel, Digital Europe at a Data Protection 
conference in Brussels 19 May 2009.
538 See for example The Guardian, “We need to talk about the right to be forgotten”, by David Drummond, 
available on the internet  <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-
european-ruling-google-debate>  [last visited 9.4.2017]; Eric Posner, “Debate about the Right to be Forgotten, 
March 13 2015, available on the internet  < http://ericposner.com/debate-about-the-right-to-be-forgotten/ 
> [last visited 9.4.2017]; K. Brimsted, “The Right to be forgotten: can legislation put the data genie back in 
the bottle?” in Privacy and Data Protection 4 (2011).
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Some have underlined that the ultimate rationale behind the right to be forgotten 
had traditionally been the protection of the individual’s dignity by giving them tools 
to control the sensitive information relating to them.539 Personal data does not need 
to be sensitive when the data subject wishes to apply his right to be forgotten.540 
However, it seems easy to agree that protecting one’s dignity is a central element 
in right to be forgotten. Once this connection is established, its relation to self-
determination must also be acknowledged. While the right to be forgotten clearly 
derives from self-determination, it also reflects the underlying values of privacy. 
When the data subject wishes to have some data erased, it seems natural to claim 
that this is done precisely for the purposes of protecting privacy. In other words, in 
the right to be forgotten both privacy and self-determination are clearly apparent.541
The right to be forgotten lived through some changes during the GDPR 
negotiations. The Commission also took a more moderate tone in relation to the 
right to be forgotten and underlined that it is not, after all, a new right.542 It was 
also questioned whether the right to be forgotten actually brings any added value to 
the existing legal framework.543 I see that it does. The new element that it brings to 
the existing legal framework is the weight and recognition it sets on data subjects’ 
rights in the cloud environment. The new societal environment certainly sets some 
expectations for reframing the data protection regime. Maybe the new problems 
that emerged in the data protection framework were not entirely solved, but at 
least they were duly recognized.
539 K. Brimsted, “The Right to be forgotten: can legislation put the data genie back in the bottle?” in Privacy 
and Data Protection 4 (2011).
540 Article 17 of the GDPR.
541 During the negotiation process in the Council and European Parliament, the Commission’s original proposal 
for the right to be forgotten lived through some changes. The data controller will for example not be held 
liable for information which is processed by third parties. In other words, the Commission’s proposal was very 
much stripped of its innovative elements targetted at challenges created in the cloud environment, and was 
left with the skeleton which exists already in the Data Protection Directive. See for example Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of Regions, A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union, 
COM 2010 (609) final; Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final (25.1.2012); Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88).
542 See for example Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission, EU Justice Commissioner, 
SPEECH/12/26, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern 
Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age, available on the internet  < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-12-26_fi.htm >  [last visited 3.7.2017]  and Financial Times, Brussels welcomes Google ‘right to be 
forgotten’ measure, May 30, 2014, available on the internet  <https://www.ft.com/content/bc116b3e-e810-
11e3-9cb3-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e1>  [last visited 3.7.2017].
543 K. Brimsted, “The Right to be forgotten: can legislation put the data genie back in the bottle?” in Privacy 
and Data Protection 4 (2011).
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3.4.2 DATA PORTABILITY
Data portability is one of the new data protection concepts introduced by the GDPR. 
Together with the right to be forgotten and some of the other novelty elements 
in the Commission’s proposal544, data portability reflects the underlying idea of 
self-determination. The core idea is that the data subject would have control over 
the personal data, which he has earlier submitted to the controller in cases where 
the data processing is based on consent or contract. Besides strengthening control 
over one’s own personal data, this right provides the data subject with the right to 
have his personal data in an electronic and commonly-used format. In other words, 
the data subject could transfer his personal data from one system to another.545 
The controller could not prevent this by invoking different electronic systems and 
claiming it is not technologically feasible.
The basic elements of this right did exist in the earlier data protection framework. 
Based on the provisions laid down in the Data Protection Directive and Data 
Protection Regulation, the data subject had the right of access to his personal data. 
Together with the right to obtain a copy of his personal data, these rights create the 
basis for data portability.546 However, data portability would take this right much 
further. The core idea behind data portability is the data subject’s right to transfer 
his or her personal data from one system to another.547 Previously, the data subject 
was indeed able to request his information, for example from Facebook based on 
the rights drawn from the Data Protection Directive, but the outcome might have 
been some hundred pages of paper.548 After the entry into force of the GDPR, the 
data subject can get information in a format which allows him to reuse this data. 
It seems justified to enhance the data subject’s control over their personal data 
when data processing takes place for example on social media. The whole content 
of the site is created by the data subject, while the controller or processor simply 
provides the structure and forum to present this content.
I argue that at least two significant elements regarding data portability must be 
distinguished when data protection is assessed in relation to transparency legislation. 
First, data portability applies to situations where the data subject is the active party 
himself and legitimizing the data processing derives from the data subject’s self-
determination. In this respect, it ought to be noted that public sector processing 
is largely excluded from the scope of this right. This is apparent in the wording of 
the said right but could also be derived from the first paragraph of the said Article. 
544 See for example Article 20 on the right to data portability and strengthened rules on the consent.  
545 Commission’s proposal Article 18.
546 Directive 46/95, Articles 10–12, Regulation 45/2001, Articles 10–13.
547 Commission proposal Article 18.
548 See for example Case C-362/14 Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
137CHAPTER IV
Processing of personal data in the public sector hardly ever takes place based on 
contract or the data subject’s consent.549 Second, when the data subject provides his 
or her personal data for processing on a voluntary basis and for sharing on social 
media, the underlying principle of privacy diverges from this right. When the data 
subject shares the information with hundreds of people, who cannot all be known 
to him, it seems justified to argue that it is rather the control over his data which 
is significant for the data subject. In other words, underlining the importance of 
self-determination is justified when the processing of personal data takes place in 
the internet environment, or in the cloud as it is put in this decade.
4. TOWARDS THE NEW DATA PROTECTION REGIME
When writing this chapter, the trilogue negotiations on the GDPR were still ongoing. 
This was preceded by long negotiations in the Council after the European Commission 
presented its Data Protection Package in January 2012. The first indications of the 
reform process were given in the Commission’s Communication in 2010.550 In the 
said Communication, the Commission underlined that the underlying principles 
and objectives of the data protection legislation were still as valid as they were at the 
time of the adoption of the Data Protection Directive.551 Thus, the reform process 
does not affect the analysis presented in this chapter. The key changes introduced 
by the data protection reform have been analyzed when relevant in relation to 
public access to documents.
A point discussed by the Commission in its Communication was the challenge 
created by fast-developing new technology.552 This was one of the issues addressed in 
the GDPR proposal. Even if the data protection regime was based on technologically-
neutral rules, the question of whether these rules are technologically current had 
arisen.553 The Commission drew attention specifically to the challenges provided by 
social networking sites, cloud computing and the fact that personal data is collected 
in more sophisticated ways; including, even more importantly, in ways which are 
not always easily detectable.
549 Article 20 of the GDPR.
550 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions, A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the 
European Union, COM 2010 (609) final.
551 Ibid.
552 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions, A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the 
European Union, COM 2010 (609) final.
553 For example, Jeroen Terstegge, Corporate Privacy Officer/ Senior Counsel, Digital Europe at a Data Protection 
conference in Brussels 19 May 2009.
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The data protection reform has strengthened the European – and also global 
– data protection landscape in many ways. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis, it is of particular interest to note the shift introduced by the GDPR on the 
increasing weight set on self-determination. As discussed in this chapter, many of 
the new provisions reflect this, as do the more detailed rules on consent. Taking 
into consideration that references to privacy have faded in the GDPR, it appears 
that the balance of underlying principles and aims of data protection is moving 
from privacy towards self-determination with the entry into force of the GDPR, 
whether this has been intentional or not.
It is justified to underline the importance of self-determination instead of privacy 
in certain cases. An example of such a case is the social media environment. In such a 
context, it is reasonable to approach data subjects’ rights through self-determination 
instead privacy. While the data subject might quite willingly disclose personal 
information through social media, he or she is not a passive data subject, but also 
the data controller or processor at some level. In such cases, the importance of the 
data subject retaining control over his or her personal data is apparent. When the 
information has been disclosed to vast audience, privacy does not seem to play an 
essential role anymore. This intriguing question, which is highly relevant in this 
thesis, will be addressed in more detail in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER V
ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS AND PROTECTION OF 
PERSONAL DATA IN LIGHT OF CASE-LAW
This chapter will examine the case-law from the CJEU and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). The three CJEU cases that will be discussed illustrate the 
tension between public access to documents and the protection of personal data at 
both a practical level and in terms of underlying principles. Once the three cases 
have been examined, the chapter will focus on the case-law of the ECtHR.
Commission v Bavarian Lager554 was the first case in which the Court of Justice 
addressed the dilemma of the conflicting rules of data protection and access to 
documents. The Court provided some initial guidance for the simultaneous 
application of the Transparency555 and Data Protection556 Regulations, the basis 
of its judgment being the full application of both Regulations. Follow-up cases 
providing more precise guidelines, and hence greater certainty in the simultaneous 
application of the Transparency and EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulations, 
can still be expected.557 In contrast, the opinion delivered by Advocate General 
Sharpston in this case was ambitious and can be considered a first attempt at a 
more profound reconciliation of these Regulations.558 The Opinion thus deserves 
careful study alongside the Court’s judgments, even though the CJEU did not adopt 
any of AG Sharpston’s propositions.
The significance of the Bavarian Lager judgment for the overall theme of this 
study cannot be overstated. This is for three reasons. First, it was the first judgment 
by the Court of Justice delivered in the area of conflicting rules of data protection 
and access to documents and it did set the basic principle for reconciliation. This 
554 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378.
555 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48).
556 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1–22).
557 The General Court delivered a judgment in Case C-82/09, Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2011:688 on 
23 November 2011. The requirement to state reasons for the disclosure was assessed in this case. The General 
Court later examined a similar case and delivered its judgment on 15 July 2015. For that, see Case T-115/13, 
Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:497. The CJEU has further elaborated the requirement to state 
reasons in case C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2250 and case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth 
and PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489.
558 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2009:624, delivered 15 October 
2009. 
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principle still forms the basis for the balancing. The follow-up cases examined by 
the General Court and the CJEU have further elaborated the interpretation of the 
principle, but often in the context of other issues.559 Second, besides the underlying 
conflicting principles, it relates first and foremost to actually conflicting rules. Third, 
compared to the decision of the General Court, the Bavarian Lager judgment showed 
the importance of the fundamental questions relating to 1) stating reasons for the 
application and 2) the data subject’s right to object the processing of personal data, 
together with 3) the data subject’s consent.
The Bavarian Lager study, together with current legislation, will show that full 
application of both Regulations does not seem achievable. It will be argued that one 
of the essential differences between the Regulations examined in this thesis, the 
obligation to state reasons for the application, has eventually to be carried out solely 
under either the Transparency Regulation or the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation. The role of the data subject’s right to object and the significance accorded 
to professional activities will also be examined. These two elements are also apparent 
in the other cases examined in this chapter. In addition to providing an in-depth 
understanding of the reasoning of the CJEU, this discussion will pave the way for 
the final argument presented in the concluding chapter.
The second case study – Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v 
Land Hessen 560 –and the third – Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia 
Oy561 – from the Court of Justice of the European Union must be examined together. 
Both involve public control over expenditure of public funds and will show that 
transparency can be considered a legitimate reason to limit one’s right to the 
protection of personal data.
While the Bavarian Lager study relates to conflicting rules in the Dworkinian 
sense, the central issues in these cases relate to the more profound tension between 
one’s right to the protection of personal data and the right of public access to 
documents. While the Bavarian Lager case covers very real conflicts between 
different provisions of the two Regulations, the second case study concerns the 
validity of certain provisions of Regulation 1290/2005.562 This validity is examined 
in terms of underlying principles. However, this second case involves no apparent 
conflict of rules on the surface level of law.563 The third case study complements 
559 See for example Case T-115/13, Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:497; Case T-493/14, Mayer v 
EFSA, ECLI:EU:T:2017:100; Case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489.
560 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662; for an analysis, see M.Bobek “Joined Cases C-92 & 93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke 
GbR and Hartmut Eifert” in Common Market Law Review 6 (2011), 2005–2022.
561 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727.
562 Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on financing common agricultural policy (OJ L 209, 
11.8.2005, p. 1–25).
563 For more on the various levels of law, see K. Tuori, Kriittinen oikeuspositivismi, (Helsinki, 2000).
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the second, in that while the findings of the Court in the second case study are of 
the utmost important for this thesis in providing clear guidelines for balancing the 
two principles, these findings should be read in conjunction with other judgments 
of the Court, as this will provide the right context for the judgment.
The Luxembourg Court makes some first attempts to strike a balance between 
the conflicting principles in these two cases. As the conflict appearing on the surface 
level of law between the Transparency and Data Protection Regulations has not 
been clearly resolved through explicit rules or case-law, these two cases and the 
reasoning of the Court can provide guidance on how to achieve this.564
The second part of this chapter will provide the background for the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Once this initial step has been taken and the institutional and judicial context 
is clear, the section will examine one of the more recent cases that illustrates how 
the European Court of Human Rights has approached the values associated with 
the protection of personal data and access to documents. In the absence of clear 
provisions addressing these issues in the legislative framework of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the significance of the case is clear. The objective 
of this section is to provide a comparative approach and to place the current 
situation in the European Union in its wider European context, providing a broader 
understanding of the relevant European legislation and case-law, and extending 
the scope of this study beyond just EU law.
Besides providing a more extensive European framework, that section will argue 
that prior agreement should not have an effect when examining a request for access 
to documents. Another characteristic feature of the Strasbourg judgment is the part 
played by legitimate interests and rightful interference in someone’s privacy. As for 
data subjects’ consent and the significance of the professional activities discussed 
above, the final argument and conclusion on the role of legitimate interests will be 
provided in the concluding chapter.
The concluding section will examine the approaches of the Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg Courts in this area and the ways they have dealt with the tension between 
these sometimes conflicting values. The main features of the core concepts relating 
to this tension are also examined in light of the case-law discussed in this chapter. 
The objective of this section is to provide both an understanding of the current 
case-law and a coherent picture of the tension at a conceptual level. This will pave 
the way for Chapter VI, where further examples of potential conflicts will be first 
identified and then examined. The examples in Chapter VI are hypothetical and, 
unlike the examples in this chapter, have not necessarily been examined by the 
Courts at this stage. Once Chapters V and VI have examined the tension between 
564 The EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation will clarify certain issues in the referred relationship. This 
will be elaborated in more detail in the relevant context.
143CHAPTER V
public access to documents and the protection of personal data, the way will be 
clear for a normative analysis of how to resolve these conflicts in Chapter VII.
1. COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
1.1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION V BAVARIAN LAGER
The judgment in the so-called Bavarian Lager case was delivered by the Grand 
Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the summer of 2010.565 
This case was the first time that the Court of Justice examined the relationship 
between the Transparency Regulation and the Data Protection Regulation,566 and 
is still the only ruling by the highest European court relating to this particular 
question. The fundamental issue in this case was how to resolve a situation involving 
conflicting rules. However, principles and rights naturally underlie this conflict.567 
In this particular case, the applicant had asked for the disclosure of documents 
containing some personal data. As the EU institutions are bound by the Regulations 
on transparency and the protection of personal data, the issue arising was how to 
assess the disclosure of personal data which is a part of a public document, based 
on either Regulation or both.568
The General Court569 had previously annulled the Commission’s decision to 
refuse full disclosure of the minutes of a meeting, granting only partial access. While 
the General Court decided the conflict in favour of transparency, AG Sharpston took 
quite a different approach, suggesting that the provisions in the Regulations are not 
actually contradictory at all. She justified her approach idiosyncratically, creating 
different categories for access to document requests.570 However, the Court of Justice 
did not adopt her Opinion, and it also set aside the judgment of the General Court 
in so far as it annulled the Commission’s decision.
565 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378.
566 European Data Protection Supervisor Public access to documents containing personal data after the Bavarian 
Lager ruling.
567 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2009:624, delivered 15 October 
2009, para 97.
568 According to article 2(3) of Regulation 1049/2001 “This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by 
an institution […] and according to article 3(1) of Regulation 45/2001 This Regulation shall apply to the 
processing of personal data by all Community institutions and bodies insofar as such processing is carried 
out […]”
569 The Court of First Instance at the time the judgment was delivered.
570 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2009:624, delivered 15 October 
2009, para 104.
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1.1.1 THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The applicant, Bavarian Lager, had requested the minutes of a meeting, including 
the names of the participants. The Commission had granted partial access to these 
minutes, but had excluded some names. In essence, Bavarian Lager wanted to import 
German beer into the United Kingdom, primarily the North of England. However, 
this turned out to be impossible. This did not reflect the lack of appreciation of 
German beer in the United Kingdom but were caused by UK legislation, under which 
it seemed to be quite normal for British pubs to be tied to particular breweries for 
their beer supplies. However, there was legislation guaranteeing the pubs the right 
to buy beer from other suppliers under certain circumstances. This so-called “Guest 
Beer Provision” (GBP) regulated this right and provided the rules that, among other 
things, specified that the beer bought from other suppliers had to be conditioned 
in a cask and its alcohol percentage had to be more than 1.2%. Bavarian Lager 
considered the GBP to fall under the prohibition of Article 28 TFEU as a measure 
having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction571 on imports, as most beers 
produced outside of the United Kingdom did not meet the GBP requirements. 
Bavarian Lager lodged a complaint with the European Commission, which led to 
the initiation of an infringement procedure against the UK. In the course of these 
proceedings, the Commission sent a formal notice to the United Kingdom. However, 
this is where the action against the United Kingdom ended. The decision not to 
pursue the infringement procedure was based on certain amendments to the GBP by 
the United Kingdom, under which bottled beer was now assimilated with the cask-
conditioned beer. A meeting was held on 11 October 1996 to discuss the GBP, with 
officers of the Directorate-General for the Internal Market and Financial Services, 
officials of the United Kingdom Government Department of Trade and Industry and 
representatives of the Confédération des Brasseurs du Marché Commun. Bavarian 
Lager had also requested the opportunity to attend this meeting, but had been 
refused.572
The request by Bavarian Lager for the minutes, more precisely the names 
included, relate to this meeting.573 In addition to these minutes, Bavarian Lager 
had also requested disclosure of various other materials such as the submissions of 
companies and organizations mentioned in this case. After the initial refusal and the 
exchange of letters between the Ombudsman and the Commission, the Commission 
granted partial access to these documents, withholding the personal data of those 
571 For more on equivalent effect, see, for instance, D. Chalmers, G. Davies & G. Monti, European Union Law, 
(Cambridge, 2010) 744–783.
572 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334, paras 15–27.
573 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 1.
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participants who had either not answered the Commission’s inquiries concerning 
the disclosure of their personal data or had refused disclosure.574 575 
Following the General Court’s annulment of the Commission’s decision, the 
Commission, supported by the Council and some Member States, appealed to the 
Court of Justice.576 The appeal was based on three grounds, two of which the Court 
of Justice examined together. Of the two arguments examined together, the first was 
an argument concerning errors in the interpretation and application of Article 4(1)
(b) of the Transparency Regulation in declaring that Article 8(b) of the protection 
of personal data Regulation was not applicable, and the second was the argument 
that the General Court had made an error in interpreting the condition in Article 
4(1)(b) of the Transparency Regulation restrictively, thus excluding the Community 
legislation on protection of personal data contained in a document from its scope. 
Given its findings and responses to the first two arguments, the Court of Justice 
did not examine the third argument.577 
The Commission argued that the General Court had made errors in law in 
interpreting the exception concerning the protection of one’s personal data.578 The 
General Court’s interpretation largely reflects the Dworkinian idea of rules.579 In a 
very much “all-or-nothing” fashion, the General Court had set aside the provisions of 
this Regulation entirely. While principles contain dimension, which allows balancing, 
this is not the case with rules.580 The Commission was particularly concerned over 
the omission to consider its Articles 8(b) and 18(a).581 It must be borne in mind, 
however, that the General Court’s decision did not render these rules void in 
general but only in relation to the Transparency Regulation and only as far as the 
data subject’s privacy was not at stake. While Dworkin recognizes that rules might 
well involve exceptions,582 the General Court’s approach could not be explained by 
this. The General Court examined the application of a particular exception to the 
Transparency Regulation and decided the case in favour of rules relating to access 
to documents. While doing this, it did entirely omit the rules laid down in the 
574 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334, paras 26–28, 34–37.
575 For more on the Ombudsman’s contribution, see the Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 
713/98/(IJH)/GG against the European Commission; a letter from the European Ombudsman to the President 
of the European Commission, 30.9.2002/7411.
576 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, paras 29–30.
577 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, paras 40–41, 81. For analysis of the judgment of the 
General Court, see, for instance, H. Kranenborg, “Access to documents and data protection in the European 
Union: on the public nature of personal data” in Common Market Law Review 45 (2008), 1094–1096.
578 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 40.
579 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 14–81.
580 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 22–28.
581 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, paras 45, 47.
582 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 14–81. For the exceptions, see also H. Kelsen, General 
Theory of Norms, (Oxford, 1991) 126–127.
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Community data protection legislation, even if the Transparency Regulation had 
set a specific requirement to take the said provisions into consideration.
1.1.2 SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND DATA 
PROTECTION REGULATIONS
It has already been noted that AG Sharpston suggested that provisions of the two 
Regulations might not actually be in conflict.583 As mentioned in Chapter I, Zucca 
emphasizes that genuine constitutional conflicts need to be distinguished from 
spurious ones,584 also noting that conflicts resolved by rational argument must also 
be distinguished from the genuine conflicts.585 If AG Sharpston’s Opinion had been 
adopted, the dilemma would have been resolved very much in line with Zucca’s 
thesis; the conflict between these two Regulations being recognized as spurious. 
Thus, genuine conflict between rights would not exist and the dilemma could be 
resolved by recognizing the conflict for what it actually is.
However, both the General Court and the Court of Justice did identify a tension 
between rights even if they took different approaches to solving it. In relation to the 
more specific provisions, the main disagreement in the Bavarian Lager case seems 
to relate to the conflict between Article 6(1) of the Transparency Regulation and 
Articles 8(a) and 18(a) of the Data Protection Regulation. In addition to this conflict, 
this case provides an example of the tension between the two Regulations at the 
level of principles in the Dworkinian sense.586 In this case, the conflict of rules is 
only a surface-level consequence of a tension in the underlying principles. As such, 
the solution must be deduced from the underlying levels of law.587
The General Court concluded that the full minutes, including the names, did not 
fall under the exception provided in Article 4(1)(b), which concerns the protection 
of one’s personal data. As this exception was not applicable, the provisions of 
the protection of personal data Regulation were not applicable either.588 589 Thus, 
under the judgment of the General Court, it seems that the application of these two 
Regulations in situations such as that of Bavarian Lager, consists of two steps: first, 
583 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2009:624, delivered 15 October 
2009, para 104.
584 L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 24– 26.
585 L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 24– 28.
586 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 14–81.
587 For more on the various levels of law, see K. Tuori, Kriittinen oikeuspositivismi, (Helsinki, 2000).
588 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334, paras 133–136, 139.
589 See also H. Kranenborg, “Access to documents and data protection in the European Union: On the public 
nature of personal data” in Common Market Law Review 45 (2008), 1094–1096.
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whether the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) is applicable must be evaluated, 
and second, if it is, the disclosure of personal data must be evaluated under the 
provisions of this Regulation.590
AG Sharpston adopted the General Court’s approach in part. However, unlike 
the General Court, the AG attempted to provide a more comprehensive approach 
to solving the dilemma.591 Given this bold attempt, this Opinion is worth examining, 
even if the Court of Justice did reject it. The essence of her Opinion seems to lie in 
the definition of the scope of the Data Protection Regulation and its relation to the 
Transparency Regulation. Her approach is closely related to the interpretation of 
Article 3(2) of the Data Protection Regulation. Sharpston notes, for example, that 
“the clear implication of Lindqvist is that, as soon as processing of personal data 
is automatic or partly automatic, it falls within the scope of the data-protection 
legislation (be that Directive 95/46 or Regulation No. 45/2001). However, a 
request for disclosure of documents made under Regulation No 1049/2001 is 
not – as I understand it – treated that way. Rather it is examined individually 
and manually”.592 It is not entirely clear how this should be interpreted. It seems 
as if the AG is assessing how to define the requests for disclosure of documents, 
i.e. whether the requests for access are to be considered as processing of personal 
data that falls within the scope of the Data Protection Regulation.
It should first be noted that the definition of processing of personal data as 
laid down in Article 2(b) of the Data Protection Regulation clearly covers the 
functions described above.593 According to Article 2(b), disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making personal data available are to be considered 
as processing of personal data, among other things. This would clearly cover the 
requests for the disclosure of documents as well. The AG’s approach would mean 
that the disclosure of documents should be considered processing of personal 
data, which partly falls outside of the scope of the Data Protection Regulation. To 
decide what documents would fall outside its scope, AG Sharpston created two 
different categories of requests for documents that include personal data.594 In 
590 The European Data Protection Supervisor also supported this approach; see, for example, Pleading of the EDPS 
in Public Hearing in Case C-28/08P (16 June 2009), available on the internet < http://www.edps.europa.
eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Court/2009/09-06-16_pleading_C-
28-08P_EN.pdf> [last visited 29.9.2011] as well as European Data Protection Supervisor, Public access to 
documents containing personal data after the Bavarian Lager ruling.
591 It ought to be mentioned that the Opinion was found quite exceptional among the various stakeholders, which 
the requests of the Commission and the European Data Protection Supervisor to re-open the case after the 
Opinion was delivered clearly indicate. See case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, paras 
35–39.
592 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2009:624, delivered 15 October 
2009, para 125. See also Case C-101, Lindqvist, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596.
593 This did not change with the entry into a force of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation.
594 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2009:624, delivered 15 October 
2009, paras 158–166.
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essence, she distinguished “real requests” from “disguised requests” based mostly 
on the amount of personal data that the documents covers.595 However, the Court 
of Justice stated quite clearly in the Satakunnan Markkinapörssi case that all 
exceptions to the protection of personal data must be carried out as narrowly as 
strictly necessary.596 Excluding some processing of personal data entirely from the 
scope of the Regulation seems to create even more limitations on the protection of 
personal data than the broad interpretation of exceptions. It seems to follow that 
the scope of the Regulation should be interpreted broadly rather than narrowly as 
suggested in the AG’s Opinion. Furthermore, it is not obvious which functions other 
than requests for access to documents should be excluded if the AG’s approach were 
to be adopted. It appears that there must be other functions containing processing 
of personal data individually and manually. Such questions could potentially arise 
at national level. Just consider a bank assessing an application for a loan; it would 
seem quite risky to state that this processing of personal data falls outside of the 
scope of the Data Protection Directive as its Article 3(1) is similar to Article 3(2) of 
the Data Protection Regulation.597
AG Sharpston argued in favour of the narrow interpretation that a broad 
interpretation would unnecessarily restrict the application of Transparency 
Regulation.598 While this concern is justified, the correct balance between the two 
Regulations can be achieved by other means. For instance, one of the founding 
principles of the Transparency Regulation is that all exceptions are laid down 
in the Regulation itself. In accordance with well-established case-law, since all 
these exceptions are to be interpreted narrowly,599 the provisions of the Data 
Protection Regulation should be interpreted in light of the founding principles of 
the Transparency Regulation when a case is examined under its provisions. Thus, 
simultaneous application of both Regulations should not be read as setting aside the 
provisions or principles of the Transparency Regulation as such. Furthermore, the 
distinction between “real” and “disguised” requests for documents does not seem 
to solve the problem but rather create a new one, since it would be rather difficult 
to separate the so-called disguised access to document requests from the real ones.
While AG Sharpston’s Opinion offers an interesting alternative for solving the 
dilemma of this thesis, the Court of Justice chose the approach of setting the full 
595 Ibid.
596 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, para 56.
597 The same applies regarding the GDPR and new EU institutions’ Data Protection Regulation.
598 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2009:624, delivered 15 October 
2009, para 149.
599 See, to that effect, Case T-20/99, Denkavit Nederland v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2000:209, para 45; Case 
C-64/05 P, Sweden v Commission and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2007:802, para 66; Joined cases C-39/05 P and 
C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, para 36.
149CHAPTER V
application of both Regulations as a founding principle.600 Despite the merits of the 
two-step approach adopted by the General Court, the Court of Justice did not accept 
this approach either, providing its own interpretation of the relationship between 
the two Regulations. In essence, the focal point in both the General Court and the 
Court of Justice judgments, and the point of disagreement between the two courts, 
was the relationship between the Transparency and the Data Protection Regulations.
The Court of Justice found that the General Court had limited the application of 
Article 4(1)(b) of the Transparency Regulation to only those cases where the privacy 
or the integrity of the persons concerned were at stake, and in doing so had not taken 
the EU legislation regarding the protection of personal data properly into account. 
The Court of Justice went further, stating that “in acting that way, the General 
Court disregards the wording of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001, which 
is an indivisible provision and requires that any undermining of privacy and the 
integrity of the individual must always be examined and assessed in conformity 
with the legislation of the Union concerning the protection of personal data, and 
in particular with Regulation No 45/2001”. Before coming to this conclusion, the 
Court of Justice had also noted that the two Regulations had been adopted around 
the same time and neither included any provision that would justify displacing the 
other Regulation.601 If this had been the case, the legislator would have resolved the 
tension between two different principles in favour of one, and drafted the provisions 
accordingly. Thus, no collision of rules would exist, simply an exception to the 
main rule.602
Thereafter, the Court of Justice concluded that in applying the Transparency 
Regulation in situations where the documents to which the applicant is seeking 
access include personal data, the Data Protection Regulation becomes applicable as 
well. The Court of Justice underlined that all of its provisions will apply in these cases 
in their entirety, including Articles 8 and 18. The Court of Justice concluded that 
the General Court had dismissed the application of these articles in its judgment.603 
Thus the Court of Justice decided to set aside General Court’s decision as far as it 
annulled the Commission’s decision and adopted an entirely different approach to 
solving the dilemma.
600 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 56.
601 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, paras 56, 58–59.
602 As earlier noted, exceptions do not lead to conflict in the Dworkinian sense.
603 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, paras 63, 64.
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1.1.3 THE DATA SUBJECT’S RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE PROCESSING OF DATA 
RELATING TO HIM OR HER
One of the issues arising in the aftermath of the Court’s judgment is how to apply the 
provisions relating to the data subject’s right to object to the processing of personal 
data relating to him or her. While the Data Protection Regulation contains provisions 
regulating the consent of the data subject, it also contains another provision, Article 
18(a), reflecting the principle of self-determination. This Article provides that the 
data subject has the right to object to the processing of personal data of this kind. As 
noted earlier, one of Commission’s particular worries related to the non-application 
of this Article.604 Article 18(a) declares that the data subject has the right to object at 
any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his or her particular situation. 
Furthermore, where there is a justified objection by the data subject, the processing 
in question may no longer involve such data.605
According to the judgment delivered by the Court of Justice, these articles are 
also entirely applicable when assessing the disclosure of the document based on 
the Transparency Regulation. Thus, the query arising concerns the application of 
these provisions when a request for access to documents has been made based 
on this Regulation. In the course of this particular process, the Commission had 
already given extensive access to documents.606 The parts of the minutes which 
the Commission did not release contained the names of the participants at the 
meeting. However, the Commission had released the names of those participants 
who had consented to disclosure. This meant that in the end there were five names 
not disclosed to the applicant, two of whom had refused the disclosure of their 
data and three of whom the Commission had been unable to reach.607 However, as 
noted by some authors, even extensive disclosure of documents might not serve the 
purpose of public access to documents if the applicant is unable to obtain access to 
the particular information important to the applicant.608 
While the disclosure of names can be justified by the consent of the data subject 
without clear guidelines concerning the simultaneous application of Transparency 
and Data Protection Regulations, I see that the lack of consent or objection to the 
604 This concern had also been expressed by some authors; see, for instance, Kranenborg, “Access to documents 
and data protection in the European Union: On the public nature of personal data” in Common Market Law 
Review 45 (2008), 1095. This particular issue has not been developed further in the CJEU’s later case-law, 
see case C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2250 and case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and 
PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489.
605 The right to object to the processing of data relating to him or her does not cover cases regulated by Article 
5 (b) (c) and (d) of Regulation 45/2001.
606 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334, para 35.
607 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334, paras 35–37.
608 P. Leino, “Just a little sunshine in the rain: The 2010 case-law of the European Court of Justice on access to 
documents” in Common Market Law Review 48 (2011).
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processing of data should not lead to the reverse conclusion.609 The simultaneous 
application of both Regulations should not impact this question. First, the data 
subject’s consent cannot be considered as an absolute requirement for the processing 
of personal data.610 Second, the right to object does not provide an absolute right to 
decline the disclosure of personal data.611 The judgment of the Grand Chamber also 
supports this view. The Court noted that in the absence of convincing arguments or 
legitimate justification for the application, the Commission was unable to balance 
competing interests.612 If the objection should be considered absolute in its nature, 
there would naturally be no need to balance these competing rights, since the 
objection would be sufficient.
While the second part of Article 18 clearly contains the procedural right of the 
data subject to be informed before personal data is disclosed, the first part also 
contains features of procedural rights,613 apparently conferring on the data subject 
the right to be heard and in the case of legitimate reasoning, an obligation for the 
institution to act accordingly. However, based on the formulation of the right to 
object, it seems quite clear that Article 18(a) does not provide any right to decline 
the processing of one’s personal data.614 Thus withholding personal information 
while giving access to other parts of the document should not be justified solely by 
the lack of the data subject’s consent or objection to the disclosure.
1.1.4 STATING REASONS FOR THE APPLICATION
One of the key elements in the Bavarian Lager case was the obligation to provide 
reasoning for the application, or the absence of such reasoning. According to Article 
8(b) of the Data Protection Regulation, personal data shall only be transferred to 
recipients if they establish the necessity to have the data transferred, and if there is 
no reason to assume that the data subjects’ legitimate interests might be prejudiced. 
However, Bavarian Lager was firmly of the view that it should not state the reasons 
or the necessity for its request. This approach was supported by the European Data 
Protection Supervisor,615 and was justified by one of the fundamentals of the access 
609 For online disclosure of personal data, see case T-343/13, CN v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:926.
610 R. Bronsword, “Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality” in S. Gutwith; 
Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 83 –109.
611 This argument will be developed further in Chapters VI and VII.
612 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, paras 77–80.
613 According to Article 18(b), the data subject shall have right to be informed before personal data is disclosed 
for the first time to third parties or before they are used on their behalf for the purposes of direct marketing, 
and will be expressly offered the right to object, free of charge, to such disclosure or use.
614 This remains essentially the same under the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation.
615 European Data Protection Supervisor “Public access to documents containing personal data after the Bavarian 
Lager ruling”, p. 4.
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to documents Regulation; the applicant’s right not to be obliged to state reasons for 
the application.616 This can be seen as supporting another fundamental principle in 
this area, the possibility of applying for access to documents anonymously.
When considering that the provisions of Data Protection Regulation were not 
applicable, as the requirements under Article 4(1)(b) were not met, the General Court 
held that the applicant did not have to reason their application pursuant Article 
6(1) of the Transparency Regulation.617 This meant that the applicant did not have 
to do so under Article 8(b) of the Data Protection Regulation either.618 Thus these 
two rules could not be applied simultaneously and the General Court resolved the 
conflict between these rules in favour of transparency. This, as the Commission 
pointed out, rendered the data subjects’ rights laid down in Article 18(a) void.619
In adopting an approach different from the General Court, the Court of 
Justice stated that full application of both Regulations should be ensured and that 
Article 8(b) should be fully applicable when the institution assesses disclosure of 
a document based on the Transparency Regulation.620 However, full application 
of both Article 6(1) of the Transparency Regulation and Article 8(b) of the Data 
Protection Regulation does not seem achievable. The applicant either has to reason 
the application or does not. Anything in between renders Article 6(1) partly void. 
Thus, there is a clear conflict between the Dworkinian rules, and only one provision 
can be applied in its entirety. Which one remains applicable is to be decided by 
deducing the answer from the underlying principles. This question will be further 
examined, and the circumstances constructing the rules for the application of other 
principles in the line with Alexy’s thesis will be provided later in this thesis. At that 
stage, the new provisions of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation relating 
to stating reasons will also be elaborated in more detail.
1.1.5 PERSONS ACTING IN A PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY
The individuals whose personal data was at stake in this case were all acting in a 
professional capacity, participating in a meeting in the course of their duties. As the 
European Ombudsman, Jacob Söderman, quite righty noted at the very initial stages 
of the Bavarian Lager case, there is no “general right to participate anonymously 
616 See for instance M. Maes, “Le refronte du reglement (CE) n 1049/2001 relatif a l’access du public aux documents 
du Parlement européenne, du Conseil et de la Commission” in Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne 3 
(2008), 584 – 585.
617 According to article 6(1) of Regulation 1049/2001, the applicant is not obliged to state reasons for the 
application.
618 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334, paras 107–109.
619 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 47.
620 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 63.
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in public activities” and the Data Protection Regulation should not be interpreted 
as implying that this was so.621 The approach adopted by the General Court reflected 
the Ombudsman’s position: “In the circumstances of this case, the mere disclosure 
of the participation of a physical person, acting in a professional capacity, as the 
representative of a collective body, at a meeting held with a Community institution, 
where the personal opinion expressed by that person on that occasion cannot be 
identified, cannot be regarded as an interference with that person’s private life.”622 
Thus the General Court saw professional activities as playing a role when assessing 
the possible disclosure of personal data. However, AG Sharpston partly disagreed 
with the General Court, noting for instance that in accordance with the case-law 
of the ECtHR, the concept of interference with one’s private life is broad. 623 This 
question will be further examined later in this thesis.
In finding that both Regulations are to be applied simultaneously, the Court of 
Justice did not distinguish between personal data relating to activities carried out 
in a professional capacity and any other personal data. However, the Court did not 
examine this aspect of the case in the absence of the reasoning for the application. 
It is therefore for future case-law to show how to weight professional activities in 
the context of breaches of privacy.
1.1.6 CONCLUSION IN THE BAVARIAN LAGER CASE
Before the Court’s decision in the Bavarian Lager case, it was not clear what 
provisions are applicable when public access is requested to documents which 
contain personal data. The Court of Justice clarified that the provisions of the Data 
Protection Regulation are also to be applied in these cases. However, as the issue 
was whether its provisions would be applicable at all, the approach adopted by the 
Court should not be interpreted as giving supremacy to this Regulation over the 
Transparency Regulation. It is of the utmost importance to note that the Court of 
Justice also clarified that full application of both Regulations should be ensured in 
principle, which seems to return the conflict to the underlying levels of law. This 
statement naturally also requires the full application of the Transparency Regulation. 
Furthermore, the principle of transparency and the principles deriving from the 
right of access to documents cannot be overlooked in cases where access to personal 
data is based on regulation governing public access to documents. The focal point 
621 A letter from the European Ombudsman to the President of the European Commission, 30.9.2002/7411.
622 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334, para 128.
623 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2009:624, delivered 15 October 
2009, paras 153 – 154.
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of this discussion after the Bavarian Lager judgment seems to be precisely the 
dimensions of the said principles.624
Furthermore, as the judgment of the Court of Justice focused on the relationship 
between the two Regulations rather than the actual relationship between the two 
rights, the judgment cannot be interpreted as giving supremacy to one of these 
rights over the other. The judgment merely provides some very basic guidelines on 
how to assess the application of two different Regulations in the situation where 
the document requested contains personal data. Later case-law has provided 
some further guidance for interpretation, in particular on stating reasons.625 These 
guidelines can be expected to be developed further in future case-law.
While the full application and the equivalence of these Regulations are clear 
after the Bavarian Lager judgment, the remaining questions concern the role of the 
reasoning of the application and the data subject’s right to object and the importance 
of professional activities. As a matter of fact, these questions have become even 
more important as a result of the approach adopted by the CJEU in the Bavarian 
Lager judgment.
1.2 VOLKER UND MARKUS SCHECKE GBR AND HARTMUT 
EIFERT V LAND HESSEN
The Court of Justice of the European Union delivered a judgment on 9 November 
2010 in the joined cases of Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert 
v Land Hessen.626 This judgment was an interesting mixture of various questions 
relating to transparency, expenditure of public funds, protection of personal data 
and proportionality. Whereas the focal point in Bavarian Lager was the contradictory 
requirements of two different Regulations, this case centred on the validity of certain 
articles627 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005628 as amended by Council 
Regulation No 1437/2007.629 While in Bavarian Lager, the tension between two 
different principles emerged at the level of rules, this case provides a very clear 
example of the tension between the principles. There are no conflicting rules at 
stake in this case. The proportionality of the underlying principles was questioned 
624 For more on dimensions of principles, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 22–28.
625 Case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489; case C-127/13 P, Strack v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2250.
626 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662.
627 Articles 42(8b) and 44a.
628 Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on financing common agricultural policy (OJ L 209, 
11.8.2005, p. 1–25).
629 Council Regulation (EC) 1437/2007 of 26 November 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the 
financing of the common agricultural policy (OJ L 322, 7.12.2007, p. 1–5).
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and, as such, the validity of certain Regulations. This case was also considered in 
the Grand Chamber, reflecting its importance.630
1.2.1 THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The EU legislation obliged a Member State to publish the beneficiaries of certain 
agricultural funding provided by two different foundations; EAGF631 and EAFRD632. 
This requirement was a part of the European Transparency Initiative, the underlying 
aim of which was to reinforce public control over the expenditure of public funds.633 
However, two German farmers, considering that publishing data relating to them 
violated their right to privacy, lodged a complaint before the national court. The 
argument of the farmers in the national proceedings seemed to be that there was 
no overriding public interest served by publishing the amounts634 they had received 
from the EAGF or the EAFRD.635
The publication of the data was based on certain articles of Regulation 1290/2005. 
These rules ensure, in particular, that the beneficiaries of funds are informed that 
some data may be made public and may be processed by auditing and investigating 
bodies for the purpose of safeguarding the financial interest of the Communities. 
The Regulation obliged the Member States to publish the beneficiaries of the EAGF 
and the EAFRD and the amounts received annually by the beneficiaries.636 637
1.2.2 NATURE OF THE PERSONAL DATA
The applicants and complainants in the national proceedings were an agricultural 
undertaking and a full-time farmer, who could be identified by the way in which they 
630 The conclusion of this case will be provided together with the conclusion of the Satakunnan Markkinapörssi 
case at the end of section 5.1.3.
631 European Agricultural Guarantee Fund.
632 European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.
633 Communication from the Commission Follow-up to the “European Transparency Initiative” green paper 
COM 2007 (127) final.
634 The internet site provided by the state of Hesse covered the information on beneficiaries’ names, postal codes 
and the annual amounts of funding.
635 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 74.
636 More detailed rules on the publication of the information on the funds beneficiaries receive are laid down in 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 529/2008 of 18 March 2008 setting out detailed rules for the application of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on publication of information on the beneficiaries of funds deriving 
from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD) .
637 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras 4, 15–17, 24.
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were listed on the internet site.638 Transmitting or disclosing this data is processing 
of personal data in the sense of the Data Protection Directive.639
The funding received by the beneficiaries was an integral part of their income 
and, as noted by the Court of Justice, it might form a considerable part of a farmer’s 
total income.640 Publishing the amounts received could therefore clearly indicate 
their income levels. There are no clear guidelines in European data protection 
legislation on how to assess the personal information relating to a person’s income. 
It is evident, however, that information related to one’s income does not enjoy the 
same special treatment as special categories of personal data defined in Article 8 
of the Data Protection Directive.641 In accordance with the earlier case-law of the 
Court of Justice, the disclosure of data related to an individual’s income might well 
be justified in some cases.642
1.2.3 CONSENT OF THE DATA SUBJECT AND RIGHTFUL INTERFERENCE IN ONE’S 
RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA
Even if the national court saw from the outset that publishing the applicants’ 
names on an internet site breaches their right to protection of personal data, it 
was not convinced that it was unjustified, seeing that the applicants had consented 
to publication. The CJEU also examined the significance of this so-called consent. 
The CJEU noted that the applicants had indeed foreseen that their personal data 
would be published, but also saw that the applicants had merely stated that they 
were aware of the requirements to publish the data. Thus, publication was not based 
on the of the consent of data subjects but on the EU legislation.643
Once it was clear that there was interference in their privacy, the CJEU moved on 
to one of the key issues of the case; it had to examine whether interference in one’s 
right to the protection of personal data could be justified. This right is guaranteed 
638 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras 25, 53–54.
639 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31–50).
640 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 58.
641 According to Article 8, Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership and the processing of 
data concerning health or sex life.
642 Joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:294.
643 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras 61–64.
157CHAPTER V
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.644 However, it is not an absolute right,645 
and must therefore be balanced against other rights and, as noted by the CJEU, 
“in relation to its function in society”.646 The referring national court was of the 
view that increased transparency, which was the rationale behind the obligation to 
publish the data, would not in fact enhance prevention of irregularities. It saw that 
the aim pursued by this legislation was sufficiently protected by other means as 
there were already control mechanisms in place for this purpose. Thus, the further 
transparency attained by the Regulation would not bring significant added value 
to control over the expenditure of public funds, particularly taking the principle of 
proportionality into consideration.647
The dimensions of the underlying principles establishing these rights are of 
great interest in seeking the correct balance between these rights.648 It was not 
clear that the provisions which were challenged contradicted Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter. These articles and the underlying principles had to be assessed in light of 
the objective of transparency. In this case, this balance had initially been carried 
out by the legislator and now the Court of Justice took its turn. First, the Court 
of Justice noted that the internet site containing information on the beneficiaries’ 
names and the exact amounts they received did indeed interfere with their private 
lives in the sense of Article 7 and fell under the protection of personal data in the 
sense of Article 8 of the Charter649. However, as noted above, one’s right to the 
protection personal data is not absolute. It was therefore necessary to decide whether 
this interference could be justified. This very much reflects the Dworkinian type 
of balancing of principles.650 Throughout the whole case, it was clear that neither 
Article 7 nor 8 would be void even if the balancing had been decided in favour of 
transparency. However, how to find the proportional balance between principles 
still had to be determined. Here, the Court of Justice focused on examining whether 
the interference was compatible with the legitimate limitations on fundamental 
rights and freedoms as laid down in the Charter.651
644 According to Article 8(1) of the Charter, everyone has the right to the protection of their own personal data.
645 For more about absolute rights, see Case C-112/00, Schmidtberger, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333; for further reading, 
H. Delany & E. Carolan, The Right to Privacy: A doctrinal and Comparative Analysis, (Thomson Round 
Hall, 2008), 58–65.
646 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 48; Case C-112/00, Schmidtberger, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333, para 80.
647 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 30.
648 For more on dimensions of principles, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 22–28. 
Also, if the Dworkinian parameters of individual and collective rights are accepted, it provides an interesting 
perspective on the relation between these two rights. See 90–123.
649 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras 58, 60.
650 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 14–81.
651 In examining the case, the Court of Justice underlined the necessity of evaluating the validity of the provisions 
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1.2.3.1 Article 51 of the Charter
Guidance on what can be considered legitimate limitations to the rights and freedoms 
laid down in the Charter is provided in Article 52. Once the Court had established 
that there was interference with the right to the protection of personal data and that 
processing the data was not based on the applicants’ consent, the Court of Justice 
went on to determine whether the criteria under Article 52(1)652 of the Charter were 
met in this case.653 Placing the criteria in Article 52 of the Charter in Robert Alexy’s 
framework shows them as the justifying circumstances in considering the weight 
and dimension of principles leading to a situation where one principle is considered 
weightier.654 The Court first examined whether the limitations were regulated by 
law without losing the essence of the rights which were breached. It then had to 
assess whether these limitations were in accordance with the general interests of 
the European Union and in line with the principle of proportionality.655
1.2.3.2 Objectives of general interest recognized by the EU
Firstly, the Court of Justice noted that the requirement that the interference be 
provided by law was clearly met in this case. Secondly, the Court of Justice examined 
the question of the limitations genuinely meeting the objectives of general interest 
recognized by the Union.656 The aim of the Regulation was quite clear. As it was 
described in the recitals, it was to strengthen public control over the expenditure of 
public funds by enhanced transparency.657 Hence, the objective of the Regulations 
was clear and was not disputed at any stage of the proceedings.
laid down in Regulation 1290/2005 and Regulation 259/2008 in light of the freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recalling that it has the same legal force 
as the treaties.
652 According to Article 52(1) of the Charter, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized 
by the Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject 
to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
653 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 64.
654 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 100–109.
655 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 65.
656 Ibid, paras 66–67.
657 According to Recital 14 of Regulation 1437/2008, “making this information accessible to the public enhances 
transparency regarding the use of Community funds in the [CAP] and improves the sound financial 
management of these funds, in particular by reinforcing public control of the money used. Given the 
overriding weight of the objectives pursued, it is justified with regard to the principle of proportionality 
and the requirement of the protection of personal data to provide for the general publication of the relevant 
information as it does not go beyond what is necessary in a democratic society and for the prevention of 
irregularities”. Recital 6 of Regulation 259/2008 contains a similar statement.
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Furthermore, the Court of Justice pointed out that the principle of transparency 
itself had been recognized in the Treaty on European Union as well as in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.658 Very significantly for this study, the 
Court specifically reiterated its earlier statement that “the principle of transparency 
enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and 
guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective 
and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system”.659 Consequently, 
the wording borrowed from the recitals of the Transparency Regulation can be 
considered an integral part of the settled case-law. Thus, there seems to be no doubt 
as to the status of the principle of transparency at this stage. Since the principle 
of transparency seems to have gained the necessary institutional support in the 
Dworkinian sense in the European Union legal framework, the remaining question 
is therefore how to balance this principle with other principles.660
The Court concluded that the Regulations served the goals of the principle of 
transparency.661 Thus, the Court first established that this principle is indeed a general 
interest recognized by the European Union and, secondly, that the Regulations were 
based on that general interest.
1.2.3.3 Proportionality
Once it was established that the criteria concerning the legislation and the objectives 
of general interest recognized by the Union had been met, it was still necessary to 
see whether the measures taken had been proportional and necessary in the sense 
of Article 52(1) of the Charter. The Court of Justice examined this question in 
some detail, taking the following facts into consideration. First, the applicants had 
argued that publication of the funding information enabled third persons to draw 
conclusions about their income662. Second, as noted earlier, the publication of the 
information undoubtedly increased transparency of the use of the agricultural aid in 
question and increased people’s ability to observe how the public funds were being 
used. Third, determining whether the measures were necessary required that these 
658 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 68.
659 Case C-41/00 P, Interpoc v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2003:125, para 39; Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 
Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 68. For a 
Case C-41/00 P, Interpoc v Commission, see also S. Kadelbach, “Case Law A. Court of Justice”, in Common 
Market Law Review 38 (2001), 184–186.
660 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 2009) 40.
661 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras 71, 75.
662 The funding formed 30% and 70% of the total annual income of the applicants concerned.
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measures be reconciled with the fundamental rights to protection of personal data 
and respect for private and family life.663
In establishing the balance between transparency and the protection of personal 
data, the Court – with references to its earlier case-law – underlined that derogations 
and limitations relating to the protection of personal data must apply only where 
strictly necessary.664 The Court of Justice had indeed stated this previously in the 
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia case.665 However, this statement of the 
Court of Justice should not be taken as a general approach. Rather, it is significant 
to note that the statement was issued in the context of balancing two fundamental 
rights. Furthermore, the Court of Justice came to this conclusion only after having 
first stated that “in order to take account of the importance of the right to freedom 
of expression in every democratic society, it is necessary, first, to interpret notions 
relating to that freedom, such as journalism, broadly”.666 Consequently, limitations 
on data protection are to be imposed in a balanced relation to other rights.
Finally, the Court of Justice held that the institutions had not ascertained that 
publishing the names of the beneficiaries would not exceed what was actually 
necessary to attain the goal.667 The Court of Justice justified its conclusion by pointing 
out that there was no distinction based on the duration, frequency, nature or the 
amount of aid received. It also elaborated more restricted ways of publishing names 
than the way that was actually adopted. The Court also underlined that more limited 
publication did not seem to provide an insufficient or incorrect picture of the funds 
granted. In addition, the Court emphasized that “no automatic priority can be 
conferred on the objective of transparency over the protection of personal data”. 
While doing this, it did however reiterate that taxpayers, i.e. the general public, did 
indeed have the right to know how public funds are spent.668 669
Thereafter, the Court of Justice concluded that the Commission and the Council 
had not properly balanced the EU’s interest in transparency and the appropriate use 
of public funds against the protection of personal data and respect for private and 
family life. Thus, the Court declared Articles 42(8b) and 44a invalid as far as they 
concern natural persons and are not drafted in more detail, making a distinction 
between the particular issues described in the judgment.
663 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras 58, 73, 75, 76, 77.
664 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 77.
665 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, para 56.
666 Ibid.
667 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 86.
668 Ibid., paras 79, 81–83, 85.
669 Joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:294.
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The Court of Justice also underlined that the fact that the data relates to activities 
of a professional nature was not relevant in this case. This approach was justified 
by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights,670 which has clarified that 
the right to privacy might cover activities of a professional nature671 and should 
therefore not be limited simply because the data relates to such activities. While 
keeping in mind that the right to privacy does cover these activities, it should be 
remembered that interfering with one’s right to the protection of personal data, or 
privacy for that matter, can be justified in some circumstances.
Even though the Court of Justice did find that certain provisions of the Regulation 
interfered with the rights of natural persons beyond what was necessary, it did 
not see this as being the case vis-à-vis legal persons.672 As previously mentioned, 
the identity of the natural persons behind the legal entities was recognizable in 
this case. The Court of Justice held however that there are significant differences 
between natural and legal persons, reiterating that legal persons are under stricter 
obligations to publish data relating to them in comparison with natural persons 
from the start. The Court of Justice also took a rather practical approach by stating 
that obliging the national authorities to verify whether there are identifiable natural 
persons behind legal persons would cause an unreasonable administrative burden.673
1.3 THE TIETOSUOJAVALTUUTETTU V SATAKUNNAN 
MARKKINAPÖRSSI OY AND SATAMEDIA OY CASE
To provide a more comprehensive picture of the underlying principles examined 
in the Markus Schecke and Hartmut Eifert case, it is important to consider the 
Satakunnan Markkinpörssi case briefly as well.674 The Court of Justice delivered this 
preliminary ruling in December 2008. While the Schecke and Eifert case concerned 
disclosure of information giving a clear indication of the incomes of farmers, the 
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi case relates to publication of the taxation information 
of a vast number of ordinary citizens.675
670 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, para 59.
671 ECtHR 16 February 2000, Amann v Switzerland (2000–II) and ECtHR 4 May 2000, Rotaru v Romania, 
(RJD 2000–V).
672 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras 87– 88.
673 Ibid., para 87.
674 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727. The case was also tried 
before the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights found that there was no 
violation of Article 10 regarding freedom of expression. ECtHR 27 June 2017, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi 
Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0627JUD000093113).
675 For an analysis of the case, see W. Hins, “Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi 
Oy and Satamedia Oy, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 16 December 2008” in Common Market Law 
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1.3.1 THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy had run a business publishing the 
taxation information of ordinary citizens for several years, information which is in the 
public domain in Finland and which Satakunnan Markkinapörssi had collected from 
various Inland Revenue Offices. The information had then been published in records 
taking the form of a journal, organized by income and municipality. While many 
other journals publish taxation information as well, the activities of Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi differed in the extent of their data, with the taxation information 
on nearly 1.2 million taxpayers676 being published. The information contained the 
first and last names of the person and their income, listed in alphabetical order. 
The publications contained hardly anything other than the taxation information 
with some rare exceptions.677
Following complaints by some individuals claiming that their right to privacy had 
been breached, the national Data Protection Ombudsman scrutinized Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi’s activities, concluding that its processing of personal data did not 
comply with national data protection legislation. The Data Protection Ombudsman 
then sought an order to ban this processing of personal data. In the course of these 
proceedings, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland referred the case for a 
preliminary ruling in Luxembourg.678
1.3.2 LEGITIMATE INTEREST
The Supreme Administrative Court posed several questions to the Court of Justice, 
including questions related to the definition of processing of personal data and 
the definition of journalistic purposes. The Court of Justice took the view that the 
data processing described in the previous section could be considered as having 
been done for journalistic purposes. Whether it was done for this reason was left 
for the national court to decide. Hence, the processing of this information was to 
be considered justified if certain criteria were met.679
In its decision, the Court of Justice provided some guidelines for the interpretation 
of journalistic purposes. It also emphasised that freedom of speech is indeed of the 
utmost importance in a democracy. It follows that all notions related to freedom 
of speech, such as journalism, must be interpreted broadly. Once this was clearly 
Review 47 (2010), 215–233.
676 This figure should be set in the context of the whole population in Finland, which is 5.3 million.
677 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, paras 25–26, 28.
678 Ibid., para 31–32.
679 Ibid., paras 34, 50, 61–62.
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established, the Court underlined that all exceptions to the right to the protection 
of personal data must be defined as narrowly as possible to achieve a fair balance 
between the two fundamental rights.680
At the national level, the Supreme Administrative Court took the view that 
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi’s activities were not conducted for journalistic 
purposes. 681
1.3.3 THE NATURE OF THE DATA
As already noted, information related to income does not enjoy special treatment 
under European data protection legislation. Whereas the information in the public 
domain gave indications of farmers’ incomes in the Schecke and Eifert case, in the 
Satakunnan Markkinpörssi case the information disclosed explicitly revealed the 
income of the data subjects. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice did not see processing 
such data as being contrary to data protection legislation provided that it was carried 
out solely for journalistic purposes.682 This approach mirrored the approach the 
Court took in the Rundfunk case, where the Court decided that disclosing annual 
income information is not to be considered contrary to EU data protection legislation 
provided that it is necessary to guarantee the proper management of public funds.683
1.3.4 CONCLUSION OF THE SCHECKE AND EIFERT AND SATAKUNNAN 
MARKKINAPÖRSSI CASES
The Court of Justice of the European Union was balancing the underlying principles 
of data protection with other values in these two cases. There was no conflict of 
rules at the surface level, but rather a tension arising at the underlying levels with 
an effect on the validity of some legislation. In these judgments, the Court of Justice 
set some basic guidelines, or Alexy’s circumstances, which would dictate the correct 
680 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, para 56–62.
681 KHO 2009: 82. The Supreme Administrative Court elaborated its decision quite extensively. Among other 
things, it reasoned its decision as follows. Where the register that has been created for journalistic purposes 
is published extensively, almost in its entirety, and even if the publication takes place in separate community-
based pieces, this type of processing of personal data cannot be considered as being for journalistic purposes. 
This reasoning was based on national legislation, which required some minimum standards to be met when 
personal data was processed this reason. The Supreme Administrative Court held that when the information 
is released as extensively as in this case, these minimum standards are not actually met, and the processing 
cannot be considered as carried out for journalistic purposes.
682 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, para 65.
683 See joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:294.
164  PART 2 – CASE STUDIES 
balance between these principles in this and similar cases. These circumstances 
could be called conditions of balancing in line with Alexy’s theory.684
The Court of Justice of the European Union examined transparency in relation to 
public funding in these cases. Today, when Europe is again on the edge of financial 
crisis, transparency on expenditure of public funds should be put under even closer 
scrutiny. Even if the Court of Justice saw the underlying principles of one’s right to 
privacy and the protection of personal data as weighing more than transparency 
in the Schecke and Eifert case, this was subject to certain qualifications. First and 
foremost, the Court of Justice did not consider the underlying principles of data 
protection more weighty in general. To start with, according to the Court, information 
relating to legal persons could still be published as before. Under the Data Protection 
Directive, this information might be personal data if it allows identification of the 
persons behind the legal undertaking.685 Consequently, the personal data was 
divided into two categories subject to different criteria for publication. Besides, the 
Court of Justice did not take the view that information relating to private farmers 
could not be published at all, seeing the current legislation as disproportionate in 
respect of its aims and methods. Thus, according to the Court, the disclosure of this 
information should be done under more detailed provisions, providing clearer limits 
and boundaries. In the more recent Manni case for example, the CJEU did not see 
the public access to personal data stored by public authorities as disproportionate 
from the outset.686
Reading this judgment together with the Court’s judgment in the Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi case, it does not seem likely that the Court’s intention would have 
been to take a definite stand against the disclosure of personal data relating to 
the expenditure of public funds, but rather to underline the importance of correct 
balancing between the two principles. In Satakunnan Markkinapörssi, since the 
Court of Justice did consider that the taxation information on numerous people 
could be released if it was done for journalistic purposes, disclosing personal data 
relating to public expenditure can be justified under certain circumstances.687 
However, it should not be done lightly, and in a way which compromises privacy 
and the right to protection of personal data only to the extent strictly necessary in 
order to achieve the other goals. In other words, balancing must be carried out in 
accordance with Hesse’s doctrine of practical concordance.
684 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 100–109.
685 According to Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46, ‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’), an identifiable person being one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity. This did change with the entry into force 
of the GDPR. The GDPR specifies that it does not apply to undertakings established as legal persons.
686 Case C-398/15, Manni, ECLI:EU:C:2017:197.
687 See also joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:294.
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2. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
2.1 GENERAL
Even though the European Convention on Human Rights has no provisions 
regulating the protection of one’s personal data or access to documents, the European 
Court of Human Rights has recognized these rights through other articles of the 
Convention.688 One of the landmark judgments in this respect was Gaskin v United 
Kingdom.689 The ECtHR based its decision on Article 8, concerning the right to 
privacy, and rejected the claim based on Article 10 which concerns freedom of speech. 
The judgment strongly reflects the data subject’s right to access his or her personal 
data. Mr Gaskin had requested access to some official files containing information 
on his childhood. The national authorities had eventually granted him access to files 
where the contributors to them had given their consent for disclosure, but denied 
him access to the rest. The European Court of Human Rights held that since the 
right to privacy imposes some positive obligations on the state, beside the negative 
obligation not to interfere with one’s private and family life, the applicant should be 
entitled to have access to these documents containing information relating to him. 
Even if the decision mostly relates to the processing of personal data, it also reflects 
some aspects of access to document principles. First, the access was sought to official 
documents apparently drafted by civil servants or someone in a similar position. 
Second, the objection to releasing the documents by some contributors did not 
finally stop the Court from coming to the conclusion that it did. This approach has 
been confirmed in more recent case-law as well. For instance, in Turek v Slovakia, 
the Court held that there had been a deficiency in the national procedure where 
Turek sought the opportunity to correct information relating to him.690
While the previous cases relate to the right to the protection of personal data, 
public access to documents (contrary to access to public documents) was at stake in 
Guerra v Italy, a case related to environmental information.691 The state’s liability for 
dissemination of information which is not otherwise directly accessible was largely 
688 There also are two international Conventions drawn up in the framework of the Council of Europe relating 
to these rights; Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data and Convention 205 on Access to Official Documents (the latter has not come into force yet).
689 ECtHR 7 July 1989, Gaskin v the United Kingdom.
690 ECtHR 14 February 2006, Turek v Slovakia, (2006–II), See also Case C-345/06, Heinrich, ECLI:EU:C:2009:140. 
In the Heinrich case, the Court of Justice held that obligations to citizens cannot be based on legislation which 
is not accessible to the public. For an analysis of the said case, see M. Bobek, “Case C-345/06, Gottfried 
Heinrich, Judgement of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 10 March 2009” in Common Market Law 
Review 46 (2009) 2077–2094.
691 ECtHR 19 February 1998, Guerra and Others v Italy, (1998–I).
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discussed in the case.692 However, the ECtHR has not taken a definite stand on this 
question, but rather resolved the cases by applying Article 8 of the Convention.693
It seems clear that the legitimate interest of the applicant has a central role to 
play in the ECtHR’s case-law. The interest might be individual as it was in Gaskin 
v United Kingdom, or it might have a more a general character as in Guerra v Italy.
2.2 GILLBERG V SWEDEN
As previously noted, while public access to documents is not a clearly defined human 
right under the European Convention on Human Rights, the ECtHR has considered 
this type of right through other rights protected by the Convention. Even if some 
authors694 have claimed that attempts to interpret Article 10 of the Convention as 
covering the right of access to public documents have failed, the recent case-law of 
the Court shows that access to public documents is indeed considered equivalent 
to human rights protected by the Convention. This right can either be considered 
as a human right protected by the Convention or equivalent to these rights as an 
important element of a democratic society.
The right balance between privacy and rightful interference in the name of 
democracy was the main issue considered by the ECtHR in Gillberg v Sweden.695 
After the Third Section had decided that there was no violation, the Grand Chamber 
accepted the case for reconsideration based on the applicant’s request for referral.696 
Given that this is quite exceptional, the case is clearly of wider significance.697 It is 
also of interest to note that the judgment of the Third Section was not unanimous, 
the decision on the alleged violation of Article 8 being split 5:2.
Even if the proceedings at the national level were largely focused on the 
relationship between the protection of personal data and access to official documents, 
and the ECtHR very similarly examined whether there had been a violation of 
Articles 8 or 10 of the Convention, the approach of the ECtHR was very different 
692 Ibid.
693 ECtHR 19 October 2005, Roche v United Kingdom, (2005–X).
694 See, for instance, A. Sharland, “The Influence of the European Convention on Human Rights, etc.”, in Coppel 
(ed.) Information Rights, (London, 2007), 88 – 100.
695 ECtHR 2 November 2010, Gillberg v Sweden.
696 The case is currently pending before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. The oral hearing took place on 29th 
of September 2011.
697 According to Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights “any party to the case may, in 
exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. Thereafter a panel of five judges 
[…] shall accept the request if the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of 
the Convention […], or a serious issues of general importance”. The Grand Chamber delivers approximately 20 
judgments per year. This figure also comprises the cases relinquished by the Chamber. Available on the internet 
< http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/8E30641D-6122-439C-9E08-3C712C02A379/0/ListarrGC.pdf > 
[last visited 25.7.2011].
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from that of the national courts. The ECtHR was assessing whether the rights of 
applicants had been violated under Articles 8 or 10, not the actual relationship or 
the tension between these articles. However, this does not mean that the issue was 
not raised by the ECtHR. In examining the procedure before the national court, 
the ECtHR naturally also touched on the question of how to assess the relationship 
between the right of access to documents and the right to protection of personal data.
2.2.1 THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The applicant, Mr Christopher Gillberg, lodged a complaint to the ECtHR, arguing 
that his rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights had 
been violated. Mr Gillberg, a Swedish psychiatry professor and Director of the 
Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at the University of Gothenburg, 
had conducted research involving children suffering from ADHD698 or DAMP699. 
The research sample contained 141 children. When the research material was 
collected, the participants – or in the early stages their parents – were told that 
the information obtained would not be further disclosed and were even promised 
absolute confidentiality.700 The research material included a vast number of records, 
test results, interview replies, questionnaires and video and audiotapes, which had 
served as the basis for several doctoral theses. According to Mr Gillberg, when he 
took up his duties as the head of the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
the university’s Ethics Committee had set confidentiality as a precondition for its 
research permit.701
In 2002, an application to access these research documents was filed. The 
applicant, named K in the judgment by the Third Section of the European Court 
of Human Rights, noted that she had no interest in the personal data which these 
files contained. She was interested in the material because she wished to examine 
the method used in the previous research as well as the evidence on which the 
previous conclusions of the research had been based. The University of Gothenburg 
declined access to the research material, basing its decision on two grounds. Firstly, 
K had not demonstrated any relation between her own research and the research 
material in question. Secondly, the material contained vast amounts of personal 
data. Disclosing this data would be likely to harm the individuals concerned.702
698 Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
699 Deficits in Attention, Motor Control and Perception.
700 ECtHR 2 November 2010, Gillberg v Sweden, paras 1, 3, 7–9, 4.
701 Ibid., paras 7–8.
702 Ibid., para 15.
168  PART 2 – CASE STUDIES 
K appealed the decision to the Administrative Court of Appeal, which referred 
the case back to the university for closer consideration; the university was to assess 
whether the documents could be released under certain conditions or after erasing 
the personal data from the research material. The university refused to grant access 
to the research documents, stating that they could not be released after the removal 
of personal data and also rejected the possibility of disclosing the information under 
stipulated conditions.703
Meanwhile, a second application to access to the research documents was filed. 
Applicant E was also conducting research of his own. The university refused to 
disclose the documents to him, the decision being based on the same grounds as 
the previous refusal. Both E and K appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, 
which concluded in February 2003 that both had a legitimate interest in the material, 
and that the documents should therefore be disclosed under conditions decided by 
the University of Gothenburg.704
This judgment of the Administrative Appeal Court and the subsequent refusal 
by the Supreme Administrative Court to examine the application was followed by a 
bureaucratic merry-go-round. Briefly, the university considered certain conditions 
as appropriate provided that the data subjects gave their consent to disclosure, 
but the applicants did not agree with some of the conditions and appealed to 
the Administrative Court of Appeal. The Court made some adjustments to the 
conditions and maintained its initial position on disclosure. Similar procedural 
rounds took place twice after February 2003. It seems that in these considerations 
the legitimate interest of the applicants was always assessed. After the last round 
before the Administrative Court of Appeal, some colleagues of Mr Gillberg destroyed 
the research material.705
These actions led to criminal proceedings against Mr Gillberg and some of his 
colleagues. Mr Gillberg was given a suspended sentence and was fined.706 At the 
Court of Appeal, Mr Gillberg had, for instance, claimed that because of Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, his actions should be considered 
excusable since disclosure of the information would have violated the rights of the 
data subjects under Article 8 of the Convention.707
703 Ibid.
704 ECtHR 2 November 2010, Gillberg v Sweden, paras 16–17.
705 Ibid., paras 18–31.
706 The amount of the day fines defines the seriousness of the crime, according to Swedish penal code (brotssbalk 
2 §). The range varies from 30 to 150.
707 Ibid., paras 32–33.
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2.2.2 THE RULING OF THE THIRD SECTION OF ECTHR
One of the questions examined by the Third Section was whether the outcome of 
the criminal proceedings against Mr Gillberg breached the rights guaranteed by 
Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention.708 Thus, the Court was balancing the underlying 
principles, particularly of Article 8, to decide whether the outcome of the case 
was justified. Mr Gillberg argued that this was not the case as confidentiality, the 
precondition for his research, had not been sufficiently considered by the national 
courts.709 He claimed that this fact should have been taken into account as a 
mitigating circumstance.710
The Third Section eventually concluded that there was no violation of Article 8 
of the Convention, specifying that the basic question was whether the conviction in 
question was necessary in a democratic society and finding that this was the case. 
The Third Section stated that “[…] the fact that the Court of Appeal did not take into 
account as a mitigating circumstance the fact that the applicant had attempted 
to protect the integrity of the participants in the research does not, in the Court’s 
view, overstep the state’s margin of appreciation in this case”. In its evaluation of 
the case, the Third Section also examined the question of the proportionality of the 
conviction, but did not find against the state in this respect either.711
2.2.3 PRIOR AGREEMENT AND THE DATA SUBJECT’S CONSENT
Two of the fundamentals of this case were prior agreement and the data subject’s 
consent, both of which played a significant role in balancing the principles of privacy 
and transparency.
One of the corner-stones of Swedish access to documents legislation is the 
obligation to assess each request for access to an official document individually and 
in terms of the content of the document. There are no block exemptions or other 
similar instruments under the Swedish legislation.712 It naturally follows that any 
agreement deviating from this should be considered void. Further, all exceptions to 
the general principle of access to a document must be laid down in law.713 Therefore 
708 Ibid., paras 65, 75.
709 Ibid., para 76, 85.
710 Ibid., para 111.
711 ECtHR 2 November 2010, Gillberg v Sweden, paras 116–119.
712 Tryckfrihetsförordning (1949:105).
713 In other words, exceptions to the law cannot be granted through legal instruments below the level ordinary 
law, for instance, through decisions of various governmental agencies.
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civil servants cannot impose limitations differing from the law, nor can they make 
such things as decisions on secrecy without the backing of the legislation.714
When the determination of whether to disclose the document must be based 
on its content, assurances not to disclose documents before they have even been 
drawn up do not seem to be in line with this requirement. Also, as public access 
to a document is a right guaranteed by the Swedish Constitution,715 it does seem 
unlikely that two parties could conclude an effective agreement limiting a third 
party’s right of access to official documents.
The assurances given by the applicant were given more weight in the dissenting 
opinion of judges Gyulumyan and Ziemele, who also considered the assessment of 
these assurances by the national court insufficient.716 It seems that the importance 
and weight given to these assurances can be considered slightly misleading. As 
noted, it seems that the applicant could not validly conclude an agreement which 
would limit a third party’s right of access, so that the assurance itself cannot have 
a substantial role in the considerations. However, the underlying reasons for these 
assurances should have been thoroughly considered. The assurance had presumably 
been given because the research project included processing a vast amount of very 
sensitive personal data and, even more importantly, sensitive personal data relating 
to children. It does not seem likely that it would have been possible to collect this 
data without the consent of the data subjects.
Seemingly then, the researcher and data subjects had agreed that the research 
data would not be further disclosed. The assurance given to the participants or their 
parents was formulated as follows: “All data will be dealt with in confidence and 
classified as secret. No data processing that enables the identification of your child 
will take place. No information has been provided previously or will be provided 
to teachers about your child except that when starting school she/he took part 
in a study undertaken by Östra Hospital, and its present results will, as was the 
case for the previous three years ago, be followed up”. The research material was 
collected over a long period, and another assurance of confidentiality was made 
later: “participation is of course completely voluntary and as on previous occasions 
you will never be registered in public data records of any kind and the data will 
be processed in such a way that nobody apart from those of us who met you and 
have direct contact with you will be able to find out anything at all about you”.717
Thus, these assurances had been offered prior to the data subjects’ consent, 
forming the basis for the actual consent. A data subject’s consent reflects 
714 A. Bohlin, Offentlighets principen, (Stockholm, 1996) 154–157.
715 Tryckfrihetsförordningen 2 Kap. Om allmänna handlingarnas offentlighet; 1 § Till främjande av ett fritt 
meningsutbyte och en allsidig upplysning skall varje svensk medborgare ha rätt att taga del av allmänna 
handlingar. Lag (1976:952).
716 ECtHR 2 November 2010, Gillberg v Sweden, paras 2–3.
717 ECtHR 2 November 2010, Gillberg v Sweden, paras 13–14.
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self-determination, the underlying value of privacy and data protection.718 Even if 
the right to self-determination is an important element of data protection, it is not 
absolute.719 Therefore the personal data can in some cases be processed without 
the consent of the data subject, for instance, by disclosing it to third parties. These 
factors should be considered when examining the significance of the consent given 
by the data subjects.
In this case, the data subjects had given their consent for processing of their 
personal data. When doing so, they were under the impression that the data would 
not be further disclosed. An interesting question in connection with this is, of course, 
whether these data subjects would have given their consent knowing their data 
might be further disclosed and, even further, if the data subjects had not given their 
consent, whether there would have been any other means of obtaining this data.
Keeping in mind that the consent of the data subject cannot be considered an 
absolute prerequisite for the processing of personal data, the next question relates 
the scope of the consent. What is the exact scope of the consent that the data subject 
has given? What did he or she consent to? There were not at the time precisely 
defined guidelines for the data subject’s consent in the European legislation, as 
seemed to be the case in the Swedish national legislation as well.720 The reasonable 
expectations of the data subject, two elements of which can be distinguished, should 
play a significant role in seeking an answer to this question. Firstly, if the further 
disclosure could have been considered reasonably foreseeable when the original 
consent had been given, the formal absence of the consent alone should then not be 
considered as an obstacle to further disclosure. It does not seem as if there would 
have been any substantial changes in the legal framework relating to the public 
access legislation between the time the consents were given and the request for the 
documents was made. Any future request should therefore have been reasonably 
foreseeable at the time the consent was given. Secondly, if the further disclosure 
of the personal data can be considered consistent with the original processing of 
the data, the absence of consent should not necessarily be an impediment to the 
processing of personal data. It does seem that both E and K would have used 
718 For more about self-determination, see, for instance, A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational 
Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, 
in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 
2009), 45 – 76.
719 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76. See also instance Case C-524/06, Heinz 
Huber, ECLI:EU:C:2008:724.
720 Convention 108 does not contain any provisions relating to the data subject’s consent. The Data Protection 
Directive and the Data Protection Regulation define consent as any freely given specific and informed indication 
of his or her wishes by which the data subject signifies his or her agreement to personal data relating to 
him or her. The Swedish legislation, personuppgiftslagen (1998 : 204), contains provisions relating to the 
consent of the data subject (for instance, 9 § and 10 §); however, it does not give more precise guidelines for 
the definition of consent.
172  PART 2 – CASE STUDIES 
the material for research purposes, i.e. for purposes similar to the original one. 
Disclosing the research material to other researchers under similar conditions of 
confidentiality could hardly be considered inconsistent with the original use of the 
personal data in question.
2.2.4 THE CONCLUSION IN GILLBERG V SWEDEN
Besides offering a broader European context for solving the dilemma of data 
protection and access to public documents, Gillberg v Sweden offers some useful 
tools for deciding when interference with privacy can be considered justified. It also 
suggests how to assess the meaning of prior agreement, the data subject’s consent 
and legitimate interest.
Firstly, it seems that the prior agreement argument cannot overrule the right of 
public access to documents. It is also quite clear that two parties cannot conclude 
an agreement restricting a third party’s fundamental rights with binding effect – the 
right of access to public documents in this case. The absurdity of the whole idea 
becomes even more glaring if the situation is compared with other restrictions 
on fundamental rights through agreements between two individuals. Two people 
agreeing that a third will not have the right to a private life or right to a fair trial would 
be just some examples. Thus, the agreement itself does not seem to create sufficient 
grounds for refusal to disclose documents; the assessment of the disclosure must be 
carried out based on the information that the documents contain. Nevertheless, the 
circumstances related to this prior agreement should have been closely scrutinized.
Secondly, the impossibility of prior agreement being decisive also derives from 
one of the basic principles of the right of public access, namely, from an individual 
examination of the content of the documents. This approach is clearly adopted in 
the Swedish legislation. It seems that the Third Section of the ECtHR confirmed 
this approach in stating that the criminal proceedings against Mr Gillberg were not 
disproportionate and that they were necessary in a democratic society. Moreover, 
as the entire case related to conflict between data protection and access to public 
documents, the judgment can also be read as recognizing that in a democratic 
society access to public documents can be a legitimate restriction to the right to 
the protection of one’s personal data.
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3. CENTRAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN 
CASE-LAW
This section will now recap and draw together the main questions raised by the case-
law examined in this chapter. First, the central dilemmas raised by the Bavarian Lager 
judgment will be discussed: stating reasons for the request for access to documents 
and the data subject’s consent. The focus will then move to the significance of the 
role played by professional activities in this context. This second question is of 
paramount importance for the overall focus of this study as it gives indications on 
setting the criteria for the disclosure of personal data.
3.1 LEGITIMATE INTEREST AND STATING REASONS FOR THE 
REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS
The legitimate interest of the applicant has gained more importance as a consequence 
of the recent case-law of the Court of Justice.721 The requirement to state reasons for 
the request leads naturally to assessment of the legitimate interest of the applicant. 
This being taken into account in assessing the disclosure of the document leads to a 
situation in which the same document might have been disclosed to different extents 
to different applicants. It also seems to follow that established Council practice of 
disclosing the documents on Council internet pages cannot continue as such. Also, as 
the Court of Justice stated in the Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia case, 
published personal data remains within the scope of the data protection regulation 
regardless of previous publication.722 This leads to the interesting question of how 
to assess situations in which personal data has been released based on access to 
document legislation.
Another interesting view, of course, is that according to Article 8(b) of the Data 
Protection Regulation, personal data shall only be transferred to recipients who 
establish the necessity for this transfer, and if there is no reason to assume that the 
data subject’s legitimate interests might be prejudiced. However, when someone 
applies for access to a document, the applicant could be satisfied with the opportunity 
to examine the document in situ. If Article 8(b) is to be taken literally as regards 
the part concerning the data transfer, studying the document in situ would not fall 
under the Article. Therefore, strict interpretation of Article 8(1) would not hinder 
the applicant having access to this data as long as it is not transferred but is merely 
721 See also Case C-139/07 P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2010:376.
722 See also Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 and Case C-73/07, Satakunnan 
Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727.
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saved and viewed in the original data bank. Consequently, a narrow interpretation of 
Article 8(b) seems to allow viewing this information as long as it is not transferred. 
Naturally, law must be interpreted in accordance with its intention. This question 
will be further elaborated in the concluding chapter together with the provisions 
of the new EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation.
3.1.1 REASONING OF THE APPLICATION
In terms of actual rules, the legitimate interest of applicants is obviously relevant 
when the question of justifying the application arises. As has been noted above, 
requests for documents do not need to be argued under the Transparency 
Regulation. This is a quite natural approach as the Regulation governs public access 
to documents. Parallel to the Transparency Regulation, there are several Regulations 
governing party access.723 These two partially linked concepts, public access and 
party access, must obviously be distinguished from each other.
It seems as if it follows from the Bavarian Lager judgment that the applicant 
should from now on state reasons for receiving the personal data possibly contained 
in the documents as well.724 This seems to be contrary to the Court’s earlier ruling, in 
which the Court stated “the particular interest of an applicant in obtaining access 
to documents cannot be taken into account by the institution […]”.725 It ought to 
be noted however that a different issue was at stake in that case. It is naturally 
not possible to assess whether there has been a legitimate interest which can be 
considered as creating the necessity required by the Data Protection Regulation 
if the application has not been reasoned. This approach does seem to create two 
significant problems. First, the applicant cannot be aware of this requirement to 
state reasons. An ordinary citizen filing an application under the Transparency 
Regulation can hardly be expected to be aware of the recent case-law of the Court 
of Justice. Second, it is very likely that the applicant is not even aware that the 
document requested contains personal data. In other words, the applicant is required 
to establish reasons for disclosure of data the content of which the applicant does 
not know. The situation has some similarities to the obligation on institutions to 
determine whether there is an overriding public interest in disclosure of a document 
under some of the exceptions of the Transparency Regulation.726 In these cases, it 
723 The inadequate framework of party access regulation means that Regulation 1049/2001 is often used as way 
to get information by parties to different cases as well.
724 For reasoning of application, see in particular Case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:489, paras 53–61.
725 Case C-266/05 P, Sison v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2007:75.
726 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, para 49.
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is also indeed quite likely that the institution itself is in a better position to assess 
the possible reasons in favour of the disclosure of the names.
3.1.2 PUBLIC ACCESS TO A DOCUMENT OR ACCESS TO PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Another interesting point about the question of legitimate interest concerns the 
question of public access to documents v access to public documents. When access 
to a document is open to the general public, legitimate interest can hardly play a 
significant role. The CJEU has concluded in its recent case-law though that reasoning 
cannot be too general. According to the CJEU public interest as such would be too 
general to justify transfer of personal data.727 This being said, it ought to be noted 
that legitimate interest could have relevance at a general level in determining the 
existence of an overriding public interest, for example.
Once the legitimate interest of the applicant is to be examined, the right of public 
access to documents seems to turn into the right to access public documents. To 
make the difference clearer, it could be described as the individual’s right of access 
to official documents.
To date, the Court of Justice has not examined whether some individual interest 
could be considered general by nature. Naturally, this would mean that these 
personal interests would reflect general interests which could be considered so 
substantial that they might constitute an overriding public interest. For instance, 
the Council has often noted that an applicant’s personal interests are irrelevant to 
examining the applications.728 If the document is to be disclosed, it will be so erga 
omnes, thus the public will have access to the document. Now, after the Bavarian 
Lager judgment, this approach will have a new twist. If one of the corner-stones 
of access to documents legislation is to be re-evaluated, it ought to be asked why it 
could not work in favour of the applicant as well.
3.2 CONSENT OF DATA SUBJECT
All four cases examined take a quite different approach to the data subject’s consent. 
Both Schecke and Eifert and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia were 
related to publishing information indicating the income of ordinary citizens. While in 
Schecke and Eifert the Court of Justice noted that data subjects had been informed 
727 Case C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2250, para 108. However, Recital 28 of the renewed 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation clarifies that the transparency of Union institutions can justify 
disclosure of data.
728 For Council’s erga omnes practice, see B. Driessen, Transparency in EU Institutional Law: A Practitioner’s 
Handbook, (Kluwer 2012) 44.
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of the future disclosure of the information, this did not have relevance in the final 
outcome. The heart of the question was the legitimacy of certain Regulations and 
the processing of data was based on legislation, not on the consent of the data 
subjects. As for Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, the Court of Justice did 
hold that the data processing activities conducted by Satakunnan Markkinapörssi 
and Satamedia could be considered legitimate in the sense of the Data Protection 
Directive if the sole objective of those activities was disclosure for public information, 
opinions and ideas. The Court of Justice left it for the domestic court to determine 
whether the activities could be considered as falling under these headings. However, 
the consent of data subjects was not considered at any stage of the case.
In comparison to all of other cases examined in this chapter, the data subjects 
in Gillberg v Sweden would seem to have the strongest case when it comes to 
consent. Despite this, it played very little role. The European Court of Human Rights 
never assessed this aspect and it was apparently not examined by the domestic 
courts either. Of the four cases examined, the Gillberg v Sweden case seems to 
be the only one in which the data was collected purely on the basis of the data 
subjects’ consent in the first place. In both Schecke and Eifert and Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, the collection was based on legislation; in Bavarian 
Lager, the data had been collected in the course of professional activities. It even 
seems possible to conclude that in the last three cases, anticipation of disclosure of 
the personal information of the data subjects would most likely have had no effect 
on their participation. However, the awareness of the future transmission of data 
in Gillberg v Sweden might have had an effect on the data subjects’ willingness to 
participate. Another question is, of course, how the content of the consent should be 
assessed. This question was tentatively elaborated in the section relating to Gillberg 
v Sweden and will be further explored in the concluding chapter. In Bavarian Lager, 
the question was rather the data subjects’ right to object to the processing of data 
related to them, even if consent did play a role in this case as well. This question 
is examined more closely in the concluding chapter, together with the question of 
the legitimate interest of the applicants, as these two questions are closely linked.
3.3 PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
The question of the significance of data being collected while the data subjects 
are carrying out their professional activities was not answered in the four cases 
considered here, nor are there any other cases that could provide a clear answer 
this question. While this section will provide some first remarks on this question, 
it will be further elaborated in Chapter VII.
While the General Court took a firm stand, stating that mere disclosure of data 
relating to participation at a meeting in the course of professional activities did not 
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breach the data subjects’ right to privacy, the Court of Justice did not confirm this 
approach.729 While the Court of Justice did not examine the reasoning of the General 
Court in this respect, it did annul the General Court’s decision in so far as this decision 
annulled the Commission’s earlier decision in the case. As for the Schecke and Eifert, 
the Court of Justice simply noted that the fact that the information related to the 
professional activities of the farmers was not fundamental to the case. Schecke and 
Eifert differs significantly from the Bavarian Lager case in terms of the nature of 
the disclosed data. While the question in Bavarian Lager concerned data relating 
to participation in a meeting hosted by an institution, the information in Schecke 
and Eifert gave indications of farmers’ income. The essential objective behind the 
disclosure also differs in these two cases. In Bavarian Lager, the main objective 
was to know who had participated in a meeting at which a decision was made that 
affected the applicants’ rights. In Schecke and Eifert, the information was to be 
released to guarantee appropriate expenditure of public funds. To put it differently, 
the disclosure of the data in Bavarian Lager was in itself the objective and purpose 
of the request, whereas in Schecke and Eifert it was a means to achieve some other 
goals. Furthermore, in Schecke and Eifert the Court of Justice did not see obstacles 
to the disclosure of the data once some additional safeguards were imposed.
The European Commission gave its proposal for the Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to the European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents after the General Court’s Bavarian Lager 
judgment. Even if it was specifically the Commission who appealed to the Court 
of Justice, it does seem as if the Commission approved the General Court’s approach 
to the disclosure of personal data relating to the exercise of professional activities. 
The Commission noted in its proposal that the Data Protection Regulation had been 
considered too restrictive, specifically concerning persons acting in a public capacity. 
Furthermore, according to Commission proposal “names, titles and functions of 
public office holders, civil servants and interest representatives in relation with 
their professional activities shall be disclosed unless, […]”.730 Hence, it might not be 
clear how to assess the disclosure of personal data related to professional activities in 
light of the current case-law, but it does seem that most of the relevant institutional 
stakeholders agree that professional activities are relevant when it comes disclosing 
the information.
729 See also case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489, paras 27–35.
730 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM (2008) 229 final, p. 19.
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4. CONCLUSION
On the face of it, the four cases discussed in this chapter have significant differences 
and present very different legal dilemmas. Nonetheless, some common and recurring 
issues can be identified. First, the most important similarity is that all cases reflect a 
balance between two fundamental rights, or rights equivalent to fundamental rights. 
While balancing the underlying principles was apparent in all cases, in Bavarian 
Lager the dilemma emerged at the level of competing rules.
As the Bavarian Lager study has shown, even if the CJEU did take the full 
application of both Regulations as a starting point, this does not seem achievable. 
The dilemma does not seem to be solvable by defining its scope in the line with 
AG Sharpston’s propositions either. As a result, the basic question raised in the 
aftermath of this judgment is to what extent the request for public documents 
should be reasoned.731 This question is closely related to the applicant’s legitimate 
interest. Another question of equal importance is how to assess the data subject’s 
right to object to the processing of personal data or the weight given to the data 
subject’s consent.
While stating reasons for the application and the data subject’s consent have 
arisen as central dilemmas in applying the Transparency and Data Protection 
Regulations simultaneously, the case studies have also indicated how to resolve 
them. Rightful interference with the protection of personal data was at stake in 
the Schecke and Eifert and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi cases. As the case studies 
have shown, transparency and journalistic purposes, for example, can be considered 
legitimate reasons for limiting one’s right to the protection of personal data. While 
the more detailed criteria justifying this interference vary in the cases examined, 
some elements of more general criteria can be distinguished, such as the significance 
of professional activities or public control over expenditure of public funds.
While similar conclusions on rightful interference with the protection of personal 
data can be drawn from the Gillberg case, another fundamental issue argued in this 
case study was the weight given to prior agreement. As it was shown, it should not 
hinder later disclosure of the information as such.
731 See also case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489. The CJEU has clarified 
in that case that the public interest as such remains on too general a level to be considered adequate reasoning. 
In the said case the CJEU accepted quite detailed reasoning as a basis for the data transfer. However, this is 
a question which is likely to be further elaborated in the future case-law, in particular in light of Recital 28 
of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation.
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CHAPTER VI
THE TENSION BETWEEN ACCESS TO  
DOCUMENTS AND DATA PROTECTION
This chapter will address the tension between transparency and data protection 
legislation in a more detailed and concrete manner, and it will introduce some 
practical examples in which this tension is apparent. The focus will be on conflicting 
data protection and transparency provisions in the European legal framework, and 
more precisely, the tension between the rules of the Transparency Regulation and the 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. Both of these Regulations are applied 
by the EU institutions and some of the situations which will be discussed in this 
chapter have already occurred in practice.
As discovered earlier in Chapter I, the potential conflict between rights and 
principles arises on the level of conflicting rules, and this chapter will now focus 
on such cases. While it is clear that these are only examples of issues pertaining to 
the surface level of law, at the same time it is equally clear that the solution for the 
conflict must be deducted from the deeper levels.732 At this stage only the tension 
between rules will be studied. It must be borne in mind that the collision of rules 
does not necessarily indicate that there would be a collision of principles or rights, 
and even less a collision of fundamental rights.733 The tension between the rights 
and underlying principles will be examined in more detail in the concluding chapter.
1. OVERLAPPING REGULATIONS
The Transparency and EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulations are partially 
overlapping. Before the entry into force of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation none of the Regulations contained any provisions to stipulate how 
to assess the relationship of the Transparency Regulation and the former Data 
Protection Regulation. This did not reflect the legislator’s lack of information; 
interrelated references to these Regulations can be found in the recitals of the said 
732 For the three levels of legal order see Kaarlo Tuori Critical Legal Positivism (Dartmouth Publishing, 2002).
733 See Chapter I.
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Regulations.734 Some Member States have adopted an approach where personal data 
which is stored in official registers is disclosed on the basis of the public access to 
documents legislation.735 However, such an approach has not been incorporated 
in European Union law, not by the Regulations nor by the case-law of the Court 
of Justice. Instead, the Court of Justice has underlined that, in principle, both 
Regulations should be fully applied.736
This being the case, the situations where both Regulations will be simultaneously 
applied has to be identified first. Only after that can an attempt to find a balance 
between the examined principles be made. Previously, situations of conflict 
examined by the European Courts were studied. Now, these situations will be 
complemented with other situations where the tension is apparent, even if not yet 
actualized in the form of concrete court cases. First, it will be examined to what 
extent the scopes of the said Regulations overlap, and thereafter, situations in which 
the rules collide will be construed.
1.1 SCOPE OF APPLICATION
When the Transparency Regulation and the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation are studied conjointly, the scope of application must be analyzed first.
The scope of Transparency Regulation covers “all documents held by an 
institution, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its 
possession, in all areas of activity of the European Union”. Thus all documents 
held by Union institutions fall within the scope of the Transparency Regulation.737 
Article 2 of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation clarifies that the scope 
of application covers “the processing of personal data by all Union institutions and 
bodies”. Furthermore, some specified areas are excluded from the scope, such as 
the processing of operational personal data by Europol and the EPPO.738
For the purposes of this thesis, two elements of the scopes can be identified. 
The first element is what is covered by the Regulations, i.e. documents and the 
734 Recital 15 of the Data Protection Regulation and Recital 11 of the Transparency Regulation. The EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation stipulates that Union institutions and bodies shall reconcile the right to protection 
of personal data with the right of access to documents in accordance with the Union law (article 9(3)). The 
new Data Protection Regulation does not contain any rules providing supremacy for either of the Regulations 
either.
735 A. Wallin & P. Nurmi, Tietosuojalainsäädäntö, (Jyväskylä, 1991) 185–188; see also laki viranomaisen 
toiminnan julkisuudesta 21.5.1999/621.
736 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 56.
737 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48).
738 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1–22).
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processing of personal data. The second element is the stakeholders who have 
to apply the said Regulations. The first element will be examined together with a 
more precise assessment of personal data and the document in section 1.2. The 
stakeholder element will be examined now.
The scope of the Transparency Regulation currently covers only the institutions, 
while the Data Protection Regulation covers Community bodies as well. However, 
this difference is in effect minor,  for two reasons. Firstly, the European Commission 
has encouraged all of its agencies etc. to adopt decisions regulating access to their 
documents. A great number of the different agencies and similar bodies have adopted 
such decisions.739 Secondly, the Commission’s proposal for the new Transparency 
Regulation includes different bodies and agencies in the scope.740 The legal basis 
on which the Transparency Regulation is based did not allow the extension of the 
scope to other bodies and agencies, but this was changed with the Lisbon Treaty. 
The legal basis laid down in EU primary law, in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, now enables the extension of the scope.741 In the difficult 
negotiating process for the recast of the Transparency Regulation, the extension 
of the scope has been one rare thing on which an agreement has been reached.742
In conclusion, the scope of application of the two Regulations overlaps 
significantly. Even if there might be some minor differences, the simultaneous 
application of the both Regulations is inevitable as far as the material scopes of 
the Regulations overlap. This would be the case when an application for a document 
which contains personal data has been filed. The more interesting question is 
therefore how to distinguish personal data from a document, if it is even possible.
1.2 DEFINITION OF DOCUMENT AND PERSONAL DATA
Having established that the scopes of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation 
and the Transparency Regulation overlap, the next step is to examine whether 
personal data, which forms only a part of a document should be considered personal 
data which falls within the scope of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation 
and secondly, and even more interestingly, whether a register containing solely 
739 See for example the decision (25 March 2009) by the European Chemical Agency on the implementation 
of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to 
documents to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.
740 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council regarding public access 
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM (2008) 229 final, p. 5.
741 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 1–390), article 15.
742 See document 14549/11, Brussels, 23 September 2011.
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personal data could be considered a document and, as such, within the scope of 
the Transparency Regulation.
The scope of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation has been defined 
widely. The second paragraph of Article 2 of the Regulation stipulates that it applies 
“to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means, and 
to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form 
part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system”.743 This 
formulation makes the scope wide for two reasons. First, it seems that the only 
personal data that falls outside of the scope are some casual data in manually-
maintained files. However, the mere fact that this manually-maintained file might 
form a part of filing system in the future suffices to render the personal data in 
scope of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. This leads to a situation 
where the exclusion of certain personal data from the scope the Regulation is a 
rather marginal question. The second reason for this relates to the processing of 
personal data by automated means, or even partly automated means. There is hardly 
any processing of personal data carried out in any other manner. The increasing 
use of different applications of new technology makes the references to manual 
processing a moot point. A Follow-up question is, of course, how to define automated 
data processing. Should word processing, for example, be considered automated 
processing of personal data? This is an issue which has been addressed and assessed 
for example by the Advocate General in the course of the Bavarian Lager case.744 
AG Sharpston had a fair try at solving the tension between the Transparency and 
the former Data Protection Regulations by focusing on the content of the concept 
of automatic processing of personal data.745 However, the Court of Justice did not 
adopt AG Sharpston’s approach. The Court did not confirm the suggestion that 
when “dealing with a request for access to documents, […] [a] human brain is still 
directing the technology, just as the handyman still manipulates the electric drill 
that has replaced the brace and bit. In my view, such a sequence of operations, in 
which the individual human element plays such a preponderant part and retains 
control throughout, should not be considered to be ‘the processing of personal data 
... partly by automatic means’ within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 
45/2001. […]” 746 Accepting this baseline would have had far-reaching consequences, 
going beyond the relationship between the Transparency Regulation and Data 
Protection Regulation. Nevertheless, the Court did adopt a different approach and 
743 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1–22).
744 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08, Bavarian Lager, delivered 15 October 2009.
745 Ibid., paras 104–147.
746 Ibid., paras 144–147.
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it does not seem too bold to state that basically all personal data is covered by the 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation in line with the Court’s case-law.747
Two different types of situations where documents contain personal data are 
studied next. First, situations in which the document contains some casual personal 
data are studied. Thereafter, situations in which the document is formed nearly 
solely from personal data will be studied.
In the context of the first type of situations, the document refers to what is more 
traditionally considered a document. For this purpose, the baseline idea is that some 
names contained in a document are not the whole content of the document but 
only minor part, for example mentioned in the text. When a document contains 
personal data, the CJEU’s case-law expects the principles of both the Transparency 
Regulation and the Data Protection Regulation to be fully applied.748 As I argued 
earlier, it follows that in these cases the disclosure of the document must be assessed 
in a two-step process. First, other parts of the document must be examined solely 
under the Transparency Regulation. After this examination has been carried out, 
the disclosure of the personal data in the document must be examined under the 
Transparency Regulation and the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. I 
must underline that this second step of the assessment cannot be based solely on 
the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, as the Transparency Regulation 
must be applied simultaneously. Any other interpretation would be contrary to the 
Court’s ruling. Thus, the document is divided into two sections, one which contains 
personal data and the rest of the document. The suggestion on how to do this will 
follow in the concluding chapter.
The second type of situation occurs when an applicant requests information 
which is basically only personal data. The Dennekamp case is an example of such 
a situation, and this request was tried before the General Court. Dennekamp 
had requested information on the MEPs who had participated in an additional 
pension scheme, which was available for Members of the European Parliament. 
The requested information covered only personal data. The question of whether 
this information was a document in the meaning of the Transparency Regulation 
was never addressed. Instead, the reasoning of the General Court culminated in the 
question of whether the applicant should have provided reasons for the disclosure 
of the document and whether the European Parliament had justified its refusal 
appropriately. Thus, the General Court decided the case on the basis of the Court of 
747 See for example case T-121/05, Borax Europe v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:64; Case T-166/05, Borax 
Europe Ltd. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:65; case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central 
Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, para 90; case C582/14, Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:779.
748 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 56.
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Justice’s Bavarian Lager judgment and, in the absence of reasoning for the request, 
decided the case in favour of the European Parliament.749
When the Dennekamp judgment is read together with the General Court’s 
Dufour judgment750, it does seem clear that the definition of document covers all 
personal data, regardless of the manner which the data has been stored or saved. 
The Dufour judgment made it clear that even when such pieces of information 
would not form a coherent entity, the information is to be considered document. The 
information can be dispersed and still be considered a document in the meaning of 
the Transparency Regulation. The adopted approach is very broad, and it basically 
leads to the conclusion that all information is to be considered a document.751 The 
General Court concluded that separate words, characters, lists, catalogues or figures, 
for example, can be considered a document. Furthermore, it underlined that length 
cannot be considered relevant when assessing whether the information at hand is 
to be considered a document.752 Consequently, one name or set of names can be 
considered a document.
The General Court did not assess in the Dufour case whether a databank as 
such can be considered a document.753 However, this question is irrelevant when 
it comes to the definition of personal data. European data protection legislation 
sees personal data as clearly separate from databanks. Examining the content of 
the concept of databanks would mostly relate to the processing of personal data, 
which is not the focus of this thesis.
In conclusion, two different types of requests for documents containing personal 
data can be distinguished. The first category contains the so-called traditional 
documents, i.e. documents which contain only some personal data. As argued 
earlier, these requests must be assessed in a two-step process. The documents in 
the second category essentially contain only personal data. These requests should be 
assessed in their entirety based on both Regulations, the Transparency Regulation 
and the Data Protection Regulation.
1.2.1 DISPERSED INFORMATION
It was earlier argued that even when information is fragmented and dispersed in 
different registers, this information should be considered a document in the meaning 
of the Transparency Regulation. The General Court confirmed this approach by 
749 Case T -82/09, Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2011:688.
750 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634.
751 Ibid., paras 91–94.
752 Ibid., paras 91–94, 108–115.
753 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634.
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stating that “[…] the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of Finland are correct 
in their contention […] that anything that can be extracted from a database by 
means of a normal or routine search may be the subject of an application for 
access made pursuant to Decision 2004/258”.754 Hence, storing information in a 
fragmented format would not enable the controller to avoid obligations deriving 
from the Transparency Regulation. In other words, storing the information in a 
dispersed format does not form a basis for refusing the disclosure of information. 
This is rather clear as far as the concept of document is examined solely based on 
the Transparency Regulation. However, assessing this situation simultaneously 
based on the EU Institutions’ Data Protection legislation, some additional elements 
have to be acknowledged.
To start with, the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation specifies that 
“personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes 
and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”.755 Solely 
disclosing personal data based on the Transparency Regulation should not be 
considered incompatible with the original purposes for which the personal data 
was initially collected. This issue will be elaborated further later in this thesis. But 
when the personal data is collected from different databanks and then combined, the 
situation becomes more complicated. One of the driving forces behind the European 
data protection regime has been the fear of effective data processing technologies, 
and how, for example, combing different data from different registers would impact 
on the data subjects’ privacy. When combining data from different registers the 
question would not relate only the disclosure of information but also how to assess 
the new information. I would be quite reluctant to argue that combining personal 
data as described  was in line with the data protection regime.
1.2.2 LEGAL BASIS FOR THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA
All processing of personal data must have a legal basis. Even publicly available data 
can be processed only when there is a sufficient legal basis for the processing. To 
illustrate this on a more practical level, two examples from the CJEU’s case-law can 
be studied: the so-called Google v Spain case and the Satamedia case.756 In both of 
754 Case T-436/09, Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634, para 153.
755 The Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and 
Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39–98).
756 Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 and Case C-73/07, Satakunnan 
Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727. For legal basis, see also Case C-13/16, Rigas 
satiksme, ECLI:EU:C:2017:336. For legal basis when personal data is disclosed, see case C-127/13 P, Strack 
v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2250, paras 101–103.
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these cases the controller was processing personal data which was already legally 
in the public sphere.
In the first case, Google was searching information from the internet and made a 
list of links based on information which it had found mechanically. In its assessment 
the CJEU saw that even if the original source of information could not be ordered 
to delete or to rectify the information, the secondary processor, i.e. Google in this 
case, was liable to erase links which referred to outdated information. In the Google 
v Spain case, the original source of information was a newspaper. This newspaper 
had published information of seizure in accordance with the national legislation; the 
national law even required publication of such information. The Court’s judgment 
leads to a situation where the original information is still available on the internet, 
but this information cannot be sought based on the name of the person. Only if 
someone is searching information of the seizure, which took place over 10 years 
ago, could this information be found. The Court’s approach creates quite a heavy 
administrative burden on the controller. The controller has a duty to erase links to 
the information, which is available through other sources, and they even have to take 
the role of “guardian of the information”. The Court’s decision puts the controller 
in a position where they can essentially decide what information is available to the 
public. There might even be a danger of links being erased, which should be available 
to the public. And this is a flaw that is more difficult to detect than having incorrect 
or outdated information on the internet. Who would know to make a claim relating 
to information which cannot be found easily on the internet? Setting these pragmatic 
questions aside and looking solely at the balancing carried out by the Court between 
the protection of one’s personal data on the one hand, and freedom of speech and 
information on the other, one must accept that the Court did find quite a delicate 
and yet fair balance between these rights.757 The data subject does have the right 
to have outdated or incorrect information rectified. On the one hand, outdated 
information is not always incorrect, yet from the data subject’s viewpoint it would be 
disproportionate to be assessed based on very old information. On the other hand, 
history should not be rewritten. Thus, the original source of information should 
not be abolished nor changed, but finding this information can be made harder.
In the second case, Satamedia published vast amounts of taxation information. 
Taxation information is in the public sphere in Finland. All the newspapers publish 
taxation information, but Satamedia’s publications contained more taxation 
information, with a very low yearly income limit and contained hardly any 
journalistic content. It was indisputable that the personal data which Satamedia 
processed was in the public sphere. It ought to be noted that it was legally publicly 
757 For a systematic analysis on reconciliation of data protection rules with freedom of speech in EU member 
states, see D. Erdos “European Union Data Protection Law and Media Expression: Fundamentally off Balance” 
in International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65 (2016), 139–183.
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available, i.e. it was not information which would have been leaked and thereafter 
published. The outcome of the Court’s judgment was that Satamedia was able to 
process the personal data if it was carried out for journalistic purposes. The national 
Supreme Administrative Court saw that processing of personal data carried out by 
Satamedia could not be considered journalistic and therefore Satamedia could not 
process the personal data.758 Thus even if it was clear that anyone has the right to 
have taxation information from the taxation office, this did not create a sufficient 
legal basis for further processing of the said data. The conclusion drawn in this case 
is very much like the outcome in the Google case when it comes to the availability 
of the information. Finding the said information in the taxation office does take 
more effort than simply googling it or sending an SMS to a certain phone number. 
It is clear that for someone to go to a taxation office to search for his neighbour’s 
income information, for example, differs from simply searching for it on the internet.
Both examined cases reflect situations where publicly available personal data 
must be processed in accordance with the data protection legislation. The first 
requirement for data processing is a sufficient legal basis. Lawfulness of the data 
processing is regulated in Article 6 of the GDPR. Processing of personal data is lawful 
only when some of the legal bases which are defined in the said Article are met. 
Processing of personal data in the public sector would be mostly based on points (c) 
and (e) of the said Article.759 In other words, “processing is necessary for compliance 
with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject” or “processing is necessary 
for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of 
official authority vested in the controller”. When controller is processing sensitive 
data, some of the qualifications laid down in Article 9 also have to be met.760 The 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation contains corresponding legal bases.
The requirement to have a legal basis for the processing of personal data does 
not create a conflict between the data protection requirements and the public’s 
access to documents. The GDPR provides the Union or national legislator with the 
possibility to set a legal basis in national (or Union) law for data processing carried 
out in the public interest. Public access to documents, is to a great extent, in the 
public interest.761 In other words, the applicant does have a legal basis for the data 
processing when seeking the information from the institutions. However, this legal 
basis does not suffice for further processing of the personal data. In other words, the 
applicant may not for example combine this information with other information. 
758 See KHO 2009: 82.
759 For public sector processing of personal data and T. Pöysti, Trust on Digital Administration and Platforms, 
in Scandinavian Studies in Law 65(2018), 339, 353. 
760 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88).
761 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374.
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Google v Spain clearly illustrates this. Unless, of course, there is another legal basis 
for the further processing of the personal data; this could be, for example, journalistic 
purposes. This being said, the question arises whether it is the institution which 
should assess if grounds for further processing exist. I see that an institution’s 
duties are fulfilled when it has ensured that the disclosure meets the requirements 
set by the Transparency and the Data Protection Regulation. Supervising the later 
data processing falls under the responsibility of the Data protection authorities.
2. COLLIDING RULES
This section elaborates different situations where there is an apparent tension 
between data protection and transparency provisions. Some of these situations have 
been touched upon when the most central judgments delivered by the European 
Courts were examined earlier. This section will now address these situations in 
more detail. This section will first discuss access to one’s own personal data. This 
is followed by more fundamental questions, namely purpose limitation and further 
transmission of personal data, and the data subject’s right to object. After these 
fundamental issues have been covered, the question of stating reasons for the 
application will be addressed.
2.1 ACCESS TO ONE’S OWN PERSONAL DATA
The Transparency Regulation does not contain specific party access rules. Nor does 
it contain specific provisions regarding the data subject’s right to obtain information 
regarding him or herself. This leads to a situation where the EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation provides wider access to the information than the 
Transparency Regulation when the applicant is the data subject. In other words, 
the applicant has wider access to his own personal data based on the EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation than in the Transparency Regulation.
The tension between the said provisions occurs when a person requests access to 
a document containing the applicant’s own personal data and has filed the request 
based on the Transparency Regulation. Transparency Regulation does not address 
this situation differently from any other situations where the requested document 
contains personal data, i.e. someone else’s personal data. Thus, the data subject does 
not have privileged access to his own data. However, based on the EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation, one has privileged access to his or her own personal 
data. Even if the applicant would not be entitled to have access to the document 
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based on the Transparency Regulation, they might have that right under the EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation.762
This leads to a situation where applying the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation instead of the Transparency Regulation, would lead to a more transparent 
approach. Furthermore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights endows data subjects 
with the “right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her”. 
Thus, the data subject should not be refused access to his personal data solely 
because they have filed the application based on the Transparency Regulation. 
Instead the data subject should be provided with an effective manner to execute 
his or her fundamental right.
When assessing how to handle the situations described above and how the 
principle of good administration influences this assessment, a comparison could be 
drawn from the institutions’ obligation to evaluate whether there is an overriding 
public interest.763 In other words, the institutions could be expected to actively guide 
the applicant to ask for the information under the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation instead.
2.2 PURPOSE LIMITATION PRINCIPLE AND FURTHER 
TRANSMISSION OF PERSONAL DATA
The second example of colliding rules, namely the further transmission of personal 
data, has been touched upon in the case-law, but not addressed as such. This is a 
question which occurs repeatedly, for example, when the confirmatory applications 
for access are examined by the Council. An often-repeated argument is that access 
to a document – or more precisely to the personal data in the said document – 
cannot be granted because releasing the data would violate those provisions of the 
Data Protection Regulation which concern further transmission of personal data.764
Before examining this question in more detail, some fundamental remarks 
have to be made. First, if this argument was accepted as such, it would lead to a 
situation where all requests for access to documents containing personal data could 
be refused based on this argument alone. Regardless of the nature of the personal 
data, it would never be released based on the Transparency Regulation, and only 
partial access could be granted to documents containing personal data. Second, 
one of the founding principles of the Transparency Regulation is the non-existence 
762 Case T-3/08, Coedo Suarez v Council, (OJ C 64, 8.3.2008, p. 54–55); Case C-553/07, Rijkeboer, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:293.
763 See for example Case T-529/09, In ’t Veld v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2012:215, para 20; Case T36/04, API v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:258, paras 54, 94.
764 See for example document 12973/07, Brussels, 19 October 2007.
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of block exemptions. All requests for documents have to be examined individually 
and based on the content.765 Hence, accepting this argument would be contrary to 
one of the founding principles of the Transparency Regulation, which requires that 
refusal to disclose documents is based on the content of the said documents, not 
purely on the nature of the documents.766
Next, these points are elaborated further. When arguing that disclosing personal 
data to the public based on the Transparency Regulation would be contrary to the 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, the core idea is that public access 
to personal data would be incompatible with the specified purpose for which the 
personal data had been initially collected. In line with Article 4 of the Regulation the 
“personal data shall be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and 
not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes”. In 
other words, the purpose limitation principle sets limits for the further processing 
of personal data when the initial processing purposes turn into a new purpose.
Before engaging in a discussion of further processing and purpose limitation, 
it should be noted that the purpose limitation principle is one of the corner-stones 
of the European data protection regime. This is well illustrated, for example, in the 
so-called Schrems case767 and the very difficult negotiations between the European 
Union and the United States that followed the Court ruling.768 One of the core issues 
in these negotiations was the access by American public authorities to personal 
data which was transferred initially for commercial purposes from the European 
Union to the United States. Setting a heavy weight on the data protection principles 
when significant commercial interests are at stake shows the profound importance 
of the said principle.769 Thus, the significance of the purpose limitation principle 
cannot be overlooked. However, it has to be examined in relation to public access 
to documents.
It was previously established that one of the most profound principles of the 
Transparency Regulation would be violated if public access to documents was 
refused solely based on the purpose limitation principle. When assessing the 
765 See for example joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:541, para 72; Case T36/04, API v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:258, paras 
55–56.
766 For similar interpretation, see for example joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ 
Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374. According the Court of Justice, it did not suffice to ensure that document 
contained legal advice. It had to be established that the disclosure of legal advice would actually harm the 
interests protected by the said exception.
767 Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
768 See for example the Press release (29.2.2016)  by the European Commission Restoring trust in transatlantic 
data flows through strong safeguards: European Commission presents EU-U.S. Privacy Shield available 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm >
769 See for example the Opinion 01/2016 on the EU – U.S. Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision by the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (13.4.2016).
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situation simultaneously from the data protection angle, the following two remarks 
can be made.
First, certain processing purposes where further processing of personal data are 
deemed not to be incompatible with the original purpose of the data processing 
are laid down in law. The Data Protection Regulation did allow further processing 
for historical, statistical or scientific research purposes.770 The GDPR allows further 
processing also for archiving purposes, and this the case with the EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation as well.771 Hence when these articles are read together 
with Article 86 of the GDPR, which provides the possibility to reconcile public access 
legislation with data protection legislation either in Union or national legislation, 
it must be concluded that the fundamental right to public access to documents 
represents a similarly significant interest as scientific research or statistical purposes.
Second, the nature and the processing context of the personal data ought to 
be addressed. When processing of personal data is carried out by public sector 
controllers, this is often done in the context of decision-making. Naturally, there are 
also situations where the personal data processed by public sector controllers might 
be sensitive. An example of this would be health data and processing of such data 
carried out by the hospitals. Another example can be drawn from social welfare. 
Nonetheless, these are situations which would mostly occur on the national level, 
not at Union level. Furthermore, the privacy interests of the data subjects in these 
type of situations are often protected in the national legislation by secrecy rules.772 
It must be underlined that this data is protected because it is sensitive, not because 
it is personal data. When assessing this in the Union context, it ought to be noted 
that the scope of the Transparency Regulation does not typically cover these type 
of activities carried out by the public sector in the national context. The European 
Union does not have a similar healthcare or welfare system to national states. 
Hence, the focus on the actions covered by the Transparency Regulation is rather 
on the institution in their decision-making capacity. In other words, the personal 
data processed by the Union institutions is very often related to persons who have 
either participated in a meeting or who are, for example, the beneficiaries of certain 
benefits.773 The information could concern civil servants who have participated in a 
770 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1–22), Article 4(1)(b).
771 Regulation (EU) No 679/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 
1–88); The Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 
and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39–98).
772 For example in Finland Laki potilaan asemasta ja oikeuksista 1992/785.
773 See for example Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert 
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meeting, lobbyists who have had meetings with the civil servants or, for example, 
information on Members of the Parliament who are entitled to some benefits which 
are financed with taxpayers money. The personal data which is covered by the 
Transparency Regulation rarely relates data subjects in their private capacity. In 
such cases where it does, the exceptions laid down in Article 4 of the Transparency 
Regulation protect the interest of the data subjects, for example, the data subjects’ 
privacy.
Bearing in mind the examined elements which characterize data processing in 
the Union institutions, it can be concluded that purpose limitation and the further 
transmission of personal data are at the heart of European data protection legislation. 
These core principles can, however, be derogated for legitimate reasons. It will 
be argued later that reconciling public access to documents with data protection 
represents such a legitimate interest.
2.3 DATA SUBJECT’S RIGHT TO OBJECT
One of the rights endowed to the data subject with the EU Institutions’ Data 
Protection Regulation is the data subject’s right to object to the processing of his 
or her personal data. In Article 23 of the Regulation the data subject has been given 
the right “to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any 
time to processing of data concerning him or her, which is based on point (a) 
of Article 5(1)...”. When the objection is deemed justified, the said personal data 
may no longer be processed. The same article also contains provisions on the data 
subject’s right to be informed. These provisions reflect the underlying aims of self-
determination of the data subject.774
There are no explicitly contradictory provisions in the Transparency Regulation, 
but the underlying interests represented by the right to object and the Transparency 
Regulation in general aim in different directions. The most profound issue in this 
respect relates to the data subject’s possibility to influence the exercise of another 
person’s fundamental right. To elaborate this little further, access to documents 
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. If the 
data subject wishes to exercise his or her right to object to the transfer of their 
personal data to a third party who is asking to access to it based on the Transparency 
Regulation, the data subject would be able to stipulate how the third party can 
exercise his or her fundamental right of access to documents.
v Land Hessen, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662; C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 29 
June 2010 (not yet published).
774 See Chapter IV, section 1.3. The new EU institutions’ Data Protection Regulation contains a similar provision.
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Next, the scope of this right will be defined in more detail and once the scope 
has been established, the right will be placed in the context of the democratic 
decision-making process and the public’s right of access to information.775 First 
the data subject’s objection should be justified. And the objection must relate to 
the particular situation of the data subject. Hence a mere refusal does not meet the 
criteria laid down in the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. The GDPR, 
like the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, also provides the possibility 
to restrict the right to object in Union or Member State law.776 Furthermore, the 
right to object is applicable only when the legal basis for the data processing is 
the public interest (or the controller’s legitimate interest). Thus, there are many 
limitations to the right to object.
Now that it has been established that the right to object is not absolute, and that 
its application might require balancing from the controller, different circumstances 
that might have an influence in the balancing can be recognized.777 As a first example, 
the data subject might want to object to the processing of his or her personal data 
for direct marketing purposes. When such a situation arises, there do not seem to be 
reasons to allow such processing in spite of the data subject’s objection. There does 
not seem to be such a public interest at stake that the balancing would lead to any 
other outcome than the termination of the data processing. As a second example, 
the data subject might have participated in a public decision-making process and 
does not want his or her personal data to be disclosed. The requester could be, for 
example, a newspaper or a non-governmental organization. When the criteria set 
for the right to object are met, i.e. certain legal bases, the controller must balance 
different interests. In the latter case, the controller has to consider whether the 
public’s right to know outweighs the data subject’s right to object. This issue will 
be elaborated further in the concluding chapter when the underlying principles 
and aims of access to documents legislation and data protection legislation will 
be balanced.
2.4 STATING REASONS FOR THE APPLICATION
Chapter III examined the applicant’s obligations to state reasons for the application. 
It was concluded that the Transparency Regulation aims at providing the widest 
possible access to documents and as such, the applicant is not required to reason his 
or her application. Therefore, the reasons for the request cannot have any relevance 
775 See for instance Case T-412/05, M v European Ombudsman, ECLI:EU:T:2008:397; Case T-383/08, New 
Europe v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:114; Case C-553/07, Rijkeboer, ECLI:EU:C:2009:293.
776 Articles 21 and 23 of the GDPR.
777 For circumstances of the case, see Chapter I, section 2.
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as such.778 The possibility to request documents anonymously also supports this 
view. Contrary to this approach, if the request for information is based on the EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, the applicant has to provide reasons for 
the request.779 
Not only do the requirements for stating reasons for the request vary depending 
on the applied Regulation, but how the reasoning is taken into account also differs 
depending on the applied legislation. The Council has also sometimes partly based 
its refusal to disclose some information by noting that the personal reasons of 
the applicant cannot have any relevance in the assessment because the Council is 
releasing the document on an erga omnes basis. Thus, the Council gives access to 
the public in general.780
The General Court tried to solve this conflict by deciding that requests for 
personal data do not need to be reasoned when the access to personal data is 
sought based on the Transparency Regulation and disclosure of the said information 
would not undermine the protection of the data subject’s privacy. However, the 
Court of Justice later reversed the General Court’s decision.781 Thus the General 
Court’s approach clarifying that the applicant did not have to provide reasons for 
the disclosure of personal data was set aside. The personal data in this case related 
to some interest representatives, i.e. lobbyists, who had attended meetings organized 
by the Commission.782 The Court of Justice stated that both Regulations are to be 
applied in their entirety.783 This decision leads to a situation where the applicant has 
to state reasons for the disclosure as far as the document contains personal data.
Hence, there are two clearly colliding rules which should be applied 
simultaneously.784 While Article 6 of the Transparency Regulation clearly stipulates 
that there is no obligation to state reasons for the application, Article 9 of the EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation states in turn that the recipient should 
establish that the data is necessary for certain tasks. When examining these colliding 
rules, the scope of application of the conflicting provisions should be addressed first.
778 See also for example B. Driessen, “The Council of the European Union and access to documents” in European 
Law Review 30 (2005), 690.
779 See for example Case T-164/09 Kitou v European Data Protection Supervisor, pending case.
780 B. Driessen, “The Council of the European Union and access to documents” in European Law Review 30 
(2005), 690.
781 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334; Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 56.
782 Ibid.
783 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 56.
784 See Chapter I, section 1.1.
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2.4.1 SCOPE OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE TRANSPARENCY REGULATION
When studying the scope of the said rules, the focus is first on Article 6 of the 
Transparency Regulation, which stipulates that “the applicant is not obliged to 
state reasons for the application”. When this rule is examined together with the 
underlying principles of the Transparency Regulation, such as the widest possible 
access to information, a narrow interpretation of exceptions and the non-existence 
of block exemptions, it does not seem likely that Article 6 intends to hinder the 
applicant from providing reasons for his or her application. Rather, the aim of 
Article 6 seems to be to limit unnecessary obstacles to releasing the information. 
Keeping these bases in mind, it actually seems that Article 6 does indeed allow 
the applicant to state reasons for the application. Another question is of course, 
whether the institution is allowed to require the applicant to state reasons. This 
question will be tackled soon. Before examining this question in more detail, though, 
another aspect of stating reasons is considered. While it is not clear whether the 
institution can require reasons when examining the disclosure of personal data 
based on the Transparency Regulation, there do not seem to be obstacles to the 
institution taking into consideration reasons provided by an applicant, even if this 
has not been the practice, for example in the Council.785 At this stage, reasons given 
by the applicant are not considered in relation to the overriding public interest test, 
but rather on more general terms, also taking into account the possibility for more 
individual reasoning.
Even if there do not seem to be hinderances to taking into account reasons 
provided by the applicant, the Council has often noted that it is unable to take 
such reasons into consideration. In these cases, the given reasons have been rather 
individual in their nature and, as such, not in the scope of the overriding public 
interest test.786 Hence, the bottom line in the Council’s argumentation is that 
individual reasons cannot be considered significant when assessing the disclosure, 
because the document has to be released to the public in its entirety. This follows from 
the European Union legislative framework, where access to documents legislation 
is considered public access to documents, not access to public documents.
However, in the aftermath of the Bavarian Lager decision, the institutions seem 
to be obliged to take the applicant’s individual reasons into account. Regardless, 
the European Commission did argue in the Valero Jordana case that it cannot take 
into consideration the reasoning provided by the applicant and the applicant should 
have filed the application under the Data Protection Regulation to a different unit 
785 B. Driessen, “The Council of the European Union and access to documents” in European Law Review 30 
(2005), 690.
786 See for example B. Driessen, “The Council of the European Union and access to documents” in European 
Law Review 30 (2005), 690.
196  PART 2 – CASE STUDIES 
in the Commission.787 However, the General Court did not adopt the view proposed 
by the Commission, but rather saw that the Bavarian Lager judgment did oblige 
the Commission to assess the reasoning provided by the applicant when deciding 
on the disclosure of the document under the Transparency Regulation.788
The General Court did not specify whether the reasons provided by the applicant 
should be in the public interest or whether they could be individual in their nature.789 
Nevertheless, when applying the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, the 
reasons provided by the data requester do not necessarily have to serve the public 
good in general; instead the reasons can be individual in their nature. Another 
interesting question is whether the necessity to take into consideration the private 
reasoning of the applicants should be extended to other areas of information as 
well. Particularly taking into consideration the principle of widest possible access to 
information, it does not seem far-fetched to suggest that individual reasons could 
also be of relevance when assessing whether the document could be disclosed.
To conclude the above discussion, the voluntary reasoning for an application 
does not seem to be excluded from the scope of Article 6 of the Transparency 
Regulation. If such reasons are provided, the institution should take them into 
consideration, if for no other reason than in the name of good administration. This 
could lead to partly individualized disclosure of documents, but one of the aims of 
the Transparency Regulation is to provide the widest possible access to documents. 
It does seem to be in the spirit of the Transparency Regulation to allow access to a 
limited group of people when the alternative is to entirely refuse access.
Furthermore, in moving towards the partly individualized disclosure of 
documents, EU practice approximates with the ECtHR practice, which has 
underlined the reasons given by the applicant throughout its case-law.790 Thus when 
it comes to personal data, access should be granted to public documents rather than 
to the public, as such, also in the framework of the European Union.
Hence, it was established that Article 6 does not exclude the possibility to 
state reasons for an application on a voluntary basis, And also that taking into 
consideration the widest possible access to documents, the institutions should 
consider such reasons when they are provided. The question that naturally follows is 
whether the institution is entitled to require reasoning in order to disclose personal 
data in light of Article 6 of the Transparency Regulation.
When reading Article 6 of the Transparency Regulation in more detail, it becomes 
evident that in some cases the institution is entitled to ask for further information 
from the applicant. According to the second paragraph of Article 6 when “an 
787 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337, paras 24, 87–89, 92, 94, 96, 100, 106.
788 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337, paras 24, 87–89, 92, 94, 100, 106.
789 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337.
790 See Chapter V, section 2.
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application is not sufficiently precise, the institution shall ask the applicant to 
clarify the application and shall assist the applicant in doing so, for example, by 
providing information on the use of the public registers of documents”. In these 
cases, the institution needs to have some further information to be able to search for 
the documents the applicant is requesting. Hence the institution cannot deny access 
to a document solely because it is unable to identify the document or documents 
that the applicant has requested, if it has not first carried out consultations with 
the applicant in order to specify the request.
To examine the rationale behind this provision, the first step is to take a look at 
the core principles of the Transparency Regulation, starting with the widest possible 
access to documents. It seems natural that the applicant is not required to give 
detailed information when filing the first request. If this was the case, the right of 
access to documents would be narrowed significantly. However, it is essential for 
the institution to have sufficient information for the identification of the document.
Even if the Transparency Regulation does allow interaction between the 
institution and the applicant, the examined situation differs from a situation where 
the institution would directly ask for reasons in order to disclose the document. 
First, the latter is explicitly closed from the scope of Article 6 of the Regulation. 
Secondly, engaging in consultation with the applicant would be quite different from 
simply asking reasons for the disclosure of the information.
Though the institution’s entitlement to require the applicant to state reasons 
for the disclosure seems to fall outside of the scope of Article 6 of the Transparency 
Regulation, it does not seem to lie in the hard core of the said article. Firstly, the article 
does recognize the possibility for twofold communication between the institution 
and the applicant. Secondly, while the article lays down some basic guidelines for the 
administration of access requests, one of the core aims besides good administration 
seems to be the widest possible access to documents. Thus, one could say that it 
would be in the spirit of the said provision to set the obligation for the institution 
to ask for reasons in cases where this would lead to wider transparency.
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2.4.2 SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS’ DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION
As was the case under the previous data protection regime, the current EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation sets the onus on the requester to establish 
the necessity to have personal data transferred.791
The renewed wording of the article on the transmissions of personal data clarifies 
the relationship between the Transparency Regulation and the data protection 
provisions, but does not entirely solve it. It still remains open how detailed the 
reasoning the applicant provides should be in order to meet the requirements set 
by the case-law. However, the wording of Article 9 together with the related recital 
introduces four significant elements to unbuckle the tension examined in this thesis. 
It even solves one issue entirely; namely the controller’s responsibility to carry out 
the balancing test. This is strongly interrelated with the last sentence of Article 9(1)
(b), which stipulates that the controller must balance various competing rights. In 
other words, the new article clarifies that 1) it is the controller who carries out the 
balancing test, and 2) various competing interests must be balanced when the said 
test is carried out. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.
The two other elements relate to the weight given to transparency in this 
context. First, Article 9(3) clearly stipulates that Union institutions must reconcile 
the protection of personal data with public access to documents. Furthermore, 
Recital 28 clarifies that the specific interest for which the data is transferred could 
relate to the transparency of Union institutions and bodies. These amendments in 
comparison the previous Data Protection Regulation crystallize that personal data 
which falls under the Transparency Regulation can be disclosed.
The rules regarding the further processing of personal data are drawn from the 
purpose limitation principle. Thus, the solution for how to apply this rule together 
with the public access to documents rules must be sought from the underlying 
principles of the said rules and an attempt to reconcile these principles will be 
made in the concluding chapter.792
791 “Article 9 – Transmission of personal data to recipients established in the Union other than Union institutions 
and bodies
 1. Without prejudice to articles 4 to 6 and 10, personal data shall only be transferred to recipients established 
in the Union other than Union institutions and bodies if:
 (a) the recipient established that the data are necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the recipient; or
 (b) if the recipient establishes the necessity to have the data transmitted for a specific purpose in the public 
interest and the controller, where there is any reason to assume that the data subject’s legitimate interests 
might be prejudiced, established that I is proportionate to transmit the personal data for that specific 
purpose after having demonstrably weighted the various competing interests.
 2. […]
 3. Union institutions and bodies shall reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the right 
of access to documents in accordance with the Union law”.
792 For colliding rules and principles, see Chapter I.
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2.4.3 INSTITUTION’S OBLIGATION TO EXAMINE THE EXISTENCE OF THE 
REASONS FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL DATA
Under the previous data protection regime there were no rules nor case-law providing 
a clear answer as to whether the institution has a duty to examine the specific reasons 
for the disclosure of personal data provided by an applicant. Guidance could then 
have been drawn from established case-law, which had set the onus on the institution 
to examine whether an overriding public interest exists when the applied provision 
contains the overriding public interest test.793 The institution was, after all, in the 
best position to assess whether an overriding public interest exists, as it had the 
best information about the content of the document. Naturally, it might help the 
applicant’s cause if he or she refers to circumstances that could be considered an 
overriding public interest.794
Before setting the focus on the current data protection regime, it ought to be 
noted that when the institution examines the existence of the reasons creating the 
basis for the disclosure of personal data on its own initiative, the different nature 
of the public interest and personal data must be taken into account. Reasons for 
the disclosure of personal data are more often related to individual circumstances 
than to the public interest. Thus, the institution is not necessarily in a position to 
evaluate such reasons unless the applicant has put forward some justification. It 
follows that the institution is not in a position to carry out the required assessment 
as far as it is not provided with the reasons.
The case-law has clarified that that the applicant must provide reasons for the 
application when the document contains personal data. Therefore, it is taken that 
this responsibility is on the applicant and this point does not need to be further 
elaborated.
Further clarification on this topic was provided by the EU Institutions’ Data 
Protection Regulation. It specified that it is the controller’s, i.e. the institution’s, 
duty to assess whether the data can be disclosed. Article 9(1)(b) stipulates that the 
“controller, where there is any reason to assume that the data subject’s legitimate 
793 See for example Case T-529/09, In ’t Veld v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2012:215, para 20; Case T36/04, API v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:258, paras 54, 94.
794 It must be noted that the Court’s approach when it comes to the onus on the institution to assess whether an 
overriding public interest exists has not been solid. In the so-called TGI case the Court laid down other type 
of general presumption. In this case, the Court first laid down a general presumption of non-disclosure for 
certain types of documents and thereafter stated that this presumption can be challenged by the applicant. 
The applicant can either show that a certain document is not covered by the exemption or that a public 
interest which justifies the disclosure exists. See Case C-139/07 P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:376, para 62. This approach was criticized. It has been underlined that the applicant is 
not in place to demonstrate whether the presumption applies or not. When the applicant does not know 
the content of the document, it is indeed quite challenging to show that the presumption does not apply. 
Consequently, this right endowed to the applicant by the Court might well remain moot. See for example D. 
Adamski “Approximating a workable compromise on access to official documents: The 2011 developments 
in the European courts” in Common Market Law Review 49 (2012), 526.
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interests might be prejudiced, establishes that it is proportionate to transmit the 
personal data for that specific purpose after having demonstrably weighted the 
various competing interest”. This is a welcome evolution introduced by the new 
legislation. While it does not solve the tension examined in this thesis entirely, it 
will clarify one important element in the complex issue.
2.4.4 CONFLICTING PROVISIONS
Having examined the scope of Article 6 of the Transparency Regulation and Article 
9 of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, it is evident that there are 
conflicting rules at stake. While Article 6 seems to leave some room for the applicant 
to state reasons for the request on a voluntary basis, it does not seem to give leeway 
for the institution to request such reasoning from the applicant. Article 9 of the EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation in turn sets the duty on the applicant to 
establish the necessity to have the personal data transferred, and it is not possible 
to assess if the application meets this requirement unless the applicant provides 
some reasoning.
Even though the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation was adopted very 
recently, nothing in the wording suggests that the principle set by the Court in 
Bavarian Lager should be reassessed. Instead, the new Regulation stresses the 
need to take into account the Union legislation on public access to documents 
when personal data is transferred. This is a conflict that cannot be solved based 
on well-settled judicial institutions either, such as lex superior. Both the protection 
of personal data and access to public documents are fundamental rights protected 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The solution to the colliding rules must 
therefore be sought from the underlying levels of law and the dimensions of the 
corresponding principles. Colliding rules do not necessarily signify a collision of the 
related rights.795 This will be further elaborated in the next chapter.





FROM SIMPLY SHARING THE CAGE TO  
LIVING TOGETHER
RECONCILING THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS 
WITH THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA
The challenges when public access to documents needs to be reconciled with the 
protection of personal data have increased over the years. The challenges are taking 
new forms, and this is heavily influenced by current developments in society. Two 
elements characterize this development; the shift from information being stored in 
registers or files to data floods, and the new means of communication which have 
become part of ordinary life.
Regarding the first element, in early data protection legislation, the weight was 
often on personal data registers or data files.796 It follows that data protection was 
primarily seen to govern rather vast amounts of personal data. Simply mentioning 
someone’s name in a certain context was not necessarily addressed under the data 
protection legislation. This has changed with new technologies which enable data 
to be saved in a dispersed format. Even when the data is saved or stored in various 
different locations, personal data can be easily searched for and fetched. Combining 
the data with other personal data has also become effortless. It follows that there is 
a need to protect personal data in such cases where the data does not form part of 
file or register, as far as the data is being processed by automated means.797 When a 
mere name in a document is personal data in the sense of European data protection 
legislation, the protection of personal data has been brought into a new era.
Regarding the second element, new means of communication have put private 
persons in a position from which they can reach an unlimited number of people in 
a very short time period. When personal data was communicated – for example as 
a part of a document – to a private person 20 years ago, it was most likely to stay 
in the private sphere of the requester or applicant. The situation is very different 
today, when all private persons can easily distribute information to an unlimited 
number of people on the internet and on social media. When it is assessed whether 
796 See for example A-R. Wallin & P. Nurmi, Tietosuojalainsäädäntö, (Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1990).
797 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31–50). Directive 95/46, article 3.
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the data subject’s right to privacy might be breached as a result of the disclosure 
of the personal data, new means of communicating the information must set the 
threshold lower than before.
This thesis first set out the theoretical framework for the research, and this was 
followed by a discussion of European transparency and data protection legislation. 
These chapters have covered the relevant provisions, rules and underlying principles 
of both sets of legislation. These rules and principles will play a central role when 
the balancing of the right of access to documents with the protection of personal 
data is carried out. This was followed by an elaboration of the actual situations of 
colliding rules; both the relevant case-law and also more theoretical situations were 
examined. Next, this concluding chapter will draw together the earlier discussions 
and seek asolution to the reconciliation of public access to documents with the 
protection of one’s personal data.
First, the legislative setting will be briefly covered. The need to reconcile public 
access to documents with the protection of personal data does take concrete form 
when the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation and the Transparency 
Regulation are applied simultaneously. After establishing that situations occur 
where both Regulations are to be applied simultaneously, an assessment of the 
underlying objectives and aims of the transparency legislation and data protection 
legislation will follow. The underlying objectives and aims are an essential part of 
the balancing, and they will be taken into account when the balancing exercise is 
carried out. However, the underlying objectives and aims cannot supersede the 
underlying principles. Before finally engaging in a discussion of the identification of 
the essence of the said rights, a brief reminder of the earlier discussion on limiting 
fundamental rights will be given. Lastly, an attempt to maintain the hard core of 
both rights, while they are simultaneously applied, will be made.
1. SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION
The collision of principles can materialize only when the respective rules collide 
on the surface level of law. The collision of rules takes place when there are two 
contradictory requirements following from legislative acts. Thus, before engaging 
in a discussion on how to balance different principles, it must be examined when 
both the data protection legislation and the transparency legislation are applied 
simultaneously. This discussion will complete the earlier analysis of the overlapping 
Regulations in Chapter VI. Thereafter will follow some brief remarks of the 
consequences of the Bavarian Lager judgment.
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1.1 MATERIAL SCOPE
Next, two elements which must be taken into account when the material scopes of 
the data protection legislation and the transparency legislation are examined will 
be discussed. First, the question of who is in a position to disclose information 
must be assessed. This question was elaborated in more detail in Chapter VI, and 
some short remarks on this issue will be given to refresh the memory. Second, the 
question of how the definition of document relates to the definition of personal 
data will be elaborated further.
The Transparency Regulation applies to all documents held by an institution in 
all areas of activity of the European Union.798 The EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation in turn applies to the processing of personal data by all Union institutions 
and bodies.799 Transmission of personal data, i.e. disclosure of personal data, is 
processing of personal data. Hence, it is clear that the Union institutions might have 
to assess disclosure of certain information based on the Transparency Regulation 
and the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, provided that the definitions 
of document and personal data overlap.800
When assessing the situations in which the definitions of a document and 
personal data overlap, it must be first noted that both concepts are wide.801 To 
start with the least complex situations, the situations where a document contains 
personal data will be discussed next. This would be the case, for example, when 
some names are mentioned in a document. Such situations clearly fall within the 
sphere of public access to documents legislation. The most intriguing question in 
these cases is the nature of the personal data. The personal data which appears 
in institution documents could be roughly divided into two categories. The first 
category would contain the personal data of those who participate in public decision-
making. This data could be, for example, signatures on a decision, or names of people 
participating in meetings etc. The second set of personal data contains more trivial 
information. It could be, for example, information about a person to whom the 
decision relates, or the personal data could have ended up in a document for other 
798 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48), Article 
2(3).
799 The Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union in institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 
and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39–98), Article 2.
800 According to second paragraph of Article 3, The data protection regulation applies “to the processing of 
personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic 
means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system”. 
However, this limitation of the scope is insignificant for the purposes of this thesis.
801 See Chapter III, section 1.1 and Chapter IV, section 2.1.
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even quite random reasons. An example of such information would be decisions 
taken by the human resources department regarding additional compensation for 
children’s schooling. I draw the distinction between the two categories of personal 
data from the level of participation in public decision-making. The first category of 
personal data relates to the position of the data subjects, and the second category 
covers all other situations. For personal data to fall in the first category, it suffices 
that person is in a position to influence public decision-making. It would not require 
that the person has actually made a decision.
Proceeding from the easiest to more challenging questions, the cases covered 
next are the situations where the document contains mainly personal data. A list 
of names and e-mail addresses would provide an example of such a case. When 
this type of situation occurs, the applicant might ask for, for example, information 
about the people who have participated in a certain meeting, as was the case in 
Bavarian Lager.
All of these situations have taken place on practical level, both at the EU level 
and also on a national level. Increasing the level of challenge, the next situation 
would cover cases where the applicant is requesting only one name, for example, 
or an IP address for that matter. Based on the case-law, one name or number could 
constitute a document.802 Thus the applicant could request one piece of information 
based on the public access to documents legislation, and this information could be 
personal data.
If the previous examples have seemed challenging combinations of the scopes of 
the examined Regulations, there is another layer to add to this. As noted, the concept 
of personal data is wide. Besides the clear cases, i.e. names, telephone numbers etc., 
the definition of personal data also more widely contains information such as IP 
addresses, licence plate numbers, etc.803 For information to be considered personal 
data, it suffices that the person is indirectly identifiable. The wide definition of 
personal data is one of the corner-stones of European data protection legislation. It 
also forms an element which underlines the need to assess the disclosure of personal 
data based on public access to documents legislation in line with the underlying 
principles of the data protection legislation. This issue will be further elaborated 
later in this chapter.
Lastly the question of databanks is briefly tackled. Despite the importance of 
the question of whether, and to what extent, data banks should be considered 
documents, profound analysis of this is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
this is a highly relevant issue, and this might well arise in some form in the future. 
Information is stored increasingly in dispersed form in databanks. This should not 
create an obstacle to public access to documents. Setting the content of the data 
802 Case T-436/09 Julien Dufour v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2011:634.
803 See Chapter III, section 2.1.1.
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banks aside, it must be noted that databanks do contain information about the 
structure and functioning of the databanks.
Thus, there are various different scenarios where the definitions of a document 
and personal data overlap. The specific features of each situation form the 
circumstances of the case. Thus, the outcome of an individual balancing case must 
always be assessed in the said context, taking the circumstances appropriately into 
account.
1.2 AFTERMATH OF THE CJEU’S BAVARIAN LAGER RULING
The studies in the previous chapters have shown that the provisions of the 
Transparency Regulation and the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation are 
contradictory to a certain extent.804 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice stated in the 
Bavarian Lager judgment that in principle, both Regulations are to be applied in 
their entirety when access is requested based on the Transparency Regulation and 
the document contains personal data.805 The Court of Justice decided this after 
the General Court had first concluded that, in certain cases, the Data Protection 
Regulation was not applicable and even personal data could be released solely based 
on the Transparency Regulation.806
The General Court has elaborated CJEU’s Bavarian Lager ruling further in its 
decisions in the Valero Jordana and Dennekamp cases.807 In the Valero Jordana 
case the European Commission had suggested that the access to personal data in 
the requested document should be entirely assessed based on the Data Protection 
Regulation, and therefore instructed the applicant to file a new request based on 
the Data Protection Regulation. However, the General Court did not accept this 
interpretation of the simultaneous application of the said Regulations.808
The Kingdom of Sweden noted that the approach suggested by the Commission 
would have led to situation where the whole framework of the Transparency 
Regulation would have vanished and as such the core principles of the public access 
legislation would become inapplicable.809 This concern is quite justified, in particular 
because the Court of Justice had not decided the Bavarian Lager case solely in 
favour of the Data Protection Regulation. The Commission’s view as presented in 
804 See in particular Chapters V and VI.
805 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 56.
806 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334, paras 107–109.
807 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337; Case T-115/13, Dennekamp v 
Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:497.
808 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337, paras 24, 87–89, 92, 94, 96, 100, 106.
809 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337, para 67.
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the Valero Jordana case does not seem to mirror the Commission’s initial approach 
either. In Bavarian Lager, the Commission had specifically argued that it was unable 
to assess the disclosure of the document under Article 8(b) of the Data Protection 
Regulation, because the applicant had not submitted reasons for the request.810 
In other words, if the applicant had reasoned their application, the Commission 
would have assessed the application based on both the Transparency and Data 
Protection Regulations.
The General Court seemed to formulate a presumption for a narrow interpretation 
of Article 8(b) of the former Data Protection Regulation in the Dennekamp case. 
However, the formulation of the interpretation instruction is cryptic to some 
extent. But when read together with the last sentence of the said paragraph, which 
underlines that the “Transparency Regulation must not be rendered devoid of 
purpose by an interpretation of the relevant provisions that would mean that 
legitimate disclosure could never have the aim of full disclosure to the public”, 
it can be only be read as creating the presumption of a narrow interpretation of 
Article 8(b) of the Data Protection Regulation, when applied together with the 
provisions of the Transparency Regulation.811 The General Court also stated that 
the reasoning related to disclosure of personal data and provided by an applicant 
may be general in nature.812
In the Valero Jordana case, the applicant had stated reasons for his application 
and the Commission modified its earlier approach by demanding an entirely new 
application based on a different Regulation. However, the General Court finally 
decided that the Commission had erred in law when requiring a new application 
based on a different Regulation from the applicant.813
Thus, the CJEU’s statement that in principle both data protection and 
transparency legislation should be fully applied is still the leading guideline when 
balancing data protection rules with public access to documents. The CJEU has 
not itself elaborated this approach. The available specification of the requirement 
for simultaneous application is drawn from the General Court’s case-law. Keeping 
the CJEU’s position and the elements stemming from the General Court’s case-
law in mind, it needs to be examined whether the balancing could be carried out 
without interfering with the hard core of the related rights. The CJEU’s instruction 
can only be applied if the simultaneous application can take place without violating 
the essence of the rights at stake.
810 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 78.
811 Case T-115/13, Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:497, para 68.
812 Ibid.
813 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337, paras 24, 87–89, 92, 94, 100, 106.
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2. IDENTIFYING AND RECONCILING THE 
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
OF DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
DOCUMENTS LEGISLATION
When the balance between the right of public access to documents and the protection 
of personal data is sought, the underlying aims and objectives of the said rights can 
and will be taken into consideration. However, the underlying aims and objectives 
cannot supersede the underlying principles, which form the basis for the concrete 
rights. In other words, aims and objectives are taken into consideration, but they 
cannot form an independent counterpart to the principles. This approach reflects 
the Dworkinian separation between policies and principles.814
To elaborate further the distinction between the underlying aims and objectives 
and the underlying principles of the rights, the following remarks can be made. 
The underlying aims and objectives will be seen as more general factors than 
underlying principles. I derive this conclusion from the following premises. Firstly, 
the underlying objectives and aims are bound with the whole Regulation. The 
principles instead form a ground for more specific rights. One Regulation might 
well contain fractions to protect several different rights.815 This is clearly the case with 
the Data Protection Regulation for example. As previously discussed, among some 
other elements, the features of the right to non-discrimination can be distinguished 
in the data protection legislation.
Furthermore, separating principles from the objectives and aims culminates 
in the Dworkinian doctrine of institutional support. While the requirements for 
institutional support have not been clearly defined, institutional support still 
implies that a principle needs rather strong support to ultimately be considered 
as a principle. For example, the reference to such a principle in the case-law of 
the Court of Justice would seem to create a sufficient basis on which to conclude 
that a certain concept is a principle. Principles are sought from the deep structure 
of law and therefore the recent changes at the surface level have not yet properly 
influenced the deep structure of law and established their place there. Thus, when 
the objectives and aims of the said Regulations are studied, they would partly seem 
814 See Chapter I section 2.2 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 1977) 90–122
815 See Chapter I section 3.2.2; See in particular T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the 
Court of Justice of the European Union clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in 
European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2016), 321–323; see also for example M. Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet 
Suomen oikeudessa, (Jyväskylä, 1991) 32.
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to exist on the surface level of law and, as such, have not become independent 
principles just yet. 816
To take the separation of aims and objectives from principles to a more practical 
level, it is quite interesting to approach the current debate taking place in Finland. 
The previous government was under heavy pressure to defend some of its political 
decisions leading to national legislation. These acts were said to be unconstitutional. 
One could claim that aims and objectives more easily reflect current political 
orientations, and this not the case with principles. Principles are more fundamental, 
they exist in the deep structure of law and no aim or objective can supersede them.
Finally, it should be underlined that the aims and objectives of the rights might 
in some cases approach the underlying principles. It was earlier established that 
there is no clear formula for how to recognize principles. It is equally difficult to 
draw a clear distinction between aims and objectives and principles.
2.1 OBJECTIVES AND AIMS OF THE EUROPEAN TRANSPARENCY 
AND DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION
The common presumption is that the Transparency and the Data Protection 
Regulations have different aims and objectives. While one should provide the widest 
possible access to government documents, the other draws from the protection 
of data subject’s privacy. This presumption has been strengthened by the CJEU’s 
case-law. The case-law has underlined the contradictory aims of the right of public 
access to documents and data protection. Just as an example, the General Court 
reiterated in the Dennekamp case that the said Regulations have different objectives. 
It underlined that the Court of Justice had stated that “Regulation No 1049/2001 
is designed to ensure the greatest possible transparency of the decision-making 
process of the public authorities and the information on which they base their 
decisions. It is thus designed to facilitate as far as possible the exercise of the right 
of access to documents and to promote good administrative practices. Regulation 
No 45/2001 is designed to ensure the protection of the freedoms and fundamental 
rights of individuals, particularly their private life, in the handling of personal 
data”.817 This approach has not been contested, and it currently forms a part of 
settled case-law.
This baseline is not contested in this research either, but it must be examined 
whether this approach is too simplistic, in particular when the appropriate balance 
816 For institutional support, see for example Chapter I, section 1.1 and in particular Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 39–45, 64–68.
817 Case T -82/09, Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2011:688, para 23; Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 49.
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between transparency and data protection is sought. I will later argue that besides 
the differing aims and objectives, the said pieces of legislation have also shared 
objectives. Good governance will be of particular interest in this respect.
Next the aims and objectives of transparency legislation will be assessed, and 
this is followed by a similar analysis of the data protection legislation. Thereafter 
the outcome of the analyses will be drawn together.
2.1.1 UNDERLYING OBJECTIVES AND AIMS OF EUROPEAN TRANSPARENCY 
LEGISLATION
When the underlying aims and objectives of European transparency legislation are 
studied, democracy is justifiably number one on the list, followed tightly by good 
governance. If data protection can be seen as a means to protect privacy and some 
other related fundamental rights, transparency and access to documents could be 
described as a precondition for a well-functioning democracy, freedom of press and 
good administration. Good administration and freedom of press are also closely 
connected, but this aspect is beyond the scope of this thesis.
While the aims and objectives are apparent in the recitals of the Transparency 
Regulation, democracy together with good governance are also strongly present in 
the explanatory report of Council of Europe Convention 205.818 According to the 
report, “transparency of public authorities is a key feature of good governance and 
an indicator of whether or not a society is genuinely democratic and pluralist”. The 
explanatory report goes further, specifying that access to public documents enables 
citizens to participate in matters of public interest and opens up the possibility to 
criticise those who are in power. Similarly with the European Union legal instruments 
relating to transparency, the explanatory report underlines that transparency makes 
administration more legitimate and increases confidence towards public authorities. 
Besides these points, the explanatory report sees that transparency strengthens the 
self-development of people and promotes human rights.
Reducing corruption is not mentioned in the European Union legislative 
instruments as an objective. However, the explanatory report of Convention 205 
specifically mentions that transparency works in favour of decreasing corruption.819 
Furthermore, different surveys have also shown the connection between 
transparency and corruption; the more transparent the system, the less likely the 
818 Council of Europe Convention 205 on Access to Official Documents 18.VI.2009, Trömsö / Explanatory Report. 
For the good governance and information governance, see Pöysti, T. “Hallintoeettiset toimintasäännöstöt 
hyvä hallinnon toteuttamisessa” in I. Koivisto; T.Ojanen; O.Suviranta & M.Sakslin (eds.) Olli Mäenpää 60 
vuotta, (Edita, 2010), 143–157.
819 Council of Europe Convention 205 on Access to Official Documents 18.VI.2009, Trömsö / Explanatory Report.
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occurrence of corruption.820 In some of the European Union legislative instruments, 
a corresponding aim has taken the formulation of guaranteeing better control of 
use of public funds.821
Next, the relationship between democracy and transparency will be examined. 
Transparency is an essential element of democracy. Firstly, it provides a means for 
participatory democracy or deliberative democracy. Secondly, a transparent system 
enables public control over public sector functions. Once the different connections 
between democracy and transparency have been elaborated, the question of good 
governance vis-à-vis transparency will be tackled. Lastly, the control over public 
funds together with the relationship between transparency and corruption will be 
discussed. Other aims, such as promoting fundamental right and self-development 
of people, will not be discussed in more detail.
2.1.1.1 Transparency as a prerequisite for well-functioning democracy
When addressing the relationship between democracy and transparency, it must 
acknowledged that there are also several other tools to strengthen democratic society, 
such as free elections, a multi-party system, freedom of information, separation of 
powers etc.822 These tools or requirements will not be examined further; the focus 
will be on transparency. Also, the aim of democracy can be seen as a hypernym to 
other aims of transparency legislation, such as participation in the decision-making 
process and scrutinizing and controlling the decision makers.
The connection between well-functioning democracy and transparency is quite 
obvious. In most of the European Union Member States this is a baseline, which is 
explicitly acknowledged.823 It does not seem too daring to state that democracy – or 
strengthening democracy – is the core aim of European transparency legislation. 
As was noted, the idea of democracy, and awareness of the public in general, was 
the driving force behind the first European transparency legislation more than 
two hundred years ago, and this same aim was behind the adoption of the first 
transparency legislation in the EU context.824 This is strongly supported by the 
820 See for instance G. Robertson, “the Media and judicial corruption”, in D. Rodriguez and L. Ehrichs (eds.) 
Global Corruption Report 2007, Corruption in Judicial Systems – Transparency International (Cambridge, 
2007), 108–115.
821 Commission Regulation (EC) No 259/2008 of 18 March 2008 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 as regards the publication of information on the beneficiaries of 
funds deriving from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund 
for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 19.3.2008 L76, p. 28–30).
822 See Chapter I section 3.
823 H Kranenborg and W. Woermans Access to Information in the European Union – a Comparative Analysis 
of EC and Member State Legislation (Europa Law Publishing, 2005), 10.
824 After the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the discussion regarding public access to 
information flourished in the European Union. The Danish rejection was seen as a sign of the gap between 
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current legal instruments regulating transparency in the European Union and the 
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Democracy in general – and also some more detailed elements of democracy – has 
been very centrally placed in the second recital of the Transparency Regulation. This 
approach has been treasured, and it is also apparent in the Commission’s proposal 
for the recast version of the Transparency Regulation.825 Besides the more general 
statement of openness strengthening the principles of democracy, the possibility 
to participate in the decision-making process, as well as the legitimacy enjoyed by 
the administration, are apparent aims mentioned in the second recital.826
The impact that transparency has on democratic structures, together with the 
possibility to participate in the decision-making process, has been elaborated in 
the Court’s case-law. This was also apparent in the so-called Turco case.827 The 
Court’s Turco decision is of utmost importance, if not the most important in the 
CJEU’s case-law. Turco had argued that “the principle of democracy and citizen 
participation in the legislative process constitutes an overriding public interest in 
[…] disclosure.”828 While the Court drew some clear guidelines on how to evaluate 
whether a document containing legal advice should be released, it also made a 
clear statement on the relationship between access to documents and democracy. 
The Court noted that the institution should balance the particular interest in 
question in light of the intention of increased transparency, and reiterated that 
according to the recitals of the Transparency Regulation “increased openness […] 
enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and 
guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective 
to the citizen in a democratic system”. The Court went further by underlining 
that these considerations being particularly important when an institution is 
using its legislative powers. The Court stated that “openness in that contributes to 
strengthening democracy by allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information 
which has formed the basis of legislative act. The possibility for citizens to find 
out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition for the 
exercise of their democratic rights”. This statement clearly recognizes the influence 
which transparency has in the democratic structures of society.
European Union and its citizens. And this discussion in turn had a close relationship with the discourse 
relating to the democratic decision-making processes in the European Union. See for example Ian Harden, 
“The Revision of Regulation 1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents” 2 (2009) European Public Law, 
s. 239–256 and Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union June 2006.
825 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM (2008) 229 final.
826 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43-48).
827 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:2008:374.
828 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:2008:374, para 12.
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The core question in the Turco case was whether documents containing legal 
advice should have been disclosed. In the three-step process put in place by the 
Court, the last step is to assess whether there is an overriding public interest justifying 
the disclosure of the legal advice. When such an interest exists, disclosure can be 
justified even if it would prejudice the interests protected by the said exception. 
Here the Court stated that “such an overriding public interest is constituted by the 
fact that disclosure of documents containing legal advice of an institution’s legal 
service on legal questions arising when legislative initiatives are being debated 
increases the transparency and openness of the legislative process and strengthens 
the democratic right of European citizens to scrutinize the information which 
has formed the basis of a legislative act”. 829 The significance of this statement 
cannot be overestimated. Not only did the Court give the very first guidelines for 
the interpretation of the overriding public interest test. It also set a very strong 
presumption in favour of the disclosure of the Council legal service’s opinions when 
given in relation to a legislative act. And this principle was based on strengthening 
the democratic rights of the European citizens. Later, the General Court has extended 
this approach by stating that scientific opinions delivered in the course of legislative 
process should also be disclosed as a rule.830 The General Court also underlined that 
this is the general principle, “even if [the opinions] might give rise to controversy 
or deter those who expressed them from making their contribution to the decision-
making process”.831 These cases illustrate how highly democracy is valued by the 
Luxembourg courts, and how transparency is clearly seen as a tool to promote this 
aim; even any nuisance that the disclosure might cause should not be considered 
a definite obstacle to access to information.
The Turco judgment was not left in a vacuum. It was followed by other cases in 
which the relationship between democracy and transparency has played an equally 
important role. Interestingly, even though AG Maduro eminently served the Court 
with the opportunity to confirm the nature of the right of access as a fundamental 
right, the Court never took advantage of it.832 Instead, the Court rather decided the 
case by emphasizing the vital meaning transparency has for democracy.833
At the heart of the Turco ruling, the general principle of disclosure of the 
information given in the course of the legislative process was formed, and, to be 
829 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:2008:374, paras 57, 67.
830 Case T-166/05, Borax Europe Ltd. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:65.
831 Ibid., 105.
832 Opinion of AG Maduro in joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:721, delivered 29 November 2007, para 32 and Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P 
Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:2008:374. Similarly, see also Case C-353/99 P Council of the European 
Union v Heidi Hautala, ECLI:EU:C:2001:661. For an analysis of the said case, see P. Leino, “Case annotation 
of Case C-353/99 Council v Heidi Hautala” in Common Market Law Review 39 (2002), 621–632.
833 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:2008:374.
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more precise, the disclosure of legal advice given in the course of the legislative 
process.834 The General Court extended this approach significantly in the Access Info 
case.835 The General Court concluded that not only should the information delivered 
during the process be released, but also information relating to the delegations 
given their contribution to the process. And this information was to be disclosed 
while the negotiation process was still ongoing.836
This case had its roots in the recast process of the Transparency Regulation and 
the related negotiations in the Council. A non-governmental organization, Access 
Info, had asked for access to some of the documents drawn up in the course of these 
negotiations. While the Council gave quite vast access to these documents, it withheld 
some parts of the information, namely the identification information relating to the 
delegations that had given their contributions in the course of the said negotiations.837 
The core argument of the Council was that releasing this information would make 
it more difficult to find an agreement in the Council. It saw that disclosure of the 
information would narrow the negotiation space of the Member States.838 The 
Council argued that proposals narrowing the wide interpretation of the principle 
of transparency adopted by the Court would be exceptionally difficult to defend “in 
the face of public opinion”. Furthermore, the Council also argued that disclosure 
of the said documents had led to a “hostile media reception” or “sharp criticism 
on the part of the public”.839
While the General Court saw that the Council had not been able to demonstrate 
that public opinion was hostile, it also held that it is characteristic for democratic 
debate that both negative and positive comments relating to the ongoing legislative 
process are made in the media and by the public. Giving some weight to the fact that 
the process in question leads to binding legislation directly applicable in Member 
States and having effect on citizens, the General Court stated that “if citizens are 
to be able to exercise their democratic rights, they must be in a position to follow 
834 Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco/ Council, ECLI:EU:2008:374, para 68.
835 Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe / Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2011:105.
836 Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe / Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2011:105. The Court of 
Justice has developed its approach even further. The CJEU set recently a presumption for the disclosure of 
the four column trilogue documents, see case T-540/15 De Capitani v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2018:167.
837 For more information see Access Info report The Secret State of EU Transparency Reforms, 21 March 2011, 
available from: http://www.access-info.org/documents/Access_Docs/Advancing/EU/Secret_State_of_EU_
Transparency.pdf
838 The exception applied in this case was Article 4(3)(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001, according to it “access 
to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates 
to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the 
document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding 
public interest in disclosure”. While this article relates to the ongoing negotiation process, the question at 
stake in the Turco case was the protection of legal advice. It ought to be noted however that in line with 
Council practice, the full versions of the documents including the indications to Member States have often 
been released following the conclusion of the negotiations.
839 The requested document was available on the Statewatch webpages.
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in detail the decision-making process within the institutions taking part in the 
legislative procedures and to have all the relevant information”. Furthermore, 
the General Court emphasized that in a democratic system, the delegations should 
be publicly accountable for the proposals they had submitted.840 While the Turco 
case circulated very much around the question of how to assess whether there is 
an overriding public interest and the criteria based on which the existence of an 
overriding public interest can be assessed, the General Court did not touch upon 
this question when it decided the Access Info case. The exception which was applied 
in the Access Info case, namely the exception relating to the ongoing negotiation 
process, contains an overriding public interest test, but the General Court decided 
the case in favour of Access Info without examining the case from this angle.841 As 
such, the General Court saw that the exception relating to an ongoing decision-
making process was not applicable at all in the said case.
In both cases the Court of Justice of the European Union assessed the role that 
transparency and access to documents play in the democratic decision-making 
process, or more precisely, in the legislative process. Based on the outcome of these 
judgments, the role must be considered significant. In the Turco case the focus was 
on the disclosure of the information building a foundation for a legislative act. In 
the latter decision, the General Court held that besides the relevant information on 
the decision-making process, the identification information relating to delegations 
should also be released.842 While access to information on the decision-making 
process enables people to participate in the public debate, the identification 
information enables people to hold the ones making the actual decisions accountable 
for their actions and also to address them directly.843
2.1.1.2 Transparency’s two democracy tools
Looking at the existing European legislation and the recent case-law, it can be 
stated that transparency – and in this case more particularly the right of access 
to documents – is essential for a well-functioning democracy. For the purposes 
of this thesis, two different ways in which transparency serves to strengthen the 
democracy in a society is identified. Firstly, it provides the opportunity to participate 
840 Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe / Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2011:105, paras 69, 70, 
78; Case C-280/11 P Council v Access Info Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2013:671, para 31.
841 Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe / Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2011:105, para 85.
842 The Council supported by the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Czech Republic and France have appealed 
this judgment to the Court of Justice.
843 The General Court’s decision covers the identifying information about the delegations that had expressed 
their opinions and given proposals in the course of a legislative procedure in the Council. This question will 
be examined in more detail at later stage in this thesis, together with the disclosure of personal information 
in the course of the democratic decision-making process.
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in the decision-making process. Secondly, it enables citizens to control their 
representatives. The significance of these tools is not diminished even with the 
fact that the relationship transparency–corruption–democracy is excluded from 
the considerations of this thesis.
Regardless of the form of democracy, the core idea is always that of the people as 
the sovereign.844 Therefore it seems utterly essential that the sovereign is provided 
with relevant information; how could the sovereign otherwise form an opinion? 
The question that follows from that is how the sovereign should be involved in the 
decision-making process, and should the form of participation reflect how much 
information the sovereign is entitled to? In the very purest form of democracy, 
the sovereign is directly involved in the decision-making process. However, even 
if direct democracy did exist in Ancient Greece and, for example, the Swiss system 
contains some elements of direct democracy, representative democracy seems to 
dominate in the Western world. At this stage, the question of whether the sovereign 
is entitled to detailed information in a representative democracy is left aside. Instead 
the focus will be on deliberative democracy.
While participatory democracy gets its authorization from free elections and 
voting, deliberative democracy draws it from citizens’ participation in the process 
of drafting laws through free, public debate.845 This is exactly the context in which 
transparency and access to public documents should be placed. It does not seem 
too courageous to state that transparency enables citizens, for example in the form 
of non-governmental organizations, to participate in public discussion.
The value of public debate in the democratic decision-making process and its 
contribution to the outcome of such a decision-making process is not always taken 
for granted. As previously noted, it has been argued, for example, that that the hostile 
media reception and sharp criticism on the part of the public forms – among other 
arguments – a basis for the refusal to disclose information.846 It has also been noted 
that the possibility to participate in the public debate does not yet imply that the 
views expressed would dictate the outcome of the law drafting process.847 It might 
well be that in the first case there would be a risk of sharp criticism on the part of 
844 G. Smith, Democratic Innovations, (Cambridge, 2009) 22; see also for example See E. Maes, Constitutional 
Democracy, Constitutional Interpretation and Conflicting Rights, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 71–72.
845 A. Ieven, “Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of 
Human Rights’ balancing of private life against other rights”, in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights (Intersentia, 2008), 62.
846 Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe / Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2011:105, paras 44, 70, 
78.
847 A. Ieven, “Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of 
Human Rights’ balancing of private life against other rights”, in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts between Fundamental 
Rights (Intersentia, 2008), 64.
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the public848, and also the latter observation seems quite correct. This should not, 
however, be held against of the importance of the public debate. The benefits of 
public debate are obvious even in light of these comments. The sole fact that the 
outcome of the proceedings might differ from some of the views expressed during 
the process, should not lead to the conclusion that public debate was in vain. The 
dissenting views expressed during the process cannot, or at least should not, be 
simply disregarded. Unpleasant views ought to be considered as well as – or even 
in more detail than – the more pleasant ones. To justify the final outcome of the 
decision-making process, dissenting opinions should be taken into consideration 
and “reasoned away”. Even if it might seem a lot to ask to put forward reasoning 
that would convince the opposite side, the reasoning should at least convince a 
“reasonable man”. This obviously contributes to the final outcome of law-making 
processes by guaranteeing better justification for the acts. Thus, public debate should 
lead to better decisions and better law-making.
Besides offering a tool for the sovereign to participate in the decision-making 
process, transparency provides the means to scrutinize the information on which the 
decisions have been based and to hold the ones making the decisions accountable. 
This serves the people, as it provides the possibility to control the functioning of 
the public sector.
A significant difference between participation in the decision-making process and 
scrutinizing the process lays in the timing of the disclosure of the information. The 
General Court held that the settled Council practice of releasing the identification 
information of the delegations once the negotiation process was concluded did not 
suffice.849 Participation in the negotiation process requires that access to information 
is provided while the process is still ongoing. The settled Council practice would 
have enabled controlling and scrutinizing the decision-making process. While this 
could be sufficient in a representative democracy, deliberative democracy sets the 
bar higher vis-à-vis the decision makers, and assumes the more active participation 
of the citizens. Nevertheless, scrutinizing and controlling still remains significant 
tools in building a democratic society and one of the core aims of the transparency 
legislation is to provide the means for that.
The Court underlined the importance of the public being able to scrutinize the 
information forming the basis for legislation in its Turco judgment. But having 
accurate information about ongoing legislative processes also enables citizens 
to participate in the public discussion relating to these matters, provided that 
these documents are released while the legislative process is still ongoing. If the 
information is disclosed after the legislative process has been concluded, the only 
purpose the disclosure can serve is the possibility to scrutinize.
848 Proposals for restricting public access to documents could easily lead to that.
849 Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe / Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2011:105.
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2.1.1.3 Good governance
Good governance and democracy are partly overlapping concepts. Good governance 
and the legitimacy of the governance are also particularly mentioned as an aim 
of European transparency legislation and good governance can be distinguished 
as an independent aim of the Transparency Regulation.850 Such characteristics 
as accountability, effectiveness and transparency are often used to describe good 
governance.851
It was earlier established that transparency can be seen as a tool for accountability. 
This was earlier examined from the perspective of strengthening democracy, but 
the same applies vis-à-vis good administration. This can be considered as one of 
the connecting points between good administration and democracy.
Besides providing tools for overseeing administration and therefore pushing the 
government to make the best of its administration, transparency should also make 
administration more effective. Quite interestingly, unbearable administrative burden 
is often used as reasoning not to examine requested documents individually.852 
On the face of it, it might seem that instead of making the administration more 
effective, transparency actually causes unpleasant extra work for civil servants. It 
would be too simplistic to leave it at that. It is an issue which must be elaborated 
further. First, it must be stressed that the burden these requests might cause cannot 
be underestimated, in particular if an element of malpractice is mixed with the 
request. However, the disclosure of documents should on a general level improve 
the quality of the preparation of different proposals, decisions and documents from 
the very start. For example, the reasoning behind different proposals or decisions 
should be drafted from the start in such a convincing way, that different decisions 
and proposals would also seem accountable in the eyes of the citizens. This, in turn, 
should make the whole administration more effective.853
850 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48).
851 See for example United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific – What is Good 
Governance, available on the internet  <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf > 
[last visited 21.2.2017].
852 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access 
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents COM(2008) 229 final (30.4.2008), p.5.
853 For the role of transparency in good governance, see also F. Weiss & S. Steiner, “Transparency as an element 
of Good Governance in the Practice of the EU and the WTO: Overview and Comparison” in Fordham 
International Law Journal. 30(2006), 1545–1586.
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2.1.1.4 Reducing Corruption
Besides being linked together, strengthening democracy and good governance form 
a joint venture with the aim of reducing corruption. Bad governance and corruption 
are often linked together.854 For example, the anti-corruption Council of Europe 
body, GRECO855, is currently urging its member states to enhance transparency 
over political funding.856
The Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents recognizes 
reducing corruption as one of its aims.857 However, this aim is not apparent in the 
European Union’s Transparency Regulation. Despite of the absence of this general 
aim in the most important legal instrument regulating public access in the European 
Union, some other instruments have explicitly mentioned the relationship between 
transparency and the proper use of public funds. This is the case for example in the 
Council Regulation on Agricultural Funds. According to Recital 6 of Regulation No 
259/2008, “making the information accessible to the public enhances transparency 
regarding the use of Community funds in the common agricultural policy and 
improves the sound financial management of these funds, in particular by 
reinforcing public control of the money used”. The recital goes further, assessing 
that the measures set up by the Regulation to prevent irregularities are justified 
and proportional in a democratic society.
The reasons why plain formulation such as “reducing corruption” is missing 
in the EU context can only be guessed. Maybe this is because the focus has been 
on strengthening the democratic structures of the Union, or maybe it has seemed 
politically more correct to dress this aim as prevention of irregularities. Nevertheless, 
the relationship between transparency and corruption has been established in many 
international surveys; transparency decreases corruption.858 The same presumption 
applies to proper use of public funds and prevention of irregularities; more 
transparency equals fewer irregularities.
854 See for example Transparency International, available on the internet  <https://www.transparency.org/
what-is-corruption/#what-is-transparency> [last visited 21.2.2017]; see also Oikeuskansleri Tuomas Pöysti, 
Korruptiontorjunnan voitettavat vaikeudet Suomessa, 11.12.2018, Available on the internet < https://www.
okv.fi/fi/tiedotteet-ja-puheenvuorot/494/korruptiontorjunnan-voitettavat-vaikeudet-suomessa/ > [last 
visited 22.2.2019].
855 Group of States against Corruption.
856 Available on the internet < http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/default_en.asp > [last visited 
21.2.2017].
857 According to 1 preamble of the Explanatory Report – CETS 205 – Access to Official Documents, Transparency 
of public authorities is a key feature of good governance and an indicator of whether or not society is genuinely 
democratic and pluralist, opposed to all forms of corruption, capable of criticizing those who govern it, and 
open to enlightened participation of citizens in matters of public interest.
858 See for example G. Robertson, “the Media and judicial corruption”, in D. Rodriguez and L. Ehrichs (eds.) 
Global Corruption Report 2007, Corruption in Judicial Systems – Transparency International (Cambridge, 
2007), 108–115.
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2.1.2 UNDERLYING OBJECTIVES AND AIMS OF THE EUROPEAN DATA 
PROTECTION LEGISLATION
This section will assess the underlying aims and objectives of the European data 
protection legislation. The background for the data protection legislation is twofold. 
While the protection of one’s privacy has always been a significant element of data 
protection, the free flow of personal data and, as such, commercial interests were 
initially at least of equal importance.859 For example, the OECD Guidelines on the 
protection of privacy and transborder data flows were adopted in 1980.860 The 
Explanatory Memorandum confirms that the guidelines were drawn with the view 
to balancing two different objectives, namely the protection of one’s privacy and 
individual liberties and the free flow of personal data.861 The free flow of personal 
data was seen as a contributor to economic growth. The different objectives of privacy 
and free flow of data were seen as somewhat contradictory and it was agreed that a 
balance between them had to be found.862 The underlying aim was to create a basic 
framework for some restrictions to data processing and, as such, unify the situation 
in different contracting parties. The differences in national legislation were seen as 
hinderances to free data flows and unifying the situation in different contracting 
parties would then ease the flow of personal data.863 Summa summarum, even 
though the need to protect privacy was recognized in these Guidelines, the actual 
interest seems to lie in the need to avoid the creation of unnecessary obstacles to 
the free flow of data.864
Quite interestingly, it seems that very similar approach was adopted when the 
first instrument regulating data protection in the European Union was negotiated. It 
was quite clearly stated in the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum regarding 
the Data Protection Directive that the objective of the Data Protection Directive was 
to allow personal data to flow freely from one Member State to another.865 To achieve 
859 See for example OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
Explanatory Memorandum. See also Commission of the European Union, Amended proposal for the Council 
Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement 
of such data, COM(92) 422 final – SYN 287, Brussels 15 October 1992. For case law, see joined cases C-465/00, 
C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:294, paras 39–42; case 
C-101, Lindqvist, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, paras 79–81; Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and 
Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, paras 51–53.
860 Recommendation of the Council concerning guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder 
flows of personal data (23 September 1980).
861 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Explanatory 
Memorandum. The OECD Guidelines were revised in 2013. Revised Guidelines are available on the internet 




865 Commission of the European Union, Amended proposal for the Council Directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data, COM(92) 
422 final – SYN 287, Brussels 15 October 1992.
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this aim, a high level of protection of personal data had to be ensured together with 
the security of data protection. The protection of one’s privacy or personal data did 
not seem to be the goal itself; while the actual aim was the free flow of personal 
data, the high level of protection of one’s personal data could rather be described 
as a means to attain this goal. This argument can be reasoned on the basis of the 
Explanatory Memorandum, but the final formulation adopted in the Directive does 
not seem to mirror this approach. It clearly defines both the protection of personal 
data and the free flow of this data as its objectives.866
When examining the objectives of the data protection legislation from this angle, 
it is also of utmost importance to note that the legal base for the Data Protection 
Directive was Article 95 EC (now 114 TFEU).867 This article lays down the grounds 
for measures which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. Consequently, it can even be questioned whether the said legal 
base would have provided sufficient grounds for harmonization measures regarding 
the protection of fundamental rights, such as protection of privacy, at that time. 
When raising this question, it must be kept in mind though, that based on the 
settled case-law, when the aims pursued by certain measures are twofold, the act 
can and must be adopted based on solely one legal base if the other aim can be 
identified as incidental.868
It seems clear that the objectives of the EU’s data protection legislation are 
twofold: the protection of one’s privacy and the free flow of personal data. Thus, it is 
important to keep in mind that while the protection of personal data is a fundamental 
right, it can also be regarded as a commercial asset with significant economic value. 
Even if the functioning of the internal market and, as such, commercial interests 
are clearly one of the main objectives of the European data protection legislation, 
this aspect was not and will be not examined in this thesis. As the overall theme of 
this thesis is balancing two fundamental rights, the commercial aspect of personal 
data is not significant in this respect.
2.1.2.1 Data protection and privacy
The relationship between privacy and data protection was studied in more detail in 
Chapter IV, and the purpose of this section is to provide a picture of how privacy 
serves as an aim of the data protection legislation.
866 For case law  on the twofold objectives, see joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer 
Rundfunk and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:294, paras 39–42; case C-101, Lindqvist, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, paras 
79–81; Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, paras 51–53.
867 Article 95 falls under Title VI concerning the common rules on competition, taxation and approximation 
laws.
868 Case C-211/01, Commission v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2003:452, paras 38–40.
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Convention 108, the very first binding international instrument governing the 
protection of personal data, names the protection of one’s privacy as its main aim.869 
This Convention was concluded in the framework of the European Council and it 
also paved the way for the EU instruments regulating data protection. The objective 
of protecting one’s privacy was indeed mentioned in the European Union data 
protection instruments under the previous data protection regime, but they also 
mention more generally the protection of fundamental rights as their objective.870
Moreover, the Commission proposal for the GDPR did not further mention 
the protection of one’s privacy as its objective in Article 1, and this approach was 
not changed during the four-year-long negotiations in the Council and European 
Parliament. Instead the GDPR mentions the protection of one’s personal data 
together with a more general reference to protection of fundamental rights as its 
objective.871 This might reflect the transition process of the protection of personal 
data that has culminated in its recognition as fundamental right. While it was 
previously considered an element of privacy, it has now established its place as an 
independent right among other fundamental rights.
The other fundamental rights which might become affected through data 
protection legislation are listed in the Commission’s proposal, and are as follows: 
freedom of expression, freedom to conduct business, the right to property and in 
particular the protection of intellectual property, the prohibition of any discrimination 
amongst others on grounds such as race, ethnic origin, genetic features, religion or 
belief, political opinion or any other opinion, disability or sexual orientation, the 
rights of the child, the right to high level of human health care, the right of access 
to documents and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. 
The Commission’s proposal does not suggest that the protection of these rights 
would be the aim of the Regulation, but merely notes that these fundamental rights 
might be affected. These rights could be categorized as freedom of expression/
information, commercial rights, non-discrimination, right to health care, children’s 
rights and the right to a fair trial.872
869 Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
Strasbourg 1981 28.1.2981.
870 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 
281, 23.11.1995, p. 31–50) and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1–22).
871 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final (25.1.2012) and  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88).
872 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final (25.1.2012).
223CHAPTER VII
Interestingly, the right to privacy was not even mentioned on the Commission’s 
list of rights.873 Arguably, this might have been done to underline the independent 
status of data protection as a fundamental right. As for the rights listed in the 
Commission’s proposal, commercial rights were excluded from the scope of this 
thesis and freedom of expression/information relates most likely to the situations 
where these rights are in conflict with data protection, i.e. the overall theme of this 
thesis. As for the children’s rights, they are seen as a part of the right to privacy in 
the context of this thesis. Health care and procedural rights related to a fair trial 
will not be discussed in more detail.
Even if privacy has been excluded from the Commission’s list, its significance 
in relation to data protection cannot be overlooked. It is still an integral part of the 
data protection regime through its provisions. Furthermore, if the original aim of 
the data protection legislation is to be dimmed, there is a serious risk of unintended 
consequences; when interpreting relatively technical legislation in particular in 
relation to other Regulations, the overall aim of the legislation should be kept clear 
in mind. If not, the final outcome might not correspond to the original objectives 
of the legislator.
When returning to the roots of the Data Protection Directive, it is of significant 
importance to note that besides the original aim of the protection of privacy, the 
Commission did specifically note that “it is not so much the content of data which 
may endanger privacy as the context in which the data is processed”.874 Thus the 
protection of personal data must always be seen in the relevant context, i.e. Alexy’s 
circumstances must be taken appropriately into account.
2.1.2.2 Integrity as an element of privacy
Neither the GDPR, the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation and its 
predecessor, the Data Protection Regulation, nor Convention 108 contain any 
provisions relating to the protection of one’s integrity, nor was this mentioned 
among the objectives of these instruments. Regardless, the protection of one’s 
integrity is an essential element of the European data protection regime. How to 
justify this assertion?
To begin with, the Transparency Regulation approaches the protection of one’s 
personal data through integrity. The Regulation specifically mentions the protection 
873 See also comments on the reluctance of using the term privacy in the data protection legislation, I. Lloyd, 
“From ugly duckling to Swan. The rise of data protection and its limits”, in Computer Law and Security 
Review 34 (2018), p. 780.
874 Commission of the European Union, Amended proposal for the Council Directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data, COM(92) 
422 final – SYN 287, Brussels 15 October 1992, p. 17.
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of integrity in the context of an exception relating to the protection of one’s personal 
data. The protection of the individual’s integrity is also specifically mentioned in 
some of the domestic legislation.875 Furthermore, integrity is often seen as reflecting 
the underlying values of self-determination.876 The protection of integrity might 
not have been specifically mentioned as an objective in the said instruments, nor 
mentioned in the recitals or explanatory memorandums. Nevertheless, both the Data 
Protection Directive and the Data Protection Regulation have several provisions 
which clearly illustrate the values of self-determination of the data subject, and as 
such, also integrity. The same applies to the GDPR and the EU Institutions’ Data 
Protection Regulation. An example of articles which reflect self-determination are 
provisions mentioning the data subject’s consent as a prerequisite for processing of 
personal data.877 Furthermore, Recital 30 of the Data Protection Directive underlined 
the importance of the data subject’s consent when processing personal data.878 
Other provisions reflecting the idea of self-determination are, for instance, different 
provisions which regulate access to one’s own personal data and provisions which 
provide the data subject with the possibility to rectify information concerning him 
or her.879
2.1.2.3 Non-discrimination
Non-discrimination was particularly mentioned as one of the aims of data protection 
legislation in the Commission’s new proposal.880 More correctly, it was mentioned 
as a human right which might be affected by the data protection legislation. This 
is not a new aim for the data protection legislation. This aim was also recognized 
for example in the OECD Guidelines.881
The objectives of non-discrimination might not be clearly mentioned in the 
recitals or articles of the current European data protection legislation. However, 
this aim is apparent in the legislation itself. For example, some special categories 
of personal data were defined as sensitive in the Data Protection Directive, as is the 
875 For example, according to Swedish Personuppgiftslagen, 1998:204, 29 April 1998, 1§ “the purpose of this act 
is to protect individuals against the violation of their personal integrity by processing of personal data”.
876 D.W. Schartum, Norway, in Blume (ed.) Nordic Data Protection, (Kauppakaari Oyj, 2001), 86.
877 For example, Articles 7 and 8 of the Data protection Directive.
878 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31–50), Recital 30.
879 See for example Article 10 of the Data Protection Directive.
880 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions, A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the 
European Union, COM 2010 (609) final.
881 OECD WP the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.
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case in the GDPR and EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. This data can 
be processed only under strict conditions. Data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership as well 
as data relating to health or sex life are considered sensitive.882 The Commission’s 
Explanatory Memorandum does not seek the justification for the special treatment of 
sensitive information through non-discrimination, but solely the risk of endangering 
the data subject’s privacy.883 Regardless, it is apparent that the type of information 
which is considered sensitive in the sense of data protection legislation is that 
which is commonly considered grounds for discrimination.884 When Article 21 of 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights on non-discrimination is placed next 
to the list of sensitive personal data, the resemblance is clear.885 Thus it seems safe 
to conclude that non-discrimination has been one the objectives of European data 
protection legislation from the very initial phases of the said legislation.
2.1.2.4 Good processing practices – good governance
One of the objectives of the European Union data protection legislation is good 
processing practices. This is not clearly expressed as an objective in the articles or 
the preambles of the said legislation, but there are several features in the legislation 
itself that reflect such aims. Good processing practices are also an element of good 
governance – or good administration. For example, the following features – which 
are present in the European Union data protection legislation – are considered 
components of good processing practices.886 First, the European data protection 
legislation contains the principle of purpose limitation. This principle is also closely 
related to transparent processing of personal data in the sense that data subjects 
should be informed how, and for what purpose, their data is used. Also, for example, 
data security can be considered a reflection of good processing practices.887
882 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p. 31–50), Article 8. As of 25.5.2018 also biometric data is considered sensitive given that certain 
qualifications are met. For biometric data, see also joined cases C-446/12 to C-449/12 Willems and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:238.
883 Commission of the European Union, Amended proposal for the Council Directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data, COM(92) 
422 final – SYN 287, Brussels 15 October 1992, p. 17.
884 See also Article 22 of the GDPR, which sets restrictions for profiling based on special categorities of personal 
data (such as race).
885 According to Article 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights “any discrimination based on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited.”
886 S. Singleton, Tolley’s Data Protection Handbook, (LexiNexis, 2004) 22.
887 Ibid.
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Besides containing provisions on good processing practices, in some domestic 
legislation promoting good processing practices is explicitly mentioned as an 
objective of the law.888 In some other Member States promoting such good practices 
might be part of the data protection authorities’ duties, even if this is not explicitly 
mentioned as one of the objectives of the data protection legislation.889
The requirements of good processing practices apply both to the private and 
public sectors. However, the focus of this thesis is on the European Union public 
sector and when good processing practices are assessed in the context of public sector 
data processing, they very quickly develop the link with good governance and good 
administration. Furthermore, the former Data Protection Regulation did set up the 
independent data protection supervisory authority, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS).890 The EDPS monitors in particular the EU institutions’ and 
bodies’ data processing practices891 and promoting good processing practices in 
the institutions is one of the EDPS’s main tasks.892 These factors are all, of course, 
strong indications that good processing practices do form a part of good governance.
Furthermore, some public sector specific characteristics do also underline the 
element of good governance when public sector data processing takes place. For 
example, some authors have expressed concerns in particular over public sector 
data collection, storage and use.893 While data processing in private sector would 
probably often have economic influences, data processing in the public sector could 
open up possibilities for strict state control over citizens. This is another reason why 
good processing practices have a particular significance in the public sector and, as 
such, are an important element of good administration.
Next, I will place good processing practices in the wider context of good 
administration. To start with, the objective of good governance is not clearly stated 
as an aim in the European data protection regime. Nor is good governance or 
one’s right to good administration an unambiguous concept in the European legal 
field.894 One reason for this might be that EU citizens’ right to good governance is a 
888 Henkilötietolaki 22.4.1999/523, Article 1.
889 S. Singleton, Tolley’s Data Protection Handbook, (LexiNexis, 2004) 22. In accordance with the UK’s Data 
Protection Act 1998, section 51, the Commissioner is charged with issuing codes of good practice to be 
followed by data controllers.
890 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1–22).
891 Article 2(1) of the Regulation 45/2001.
892 Tasks of the European Data Protection Supervisor, available on the internet < http://www.edps.europa.eu/
EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS?more=moins > [last visited 21.2.2012].
893 P. Blume, Denmark, in Blume (ed.) Nordic Data Protection, (Kauppakaari Oyj, 2001), 18. See also P. Seipel, 
Sweden, in Blume (ed.) Nordic Data Protection, (Kauppakaari Oyj, 2001), 120.
894 For example, it has been criticized that the Commission did not define the concept of good governance in its 
White Paper. See for example H. Addink, Principles of Good Governance: Lessons from Administrative Law, 
in Curtin and Wessel (eds.) Good Governance and the European Union, Reflections on Concepts, Institutions 
and Substance, (Intersentia, 2005), 24.
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relatively new concept in the European legal framework. While some authors raised 
the question of whether good administration should be considered a human right 
in 2008895, its status as a fundamental right in the European Union was clarified 
when the Charter of Fundamental Rights entered into force in December 2009.896
Even if there is no clear European definition of good governance, different 
elements of good governance can be captured. These can be sought from the 
practice of Member States and EU institutions. For example, the British and 
Irish Ombudsman Association lists the principles of good governance as follows: 
independence, openness and transparency, accountability, integrity, clarity of 
purpose and effectiveness.897 Some of the elements of the principles of openness 
and transparency would include that policies and procedures are openly and clearly 
defined. Another key element of this principle is free access to information. The 
principle of clarity of purpose aims at three different goals. Firstly, it should be clear 
why a certain scheme exists. Secondly, it should be clear what this scheme does. 
Thirdly, it should be clear what can be expected from the scheme.898
As for the Union institutions, the European Commission has considered 
the following principles relevant for good governance: openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence.899 The European Ombudsman in 
turn has defined several different elements of good administrative behaviour. 
These elements are described in the 27 articles of the European Code of Good 
Administrative Behaviour.900 Data Protection is clearly mentioned in Article 21 in 
the European Code of Good Administration. However, the article does not give 
further guidance on how data protection should be considered as part of good 
governance. It simply states the evident, namely the requirements of the civil 
servants to process personal data in accordance with the former Data Protection 
Regulation. Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the Council adopted a decision 
regarding good administrative behaviour. In this decision, the requirements of data 
protection legislation are specifically noted in Article 11.901
895 M. Niemivuo “Good Administration and the Council of Europe” in European Public Law 4 (2008), 563.
896 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 1–16).
897 Good Governance Guide, available on the internet < http://www.bioa.org.uk/docs/BIOAGovernance-
GuideOct09.pdf > [last visited 21.2.2012].
898 Good Governance Guide, available on the internet <http://www.bioa.org.uk/docs/BIOAGovernance-
GuideOct09.pdf> [last visited 21.2.2012].
899 European Transparency Initiative (ETI), Communication from the Commission of 21 March 2007, Follow-up 
to the Green Paper ‘European Transparency Initiative’[COM 2007 (127) final]; Commission’s white paper, 
Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, Relations with the public, adopted on 1 March 2000 (OJ 20.10.2000 
L267).
900 Decision of the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of 25 June 2001 on a code of good administrative behaviour for the General Secretariat of the Council 
of the European Union and its staff in their professional relations with the public (OJ 5.7.2001 C189/1); The 
European Ombudsman, The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, 2005.
901 Decision of the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of 25 June 2001 on a code of good administrative behaviour for the General Secretariat of the Council 
of the European Union and its staff in their professional relations with the public (OJ 5.7.2001 C189/1).
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As said previously, good governance is is an ambiguous concept  and as 
such, it leaves a wide margin for elaboration when what forms the content of 
good administration is assessed. However, it seems quite safe to suggest that 
good processing practices are part of good administration in the European legal 
framework. Specifying the exact elements of good processing practices is much more 
difficult. While data protection is clearly mentioned in the European Code of Good 
Administrative Behaviour, there are no clear indications of how to define different 
components of data protection as a part of good administration, apart from one’s 
right to access his or her own file.
Further, the European Code of Good Administration refers to data protection 
legislation as a whole, but some elements which are more important in relation 
to good administration can be distinguished. Based on the principles defined in 
some domestic practice, the common principles for good administration and data 
protection legislation could be found in certain provisions. This is particularly 
the case with the principles of openness and transparency, and also clarity of 
the processing purpose. As mentioned earlier openness and transparency have a 
different meaning in the internal dynamics of data protection legislation vis-à-vis 
access to document legislation.
Some of the articles giving more precise frames for good processing practices 
are laid down in the European data protection legislation. An example of this is the 
requirement for purpose limitation in the processing of personal data. As noted by 
some authors, this requirement promotes the transparent processing of personal 
data.902 As such, it also works in favour of good governance. 
Thus, even if good processing practices or good governance are not explicitly 
mentioned as the aims of the data protection legislation, I argue that they do form an 
integral part of the aims and objectives of the European data protection legislation.
2.1.2.5 Democracy
Having discussed the different objectives of the data protection legislation, it is 
also essential to look at privacy’s relationship with democracy. The relationship 
between transparency and democracy was examined earlier903 and it was concluded 
that transparency can be considered a prerequisite for well-functioning democracy. 
However, according to some904 privacy can also be considered a prerequisite, or at 
least an element of, democratic society and for the freedom of speech.
902 Ibid.
903 See Chapter III, section 1.2.
904 See for instance A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of 
Self-Development: Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De 
Hert; C. de Terwangne & S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76.
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The relation between privacy and democracy might not at first sight seem as 
clear as the relationship between transparency and democracy. The connection 
between privacy and democracy is based on the assumption that in order to be able 
to form and freely express personal opinions, one should have privacy to develop 
and elaborate these thoughts.905 In this context it is of interest to note that the 
driving force behind the development of the data protection regime was the fear of 
the potential effects of uncontrolled use of new information technologies. On the 
one hand the new technologies were seen as a threat to privacy, and on the other 
hand the new possibilities they offered for controlling and supervising people were 
considered dubious906 That is to say that the control of the state over its citizens 
was considered worrying.
Nonetheless, when access to documents is inserted into the equation with 
democracy and privacy, we immediately notice that without first having the relevant 
information, the meaning of the privacy becomes void via-á-vis democracy. Thus, 
the opportunity to elaborate one’s thoughts without interference is rendered fruitless 
quite quickly if one is not first provided with sufficient information. To conclude, even 
if there might be some grounds to regard privacy as a prerequisite or an element of 
democracy, it still seems quite a far-fetched construction. Other fundamental rights 
could also be linked with democracy with similar constructions.
2.1.3 SOME REMARKS ON THE UNDERLYING AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF 
TRANSPARENCY AND DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION
It was earlier established that the contrast between the different objectives of 
transparency and data protection legislation have dominated the discussion on 
the balancing of the said rights. This is too simplistic an approach. Both similarities 
and differences exist between the underlying objectives and aims of transparency 
and data protection legislation. This section will first draw together the discussions 
from the previous chapters and sections, noting the differences between the aims 
and objectives of the said rights. Thereafter the shared objectives and aims of the 
transparency and data protection regime will be discussed.
There are differences between the underlying objectives and aims, but I would 
lay even more weight on the differences which exist in the structures of the said 
concepts. The protection of personal data is a more complex and multilateral concept 
than the right of access to documents. Different sub-elements of data protection 
905 A. Rouvroy & Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the importance of Privacy for Democracy”, in S. Gutwith; Y. Poullet; P. De Hert; C. de Terwangne 
& S. Nouwt, Reinventing Data Protection (Springen, 2009), 45–76.
906 Wallin & Nurmi, Tietosuojalainsäädäntö, (Helsinki, 1990) 1–7.
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reflect different underlying objectives and aims of the data protection legislation. 
For example, when particular provisions relating to the processing of sensitive data 
reflect the aims of non-discrimination, certain provisions reflect the objectives of 
good governance instead. An example of such provisions are the rules governing 
diligent planning of the processing operations. The dispersed structure of data 
protection could be elaborated further, but it suffices to note that while different 
objectives are not apparent in all aspects of data protection legislation, they are 
clearly visible in some areas and in some legislative provisions. This underlines the 
significance of the contextual interpretation. It is therefore of utmost importance 
to establish Alexy’s circumstances for the balancing. These circumstances will be 
drawn from the objectives and aims of the said rights. Seeking the proportional 
balance in Hesse’s terms must be based on contextual interpretation.907
Setting the structural differences aside and focusing on the aims and objectives 
themselves, an interesting difference between the underlying objectives of the 
examined rights is how they have been developed over the years. While the core 
objectives and aims of the transparency and public access to documents legislation 
have remained the same for centuries, the original aim and objective of the protection 
of personal data has faded and turned into a more pluralistic set of objectives. 
While transparency legislation has realised the values of democracy from the very 
beginning, the original objective of protecting one’s privacy has not even been 
mentioned in the GDPR.908 One reason for this might be the changing nature of 
the right to protection of personal data. When the first data protection laws were 
adopted in Europe, data protection was seen as an element of privacy. Only after 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights entered into force has the protection of personal 
data been unanimously recognized as an independent fundamental right. Maybe 
the Commission dimmed the reference to privacy to underline this development, 
rather than to blur the original objectives and aims of the data protection legislation.
Now, it was established that the objectives of transparency regulation have 
remained the same throughout hundreds of years. It was argued earlier in this 
chapter that principles exist in the deep level of law while objectives and aims 
are often found on the surface level of law. When the underlying aim to increase 
democracy has existed over decades, it can hardly be argued that democracy cannot 
be considered a principle because it cannot be draw from the deep level of law. Going 
back all the way to the first transparency legislation and Chydenius’ explanatory 
907 See Chapter I, section 2.2.1.
908 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final (25.1.2012) and  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88).
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texts, and then putting them together with the introductory part of the current 
legislation, it must be concluded that the connection between transparency and 
democracy is solid. Thus, the reasoning must be sought from elsewhere. Principles 
can be seen as propositions which describe rights; “arguments of principle are 
arguments intended to establish an individual right”.909 The discussion on whether 
the right to democracy exists will not be touched upon. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the collective nature of democracy is underlined. Consequently, it is not seen 
to establish an individual right and therefore cannot be considered a principle.910
Once it has been established that democracy is rather an objective or aim of the 
transparency legislation than an underlying principle, the question that follows is 
whether this would lead to a situation where arguments of democracy could not 
supersede arguments of principle. In a Dworkinian world, policies can never trump 
principles.911 Hesse’s practical concordance in turn takes policies into account as 
a part of a proportionality test and the European Court of Human Rights sees 
limitations to certain rights justified when they are necessary in democratic society.912 
Drawing on what was said, it appears clear that democracy can and even must be 
taken into account as an underlying objective when transparency is balanced with 
other rights. But could it trump arguments of principle, which are intended to 
establish individual rights? For the purposes of this thesis this question does not 
need to be answered. Thus, it remains unanswered. Instead, the focus will be on two 
other related issues. First, the hard core, the essence of public access to documents, 
will be derived from the grounds of democratic decision-making. This will be based 
on the right to receive information about the decision-making processes that take 
place in the democratic structures of society. Second, democracy will be an essential 
element when Hesse’s and Alexy’s optimization is practiced while looking for the 
balance between data protection and transparency.
Now some differences between the underlying objectives have been assessed. 
The most obvious difference between the protection of privacy and access to data 
is not addressed at this stage. This issue will be focused on when the solution for 
reconciling the different principles is carried out.
Next, the most significant similarity between the said objectives and aims will be 
briefly discussed. This is the objective to promote good governance. The objective of 
good governance has long been considered as one of the core aims of transparency 
regulation. This aim can be sought all the way from the Chydenius’ explanatory 
909 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth 1977) 90–91.
910 See Chapter I, section 1.1 and section 1.2.
911 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 1977) 90–122.
912 See Chapter I section 2.4, in particular K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfaussungsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, (Heidelberg, 1990) 142; T. Marauhn and N. Puppel, Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: 
Konrad Hesse’s notion of “Praktische Kokordanz” and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in Brems 
(ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 279–281. 
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memorandum. It is more rare to see the connection made between the protection of 
personal data and good governance. Regardless, it was shown earlier in this chapter 
that there is a connection between data protection rules and good governance. This 
objective might not be apparent in all provisions of the data protection legislation, 
but it clearly exists. When good governance forms part of the circumstances where 
rights are balanced, this similarity is of particular interest. Furthermore, the shared 
objectives and aims of the Transparency and Data Protection legislation will be 
of particular interest in such cases where the application of the rules of the said 
Regulations would lead to different outcomes.
3. FROM SIMPLY SHARING THE CAGE TO  
LIVING TOGETHER; RECONCILING PUBLIC ACCESS 
TO DOCUMENTS WITH THE PROTECTION OF 
PERSONAL DATA
This section will focus on the colliding rules on the surface level of law and seek 
the balance by weighing the underlying principles of data protection and public 
access to documents. When the dimensions of the principles are sought, the 
limits of the respective rights will be heavily tested. The question of whether the 
underlying principles can be reconciled or whether the simultaneous application 
of the examined Regulations actually leads to a violation of the hard core of one 
the rights will be addressed in the second part of this section. The second part of 
this section will first examine the essence of the said rights and thereafter assess 
whether the hard core of both rights can remain untouched when the underlying 
principles of the rights are reconciled. Or will it be inevitable that one of the rights 
will supersede other? Finally, a suggestion for a procedural provision will be made.
Before engaging in the discussion of balancing the said rights, a short reminder 
of some basic elements when fundamental rights are limited will be provided. It was 
established earlier that limiting one fundamental right in order to realize another 
fundamental right does not necessarily lead to violation of the said right and, as 
such, to a genuine collision of rights.913 Thus fundamental rights can be limited 
without violating the said rights. However, the restrictions cannot be arbitrary or 
disproportionate.
913 Se Chapter I, section 2.
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3.1. RIGHTFUL INTERFERENCE OF PROTECTION OF PERSONAL 
DATA
It was earlier established that neither of the examined rights is absolute.914 It follows 
that these rights can be restricted without violating the said rights.915Both examined 
rights are recognized as fundamental rights in the legal framework of the European 
Union. Therefore the potential limitations to these rights must meet the criteria laid 
down in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.916As was established 
earlier, the said article sets some basic requirements for the limitations, i.e. that they 
must be provided for by law, respect the essence of the right and be proportional. 
For the proportionality test, the Charter provides some further guidance. To be 
proportionate, the limitation must be necessary, i.e. the aim pursued cannot be 
achieved without the said limitation. If same result can be achieved by measures 
which interfere less with the said fundamental right, those measures must be 
selected.917 Second, the limitations must pursue general interests recognized by 
the Union.
3.1.1 PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND RESPECT THE ESSENCE
Thus, the limitations must be 1) provided for by law and 2) respect the essence 
of the said rights. When limitations are set by the legislator in the course of 
legislative procedure, it does not take much of an effort to establish whether the 
first requirement is met. The limitation could for example take form as an exemption 
to the other right.
The question of whether the first requirement is met does not need to be 
further elaborated. Both rights are regulated by law and this thesis will provide a 
suggestion on how to reconcile the tension between the two principles by reading 
914 For the protection of personal data not being an absolute right, see also Opinion of the Court (Grand Chamber) 
of 26 July 2017 pursuant to article 218(11) TFEU, ECLI:EU:C:2016:656, para 181.
915 For rightful interference with the right to protection of personal data, see also Opinion of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 26 July 2017 pursuant to article 218(11) TFEU, ECLI:EU:C:2016:656, paras 181–210.
 Very detailed and rather technical methods for assessing the privacy and data protection risks have been 
developed. See for example EUI working paper, Report on system effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction 
assessment; Data Protection by Erik Krempel, Fraunhofer IOSB and Dr. Coen van Guljik, TU Delft, available 
on the internet < https://surveille.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2015/04/D3.3bSystem-Effectiveness-
and-Efficiency-Data-Protection.pdf > [last visited 15.5.2017].
916 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 1–16). For restricting the 
principle in the Finnish context, see O. Mäenpää, Julkisuusperiaate (Helsinki, 1999), 15–19.
917 See for example joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Kärtner Landesregierung, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 and joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut 
Eifert v Land Hessen, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662.
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the Transparency Regulation and the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation 
together without violating the essence of either of the examined rights. Before offering 
the suggestion for the interpretation, the essences of the rights need to be studied 
in more detail. Only after this analysis has taken place, it can be assessed whether 
reconciliation is possible while the cores of the said rights remain untouched. Before 
studying this issue in more detail, the circumstances of the case will be studied.
3.1.2 PROPORTIONALITY
To assess whether a certain measure limiting the protection of personal data or public 
access to documents is to be considered proportional, it is necessary to identify the 
essence of the said rights. When reconciling two fundamental rights, the hard core 
of both rights should remain untouched. Measures invading the hard core of the 
right can hardly be considered proportional. Therefore, the proportionality test will 
be carried out simultaneously with the identification of the hard core of the rights. 
At this stage, the proportionality test is studied on a more general level and some 
general remarks about the relevant circumstances will be given in the next section.
The core idea of the proportionality principle is that the measures taken are 
suitable for the objectives they are aiming at.918 Drawing from the CJEU’s case-law, 
the requirements to be met in the proportionality test have been elaborated in more 
detail. Self-evidently, these requirements reflect also the wording of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The proportionality test could be formulated as follows: “The 
measure must (1) pursue objectives of general interest recognised by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others; (2) be suitable to meet 
these objectives; (3) be “necessary” in the sense that it is the least invasive suitable 
measure; and (4) is proportionate in the strict sense”.919
The first element of the proportionality test can be examined already at this stage, 
even if the essence of the rights has not yet been identified. The first element is to 
assess whether the intended measures will meet the objectives of general interest 
recognized by the Union. The rights balanced in this research are recognized by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Both rights have also clearly established their 
place in the Union’s primary law. Thus, this is an issue that does not need to be 
further elaborated. The objectives are of general interest in Union law. And also, 
the intended measures pursue rights of other.
The other elements of the proportionality test will be carried out while identifying 
the essence of the examined rights. What is to be considered proportional might vary 
918 T. Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law, (Oxford, 2005) 136–142.
919 L. Feiler, “The Legality of the Data Retention Directive in Light of the fundamental Rights to Privacy and 
Data Protection” in European Journal of Law and Technology 3 (2010).
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based on the aims pursued. The limitations of one right must be strictly necessary in 
order to realize the other right. It follows that what is to be considered proportional 
depends of the circumstances of the case. The circumstances of the case may vary, 
and the legislator cannot predict all possible scenarios that might occur in the 
future. An attempt to capture the circumstances can be given by elaborating the 
conditions under which one principle takes over another.
3.2 THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE – CONDITIONS
When two multidimensional principles are reconciled, contextual-based balancing 
is unavoidable.920 It was earlier established that contextual-based evaluation is not 
arbitrary. One could tentatively name such factors as legal certainty, predictability, 
rule of law, constitutional state, significance in democratic society etc. as elements 
which should be met in contextual-based analysis.
Drawing from the circumstances of the case, the conditions providing the tools 
for a case-by-case analysis can be identified. When it is examined how to balance 
two competing principles, “the judicial function is to establish the conditions 
under which one principle takes over another”.921 This section will elaborate the 
circumstances which will have relevance when an assessment of whether personal 
data should be disclosed takes place. In other words, elements which create the 
conditions for contextual-based analysis will be provided in this section.922
I divide the circumstances of the case into two categories: the data processing 
environment and the nature of personal data. Both the processing environment 
and the nature of personal data can be further developed and structured in more 
detail. First the environment where the data is being processed will be elaborated, 
and this will be followed by an analysis of the nature of the personal data.
3.2.1 PROCESSING ENVIRONMENT
The risk elements involved in data processing vary in different processing 
environments. It is clear that the risk involved in data processing differs significantly 
in offline and online worlds. First, I will elaborate how information in the public 
sphere relates to the online world. This will be followed by a more general analysis 
920 For case-by-case balancing in the CJEU’s case-law, see also Brkan, M. The Court of Justice of the EU, privacy 
and data protection: Judge-made law as a leitmotif in fundamental rights protection, in Brkan, M. & E. 
Psychogiopoulou (eds.) Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the Digital Environment, (Edward Elgar, 
2017), 19–22.  
921 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) xxviii.
922 See Chapter I, section 2.2.1. 
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of situations where processed data is publicly available. It must be underlined that 
this assessment will not touch upon the question of making this information publicly 
available in the first place.
3.2.1.1 Publicly available information and online information
One of the core issues which needs to be tackled when seeking the balance between 
the two rights, is whether the information should be available to all, or whether there 
may be limitations to this. This is also a question which has great significance when 
placing this scenario in an online world. I see that at least two elements make the 
online world very different from the offline world. First, the most obvious difference 
is that online information is available to everybody. Second, combining information 
from different sources by using – for example – search engines, makes reuse of this 
information effortless. Furthermore, it could even be argued that this type of search 
based on personal data creates profiles, and could therefore be subject to particular 
data protection rules concerning profiling.
Once this is said, it should be kept in mind that one of the core ideas of the 
transparency legislation is that requests for the information can be made anonymously. 
In other words, the identity of the applicant requesting the information should 
not be relevant when assessing whether the document can be disclosed. When 
assessing the disclosure of personal data against that background, the question 
of the online / offline environment seems irrelevant.923 However, I see that this 
approach must be elaborated further in particular in light of the Bavarian Lager 
judgment.924 And not only Bavarian Lager, but also other judgments, such as Schecke 
and Hartmut Eifert and so-called Data Retention I play a role in this assessment.925 
These judgments have stressed that the protection of personal data is a fundamental 
right. Besides this element, these judgments have underlined the importance of the 
proportionality requirement in relation to the data protection provisions. In other 
words, interference with one’s right to the protection of personal data must be limited 
to what is strictly necessarily. The Court’s approach follows very much Hesse’s 
doctrine, which underlines the necessity element when restricting fundamental 
rights.926 I argue that such factors as general availability and the possibility to 
923 See also H. Nissenbaum, Privacy in context – Technology, Policy, and Integrity of Social Life, (Stanford 
University Press, 2010) 53–58. Nissenbaum notes that it has hardly caused any heated debated when public 
records are made accessible through the internet. 
924 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378.
925 Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662 and joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Kärtner 
Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
926 See Chapter I, section 2.4.
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combine personal data with the information from various other sources, have a 
great significance when assessing whether such processing of personal data is to be 
considered proportional with the aims pursued. The circumstances for balancing 
can be drawn from these elements.
To take these propositions to a more practical level, the following example can 
be given. Minutes from city council meetings are publicly available information in 
some Member States.927 These minutes might contain at least two types of personal 
data. First, the minutes would most likely have information about the municipal 
decision makers. Besides this information, there could also be occasional information 
about municipal citizens, for example in the context of their construction permits. 
When the city council’s minutes are publicly available, this information –including 
the personal data – would be accessible for the public from the outset. When this 
situation is considered in the offline world, it seems to meet the requirements 
of proportionality. First, the information about political decision makers should 
be publicly available, including at the municipal level. Second, the information 
about the construction permits might be relevant to some municipal citizens, and 
there does not seem to be any reason to assess the situation differently. In other 
words, there is no need for secrecy in such cases. However, when this situation is 
transferred into a different environment, in an online world, the setting looks very 
different. When the information about someone’s construction permit is available 
to the whole world for an unlimited time period, the proportionality requirement 
kicks in, and the necessity of such a measure can be questioned when taking into 
account the aims of the said measure. Even if in principle the situation does not 
change – the said information is available to everyone – the limitations of one’s 
privacy rights and the level of interference with privacy is on a very different level 
in these two situations. In an online environment, the existence of search engines 
and the possibility to google someone allows the searcher to combine vast amounts 
of information from different sources. Thus, the information about someone’s 
construction permit combined with other information available on the internet, 
could reveal more private information about the said data subject. Furthermore, this 
information could be entirely irrelevant to the person searching for the information.
To draw together the previous discussion, the general availability of the 
information is relevant when assessing whether the measures taken to safeguard 
the right of access are proportional in relation to the limitation of one’s privacy. 
The difference between self-determination and privacy will be further developed 
soon, but I underline that the focus in this question is on privacy. Due to modern 
technology, availability cannot be considered solely based on public availability of 
the information. Because of the different nature of the online world and the offline 
927 This is the case for example in Finland.
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world, I suggest that publicly available information should be distinguished from 
online availability. While I see that this can offer part of the overall solution, it 
must be acknowledged that this distinction has its own difficulties, for example, 
how to place freedom of speech in this construction or how to assess situations 
where information is gained in the offline world and then transferred into the 
online world.928
3.2.1.2 Processing publicly available personal data
In this section I will elaborate further the question touched upon in the previous 
section and set it in the current context. The red line is to separate online information 
from publicly available information. This is an essential element when seeking 
the solution to the research question. The distinction cannot be derived from the 
applicant who requests the information, i.e. the person who has the right of access. 
The right would still belong to all. Instead, this distinction is based on how the 
publicly available personal data can be processed in the online environment and 
in other environments. When personal data is available in the online environment, 
personal data can be processed further without any restraints. In other words, the 
distinction of the processing environment should not imply that fewer persons 
would be entitled to have access to the documents. The right of access would still 
belong to all, but the restrictions regarding the processing environment would set 
natural boundaries for the processing of personal data.
It is clear in light of the Court’s case-law that even when personal data is publicly 
available, data protection rules and principles apply to the processing of such 
personal data. It was clarified in the Spain v Google case that when personal data is 
legally available from one source, it does not necessarily signify that this information 
could be made available for unlimited number of people.929 The Court’s decision 
echoes its earlier Satamedia judgment, where the Court concluded that excluding 
personal data which has been published from the scope of the Data Protection 
Directive infringes EU law.930 Thus, it clearly follows from the CJEU’s case-law 
that even when personal data is in public sphere or publicly available, it must be 
processed in accordance with the data protection legislation.
It follows that when publicly available personal data is processed, it must take 
place in accordance with the data protection legislation. For the processing to meet 
928 An answer to the latter question can be sought from the Spain v Google case (Case C-131/12, Google Spain 
and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317). The environment was different, but same principles could apply to 
situations where access to information is gained in the offline world.
929 Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
930 Case C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727.
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the requirements of the data protection legislation, first the data processing must 
have a legal basis set out in the data protection legislation or alternatively fall outside 
the scope of the data protection legislation. This would be the case, for example, if 
personal data was processed solely for household purposes.931 An example of the 
legal basis for the data processing could be controller’s legitimate interest.932
When personal data is publicly available, there are not any natural limitations 
to, for example, collecting the personal data. However, this does not imply that 
the data protection rules do not apply to publicly available personal data. The 
question that follows is who should then ensure that personal data is being processed 
appropriately. This task falls naturally on the national data protection authorities 
or, in the case of the Union institutions, the EDPS.933
Besides ensuring that personal data is processed based on an appropriate legal 
basis, the supervisory authorities must ensure that other requirements of the 
data protection legislation are also met. While certain requirements – such as an 
appropriate legal basis934 – must always be met, many of the other requirements 
which need to be fulfilled depend on the type and nature of the processing situation. 
The greater the risk involved in the processing, the stricter the requirements for 
the controller.935
3.2.2 THE NATURE OF THE PERSONAL DATA
As I suggested earlier, the type or nature of personal data forms the other category of 
circumstances. The definition of personal data is wide.936 When the definition covers 
information from IP addresses and licence plate numbers to genetic information, it 
seems clear from the outset that the nature of the data must be taken into account 
when the circumstances of the case are assessed.
931 For the household exemption, see also European Law Blog, News and comments on EU law, European Data 
Protection and Freedom of Expression After Buivids: An Increasingly Significant Tension, February 21 
2019, available on the internet  < https://europeanlawblog.eu/2019/02/21/european-data-protection-and-
freedom-of-expression-after-buivids-an-increasingly-significant-tension/ >  [last visited 23.2.2019]. See also 
case T-345/17 Buivids, ECLI:EU:C:2019:122.
932 For more on legitimate interest, see for example the Article 29 Data Protection working party, “Opinion 
6/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC”, 
844/14/EN WP 217.
933 For the competent national data protection authority, see case C-230/14, Weltimmo, ECLI:EU:C:2015:639 
and case 191/15, Verein fur Konsumentioninformation v Amazon, EU:ECLI:C:2016:612.
934 See also case C-127/13 P, Strack v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2250, para 108.
935 See for example Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 
1–88).
936 See Chapter IV, section 2.1.
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3.2.2.1 The status of the person – public persons, public decision -making
I argued earlier that there should be a strong presumption of disclosure of personal 
data which relates to those who are in a position to influence public decision-making. 
If the right to protection of personal data was to be restricted in order to realize 
public access to documents, the restriction should be limited to what is strictly 
necessary in order to realize public access to documents.937 These measures should 
also be proportional taking into account the objectives of the limitation. Whether 
limiting the right to the protection of personal data is proportional in such cases 
where the data relates to public decision-making will be assessed next.
Guidance on solving this issue can be sought from the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. The Strasbourg Court has drawn some guidelines for 
assessing whether a person is a so-called “public person”. Before engaging in the 
ECHR’s practice in more detail, it must be underlined that ECHR’s practice has 
developed in the course of freedom of expression cases. In other words, in such 
situations where the information related to a certain person has been published 
and distributed to public. When such situations are compared with public access 
to document cases, the restriction to one’s privacy must be considered heavier 
in the former case. In the latter, personal data is not actively disseminated to an 
unlimited number of people.938
The ECHR has categorized two sets of public persons. These categories are 
politicians and figures of public importance. In accordance with the ECHR’s practice, 
politicians should tolerate interference with their privacy to a certain extent. The 
ECHR has recognized, however, that other persons who also appear in public might 
be in a position where the breach of their privacy is allowed to a certain extent. 
Examples of this group of people would be civil servants and judges.939 The ECHR’s 
approach seems justified in the sense that when a person is involved in a decision-
making process and the outcome of that decision has an effect on the society on 
more general level, the threshold to withhold information about the said decision 
makers should be quite high. I see that in the case of politicians the threshold 
should be even higher; this is for two reasons. Political decision-making allows more 
margin for discretion than the decision-making carried out by civil servants. The 
parameters for political decision-making can be drawn from fundamental rights, 
but it is precisely political decision-making which might amend other rights or 
937 See Chapter I, section 2.4.
938 For the media being capable of inflicting the gravest damage on individual as a result of personal information 
processing, see for example D. Erdos “European Union Data Protection Law and Media Expression: 
Fundamentally off Balance” in International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65 (2016), 140.
939 See for example R. Gisbert, The Right to Freedom of expression in a democratic Society (Art. 20 ECHR), in 
Garcia Roca & Santolaya (ed.) Europe of Rights: A Compendium of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, (Leiden, 2012), 395.
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obligations based on legislation. In other words, the rules on the surface level of law 
are amended by political decisions. When politicians have such a heavy influence 
on the rules applicable to society in general, the public in general should know how 
political decision makers use their influence. Civil servants, in turn, are bound to 
interpret the existing legislation. Therefore, the margin of discretion carried out by 
civil servants is limited to cases where the rules on the surface level of law do not 
provide a direct answer. In other words, while the decisions made by politicians 
cover all the elements needed for the decision-making, civil servants do not have 
a margin of discretion; rules are either applicable or not.940 Naturally in certain 
cases the question of whether the rule becomes applicable or not might arise. Thus, 
the civil servant’s margin of discretion – if it can be called discretion – is limited 
to identifying the hard core of the right when assessing the case and seeking an 
answer from the underlying levels of law.
Not only public figures but also civil servants conducting public duties have been 
considered differently from ordinary people when it comes to the right to privacy.941 
This baseline was tried in the Valero Jordana case. Both the applicant and the 
Kingdom of Sweden suggested that the exception to public access to documents 
laid down in Article 4(1)(b) concerning the protection of personal data should 
not have applied in the said case. It was argued that the said information did not 
interfere with the private life of the data subjects, because the applicant was asking 
only for information which related to the data subjects as civil servants.942 This 
argumentation goes alongside with General Court’s Bavarian Lager judgment.943 
The General Court did however reject this approach in particular, even if, in the 
end, it decided the case based on different merits. The General Court underlined 
that civil servants also have the right to privacy.944
3.2.2.2 The status of the person – private actors in the public sector –  
Reasonable expectations
To elaborate the second category of circumstances, i.e. nature of personal data, 
further it does not suffice study the concept of public person. To start with, there 
have been some concerns about the blurring lines between the private and public 
940 See Chapter I, section 1.1.
941 See for example R. Gisbert, The Right to Freedom of expression in a democratic Society (Art. 20 ECHR), in 
Garcia Roca & Santolaya (ed.) Europe of Rights: A Compendium of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, (Leiden, 2012), 395.
942 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337.
943 Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:334.
944 Case T-161/04, Valero Jordana v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:337. See also case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth 
and PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489, paras 27–35.
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sector. These have mainly related to the lack of transparency in the private sector 
and, for instance, the inapplicability of freedom of information legislation in the 
private sector.945 These concerns are justified in such cases where private sector 
actors are confided with public sector duties. Furthermore, there are situations 
where private sector actors are not directly confided with public sector duties, but 
the private sector actors have influence, one way or another, on public decision-
making. As a third example, private sector actors might receive significant aid funded 
with tax payers’ money.
It follows that the assessment of proportionality cannot be carried out solely 
based on the distinction between public and private persons. This is where the 
reasonable expectations of the data subject become relevant. Guidelines for this 
assessment can be drawn from the GDPR.946 Article 6 of the GDPR sets good frames 
for this assessment because Article 6 addresses the situations where personal data 
is processed for a different purpose from that for which it was originally collected. 
That is to say that further processing is in line with the European data protection 
legislation when criteria in Article 6 are met; in other words, the data subject should 
reasonably expect that the data will be further processed in accordance with Article 6.
The GDPR and the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation set a non-
exhaustive list of elements to be taken into consideration when personal data is 
processed for a purpose other than the initial processing purposes.947 The first 
element on the list is “any link between the purposes for which the personal data 
have been collected and the purpose of intended further processing”. When personal 
data is collected or stored on such an occasion which relates to the position of a 
person influencing public decision-making, the link between disclosure based on 
public access to documents and the original processing purposes exists. In such a 
case, the access request related to the position of the person. The same information 
would be requested regardless of who the individual participating in the public 
decision-making was.
The second element on the list id “the context in which the personal data have 
been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data subjects and 
the controller”. When personal data is collected in the course of a process which 
leads to a decision and the data relates to those who are in a position to influence 
the said public decision-making, the requirements of this element are met.
945 J. Freeman, “Extending public accountability through privatization: From public law to publicization”, in 
M.W. Dowdle (ed.) Public Accountability, (Cambridge, 2006), 83–111.
946 According to Recital 47 of the GDPR “the legitimate interests of a controller, including those of a controller 
to which the personal data may be disclosed, or of a third party, may provide a legal basis for processing, 
provided that the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding, 
taking into consideration the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the 
controller”. 
947 Article 6 of the GDPR and article 6 of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation.
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The third and fourth elements on the list relate to the nature of personal data 
and the possible consequence for the data subject. When public access is given 
to such personal data, which relates to data subject in their capacity to influence 
public decision-making, consequences which are not necessarily only pleasant 
might arise. Disclosed information might, for example, reveal how influential a 
lobbyist organization was in a legislation process. The feedback which follows such 
a disclosure will not necessarily be pleasant.948 This is, however, at the very heart of 
the structures of the democratic society and public’s right of access to documents.
When these elements are assessed together with the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which clearly requires that public persons tolerate a higher 
degree of limitation to their privacy, it is safe to conclude that when someone is in a 
position which enables him or her to influence public decision-making, and access 
to personal data is requested in this context, there is hardly grounds to argue that 
the data subject might have reasonable expectations of non-disclosure of the said 
data. Naturally some other exception laid down in the Transparency Regulation 
might apply in such a case, for example the exception laid down in Article 4(3) to 
protect the institution’s decision-making process.
3.2.2.3 Sensitive data – Nature of personal data
As a last element to be taken into consideration when the circumstances of the 
case are assessed, the sensitive nature of the personal data must be assessed. This 
assessment must be carried out with a view to such data being made publicly 
available. It is clear that there are such types of personal data which require a high 
degree of protection. The processing of certain types of personal data is considered 
more risky from the outset. For example, the processing of special categories of 
personal data is prohibited by default and allowed only in certain, specified cases. 
An example of such data is health data, but also other types of data are considered 
sensitive, such as data concerning religious or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual 
orientation.949
To elaborate this further, such personal data which does not fall in the scope of 
special categories of personal data, but is still somehow sensitive must be examined. 
The sensitivity does not then follow from the nature of the data itself, but from the 
wider processing context. The data could reveal for example information about data 
subject’s whereabouts, information which is in many cases harmless. A practical 
948 In Case C-280/11 P Council v Access Info Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2013:671, para 15, CJEU’s reference to General 
Court’s conclusion, “that it is in the very nature of democratic debate that a proposal for amendment of a 
draft regulation can be subject to both positive and negative comments on the part of the public and the 
media”.
949 See for example Article 9 of the GDPR.
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example of the importance of the processing context of such data is provided by 
information which was leaked by Wikileaks. According to newspaper information, 
the leaks by Wikileaks had put certain people in serious danger.950 I see that this 
example demonstrates two things. First, disclosure of personal data requires a 
context-based assessment. Unintentionally wide disclosure of personal data might 
lead to serious consequences. It follows that disclosure of personal data almost 
always requires a certain level of consideration. The circumstances that create 
the conditions for disclosure of personal data can be formulated with a certain 
specificity in law, but the legislator cannot take all future situations into account in 
a detailed manner, and the provisions drafted in law must provide a certain amount 
of flexibility for the later application of the said provisions.
The second point demonstrated by the given example is how access to all 
personal data cannot be given by default and the need for protection might derive 
from other elements than those at the hard core of the right to data protection 
legislation. Revealing personal information which is not sensitive per se could, 
for example, hamper international relations or complicate institutions’ decision-
making processes. At the EU level these other interests are, however, protected by 
the exceptions laid down in the Transparency Regulation.
Consequently, special categories of personal data cannot be placed at the hard 
core of the right to the protection of personal data by default. Information about 
someone’s philosophical view on life might be much less sensitive than, for example, 
information about someone’s whereabouts. However, the nature of personal data 
must be taken into consideration as Alexy’s circumstances of the case when the 
balancing between different rights is carried out.
3.3 HEADING TOWARDS THE HARD CORE
The tension between rights must be balanced with a view to reach the optimal 
effect of both rights. 951 When the optimal effect is achieved, the essence of the 
both rights is maintained. The limitations may not be broader than what is strictly 
necessary.952 Next, the underlying principles of both rights will be examined. First 
an analysis is carried out on whether, and to what extent, certain principles need to 
950 See for example Helsingin Sanomat, 29.8.2016, A 22.
951 For optimal effect, see K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfaussungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
(Heidelberg, 1990) 142 and T. Marauhn and N. Puppel, Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: Konrad Hesse’s 
notion of “Praktische Kokordanz” and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts 
between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 279–281.
952 For the proportionality test in the data protection context, see also I. Cameron, “Balancing data protection 
and law enforcement needs: Tele2 Sverige and Watson”, in Common Market Law Review 54 (2017), 1470 
and case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
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be limited in order to realize the other right, while simultaneously heading towards 
the identification of the hard core of the said rights. Thereafter, a conclusion on 
whether the prescribed limitations will lead to collision of rights will be provided.
3.3.1 PURPOSE LIMITATION AND FURTHER TRANSMISSION OF PERSONAL 
DATA V WIDEST POSSIBLE ACCESS, NO BLOCK EXEMPTIONS AND NARROW 
INTERPRETATION OF EXCEPTIONS
It was established earlier that personal data must be collected and processed 
for specified purposes. The purpose limitation principle is one of the founding 
principles of European data protection legislation. It is enshrined by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and it was also an essential element in the CJEU’s Schrems case 
assessment, where the CJEU elaborated the essence of the protection of personal 
data.953 When personal data is collected for a certain purpose, it may not be further 
processed for incompatible purposes.954
While the purpose limitation principle is very clearly formulated in the Union 
legislation, the colliding principles of the transparency legislation must be recognized 
and sought from the deeper levels of law. However, once they have been established, 
they are equally clear. The principles which collide with the purpose limitation 
principle have been elaborated in Chapter III. These are the principles of no block 
exemption955, narrow interpretation of exceptions and widest possible access.
If the purpose limitation principle was applied as such to situations where the 
data has been requested based on public access to documents legislation, personal 
data could hardly ever be disclosed. This cannot be the aim of the purpose limitation 
principle. It seems that situations where the applicant would process the personal 
data for the same purposes as the original controller are quite rare. For example, 
information about the participants of a meeting in the course of public decision-
making – or an example from national level, municipal decision-making concerning 
building permits – would hardly be processed for the initial processing purposes by 
the applicant. However, the change in the processing purposes would not necessarily 
signify that the secondary processing is illegitimate. Furthermore, this information 
could be relevant and sometimes even necessary for the applicant. The relevance 
could be quite general in its nature too, such as journalistic purposes. Thus, the 
personal data could be processed for very legitimate purposes even if the initial 
purpose differentiated from the secondary purpose.956
953 Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, para 90.
954 See Chapter IV, section 3.1.
955 For block exemption, see case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489, para 70.
956 See for example Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 
1–88), Recital 50.
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Hence, strict interpretation of the purpose limitation principle would create 
an obstacle to the right of access and deprive the Transparency Regulation of its 
effect. A vast amount of personal data would never be disclosed, even in such cases 
where the disclosure would not endanger the interests protected by the exceptions 
laid down in the Transparency Regulation.957 In other words, certain information 
would not be disclosed purely based on the nature of the said information, i.e. for 
the reason that it is personal data. This would lead to a situation where the 
data is protected, not the data subjects or the data subjects’ interests. 
I argue that the ultimate goal or aim of the data protection legislation 
is, however, to protect data subjects and their interests. Not the data.
The CJEU’s elaboration of the essence in the Schrems case does not lead to 
different conclusion. Even if the CJEU did set a particular weight on the purpose 
limitation principle in its assessment, the CJEU did eventually conclude that the 
essence of the right to private life had been violated due to the wide and general access 
by public authorities to the content of electronic communication. An aggravating 
fact was that this access to electronic communication took place in a context in 
which there were no legal remedies available to the individuals. Hence, the CJEU 
saw wide access by public authorities and a lack of legal remedies as violating the 
essence of Article 7 and respectively Article 47 of the Charter.958 
The circumstances creating the tension studied in this research differ significantly 
from the circumstances examined by the CJEU in the Schrems case. First, the 
European legal framework does provide legal remedies for the data subjects. Second, 
when personal data is collected by the public sector in the course of the exercise 
of public duties, and should be publicly available from the outset, it can hardly 
be claimed that the disclosure of personal data was not reasonably foreseeable at 
the time it was collected. This differs from the circumstances of the Schrems case, 
where personal data had initially been collected for commercial purposes. When 
data subjects actively share their own personal information on Facebook and use 
the said platform as a channel for personal communication, they have the right to 
expect this information to be shared only with recipients with whom they choose 
to share it.  
Furthermore, strict interpretation of purpose limitation principle would create 
a block exemption. It was earlier established that one of the underlying principles 
of the transparency legislation is no block exemptions.959 It was also acknowledged 
957 See Chapter III, section 6.
958 Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, paras 90–95. It ought to be mentioned that access by public 
authorities in the Schrems case differs significantly from public access, which is examined in this thesis. 
Public access is sought to official documents, not private communication information between individuals. 
Also, the context where this takes place differs significantly from the one where personal data was processed 
in the USA under the Privacy Shield. The redress mechanism is built in the EU data protection framework.
959 For the presumption of non-disclosure, see D. Curtin & P. Leino, “In search of transparency for EU law-
making: Trilogues on the cusp of dawn” in Common Market Law Review 6 (2017), 1078–1079. The CJEU 
has established this also in more recent case, see for example in the case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN 
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that the CJEU has accepted certain presumptions regarding non-disclosure of 
information. However, these presumptions do not correspond to the situation at 
hand, where the disclosure relates to personal data, not enormous amounts of 
information, for example related to infringement procedures.
Simultaneously, strict interpretation of the purpose limitation principle would 
be contrary to the widest possible access principle and the principle of narrow 
interpretation of the exceptions. As was noted earlier in Chapter III, both of these 
principles are well established in the case-law. To conclude, strict interpretation of 
the purpose limitation principle would be contrary to many of the core principles 
of the transparency legislation and would create a presumption that personal data 
could not be disclosed from public documents.960
It follows that the purpose limitation principle must be restricted in order to 
realize the right of access to documents. As Hesse puts it, “conflicting rights and 
interest must be subject to limitations, so that each one attains its optimal effect”.961 
Whether the need to restrict the purpose limitation principle would lead to a genuine 
collision of the rights examined in this thesis can be assessed only after it is clear 
whether the essence of the said right can be maintained despite of the restriction.962 
3.3.2 STATING REASONS FOR THE APPLICATION
The next step towards the hard core is to elaborate how stating reasons for the 
application fits into the overall picture. The question of stating reasons for an 
application filed under the Transparency Regulation was at the very heart of the 
Bavarian Lager case. The General Court had concluded that there was no need for 
reasoning, but the CJEU turned it around. The CJEU underlined that there are no 
provisions granting one Regulation primacy over the other and that in principle, their 
full application should be ensured.963 The CJEU stressed that the Data Protection 
Regulation must be applied simultaneously with the Transparency Regulation. If 
this was not the case, personal data would be disclosed from official documents 
solely based on the Transparency Regulation. In such cases personal data would 
Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489, paras 69–70. The CJEU did not accept EFSA’s argument as this 
would have led to a situation where a similar argument could have been used as grounds to refuse access to 
personal data generally in all similar situations. 
960 Case T-115/13, Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:497.
961 See Chapter I, section 3. K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfaussungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
(Heidelberg, 1990) 142; T. Marauhn and N. Puppel, Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: Konrad Hesse’s 
notion of “Praktische Kokordanz” and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts 
between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 279–281.
962 For genuine collision of rights, see Chapter I, section 3. L. Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as 
Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (ed.) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (Intersentia, 2008), 3–126.
963 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, para 56.
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be protected solely based on the privacy exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of 
the Transparency Regulation. The CJEU saw that this was not sufficient.
The CJEU’s decision renders the tension in a situation where the rules collide 
on the surface level of law inevitable. The Transparency Regulation stipulates that 
requests for public access to documents do not need to be reasoned, while the 
EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation requires the recipient of the data to 
establish the necessity for the data transfer.964 From the outset, these rules cannot 
be applied simultaneously. This does not, however, necessarily reflect the collision 
of the underlying principles.
It is given that the requests must be reasoned. This was the core of the CJEU’s 
judgment. This baseline was not amended with the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation either. Whether this leads to a collision on the level of principles can be 
deduced by identifying the essence of the right of access. I will do this by carrying 
out an assessment of three elements related to the reasoning of an application. The 
first and second elements are interconnected. First, it will be assessed whether the 
right to receive public sector information without stating reasons falls within the 
hard core of the right, and thereafter whether there are certain situations in which 
personal data should always be disclosed. The third element culminates in the 
question of how to interpret the requirement to state reasons for the application; 
in other words, how general or detailed the reasoning should be.
It was earlier established that the aims and objectives of the Transparency 
Regulation are strengthening democracy, good governance and reducing corruption. 
These aims are achieved by granting access to information. It was argued earlier that 
having access to information strengthens democracy in two different ways. First, it 
creates grounds for participatory, or deliberative, democracy. Second, it provides the 
general public with the means to supervise decision-making and decision makers.965 
To achieve this goal, it is essential that the applicant has the information. It is 
secondary if the applicant gives some reasoning in order to receive the information, 
provided that it will not de facto lead to denial of access to the information.
The right to request information without stating reasons is not widely elaborated 
in the recitals of the Transparency Regulation. It can be argued that this rule draws 
from the principle of widest access and on the other hand from public access. To 
begin with public access, when access is given to the public in general, the reasons 
for the further use of the requested information are insignificant. This is how public 
access differs from party access. Therefore, the applicant should not be asked to 
reason the application – in other words, to provide particular reasons related to 
964 See Chapter VI, section 2. The necessity to establish that it is necessary to have the data transmitted follows 
from the new EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation as well (Article 9), but other elements included in 
the Regulation will clarify the situation.
965 See Chapter VII, section 2.1.1.
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the specific circumstances.966 Secondly, widest possible access is ensured when 
disclosure of the information does not require reasoning. If stating reasons would 
instead lead to wider access in some rare cases, for example when the requested 
document contains personal data, providing reasons would not seem to violate 
the hard core of the right of public access, but rather work in favour of enhancing 
transparency.
The second interrelated element is whether there are such situations where access 
to personal data – personal data which is part of an official document – would fall 
within the hard core of the right of access to information. In other words, whether 
there is such personal data that the nature of the data sets a presumption for the 
disclosure, and whether the presumption of access to this data would invade the 
hard core of the competing right, that is the right to the protection of personal 
data. It was earlier established that official documents may contain different types 
of personal data. There is data which relates to decision makers and there is data 
which relates to other data subjects.967 I see that access to personal data should be 
treated differently when access is requested to data which relates to those who are 
in a position to influence public decision-making. In a democratic society, citizens 
should have the right to know who influences the decisions which have an effect 
on citizens. This presumption could be superseded by the exemptions provided 
by the Transparency Regulation when disclosure of such personal data would 
endanger some of the interests protected by the said exemptions, such as privacy 
or international relations.968 It is clear, however, that the said information is personal 
data, even if it relates to a certain post or role in public decision-making.969
The third element in this assessment sets weight on the processing of personal 
data. I see that stating reasons to receive personal data derives from two core 
elements of data protection legislation. The processing of personal data must have 
a legal basis and personal data may not be further processed for incompatible 
purposes.970 First, processing of personal data is only allowed when there is an 
appropriate legal basis for the processing, or if the processing could fall outside the 
scope of the GDPR and be carried out, for example, for household purposes. This 
is an element, which separates data protection from the right to privacy. It was 
earlier established that the right to the protection of personal data has become an 
independent fundamental right, separate from the right to privacy. The requirement 
966 Particular reasons should be taken into account on a more general level when assessing, for example, the 
existence of the overriding public interest.
967 See Chapter VI, section 2.1.1.2.
968 See Chapter III, section 6.
969 See for example Case T-94/16, Psara v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2018:602, paras 50–52.
970 The latter element does ultimately come back to the purpose limitation principle.
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for a legal basis is the feature that is characteristic for data protection in general 
and simultaneously clearly separates it from the right to privacy.
In this context, it ought to be underlined that I see that the requirement to 
have a legal basis for the processing of personal data differs from the more general 
requirement of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which sets the 
parameters for restricting fundamental rights,971namely that the requirement that 
restrictions to fundamental rights must be provided by law. First, Article 8 of 
the Charter states that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her; this does not signify that the processing of personal data is 
banned. In other words, the processing of personal data does not itself constitute 
a restriction of the data subject’s right. This is apparent in the European data 
protection framework. I give two further examples to illustrate this. Starting with 
the manual processing of personal data, which is excluded from the scope of the 
GDPR; it does not follow from this exclusion that the said data may not be processed 
at all because the processing is not based on law. Instead it may be processed without 
any limitations as long as the data does not form a data file. This is logical, because 
the said data processing does not endanger the interests of the data subject, with 
the scale of the processing being always quite moderate. Further, Article 9 of the 
GDPR forbids the processing of special categories of personal data. If data processing 
was banned from the outset, there wouldn’t be a need to separately legislate on the 
said prohibition. Thus, the processing of personal data does not itself constitute a 
restriction of the data subject’s right. Furthermore, if the processing of personal data 
was considered a restriction to the data subject’s right, it would lead to a situation 
where the data itself was protected, not the data subject or data subject’s interests. 
Even if in everyday language it is very common to use terminology that refers to 
protection of personal data, the aim is not to protect the data, but rather the data 
subjects. The GDPR’s name quite clearly illustrates this; it is “a regulation on the 
protection of natural persons” with regard to the processing of personal data.
Moving back to assessing the requirement to state reasons for the application, 
another element included in the requirement to establish the necessity of the data 
transfer is the purpose limitation principle. The purpose limitation principle is 
one of the core elements of data protection, but it was earlier established that it is 
necessary to limit the purpose limitation principle in order to realize one’s right of 
access to documents. This leads to a situation where the applicant should not be 
required to demonstrate that the further processing of personal data will be carried 
out for purposes compatible with the original data processing. This argument draws 
971 For similar conclusion in the context of analyzing the CJEU’s rulings related to protection of personal data, 
see also G. González Fuster, “Fighting For Your Right to What Exactly? The Convoluted Case Law of the EU 
Court of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data Protection” in Birbeck Law Review, 2(2) (2014), 271–278; 
G. González Fuster & R. Gellert, “The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search 
of an uncharted rights“ in International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 1(2012), 78–81.
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support also from the recent case-law of the General Court; the Court does not lay 
emphasis on the purpose limitation principle in its reasoning when it is assessing 
whether the applicant has provided sufficient reasons.972 Further backing for this 
approach can be sought from the recently adopted EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation. Recital 28 of the Regulation clarifies that the specific purpose, referred to 
in the article on transmission of personal data, can relate to the transparency of EU 
institutions and bodies. The recital clarifies that when personal data is transmitted 
to recipients in the Union, and the recipient needs to establish the necessity for 
the data transfer, the specific purpose in the public interest for which the data is 
transferred can relate to the transparency of the Union institutions. This should 
not, however, be read as if personal data could be further processed for whatever 
purposes when the recipient has received it based on the said provisions. General 
parameters for data processing also apply to the processing of personal data received 
based on Transparency Regulation.973  
It has been established that public access to documents cannot be realized when 
the purpose limitation principle applies. It hasn’t been examined yet, whether the 
requirement to have an appropriate legal basis for the data processing would lead to 
a similar conclusion. The requirement to process the data legitimately either based 
on an appropriate legal basis or for the purposes which are excluded from the data 
protection regime would create an obstacle to public access to documents in such 
cases where the applicant does not have an appropriate processing purpose. In 
other words, the applicant would receive the information in such cases where the 
processing of personal data can be considered legitimate. This would differ from 
establishing the necessity to have the personal data transferred. The suggested 
approach sets the threshold to provide information for the further processing lower. 
It would suffice to give information about the intended legal basis applied in the 
processing, in other words, a simple informational notice would fulfil the 
requirement. This must be separated from party access where the position of the 
applicant is a significant element when assessing whether the information can be 
released. Legitimate processing purposes would not necessarily need 
to contain the actual, particular processing purposes; a more general 
reference to appropriate processing purposes should be considered 
sufficient. This approach would enable the applicant to request public access 
to documents anonymously and thereby meet the right to file an application 
anonymously based on the Transparency Regulation.
972 Case T-94/16, Psara v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2018:602 ; case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN 
Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489.
973 For case law, see in particular ase C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 and case 
C-73/07, Satakunnan Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727.
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The suggested solution reflects the existing case-law of the Luxembourg court. 
The CJEU has established that publicly available information must be processed 
in accordance with data protection legislation.974 In other words, information that 
is legally publicly available must be processed in accordance with data protection 
legislation. The General Court has in turn agreed that general reasoning is sufficient, 
when data is applied for based on the Transparency Regulation.975 Some further 
indications of how to assess adequate reasoning have been developed in later CJEU 
practice. According to the CJEU, public interest as such would not provide sufficient 
reasoning for disclosure. It did, however, consider reasoning based on suspicions 
regarding the impartiality of expert advice as adequate reasoning for the disclosure.976 
After the entry into force of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, this 
must also be read together with Recital 28, which confirms that the transparency 
of Union institutions and bodies can justify the disclosure of data. Drawing from 
this, it seems that the applicant is not expected to give detailed reasoning regarding 
the intended further processing related to his or her particular situation.
It must be noted that the General Court has in its more recent case-law argued 
that transparency does not justify as such transfers of personal data.977 I see that 
this conclusion alone does not contradict what was just said. This conclusion was 
drawn in a case where the applicant had requested bank extracts from certain 
MEP’s bank accounts. When the balancing exercise is carried out, it is relevant 
what type of personal data is at stake. The situation has become even more clear 
with the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, with Recital 28 clarifying that 
the transparency of Union institutions and bodies can justify disclosure of data.
To conclude, if the applicant was to give general information about the intended 
legal basis of the further processing, the requirements elaborated in the CJEU’s case-
law read together with Recital 28 of the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation 
would be met.
3.3.3 THE INVIOLABLE CORE OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS 
AND THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION
It was earlier established that the hard core of the right has a rule-like effect; it 
does not allow balancing. It follows that a genuine conflict of fundamental rights 
exists only when the hard core, i.e. the essence of the right, collides with another 
974 Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 and Case C-73/07, Satakunnan 
Markkinapörrsi and Satamedia, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727.
975 Case T-115/13, Dennekamp v Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:497, para 61.
976 Case C-615/13 P, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489, paras 47–61.
977 Case T-94/16, Psara v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2018:602, paras 76, 91.
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right and cannot be put into effect simultaneously. It was also established that 
the hard core of the fundamental right might be fragmented.978 So far this section 
has focused on the underlying principles of the said rights, also taking partly into 
account the underlying objectives and aims of the said rights and has given some 
first suggestions on how to reconcile the right of public access to documents with 
the protection of personal data by limiting the other right only to the extent of what 
is strictly necessary.
Next, the dimension of the hard core of the examined rights will be identified 
in order to conclude whether there is a genuine conflict of fundamental rights at 
stake, or whether is there room for proportional balancing. First, the essence of the 
right of public access to documents will be identified. This is followed by a similar, 
though lengthier, analysis of the essence of the right to the protection of personal 
data. It was earlier established that the right to protection of personal data is a 
multidimensional concept and the upcoming analysis reflects this feature of data 
protection.
3.3.3.1 The essence of the right of public access to documents
The underlying principles of public access to documents, the right to receive 
information, were discussed earlier. This principle can be further elaborated in 
two different sets of circumstances related to access to personal data. The first 
circumstances would cover all types of personal data, and the second circumstances 
would cover situations where the data relates to persons who are in a position to 
influence public decision-making. The first set of circumstances will be discussed 
next. Thereafter, the second set of circumstances will be covered.
3.3.3.1.1 The right to receive information
The colliding rules on the surface level of law are the requirements to establish 
the necessity for data transfers based on the EU Institutions’ Data Protection 
Regulation and the right to receive information without stating reasons based 
on the Transparency Regulation. These colliding rules were discussed in detail in 
Chapter VI, section 2.
Being fully aware of the harsh criticism this may cause among my dear, 
distinguished Finnish colleagues, I dare to argue that the applicant’s right to file 
an application without stating reasons does not fall within the hard core of the right 
of access to documents. But this is only within certain parameters. First, to be more 
978 See Chapter I section 2.2.1.
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accurate, a lighter version of stating reasons for the application. I would call this 
informing the controller of the legal basis on which the personal data is intended 
to be processed. This would signify that the applicant would inform the civil servant 
who decides on the disclosure of personal data, of the legal basis on which the 
intended further processing of personal data will be based. This would not require 
further or more detailed reasoning from the applicant and would not include the 
necessity to establish the intended processing purposes. Thus, simple information 
about the intended legal basis for the processing would suffice for exercising the 
right of public access to documents which contain personal data. This would require 
that an applicant who requests access to personal data is at least aware of the data 
protection requirements and carries out some light planning on how to process 
the data. In other words, the applicant should understand that there are certain 
limitations to how personal data may be further processed. It would also set a light 
supervisory responsibility on the public sector actor who discloses the information. 
The ultimate responsibility to ensure that the data has been appropriately processed 
would stay with the competent data protection authority, with this being the national 
supervisory authority in most cases. When personal data is disclosed to an applicant 
in the Member States, this would set the national supervisory authority as the final 
guardian of the secondary processing of personal data. The GDPR sets out similar 
powers and duties for the supervisory authorities in all Member States, hence this 
should guarantee the appropriate supervision of the data processing in all Member 
States. The European Data Protection Supervisor would hardly take the role as the 
final guardian of the processing in these situations, because the competence of the 
EDPS covers the EU institutions. Unless data transfers between institutions were 
based on the same structure, the role of the EDPS would continue to be supervising 
whether the institutions have met their obligations when disclosing the personal 
data.979
It was established earlier that the Transparency Regulation itself recognizes the 
possibility of the public authority engaging in a dialogue with the applicant in order 
to better meet the needs of the applicant. This possibility is also recognized in the 
national legislation, for example, in Finland. It follows that if stating the legal basis for 
the intended data processing in order to apply the rights given in the Transparency 
Regulation is accepted as starting point, the institutions should assist the applicant 
with this task when the applicant is unaware of this requirement. And when the legal 
basis for the secondary processing purposes is apparent, the institution should take 
this into account on its own initiative, even if the applicant hadn’t understood the 
need to formulate this reasoning in their application. This duty would follow from 
the requirements of good governance and can be derived from the practice related 
979 Data transfers to third countries based on access to documents legislation are excluded from the scope of 
this assessment.
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to public access to documents, i.e. the institutions’ obligation to assess whether 
there is an overriding public interest.980 The threshold for submitting the intended 
legal basis for data processing, when data is sought based on the Transparency 
Regulation, should not be set too high. Requiring very detailed reasoning about 
the processing purposes approaches the limits of the essence of the Transparency 
Regulation and the right of access, and would simultaneously set an obstacle to 
anonymously requesting public access to documents. This would invade the hard 
core of the right of access.
Actual access to information lies within the hard core of the fundamental right of 
public access. This can be realized by handing out the personal data to the applicant 
when the information about the intended legal basis is given to the controller, i.e. 
EU institution. Submitting the intended legal basis would not set obstacles for the 
aims and objectives of the Transparency Regulation either. It would not render 
the two transparency tools of democratic decision-making void; quite the opposite. 
Further, simply notifying the intended legal basis would not prevent the actualization 
of the other aims and objectives identified earlier in this thesis – good governance 
and reducing corruption – either. Thus, a light informational obligation about the 
legal basis would not infringe the hard core of one’s fundamental right of access to 
documents, provided that this obligation remains light. It is of utmost importance 
that the threshold for providing such information remains on such a level that the 
identity of the applicant can remain anonymous.
The judgment by the General Court in the Bavarian Lager case balanced data 
protection with public access to documents by excluding the data protection 
legislation entirely from the assessment. The approach suggested in this thesis 
would take the core elements of the data protection legislation into account. These 
elements are privacy and the requirement to have an appropriate legal basis for the 
processing of personal data. Furthermore, other rights provided by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, i.e. the data subject’s right of access to his or her personal data 
or the right to rectify the data concerning him or her, would not be hampered either. 
The data subject could exercise these rights in relation to the original controller 
and in cases where the secondary data processing takes the form of full-scale data 
processing, the data subject can exercise these rights towards the secondary data 
controller. This also reflects the current situation when it comes to the processing 
of personal data. The judgment and consequences of the Google case give a perfect 
example of that.981
Furthermore, the suggested approach would be also in line with the requirements 
set by the CJEU’s judgment stating that in principle both data protection and 
transparency legislation should be fully applied. The suggested solution is drawn 
980 See Chapter III, section 5.2.
981 Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
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from giving a narrow interpretation for the requirement “to state reasons for the 
application”. One of the underlying principles of the Transparency Regulation is 
the narrow interpretation of the exceptions to public access to documents. When 
data protection legislation is applied to public access to documents requests based 
on Article 4(1)(b) of the Transparency Regulation, the contradictory requirements 
set in the data protection legislation, i.e. the obligation to state reasons, should 
be interpreted narrowly. This is how the contradictory goal set by the Bavarian 
Lager case can be achieved; applying the rules of the data protection legislation in 
light of the principles drawn from the Transparency Regulation. This is possible by 
interpreting the current provisions accordingly, or the situation could alternatively be 
clarified by new formulation of certain provisions of the Data Protection Regulation.
Notification of the intended legal basis would not set an obstacle for the 
institutions to apply some of the exceptions laid down in the Transparency 
Regulation. If there was a danger that was reasonably foreseeable and not purely 
hypothetical, the privacy exception could apply, or some other exception for that 
matter, such as the exception at 4(3), which protects the institutions’ decision-
making process. This would guarantee that the other element in the hard core of 
data protection, namely privacy, would enjoy appropriate protection.
Lastly, if stating reasons for the application was considered a violation of the 
essence of the Transparency Regulation, even when such a requirement would 
consist only of a light informational obligation which does not reveal the identity 
of the applicant, a genuine conflict of fundamental rights would exist. If personal 
data was disclosed regardless of the existence of the legal basis for the secondary 
data processing, it appears that the data subject’s rights would not be safeguarded. 
This characteristic feature of the data protection legislation would be dimmed, and 
the weight would be on the privacy rights.
3.3.3.1.2 Right to receive information related to public decision-making
This section has focused on the right to receive information. Earlier in this thesis, 
it was argued that the right to receive personal data which relates to persons who 
are in a position to influence public decision-making is within the hard core of 
the right of public access. There have been some attempts to express this element 
in the previous case-law, both on the EU level and on the national level.982 To 
draw the previous discussions together, when contextual, moment-to-moment 
interpretation is exercised, the aims and objectives of the Transparency Regulation 
– that is, strengthening the democratic structures of society – must be taken duly 
982 Case C-28/08P, Bavarian Lager, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378; KHO 2014:83.
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into account and the nature of the personal data dictates how its disclosure is to 
be assessed.983 There is no right to anonymous decision-making.
Furthermore, I argue that there is always a legal basis for processing the personal 
data of such persons who are in a position to influence public decision-making. This 
legal basis can be drawn either from Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR which concerns the 
legitimate interest of the controller or Article 6(1)(e) of the GDPR which relates to 
public interest of the controller. Alternatively, the national flexibility provided by 
the GDPR could be exercised to provide a more clearly-framed legal basis for the 
said data processing.
Thus, a presumption of an existing legal basis for data processing should be 
deemed to exist when personal data relates to persons who are in a position to 
influence public decision-making. If the disclosure of the personal data would 
infringe the privacy rights or some other interests of the said data subject, some 
of the exceptions of the Transparency Regulation could then be applied. Thus, the 
information should be withheld if there are any grounds to conclude that some of 
the interests protected by the exceptions laid down in the Transparency Regulation 
would be jeopardized by the disclosure.
3.3.3.2 The essence of the right to protection of personal data
This section will elaborate the elements which can be placed within the hard core 
of the right to the protection of personal data.984 It was earlier established that the 
hard core of a fundamental right does not necessarily constitute only one element, 
but may contain several different elements. In other words, there might be several 
elements in the hard core of a right and, as such, the right could have a rule-like 
effect.985 In order to establish these elements, the circumstances of the case must be 
appropriately assessed when identifying the essence of the right.986 Next, I will argue 
that two elements will form the essence of the right to the protection of personal 
data. The first element is privacy or the right to self-determination. The second 
element is the requirement to have an appropriate legal basis for the processing of 
983 See for example the 1 preamble of the Explanatory Report – CETS 205 – Access to Official Documents, 
which states that transparency of public authorities is a key feature of good governance and an indicator of 
whether or not society is genuinely democratic and pluralist, opposed to all forms of corruption, capable of 
criticizing those who govern it, and open to enlightened participation of citizens in matters of public interest.
984 For example Clifford and Ausloos have also elaborated the question of the hard core of the data protection 
and in particular the role of fairness in this context. See D. Clifford and J.Ausloos, “Data Protection and the 
Role of Fairness” in Yearbook of European Law 37 (2018). 
985 See T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
clarifies the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 
(2016), 321–323.
986 For circumstances of the case, see R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 54, 100–107.
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personal data. Thereafter, an assessment of some other central elements of data 
protection will follow. These elements might be placed close to the inviolable core, 
but not at the centre of the said right.
3.3.3.2.1 Right to privacy and self-determination in contextual interpretation
I argue that the hard core of the right to the protection of personal data must 
be assessed differently when data processing takes place in the public sector and 
when it takes place in the private sector. As Ojanen notes, “the identification of 
the essence is a matter of contextual, moment-to-moment interpretation”.987 In 
Alexy’s terms, the circumstances of the case are the elements for measuring the 
dimensions of principles.988 As earlier argued, when the processing of personal data 
takes place in a commercial environment, such as Facebook or supermarkets’ loyalty 
programmes, the data subjects often voluntarily provide personal information to 
the controller. In such scenarios, the more traditional approach where the weight 
is on the endangerment of the data subject’s privacy in a case of disclosure does 
not seem to provide a sufficient answer as to what falls within the hard core of the 
said right. Instead the weight should be laid on self-determination. When the data 
subject him or herself is the source of the information, the need to protect the right 
to control one’s own personal data seems to gain more importance.
Thus, one should place self-determination at the centre when data is processed 
for private sector purposes. This also reflects the developments deriving from the 
GDPR. As argued earlier, self-determination is gaining increasing importance in 
the new data protection regime. It was also argued earlier that the right to self-
determination does not have a similar effect when the processing of personal data 
takes place in the public sector, because of the different requirements for public 
sector data processing. A particular emphasis was set on the public sector legal 
basis when it comes to data processing. Generally, the legal basis for public sector 
data processing is more precise and derives from the national or Union legislation.
To elaborate this further, when processing takes place in the public sector, the 
data subject is hardly providing the controller with a vast amount of information on 
their own initiative. The data subject is often in a position where they have no control 
over the collection of their personal data. The same applies for the controller. The 
processing of personal data carried out by public authorities is generally based on 
a legal obligation or the public interest. When these legal bases are applied, there is 
987 T. Ojanen, “Making the essence of fundamental rights real: the Court of Justice of the European Union clarifies 
the structure of fundamental rights under the Charter” in European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2016), 
326. See also M. Brkan, “The Unstoppable Expansion of the EU Fundamental Right to Data Protection: Little 
Shop of Horrors?” in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 23 (2016), 827.
988 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 54, 100–107.
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detailed legislation covering the processing of personal data.989 The controller seldom 
has a choice regarding the processing purposes, or the amount of data collected 
etc. When detailed provisions regulate the said processing, there is less room for 
data subject’s self-determination. Thus, there is little space to place the right to 
self-determination within the hard core of the data protection, when processing is 
carried out by the public sector. The public sector should limit its data collection to 
what is necessary in any case, and this premise should be taken duly into account 
in the law drafting process. By contrast, weight should be set on the protection of 
data subjects’ interests in these situations. It follows that public authorities should 
ensure that the privacy of data subjects will not be infringed.
It was earlier established that similar circumstances would lead to similar 
outcomes.990 The context in which the said rights are balanced create different 
circumstances. Identifying these different circumstances enables the formulation 
of precise conditions leading to similar outcomes in similar cases. Thus, even if the 
inviolable essence must be assessed differently on a case-by-case basis, this does 
not lead to arbitrary outcomes.991 When balancing takes place in the social media 
type of environment, the data subject’s right to self-determination forms a part of 
the inviolable core; the data subject has deliberately shared information about him 
or herself on social media. However, when balancing takes place in the context of 
public sector processing, it is the right to privacy which forms a part of the inviolable 
core of the right. This characterization of different circumstances creates a rational 
formulation for the balancing in each case.
Now, even though I separate self-determination from privacy, it ought to be 
noted that self-determination is an underlying value of privacy and as such cannot 
be entirely separated from privacy. Thus, the core of self-determination returns to 
privacy rights.992 It follows that even in the contextual case-to-case analysis where 
the data processing environment sets a different angle for the assessment, the core 
of these rights stems from the same source.993
The right to object also reflects the underlying principle of self-determination. 
The right to object was earlier identified as one of the conflicting rules.994 However, 
989 See for example case C-398/15, Manni, ECLI:EU:C:2017:197, where the CJEU balanced interests related 
to protection of personal data and public access to such data. The CJEU decided the case in favour of 
transparency, setting an onus on the national court to examine whether there might be particular reasons 
to restrict public access to the personal data and give instead more limited access only to such requesters 
who have a specific interest in access.
990 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford, 2010) 54, 100–107.
991 See Chapter I, section 2.2.1.
992 See Chapter IV, section 1.
993 See also H. Nissenbaum, Privacy in context – Technology, Policy, and Integrity of Social Life, (Stanford 
University Press, 2010) 73. Nissenbaum suggest that privacy is control or restricted access to information 
about us.
994 See Chapter VI, section 2.
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as has been underlined previously, this does not yet imply that a conflict of principles 
and fundamental rights exists.
Even if the right to self-determination and privacy can be placed within the hard 
core of the right to the protection of personal data, the rule of the right to object does 
not fall within the hard core of the right to protection of one’s personal data. First, 
this element is not separately mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
unlike, for example, the data subject’s right of access and right to rectification. 
Second, the GDPR provides an explicit possibility for the controller, and also for 
the Union or national legislator, to exempt from the right to object. Third, the right 
to object applies only in such situations where the processing of personal data is 
based on certain legal bases.
Furthermore, the GDPR sets a threshold for applying the right to object. When a 
data subject exercises his or her right to object, the objection must relate to a particular 
situation. The exact content of particular situation has not yet been elaborated in the 
case-law as the GDPR became applicable in May 2018. Furthermore, the controller 
is allowed to continue the processing when it demonstrates compelling legitimate 
grounds for it. These compelling legitimate grounds must also override the interests 
of the data subject. Thus, even if the Union or national legislator has not exercised 
the leeway provided by the GDPR and set an exemption from the right to object, the 
controller can deny the data subject’s right to object if there are legitimate grounds 
for it. Hence, the controller has some margin of appreciation regarding the data 
subject’s right to object. Eventually it will be for the Court to decide whether this 
margin has been appropriately used.
Hence, it is established that the right to object is not within the hard core of 
the right to data protection. The next step is to assess whether the limitations to 
right to object would be suitable to gain the objectives it is aimed at. To conduct a 
proper assessment on this issue, one should first establish the how right to object 
would be limited.
3.3.3.2.2 Legal basis for the processing of personal data
When formulating the hard core of the right to the protection of personal data, 
there is one element that should be placed at the very centre of the hard core of 
data protection regardless of the context in which the processing takes place. This 
is the legal basis for the processing of personal data.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights very clearly stipulates that personal data 
must be processed on the basis of the consent of the data subject or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law. The GDPR sets the legal basis for data processing 
in Article 6. Unlike the purpose limitation principle, the GDPR does not allow 
exemptions from this requirement in national or Union law. Apart from the 
requirement of legal basis, the GDPR allows exemptions from all of the elements 
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stipulated by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. These are the purpose limitation 
principle, the right of access to one’s own personal data and the right to rectify it. 
The restrictions to these rights must be laid down in national or Union law, but the 
requirement to have a legal basis for data processing may not be exempted even 
by national or Union law.995
Furthermore, the weight given to an appropriate legal basis is apparent when 
personal data is collected from publicly available information, as was the case in 
Google v Spain.996 It was clarified in the Google case that even if the data is already 
in the public sphere, that fact itself does not provide sufficient preconditions for 
meeting the data protection requirements, and the secondary data processing must 
also be in line with the data protection legislation. And the first requirement to 
meet the data protection legislation is to have an appropriate legal basis for the 
data processing.
Lastly, the requirement for a legal basis also separates data protection clearly from 
privacy rights. This is noteworthy as it demonstrates data protection’s emergence 
onto the field of fundamental rights as an independent player. Even if the protection 
of personal data is still strongly connected with privacy rights, and the protection 
of one’s privacy together with self-determination forms an essence of the right to 
the protection of personal data, the requirement for a legal basis is the decisive 
feature which separates data protection from its roots.
3.4 OTHER ELEMENTS NEAR THE HARD CORE OF THE RIGHT 
TO DATA PROTECTION
The previous subsection studied the elements constructing the hard core of the right 
to data protection. This subsection will discuss other essential elements of the said 
right. As was argued earlier in this thesis, the elements covered in this section do 
not however fall within the hard core of the said right. First, a concluding glance at 
the purpose limitation principle will be given and this is followed by some remarks 
about special categories of personal data.
Purpose limitation is one of the fundamental principles and corner-stones of the 
European data protection regime. The purpose limitation principle is safeguarded 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and on more practical level it has played 
a significant role, for example, in the Privacy Shield negotiations between the EU 
and the United States. Nevertheless, the purpose limitation principle is not absolute 
in the sense that it wouldn’t allow any restrictions without a collision of principles 
995 The GDPR does provide flexibility regarding the legal basis what it comes to reconciling protection of personal 
data with the freedom of information.
996 Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
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and thereby a collision of rights. Further processing of personal data for scientific 
and statistical purposes, for example, is not to be considered incompatible with the 
initial processing purposes and as such, it is not in contradiction with the purpose 
limitation principle. The GDPR also gives leeway to the Member States to derogate 
from the purpose limitation principle, and the CJEU’s analysis of Safe Harbour 
violating the essence of the right to a private life did not culminate in the breach 
of the purpose limitation principle – instead the core element was too wide and 
general access by public authorities to the content of electronic communication.997
Thus, the purpose limitation principle does not belong within the hard core of 
the right to the protection of personal data even if it must be placed very close to 
the hard core. The purpose limitation principle does not therefore carry a rule-like 
effect as the elements in the hard core of the right do; it is not absolute. It follows 
that the purpose limitation principle can be restricted and when this restriction is 
proportional, in other words realized only to the extent necessary to realize public 
access to documents, it does not lead to a collision between the protection of personal 
data and public access rights.
Another element which must be place close to the hard core of data protection 
is sensitive personal data. It was earlier argued that access to personal data related 
to the public decision-making process falls very close to the hard core of the right 
of access. Sensitive data in turn falls very near the hard core of the right to data 
protection. This illustrates the importance of contextual interpretation and the 
significance of the circumstances of the case. Sensitive personal data has been given 
a special status in European data protection legislation. This issue was discussed 
earlier in this thesis and now it suffices to note that sensitive data must be placed 
close to the hard core, but it does not form the essence of the said right.
4. TENTATIVE INTERPRETATION TOOL RECONCILING 
THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC ACCESS WITH THE 
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA
To draw together the discussions from the previous chapters and sections, an 
interpretation tool together with a tentative drafting proposal will be provided in 
this section. This will reflect the current case-law and newly adopted EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation accordingly. There was an excellent opportunity to 
provide further clarification on the relationship between the examined Regulations 
in the course of the recently concluded reform of the Data Protection Regulation. 
997 Article 23 of the GDPR; Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, paras 90–94.
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This opportunity was not wasted, and the new Regulation clarifies certain elements, 
which have caused tension between the Transparency and the Data Protection 
Regulation.
However, some issues remain unsolved and an interpretation tool providing the 
means to apply both Regulations simultaneously will be elaborated next.
4.1 CURRENT SITUATION
Consent has been one of the main components when it comes to the disclosure of 
personal data from public documents. The data subject’s consent is one legal basis 
for data processing. It is the legal basis which most clearly reflects the right to self-
determination. The Charter of Fundamental Rights does not set a preference on 
consent as a legal basis, but it does distinctly mention it. The Charter states that 
personal data must be processed on the basis of the consent of the person concerned 
or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.
Article 6 of the GDPR sets out five other legal bases for data processing. Similarly, 
the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation sets out alternative legal bases for 
data processing. When an assessment of the data processing takes place in relation 
to public access to documents, there is public sector data processing at hand. This 
means that the data should not be processed based on the controller’s legitimate 
interest; the GDPR excludes this possibility from the public sector. Most public sector 
processing is based on legislation and on the subsections (c) and (e) of Article 6(1) 
of the GDPR. These legal bases relate to legal obligations to which the controller 
is subject and the public interest. It follows that the legal basis for data processing 
should in most cases be drawn from these subsections. However, other legal bases, 
i.e. consent, contract and the vital interest of data subject, are available for public 
sector actors too.998 Even if the public sector is not entirely deprived of the use of 
consent as a legal basis, it should be used sparingly, given the imbalance between 
the controller and processor.999  
Asking for the consent of the data subject for further transmission of their 
personal data in such cases where a third person has filed an application based on 
the Transparency Regulation provides an easy way out – when the data subject does 
indeed consent. However, I see that the central means to disclose and further process 
personal data should not be the data subject’s consent. This sets the balancing of 
998 Similarly EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation Article 5 allows processing of personal data based on 
the said legal basis.
999 See Recital 43 of of the Regulation (EU) No 679/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 
119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88).
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the rights on the data subject. Naturally the data subject assesses the situation 
purely from his or her personal angle. This does not seem to provide a well-adjusted 
approach to disclose personal data. I see that it should be the controller, which in 
these cases is the institution or body, that should conduct the balancing test.
To elaborate further where I am coming from, I see that that the data subject 
should not be put in a position where they can stipulate how another person’s 
fundamental rights are to be fulfilled, or in other words to decide how someone can 
exercise the right of access and receive information from public documents. This 
is in particular the case when the nature of the personal data falls in the hard core 
of the right of access and relates to public decision-making. Furthermore, in such 
cases where the right to object applies to data processing and access is requested 
to information which relates to public decision-making, a particular weight in the 
assessment should be set on the shared objective of good governance, an aim shared 
by both of the examined Regulations. When assessing how to interpret whether 
compelling legitimate grounds exist, a heavy weight should be given to this aim.
Furthermore, one last observation about current practice will be made, namely 
Council practice to disclose erga omnes all documents. It was earlier argued that 
public access to documents does not equal online internet access to documents. 
The potential invasion of privacy is on different level in these two situations. Recent 
judgments by the European Court of Human Rights support this argument. The 
European Court of Human Rights concluded in its Satamedia decision that “the 
fact that the data in question were accessible to the public under the domestic law 
did not necessarily mean that they could be published to an unlimited extent”.1000 
Furthermore, all of the requirements of the data protection legislation must be taken 
duly into account in such situations. Hence, despite of the good aim of enhancing 
transparency, erga omnes disclosure would actually restrict the access to public 
documents which contain personal data. Disclosure of such information should 
be carried out on a case-by-case basis.
4.2 INTERPRETATION TOOL AND DRAFTING PROPOSAL
It was earlier established that personal data may not be further processed for 
purposes which are incompatible with the initial processing purposes. It was also 
established that all processing of personal data must have a legal basis. When 
further processing of personal data is addressed conjointly with the Transparency 
Regulation, it should be assessed in a two-step process. First the applicant would 
provide information about the intended legal basis for the controller. This first phase 
1000 See ECtHR 77 June 2017, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland (ECLI:EC:ECHR:
2017:0627JUD000093113), para 190.
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would be quite informational in its nature. The controller would carry out a prima 
facie type assessment of the legal basis provided by the applicant. This first phase 
would be based on the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation, in particular 
its Recital 28 as read together with the underlying principles of the Transparency 
Regulation. In cases where the applicant is not able to provide the controller with 
information about the intended legal basis, the controller would not disclose the 
said information.
The second phase would fall entirely under the Transparency Regulation. When 
the first phase has been fulfilled, the institution would still need to assess whether 
some of the exceptions laid down in the Transparency Regulation would become 
applicable. While the distinctive feature of the data protection legislation was 
reconciled with the right of access during the first step, the second phase would 
ensure that the privacy of the data subject is protected. Further, the second phase 
would also ensure that the other interests protected by the said exceptions are 
not compromised. When another reason to withhold the information exists, for 
example the protection of international relations, the said exception would apply. 
Thus, the personal data should be disclosed when an appropriate legal basis exists 
unless there are reasons to withhold the information based on the exceptions laid 
down in the Transparency Regulation.
When there is no reason to withhold the personal data based on the exceptions 
provided in the Transparency Regulation, the applicant would receive the personal 
data. As was established earlier, personal data that is in the public sphere must 
also be processed in accordance with the data protection legislation. Thus, the 
applicant should ensure that the requirements set by European data protection 
legislation are met when the data is further processed. It was earlier noted that 
the institution would have a light responsibility to control the further processing 
of personal data in such cases. This duty would have been fulfilled by verifying 
that the applicant has the right to process personal data based on the GDPR or EU 
Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. The actual supervisory duty would remain 
with the competent supervisory authority.
When I was drafting the concluding chapter, negotiations on the EU Institutions’ 
Data Protection Regulation were still ongoing. At that time, I suggested adding a 
new provision in the former Data Protection Regulation in order to clarify that the 
purpose limitation principle does not apply when personal data is requested based 
on the Transparency Regulation. The suggested formulation for the new provision 
would have been: Personal data may be disclosed based on a request filed under 
Regulation 1049/2001 when the applicant informs the controller of the intended 
legal basis [his/her right to process the personal data based on the GDPR]. 




Without prejudice to articles 4, 5 and 10:
1. Personal data shall only be processed for purposes other than those for which 
they have been collected if the change of purpose is expressly permitted by 
the internal rules of the Community institution or body.
2. Personal data collected exclusively for ensuring the security or the control of 
the processing systems or operations shall not be used for any other purpose, 
with the exception of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution 
of serious criminal offences.
3. Personal data may be disclosed based on a request filed under Regulation 
1049/2001 when the applicant informs the controller of the intended legal 
basis of the processing.
However, the new EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation does not contain a 
similar provision on change of purpose as the previous Data Protection Regulation 
had. The initial idea of the drafting proposal was that it contains the two-step process 
for the assessment discussed earlier in this thesis. It was suggested that personal 
data may disclosed based on a request under Regulation 1049/2001, which is 
the Transparency Regulation. This formulation suggests that the Transparency 
Regulation applies to such information. In other words, once the applicant 
has fulfilled the light informational obligation, the exceptions laid down in the 
Transparency Regulation become applicable.
Another solution was adopted in the EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation. 
This was the clarification in Recital 28 on the legitimate grounds for further 
processing. This also clarifies that personal data may be further processed based 
on transparency legislation. Furthermore, Article 9(3) states that Union institutions 
and bodies shall reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the 
right of access to documents in accordance with Union law. This thesis provides a 
suggestion for interpreting the Union legislation and the contradictory requirements 
stemming from the legal framework in order to meet the requirement set by the 
CJEU to fully apply both Regulations, without violating the essence of either of 
the examined rights.
The new EU Institutions’ Data Protection Regulation will incorporate some 
elements elaborated in this research, such as the controller’s responsibility to assess 
whether the personal data should be disclosed or not. It will also clarify that personal 
data may be transferred for the purposes of the institutions’ transparency. These are 
welcome steps forward on this particular issue. However, some work still remains 
to be done. This thesis provides tools for interpreting the new Regulation together 
with the existing case-law, in particular how to assess when the criteria for the 
reasoning of the application have been met.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To draw together the previous sections, the apparent tension between the colliding 
rules of data protection and public access to documents legislation on the surface 
level of law does not reflect a collision of the underlying principles. The principles 
which reflect these rights can be reconciled while maintaining the essence of both 
rights. Thus, there is no genuine conflict of fundamental rights, even if the tension 
between the examined rules is apparent.
When appropriate balance has been sought from the deeper levels of law, the 
hard core of both rights should be maintained. Neither fundamental right should 
be restricted more than is strictly necessary for the realization of the other right. 
The core elements for reconciling public access to documents with the protection 
of personal data are restricting the purpose limitation principle and giving effect 
to the requirement to have an appropriate legal basis for the data processing. To 
balance this with the right of access, the requirement to state reasons must be 
narrowly interpreted. In other words, only a simple notification of the applied legal 
basis suffices to meet the said criteria.
Furthermore, the privacy of the data subjects will be protected by the provisions 
laid down in the Transparency Regulation. Situations where processing takes place 
in the private sector, and where the emphasis should be on self-determination, do 
not fall within the scope of this thesis.
Balancing requires trying the limits of each right – but only to the extent strictly 
necessary to realize the other. Being perfectly aware of the grinding of teeth this 
suggestion will cause among my data protection-loving European colleagues and, 
at the same time, the freezing cold welcome it will receive from my dear Finnish 
colleagues, I dare to say that it provides a balanced solution to reconciling the 
protection of personal data with public access to documents. Four years of GDPR 
negotiations taught me that the best compromise solutions are those with which 
no-one is entirely content. That is when the true balance is found. Limits are heavily 
tested, but no redlines crossed; the essence is preserved.

